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2Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the history of Bahrain in the period 
'1920-45* It is based primarily on archival material in the India Office
Records* The earlier chapters in the thesis deal with the Administration
of Shaikh °Isa bin °Ali Alkhalifah, whose active rule of Bahrain 
encompassed 55 years, from 1869 bo May 1925 when the British Government 
retired him, against his will, in the long-term interests of the ruling 
family of Bahrain and those of the country as a whole* Under his period 
in office, both the ruling family and their tribal associates had acquired 
immense power, privileges and autonomy. After the First World War, the 
serious faults which the Shaikh's administration had manifested over the 
years became a much publicized affair and a source of great embarrassment
c
to the British Government* In Bahrain, the Shaikh's Shi ah Arab 
subjects, who were the victims of discriminatory policies, rebelled in 
February 1922 and brought the country's administration to a halt.
The thesis assesses the role played by the Foreign Office, the
Government of India which maintained direct links with the Shaikh and the
British Political Authorities in the Gulf, before and during the adoption
of a policy of reforms in Bahrain* Also included in the discussion are:
the actual reforms carried out under Shaikh Hamad, the Heir Apparent and
Shaikh Isa's deputy, the struggle conducted by the ruling family and their
ctribal supporters against the reforms, and the support given by the Shi ah 
Arabs to Shaikh Hamad's Administration over their introduction. The 
modernization process during the years 1925-26 was supervized by the 
British Agent in Bahrain and it produced an organized government structure 
formed of specialized, secular departments and offices. This was the 
first time such a modern administration had been created in the Arab 
Sheikhdoms* Other chapters examine the politics of education and 
educational reform, reform of the pearling industry and the causes for the 
decline of the pearl-trade of Bahrain. The advent of oil is also
3studied and the new industry is seen to have saved the country from 
economic disaster in the aftermath of the recession of the early 1930s.
The thesis concludes that the Government of India vacillated over 
the initiation of the reforms in Bahrain and that even when it agreed to 
them it was goaded into action by the Foreign Office whose officials 
acted in response to Tehran's criticisms that the Government of India 
shared responsibility for Shaikh Isa's misrule. The reforms curbed the 
power of the ruling family and at the same time they enhanced British 
Influence over the administration of Bahrain. More penetrating than 
the administrative reforms were the far-reaching socio-economic changes 
induced by the establishment of the oil industry in Bahrain. Greater 
communication and travel became possible after Bahrain's entry into the 
age of oil. Wider co-operation between Sunnis and Shi ahs, such as 
Bahrain witnessed in the second half of the 1930s was due chiefly to the 
subjection of Bahraini schoolboys of both sects to a unified system of 
education and to their sharing of jobs as employees of the Oil Company, 
and also to the increased political awareness of the people and their 
leaders. It should be noted also that the influx of oil revenues gave 
greater wealth to the ruling family and thereby helped to strengthen 
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7Preface
To write about the modern history of Bahrain, while basing one's 
account on official contemporary documents is, for a native researcher, 
a rather sensitive undertaking. The sensitivity lies in the fact that 
both the persons and the events involved are only five or six decades old. 
Once committed to his research there is no choice but to consider all the
many issues as they unfold themselves in the archival material. It is no
exaggeration to say that until some time after the First World War Bahrain 
was still a state which had many Medieval elements and these were 
anachronistic for the needs of the changing world of the 1920s. To
concentrate upon certain aspects in the history of that period while 
omitting others is a task more suited to a journalist than a historical 
researcher. It is only by considering the totality of that history, 
including the sensitive and delicate issues, that a comprehensive account 
can be attempted. It is with this principle in mind that the present 
study has been approached.
My acquaintance with the history and politics of the Near and Middle 
East began during 1979-80, when I was an M.A. student of the Area Studies 
Programme organized by the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies. The series of lectures and 
seminars which I attended then, were extremely helpful and 1 am grateful 
to all the teachers who introduced me to the subject in particular 
Professor M.E. Yapp who has continued to take an interest in my research 
work.
I wish to express here my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. R.M. Burrell 
of the Department of History at the School, who spared no effort in the 
way of improving the quality of this thesis. V/ith careful scrutiny, 
sustained advice and guidance he led me through my work over the years, 
ready always to help. To him I owe a great deal which cannot be recorded 
here .
For the tedious task of typing the thesis, I wish to express my 
appreciation for the help received from Mrs. A. Percy, and from Miss I. 
Miller - a fellow post-graduate in the Department of History - who 
assisted with the final revisions and corrected some of my language errors, 
thereby minimizing the risks to my readers. What remains of those 
errors, is my own responsibility. I am also thankful to the staff of 
the following institutions for their dedicated services:
The India Office Library for allowing me access to all the files 
in their possession, and for permission to use the material for research 
purposes. I am particularly grateful to Mrs. P. Tuson, Archivist - 
Middle East Section, who was helpful to me in many ways, and to the staff 
of the Photocopying Section of the India Office Library for the services 
which they rendered over the years.
The staff of the Public Record Office, the Library of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies and the Senate House Library in the University 
of London were all helpful to me. I wish to thank Miss Barbara Terris 
of the Inter-Library Loan System - S.O.A.S. - who arranged for me to 
consult a number of theses from other universities.
Finally, I should like to extend my sincere thanks to H.E.
Mohammad Mahdi Mohsin A1 Tajir for providing me with a generous grant and 
suitable accommodation while I was a student in London. My special 
thanks also go to his brother Mr. Hadi A1 Tajir who treated me and my 
family with equal care and attention throughout our stay in the United 
Kingdom. To my wife and daughter Israa my earnest thanks for showing 
patience and forbearance in the face of countless pressures.
9Notes on Transliteration and Alternative English Renderings of Arabic 
Forms
Transliteration of Arabic words and the use of diacritical marks are 
kept to a minimum throughout the thesis. However, the system adopted here 
is the one with which Arabists and others concerned with the Middle East 
are familiar, some features of which appear below:
Consonants







Arabic Guttural Sounds: h t kh
*■ i t c
q t gh
Vocalic length is indicated by a dash over a vowel sound as in: 
Manamah capital of Bahrain
i.e. the second -a- is a long vowel 
Many names of persons, places, etc., are written in variant forms by 
different writers, viz.
Isa, Easa for °Isa 
Qazi, Qadhi for Qacli 
Shiah, Shia for Shi ah 
In quotations, the original forms are left unaltered, and the most 
frequently used ones in the correspondence of the period, such as:
Isa and Ibn Saud, have been adopted for use in the present thesis.
Finally, note that Dowasir is the plural of Dosari, a Najdi tribesman
resident in Bahrain. Similarly, Baharnah is the plural form of Bahrani,
 *• " -L LLI • 1 J J «
*« *Q
a native Shi ah Arab. J.G. Lorimer (Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 
cOman and Central Arabia) uses a slightly different spelling: Baharinah
e»
which conforms to the written Arabic form rather than the spoken form 
employed in this study.
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Abbreviations
G. of I. The Government of India
1* . S • G «I« Foreign Secretary - Government of India
P.R. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf
D.P.R. Deputy Political Resident
P.A. Political Agent at Bahrain




S.S.I. Secretary of State for India
U.S.S.I, Under-Secretary of State for India
U.S.S.F.O. Under-Secretary of State - Foreign Office
S.S.C. Secretary of State - Colonial Office
A.P.P.A, Administration Report of the Political Agency
I.O.R. India Office Records





Introduction: Survey of the Thesis and Discussion of Sources
This thesis examines the economic, political and social history of 
Bahrain in the period 1920-45- It is based upon a wide range of 
archival material in the India Office Records, supplemented where 
necessary by documents from the Foreign Office archives- (The precise 
series used and an appraisal of their relevance to this study will be 
provided below*) While some aspects of the history of Bahrain during 
that period have been treated by previous writers (whose contributions 
will be reviev/ed later), no previous work has attempted to provide a 
comprehensive historical study of economics, politics and society.
Earlier studies also appear not to have used the full range of documents 
which are now available and relevant to such research.
The years between the First and Second World Wars are important to 
the history of Bahrain as they represent the transition from 'the 
traditional* to *the modern* age. During these years Bahrain was 
subjected to many fateful and unsettling changes. An old economic 
mainstay - the pearling industry - lost its traditional importance while 
a new industry, one which was to have enormous consequences for the 
country's economy and society - petroleum extraction and refining - began 
its operations. In a separate but not unrelated development a new 
system of education was introduced and here Bahrain was well ahead of 
her Arab neighbours in the Gulf. On the international scene Bahrain 
became of greater strategic importance to its protector - Great Britain - 
as the result of the decline in British influence in Persia following 
the rise to power there of a vigorous new dynasty, and as the protection 
of Imperial air communications and the continued defence of oil supplies 
became matters of great concern- The overall result was, a 
consolidation of British influence in Bahrain.
The opening chapters in the thesis provide an account of Bahrain in
12
c cthe early 1920s when it was ruled by Shaikh Isa bin Ali A1 Khalifah 
who was born in 18^8, and who acceded to the rulership in 1869- His 
three living sons were: Shaikh Hamad, born in 187^* Shaikh Mohammad born
in 1877» and Shaikh Abdullah born in 1880. The A1 Khalifah who follow
_ -1 
the Maliki sect of Islam, had ruled the islands since 1783*
During the 1920s the country was informally divided into areas of
influence each controlled by a leading Shaikh, Moharraq, the second
largest island in the Bahrain archipelago was the Ruler*s place of
residence except during the summer months when he and his followers
moved to the main island* The Ruler*s pov/ers over the country*s
internal affairs were absolute. Apart from the Shara0 Court, Bahrain*s
Administration consisted of a few local Councils such as: Majlis
c *-*>
al- Urf: a Council to inquire into commercial disputes, the Salifat
al-Ghaws: the Court for pearl-diving affairs and the Shaikh*s own
Majlis where he met and conferred with his allies, Chiefs of the tribes
and the leading men of Bahrain, Every town had an Amir appointed by
the Ruler and authorized to carry out certain duties on his behalf.
This official was assisted by a number of Fidawis, i.e. armed retainers
whose repeated excesses earned them the animosity of the people. Until
mid-1923 the Shaikh relied on Customs dues for his income, and to a much
lesser extent on income from his private date-gardens. The pearl trade
and general commerce of Bahrain were largely controlled by merchants
from the Sunni community, among whom were a number of Sunni Persians.
Bahrain's trade with India was managed principally by Indian merchants
and traders many of whom had been established on the islands for many
years. Similarly, the import-export trade with the Persian littoral
Q
was largely carried out by Persians both Sunni and Shi ite.
1 The above dates are obtained from J.G. Laithwaite: Confidential




For centuries, the Shi ah Arabs had been involved in traditional 
trades and crafts such as: date-cultivation, fishing, weaving, sail and
mat-making, boat-building, pottery and some other cottage industries of 
lesser economic significance. Their conditions before 1923 were 
described by the Resident as:
c’’The mass of the people of Bahrain who are ... ... Shi ahs,
were the sufferers and their condition resembled that of 
helots, who could call no lands nor the produce of any lands 
their own.”^
The ethnic and religious composition of the population of Bahrain
is quite complex and the terms used by various authors to describe the
different groups are not always crystal clear. In todayfs usage the
term Bahrainis refers to both Sunni and Shi ah Arabs, but in the period
studied in this thesis it is used almost exclusively for the Baharnah
Arabs. The tribal elements among the Sunni community of Bahrain
invariably refer to themselves in their petitions, as the ‘tribes*.
In this context the word 'tribes* should not be understood to mean
nomads, for by 1920 these people had already been transformed into a
settled population and their life-style was far from being nomadic.
They were now landowners, pearl dealers, merchants and Nakhudas, i.e.
boat-captains. They represented a distinctive class, and comprised
various tribal groups loyal to Shaikh Isa's rule. They shared the
historical tradition of the Al Khalifah., the Rulers, and they were all
Sunni. Throughout this study they are referred to as the 'tribal
element* in preference to the 'tribes* for the reasons stated above
which are supported by the Resident's statement in 1924-:
"As a matter of fact there are no real 'tribes* worthy of the 
name in Bahrain - the Dowasir were the nearest approach to a 
real tribe
1 Colonel F.B. Prideaux, P.R., to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/73, No. 521-S,
6.9.1924.
2 Colonel A.P. Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/73, No. 57-T, 22.5.1924.
1*f
In addition to the tribal element, the Sunni community of Bahrain 
includes a large number of Huwalah Arabs who profess Arab descent but 
whose grand-parents were in fact once resident on the Persian littoral. 
Among their ranks, today, are some influential merchants and a few 
Government officials, some in sensitive posts. In the British documents 
of the period they are referred to as: '’Sunni Persians”, and hence the
rather ambiguous description of them in some recent writings as:
"Sunni Persians of allegedly Arab origin”.
By virtue of the two Treaties signed with the Shaikh in 1880 and 
1892, Britain controlled Bahrain’s foreign relations. Prior to 19“19i 
Britain exerted little influence over the Shaikh's handling of his 
domestic affairs, leaving him in virtual control. In 190^, however, 
the Resident had set a precedent and had interfered when a couple of 
foreigners were mishandled by Fidawis acting on orders from Shaikh Ali 
bin Ahmad, Shaikh Isa's nephew. Again during 1909 and. later the 
Resident stepped in with regard to the question of jurisdiction over 
Hasawis, Qatifis, and Najdis (See Chapter Two). In both cases, the 
issues affected foreigners, not the Shaikh's subjects.
Control of the Agency at Bahrain in the period 191^-1920 was the 
responsibility of Sir P.Z. Cox who was the Political Resident, and who 
after 1920 became Civil Commissioner - Baghdad, until he retired in 1923- 
Throughout the First World War, Cox was heavily involved with the 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and the Residency in Bushire was in 
effect run by a Deputy-Resident from January 1915® At this time,
British Imperial interests in Iraq, and relations with Ibn Saud, which
1 F. Stoakes: Social and Political Change in the Third World: Some
Peculiarities of Oil-Producing Principalities of the Persian Gulf, 
p. 198, in D. Hopwood, edited: The Arabian Peninsula - Society and
Politics (London 1972).
2 For the full text of the above Treaties see C.U. Aitchison: A 
Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads, Relating to India 
and Neighbouring Countries (Delhi, 1933)? Vol. XI, pp. 257ct38.
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were conducted by Cox himself came to exercise some influence over
British policy towards Bahrain. The recommendations of the Masterton*-
1
Smith Committee of 1921 in respect of the Arab littoral of the Gulf
including Bahrain, left questions of policy to the Colonial Office in
consultation with the Foreign Office in London. The Government of
India*s role was to be confined to "administrative and purely local
matters" such as the recruitment and appointment of personnel. In
practice, however, with regard to Bahrain, the Resident continued to
receive his orders from the Government of India, which was allowed
responsibility for political matters concerning the Arab littoral, so
long as that involvement was not likely to generate international
repercussions. The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office stepped in
only in major questions of policy such as that from 1922 onwards with
2
regard to the Persian claim to Bahrain , and the relieving in 1925 of
Shaikh Isa from the obligations of active rulership. In 1935 the
Colonial Office waived responsibility for the affairs of the Gulf which
3were then again taken up by the India Office.
The enforcement of the Bahrain Order-in-Council in 1919 (See 
Chapter Two for definition) enhanced the powers invested in the Political 
Agent and thus created a measure of tension between the Shaikh and the 
Agent. For sometime, the local Administration ceased to function 
adequately and as time went by the Shaikh*s intransigence was reflected 
in his somewhat hostile attitude towards the Agency. Such was the 
seriousness of the situation that in March 1920 Major Dickson would have
1 The Committee was named after its Chairman James Masterton-Smith.
It was set up at the command of the Prime Minister in order to advise 
on the creation of a new department under the Colonial Office to deal 
v/ith mandated and other territories in the Middle East. The 
Committee submitted its report on 31st January, 1921. I.O.R. 
L/P+S/11/193.
2 L. Oliphant to U.S.S.I. I.0*R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. E 2649/16W91, 
18.3.1922.
3 Persian Gulf: Political Control 1930-39. I.O.R. L/P-HS/10/1273.
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preferred a shov; of force:
” ... the occasional presence of a warship in Bahrain harbour 
would do much to keep our prestige alive among a set of people 
who are only too apt to forget that the British Empire exists 
and does take interest in Bahrain affairs. Personally also I 
know my own work will be greatly facilitated if Shaikh Isa were 
to occasionally wake up and see a warship lying out in his 
harbour.11^
The Agency demonstrated greater firmness in dealing with the affairs 
of Bahrain during the tenure of Major C.K. Daly who succeeded Dickson 
in early 1921. Daly took a couple of bold measures which were greatly 
to affect the Administration of Bahrain and eventually to induce a 
change in the Government of India*s attitude towards the Shaikh. 
Nevertheless, his call for reform of the Administration was received by 
that Government with some caution, and it met active opposition on the 
part of the tribal elements in Bahrain who regarded the proposed changes 
as pro-Shi ah and detrimental to their privileged position. It v/as at
2this stage that Ibn Saud seemed likely to be drawn into Bahrain affairs. 
During the first half of 1923$ a series of outrages were committed 
against Persians as a result of which the Foreign Office again intervened 
and in May of that year Shaikh Isa was retired involuntarily. The 
Administration was then reformed under the new regime of Shaikh Hamad 
and during this time the Agent*s authority was much more pronounced and 
v/as exercised more actively. The official commentary bears this out:
1 Major H.R.P. Dickson to D.P.R. I.O.R. 13/2/71, No. 69-C, 13-3.1920.
2 Ibn Saud*s formal relations with Britain were first shaped by the
Treaty of Darin of 1915, which earned him and his successors after 
him, the recognition of the British Government and entitled him to 
British aid. After the conclusion of the Treaty, Ibn Saud 
appointed Abdul Aziz bin Hasan al-Qusaibi as his Agent in Bahrain, 
about whom Daly wrote: ” ... he had the monopoly of the carrying
trade between here (i.e. Bahrain) and c0jair and owns a number of 
boats. The brothers Qusaibi, one of whom lives in Hasa, one here, 
and one in Bombay, have come into prominence only since the subsidy 
has been paid to Bin Saud ... There is little doubt that Khan
Bahadur Abdul Aziz al-Qusaibi aspires to become recognized as Bin
Saud*s Consul here." Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/1/319*
No. 88-C, 23.5.1922.
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" •*• conditions in Bahrain have stabilized themselves under 
the rule of Shaikh Hamad* But the rule has been substantially 
rule by the Political Agent,"
The modernization of the administration in Bahrain in the early 
1920s culminated in changes of a secular nature and in greater British 
involvement in the domestic affairs of the country, developments which 
were viewed by other Shaikhs of the Gulf v/ith considerable apprehension. 
Concerned over these repercussions of the Bahrain reforms, the Govern­
ment of India sought to reassess the British position in Bahrain in 1927, 
and a more cautious approach was then adopted. In his assessment, the 
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India admitted that:
"Our present interference goes doubtless beyond what flows 
inevitably from our Treaties. But no Treaty could adequately 
cover it unless it were a Treaty extinguishing the Shaikh1s 
sovereignty to a degree less than that possessed by an Indian 
Chief
The reforms of the 1920s certainly culminated in greater stability 
and harmony. During the 1930s, however, the country suffered from 
x-ecession and from the effects of the collapse of the pearl-trade.
The advent of oil saved the economy from v/hat otherwise could have been 
complete breakdown. Royalties from oil provided the necessary funds 
for keeping the country going and for expanding public services. V/ith 
the Civil List consuming roughly ^0-50% of the State's Annual Income 
and this includes the Ruler's one-third share from oil royalties, the Ruling 
Family possessed more cash in the oil-era than the merchants of Bahrain, 
some of whom had been ruined by the failure of the pearling industry.
This thesis will argue that the changes v/hich the oil-industry brought 
about were more profound and lasting than those induced by the 
Administrative reforms of the 1920s.
1 Memorandum, B. 396, op. cit.
2 sir D. Bray, F.S.G.I.: Note on Reforms in Bahrain. I.O.R.
15/2/127, no number, 6.11.1927*
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The 1930s also witnessed educational developments, greater 
communication and travel, and the forging of new links with the rest of 
the world after Bahrain had become an oil-exporting country* These 
together with other developments helped create greater political 
awareness among certain limited sections of the population*
The revival of the Persian claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain, in 
the 1920s, was a source of great discomfort for Shaikh Hamad and for 
Britain. Anglo-Persian relations were strained during the time of 
Reza Shah. There was a significant British presence in Southern Persia 
which, after the restoration of the authority of the central Government 
in Tehran, became a target for Persian nationalist sentiment. Between 
1922 and 1928 Britain withdrew from the postal and quarantine services 
and withdrew her few remaining troops from Iranian soil. In January 
1928 Britain and Iran were Involved in negotiations whose object was to 
try and settle all outstanding issues including: the withdrawal of the
“I
naval bases from Henjam and Basidu, and the ownership of Bahrain.
From the start the Persian government rejected a British proposal to 
discuss Bahrain independently of any other issue and in exchange for 
abandoning their claim to Bahrain they asked for territorial 
compensat ion.
In June 1928, the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence met to examine the British position in the Gulf vis-a- 
vis the changed circumstances in Iran. The Committee saw no real harm 
in Persia assuming her proper share of responsibilities in the Gulf 
provided she did not allow some other Power to take the place of Britain.
1 For a brief account of the Persian policy during the time of Reza 
Shah, see R.M. Burrell: Britain, Iran and the Persian Gulf: Some 
Aspects of the Situation in the 1920s and 1930s, p. 18? in 
D. Hopwood, edited: The Arabian Peninsula? op* cit. For the
background' to the British association with Henjam and Basidu, see 
pp. 163-6 9, of the above article.
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None the less, Persian nationalism and Persia*s membership in the League
of Nations were viewed by the Committee as developments which were
disadvantageous to Britain* The Committee's Report of October 1928
considered the upholding of British supremacy in the Gulf as more
crucial, then, to the security of India and to British Imperial interests
than ever before. The Persian oil-fields, Iraq's entry into the age of
oil, and the arrival of air-power, were regarded as equally important
interests. The Committee recommended the retention of sufficient
presence in the area, and the establishment of military and civil air
routes along the shores of the Gulf.
By 1930 the negotiations betvreen Iran and Britain had reached a
deadlock, and a year later a suggestion to declare Bahrain as a
Protectorate was opposed by the Government of India lest it should upset
the status quo in the Gulf. Bahrain's political status had been
officially defined in 1928 as follows:
"The principality is an independent Arab State under the 
protection of His Majesty's Government, but not a British 
Protectorate."^
The air route agreement with Iran was signed in December 1928 and
the service commenced in April 1929 hut the route was transferred to
the Arabian littoral after the expiry of that agreement on 31st May
1932. The negotiations between the two governments which had lasted
from 1928 to 1932 failed to produce a general treaty settlement. In
193^ the British Government purchased adequate land at Bahrain for a
combined naval and air base, and in April 1935 the British navy withdrew
2from both Henjam and Basidu to Jufair in Bahrain.
1 Memorandum, B. 398, op. cit.
2 For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of the Anglo-Persian
relations at this time see: N.F. Kittner: Issues in Anglo-Persian
Diplomatic Relations 1921-33, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 
1980-81, Chapters IV, V.
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The controversy over Bahrain inevitably affected its relations 
with Iran* During the 1920s Tehran repeatedly accused the British 
Authorities in Bahrain of failing to provide adequate protection for the 
Shi ahs there* Throughout the 1930s both Tehran and Bahrain were 
involved in 'tit for tat' measures and counter measures against each 
other's subjects then resident in their respective countries* The 
relations of Persians and Bahrainis, rather than the Anglo-Persian 
controversy itself, are treated briefly in the course of the thesis, 
and a section in Chapter Eight is devoted to those relations as they 
developed in the 1930s and were stabilised after 1937*
In Bahrain the War years 1939-^5 were a period of hardships, of 
food shortages and of rationing, but they also saw the construction and 
expansion of State-financed services. It was during this period that 
the educational apparatus of Bahrain came under direct British super­
vision. Failure to acknowledge British participation in the 
Administration of Bahrain in this period would be an injustice to history 
and to the men who left their mark on it.
While this thesis was planned on chronological lines, it v/as
recognized that some themes were better treated together and to help the 
reader there now follows a review of the contents of the separate 
chapters. Chapters II-IV deal with the crucial issue of the 
Administration of Bahrain, institutional and administrative reforms and 
the Government of India's changing attitude over questions of policy*
More specifically, Chapter Two provides the background to the
Administration in the years 1920-23, it considers the friction between 
the Shaikh and the Agent over the operation of the Bahrain Order-in*= 
Gouncil, Shaikh Abdullah's involvement in political affairs, the creation 
of the Manamah Municipality in mid-1919* and the difficulties which it 
encountered. In addition it considers Shaikh Isa's negative response 
to suggestions for reform, and tribal opposition to the proposed changes*
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It also discusses, Foreign Office intervention in favour of a policy of 
reform, Najdi-Persian disturbances in early 1923 j Shaikh Isa's enforced 
retirement and Ibn Saud's assurances from the Resident confirming the 
British Government's willingness to uphold Sunni control of the 
Administration.
Chapter Three discusses specific improvements carried out under the 
Administration of Shaikh Hamad, viz. the drawing up of the Civil List, 
the reform of the Customs, and the institution of Shaikh Hamad's Court. 
Thereafter, the discussion centres upon the politics of reform and this 
includes the resistance shown by the tribal elements, and the acts of 
violence committed against the Baharnah who supported the introduction 
of the reforms, in addition to Shaikh Isa's memorial to the Government 
of India in which he demanded his restoration to the Rulership. The 
tribal Congress of October 1923, the Dowasir exodus from Bahrain, the 
trial of the Khalids and the creation of the Levies bring this Chapter 
to a close.
The background to the years 192^-29 is set forth in Chapter Four. 
This covers the disbandment of the Levies in 1926, a survey of towns 
and villages, and the creation of new Government Departments such as 
Land Registration and Waqfs. The Government of India's concern over 
the implications of the reforms for other Shaikhs of the Gulf, a re­
examination of the British position in Bahrain, and the achievements of 
the reforms as seen by the Political Authorities in the Gulf, are topics 
treated in some detail. After Daly's departure from Bahrain at the 
end of 1926, Shaikh Hamad's involvement in political affairs increased, 
and this is reflected in his relations with the Resident which culmin­
ated in the return of the Dowasir to Bahrain and in his decision to 
commute the sentences of the political offenders.
In Chapter Five the affairs of the Pearling Industry of Bahrain are 
analysed systematically, pearling reforms and the fortunes of the
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industry are treated in considerable detail# The development of education 
in Bahrain and the political background to that service form the contents 
of Chapter Six; agriculture, oil and Bahrainfs trade and finances are 
treated in Chapter Seven# In the tables provided in this Chapter, the 
order of numbers is given in the system of crores and lakhs e.g. 1,03 ,6 5 0  
not 103,650, i.e. One lakh three thousand and six hundred and fifty rupees. 
The political background to the years 1930-4-5 is investigated in Chapter 
Eight, and this includes the Baharnah grievances of 193^ which centred upon 
inadequacies in the Court system, a lack of schools, and the absence of 
representation on certain Councils. The cool reaction of the Authorities 
to those complaints is also included in the discussion. With the devel­
opment of the oil industry in the 1930s and the expansion in education and 
general communication, greater co-operation between the two religious sects 
of Bahrain gradually came about and this manifested itself in their joint 
demands of 1938. The restrictions on food supplies and the introduction 
of rationing during the Second World War are also treated here. A 
concluding Chapter then endeavours to draw together the main themes of the 
thesis and to offer an overview of the many changes which affected Bahrain 
during the period.
As was noted earlier this thesis relies heavily on archives of the 
India Office Library and Records. These contain, inter alia, the vol­
uminous correspondence exchanged between officials in London, Delhi,
Bushire and Bahrain. More specifically, they include the correspondence 
between the Foreign Secretary - the Government of India, the Resident and 
the Agent in Bahrain. The latter officials represented the British 
Political Authorities in the Gulf. These primary sources cover virtually 
all of the affairs of Bahrain in the period under consideration. The 
series: Political and Secret contains much of the correspondence between
various Authorities, and also includes a large number of useful Memoranda 
011 a variety of topics related to Bahrain. Of direct relevance to this 
study are the files: I.O.R. L/P+S/18, L/P+S/10/1039, 10Vl, 10^2, 10Mf, 10^5-
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Of particular interest are the Annual Administration Reports of the 
Political Agency, Bahrain. These provide a detailed and comprehensive 
summary of the Administration’s activities during a given year, inform™ 
ation on contacts made with Ibn Saud, the Shaikh of Qatar and the Chiefs 
of the Trucial Coast. The Residents correspondence with the British 
Consuls in Shiraz, Bandar Abbas and Lingah occasionally touch on subjects 
of relevance to Bahrain such as: smuggling of provisions from the Arab
to the Persian littoral, press»cuttings from Shirazi papers which discuss 
the affairs of Bahrain, the state of the Baharnah community in Lingah, 
etc. The Legal Records of the Bahrain Agency Courts (R 13/3/-) are 
another source of information but these have less direct bearing on the 
issues discussed in this study. The Agency files contain the Ruler’s 
Correspondence with the Agent, the Adviser’s Annual Reports on the 
Administration, Annual Reports of the Agency, Customs Files plus 
Director of Customs Annual Reports, Budgetary Affairs, and also a host 
of documents which provide information on Influential Individuals, the 
Baharnah of Qatif, extracts from the Arab and Persian Press, Intelligence
Reports and German propaganda pamphlets of the early 1920s published by
2the Kaveh Press, Berlin.
In citations of archival material, the following order has been
followed throughout the thesis:
"Major Daly to Col. F.B. Prideaux. I.O.R. 13/2/127, No. 20-S,
3.8.1925."
This indicates that the communication was between the Political Agent and 
the Resident, and that it is a letter or a memorandum kept in India Office
1 The Agency Reports also contain the following regular headings; Ruler 
of Bahrain and the AlKhalifah Family, Local Affairs, The Bahrain 
Police Force, Artesian Wells, Agriculture, Customs Revenues, 
Municipalities, Public Works, Education, Trade, Post Office, Medical, 
The Bahrain Petroleum Company, and the activities of the American 
Missionaries in Bahrain.
2 P. Tuson’s: The Records of the British Residency and Agencies in the
Persian Gulf (London, 1978) is an invaluable guide to India Office 
Records.
2^ -
File number 15/2/127® 20-S is the original number of the document
cited, followed by the date on which it was written. Telegrams 
exchanged between either of these Authorities and the Government of India 
are cited as telegram* in order to show the urgency of the message.
Note that ’Consul* and 'Baliose* are occasionally employed by the 
local people in petitions, etc., to refer to the Political Agent;
•Consul General* and even Ra’is al-Khalij "Head man of the Gulf", are 
references to His Majesty’s Political Resident in the Gulf.
As regards the Foreign Office material, the series F.O* 371 , 
volumes 89V 7, 18920 together with F.O. letters preserved in the I.O.R. 
L/P+S/10/1039, L/P+S/10/10^1, L/P+S/10/10 -^5, I.O.R. 15/2/150 were 
consulted. Any study which does not diversify its sources of inform­
ation is liable to be judged as one-sided. Fortunately, the Political 
Agency Files furnish us v/ith petitions, letters, memorials, cables, and 
even press cuttings which shed light on the differing views of the Rulers 
and their subjects on a variety of issues. Normally, every document 
which was originally written in Arabic carries an English translation in 
the same file. Such petitions and letters of protest can be found in 
the Agency Files: I.O.R. 15/2/12, 15/2/73, 15/2/88, 15/2/121, and
15/ 1/319.
Also of interest are two personal accounts of Bahrain, one by the
Egyptian gafiz Wahbah: Khamsuna Arnan fi Jazirat al- Arab (Cairo, i960)
"Fifty Years in Arabia", pp. 1^-20. Wahbah was headmaster of al- 
Hi dayah School in Bahrain and a member of the Education Committee in the 
period 1920-21. The other is by Amin Rihani: Muluk al-°Arab (Beirut,
1925), Vol. Tv/o, pp. 179"2if9® Rihani, a well known writer, traveller 
and lecturer, visited the islands during the first half of 1923 and met 
Shaikh Isa in his Majlis in Moharraq. He was shown the Literary Club 
there and v/as greatly impressed by the activities of its members 
especially its President, Shaikh Mohammad bin Abdullah Al Khalifah and
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Abdullah al-Zayed, writer and journalist who in 1939 founded and edited 
"kk® al-Bahrain newspaper. (Some material from the educational column 
of that journal has been used in Chapter Six on Education.) Both 
Rihani and Wahbah provided us with commentaries on the general history of 
Bahrain and especially on Shaikh Isa's differences with the Political 
Agent in the early 1920s. Wahbah*s account, however, shows traces of 
his argument with Major Daly - the current Agent - who believed that the 
articles published by the Egyptian paper Al-Akhbar which were critical of 
him, were the work of Wahbah, and the latter was refused re-entry into 
Bahrain in 1922 when he returned suddenly from Kuwait by sea.
Yusuf al-Falaki*s (Pseudonym): Qadiyat al-Bahrain, "The Case of
Bahrain”, is a clandestine work about Bahrain which was probably published 
in Beirut in the mid-1950s. Pages 11-15 contain some useful background 
information about the rivalries between the leading families of the 
Baharnah Arabs at the time of the Khalifi conquest of Bahrain in 1785 
and the struggle put up by them, an aspect of the history of Bahrain not 
discussed in most other published works.
It should be noted that the actual texts of the letters and 
petitions submitted to the Government of India by Shaikh Isa, the tribal
C 4elements or the Shaikh's Shi ah subjects are preserved in the India Office 
Files, and they provide a much more extensive and reliable source of 
information about Bahrain than do the above accounts.
Charles Belgrave*s: Personal Column, is another book closely
related to the period under study. Its importance lies in the fact that 
Belgrave served as financial Adviser,first to Shaikh Hamad from 1926-^2, 
and continued thereafter in the same capacity to serve his son, Shaikh 
Salman, from 19^2-57* ^he book is an account of his personal 
experience of Bahrain and, therefore, is essential background reading. 
However, Belgrave*s correspondence with the Political Agent, iirhich 
include his regular reports, are far more detailed and are available in
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the India Offiee Files. Some of Belgrave's personal papers were later 
deposited at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of 
Cambridge, but these are not currently available as they are being used 
by a member of the family who is writing a biography of Charles Belgrave.
Also of less direct relevance are the following articles by Belgrave 
published in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, J.R.C.A.S.:
(1) Bahrain, J.R.C.A.S. 1928, pp. 440-45.
(2) Pearl Diving in Bahrain, J.R.C.A.S. 1934, Vol. 21, pp. 450-52.
(3) The Persian Gulf - Past and Present, J.R.C.A.S. 1968, Vol. 55» PP* 
28-34.
Wherea s several previous theses covered a larger period in the modern history 
of Bahrain, the present one limits its scope to 1920-43. This has made 
it possible to attempt a fuller treatment of the main topics in the history 
of the period. Apart from questions of scope and detail, there are 
some other features which set this study apart from others:
(a) Administrative reforms are treated here as a crucial and central 
theme of the 1920s. It is shown that the policy of reform was forced 
upon the Government of India by the Foreign Office whose officials in the 
area sought to improve relations with Tehran in the wake of the Persian 
allegations of ill-treatment of Shi ahs in Bahrain with British connivance. 
Also, reforms meant different things to different communities. To the 
foreign community of Bahrain, especially the Indians engaged in inter­
regional trade, reforms meant the introduction of an organized government, 
better public services, and a more secure base for the islands* 
commercial links with British India. To the Baharnah, reforms meant 
their liberation from tribal overlordship. To the Sunni tribal element 
reforms had to be resisted since their aim was to limit their powers and 
to treat them, for the first time, on a basis of equality with the rest 
of the population. For the ruling family reform meant innovation and 
a reduction in their traditional powers - and this was obviously 
undesirable.
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(b) Previous works give scant account of Shaikh Abdullah’s involvement 
with the Administration, his ambition to succeed his father, and his 
resistance to the new Administration of Shaikh Hamad - this is covered 
in detail in Chapters II and III.
(c) The Saudi influence, as exercised by the Najdi element in Bahrain 
in the early 1920s, was quite significant. The theses of Rumaihi and 
Khuri (see below) fail to mention the correspondence between Ibn Saud and 
Colonel Knox, acting Resident, especially those exchanged after the 
retirement of Shaikh Isa in May 1923* and the assurances conveyed to the 
effect that the British Government intended to bolster the rule of
Al Khalifah and to ensure the continuation of Sunni domination over the 
Administration of Bahrain.
(d) The Government of Indiafs action against Shaikh Isa generated resent­
ment on the part of the Shaikh, hds family and supporters . Their protests 
were voiced in a series of petitions, memorials, and even articles in 
journals in the period 1923"2^. These protests have received little
or no attention from previous writers.
(e) The planning and execution of reforms brought the Agent to the heart 
of the Shaikh’s Administration. Greater British involvement in the 
affairs of the Administration created a new situation and this prompted
a review of the reforms in 1927- The findings and the recommendations 
which resulted have received little attention in previous works and they 
are treated in considerable detail in Chapter Four.
(f) Pearling in this study is examined much more systematically and with 
greater use of statistical data than in previous works.
(g) The discussion of educational affairs is also based, here, on a 
close review of archival material. The emphasis is laid on the 
politics of education rather than the mere survey of facts and figures of 
Primary, Intermediate and Secondary Education. Also dealt with in this 
respect are the sectarian prejudices of the early 1920s, the British 
developmental contribution in the years 1939-^5 » including the important
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role of the British Council,
(h) In addition this thesis surveys the trade and finances of Bahrain 
and includes a review of the total value of the trade of Bahrain - imports 
and exports, Customs revenue derived from all sources, the total value of 
cargo trans-shipped at Bahrain for the mainland, and the annual budget 
estimates.
This introduction will conclude with a brief review and evaluation 
of the theses which have been written on the modern history of Bahrain,
Part Two of F.I, Qubain*s Doctoral Thesis: The Impact of the
Petroleum Industry on Iraq and Bahrain (University of Wisconsin, 1956) 
is concerned entirely with Bahrain. The opening chapters furnish 
general information about the geography, traditional economy, history 
and the population of Bahrain. The rest of the study is devoted to 
Bahrain*s oil industry and its impact upon the people and the country 
particularly after the Second World War. For his data, Qubain relies 
mainly on the official publications of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, 
the Arabian American Oil Company, and on the Annual Reports of the 
Government of Bahrain. The thesis also contains information obtained 
by the writer personally, some of it by direct correspondence with the 
Company officials. The statistical data covers a wide range of topics 
pertaining to the oil industry and to the volume of trade between 
Bahrain, the United Kingdom and the United States, and a table on Cost 
of Living Survey Data for Bahraini Employees, June 1951» etc. However, 
Qubain does not use archival material of the India Office Library and 
therefore does not mention the strike of 1938 by the Bahraini work force 
of the Company and the issues which arose from that event.
R.E. Littlefield*s M.A. Dissertation: Bahrain as a Persian Gulf
State - With Reference to Its Relations with Great Britain and the 
Province of Al-Hasa (The American University of Beirut - A.U.B. - 198^) 
deals with the modern history of Bahrain beginning with post-World War 
One period. It contains an account of the Shaikh*s government, the
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power invested in the British Political Authorities, the abusive 
treatment of the Shi ah Arabs, the Anglo-Iranian controversy over the 
Sovereignty of Bahrain, and the development of the national movement in 
the early 1950s. While it is a sound study like the preceding one it 
makes little or no use of primary archival sources contemporary to the 
period studied,
A.Y. Al-Hamar’s M.A. Dissertation: An Analytical Study of the
System of Education in Bahrain 19^0-65 (A.U.B., 1968), examines the 
development of the Primary, Intermediate and Secondary levels of 
education and this includes their corresponding curricula. Much of the 
information provided is based on official publications, Education reports, 
and the writerfs own questionnaires and statistics, in addition to his 
personal experience in the field, which makes it a useful study.
Together with an earlier account by R.B, Winder: Education in Bahrain:
From the Earliest Times to 195& (Beirut, 1959) 1 which traces the history 
of education there, including the earliest American Missionary Schools, 
these two works represent the first systematic approaches to the subject.
T.T. Farah wrote two studies of Bahrain, one of which is an M.A. 
Dissertation entitled: The Question of the Transfer of the British
Residency (A.U.B., 1970Q from Bushire to Bahrain. After a brief account of 
the history of Bahrain and the British connection with the Gulf, he deals 
with the transfer of the Residency and with the views of the various 
authorities involved in the decision-making process. He attributes both 
the transfer of the Imperial Air Route to the Arab Coast and of the 
Residency to Persian political pressure. However, he erroneously gives 
1951 as the date on which the Route was transferred (Ibid., p. 113), 
though the correct date is, after the expiry of the Air Route Agreement 
with Iran on 31st May 1932. On the other hand, the transfer of the 
naval base from Iran to Bahrain took place in 1935• The decision to 
transfer the Residency was taken in 1936 but was not actually implemented
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until 19^6, largely because of the outbreak of the Second World War, 
Farah*s dissertation draws its material from the documents of both the 
Foreign and India Office archives.
His doctoral thesis: Protection and Politice in Bahrain 1869-19^5
(The University of London, 1979) was not available for consultation 
because of the restriction placed on it by the author. It is, however, 
concerned with an earlier period in the history of Bahrain, which ends 
before the present study begins.
M,G. Pumaihifs: Bahrain; Social and Political Change Since the
First World War (Durham, 1976), examines aspects of the history of Bahrain 
in the post-World War One period up to the early 1970s, Rumaihi*s study 
is, in many respects, sound and detailed and derives its data from the 
archives of the India Office Library, Areas in which the present study 
departs from those treated by Sumaihi have already been mentioned on the 
preceding pages. It remains to be said here that his statement as to the 
lack of information on the origins of the Baharnah (Part I, The People, 
p, 26) ought to be reconsidered since adequate information based on old
'l
Arab sources has come to light in recent years.
1 In his doctoral thesis Qubain states (Part II, page 286, op. cit,):
" ... the Shicis are all Baharnah. There is no agreement as to the 
ethnic origin of these people; however, they now speak Arabic and 
are regarded as Arabs."
According to old Arab sources, the region of al-Bahrain including the 
island of Awal, i.e. Bahrain, was largely peopled by °Abd al-Qais 
tribes, who controlled the entire region in pre- and early Islamic 
times. These sources mention place-names on the islands of Bahrain 
which were then inhabited by cAbd al-Qais and are presently peopled 
by the Baharnah Arabs who descended from cAbd al-Qais. Moreover 
these sources adduce strong evidence as to their Arab origins. On 
the other hand, J.G. Lorimerfs broad statement which dates the 
emergence of Shicism in Bahrain back to the Safavid rule in Persia 
(1501-1732) is misleading (Gazetteer ..., Geographical and Statistical, 
Part IIA, p. 208, op. cit.). Arab sources trace Shi°ism in the region 
to the time of cAli Ibn Abi TSlib, the fourth of the rightly-guided 
Caliphs. They mention cAbd al-Qais among his earlier supporters,
Awal island being their stronghold. They reveal that a large number 
of cAbd al-Qais personalities fought on his side in the battle of 
al-Jamal in 656 A.D., and in the battle of Siffin shortly afterwards. 
In the wake of the tribal conquest of Bahrain in 1783j the Shicah 
Arabs there were persecuted on the pretext of their alleged non­
conformity to Orthodox Islam. See ray: Language and Linguistic
Origins in Bahrain: The Baharnah Dialect of Arabic (19&2 )T London.
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F*I. Khuri's: Tribe and State in Bahrain (The University of
Chicago, 1980) is according to the author an analysis of the trans­
formation of authority from tribal rule to modern government.
According to Khuri both British rule and the oil industry were 
responsible for shaping modern Bahrain. There is much in this study 
which merits attention such as the discussion of religious matters 
hitherto left almost untouched by authors who wrote about Bahrain, 
perhaps owing to the sensitivity of the topic. Nevertheless, this 
study falls short in certain respects: it does not provide adequate
information about the issues related to the reforms carried out in 
Bahrain, via. the role of the Foreign Office or the attitude of the 
Government of India towards the reforms and still less about the period 
of maladministration which endured until May 1923* From the start the 
author divides the population of Bahrain into tribal overlords and 'the 
peasantry', i.e. the Baharnah Arabs. Both Rumaihi and Belgrave state,
c
with justification, that the Sunni tribes deprived the native Shi ah
Arabs of their lands after they had conquered Bahrain in 1783 (See,
Political and Social Change ..., p. 25, op. cit. Also, C. Belgrave,
Personal Column, p. 53)• Khuri tends to play down this matter despite
the abundance of archival material to support the case. As a matter
of fact the 'peasants' were the original landowners whose conversion
into tenant-cultivators came about as a result of deliberate policies
of the Rulers in the period which preceded the reforms of 1923*
While Tribe and State in Bahrain contains much sound information,
it also embodies a number of questionable generalisations. We are told
c(pp. 8-9) that: ”Shi a jurists rose to power not only as legal experts
—  functionaries of tribal government —  but also as political leaders 
challenging the legitimacy of tribal rule". This statement contains an
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element of truth, but it should not mislead us into believing that all
the Baharnah leaders were either Qadis or jurists. It is generally
recognized that Shi ah Qadis play a more active role in the affairs of
their community than do their Sunni counterparts. None the less, a
glance at the names of the Baharnah leaders in the period 1920-45 reveals
that among their ranks were pearl-merchants, leading personalities from
Cthe villages, landowners, founders of Matams (places where the Shi ah 
assemble especially during the months of Moharram and Safar to mourn 
their martyred Imams), all of these people wielded some degree of 
influence among their followers in Manamah or in the villages* This is 
not to play down the high esteem in which Shi°ahs held their Qadis nor 
to minimize the extent of their influence over the community, but it 
should not be assumed that the Qa$is were the only source of leadership 
among the Baharnah.
The statement of Khuri, that Major Dickson (p. 89): !t ... sought
to introduce reforms through the civil courts, municipal organizations, 
schools, and other modernizing institutions'1, requires some modification. 
Dickson had charge of the Agency in Bahrain from 6th November 1919 to 
28th November 1920, i.e. he served as P.A. for just over one year.
Except for the Agency Courts, Dickson did not involve himself with 
judicial reforms at all. The earliest attempt at such reform was made 
by Major Daly in July 1923 when Shaikh Hamad*s Court was instituted and 
modelled after the Joint Court (see Chapter Three). As regards 
"municipal organizations" there were none during Dickson*s time apart 
from the Manamah Municipality which was established in July 1920, five 
months prior to Dickson’s departure from Bahrain and sanctioned by 
Shaikh Isa after sustained opposition. During Dickson’s tenure of the
Agency the Municipality was plagued by mismanagement and he spent much 
of his time trying to remedy its ills. The appointment of Shaikh Hamad 
as President of the Municipal Council in June 1921 marked the real start
33
of the municipal reforms.
As regards "schools11, there was only Al-Hidayah School started in 
the last quarter of 19^9 * and managed by a local committee, headed by 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa A1 IChalifah. The Agent distanced himself from 
the affairs of this school because at this stage it was financed by 
private donations from the Sunni community of Bahrain, Finally, 
concerning "other modernizing institutions" this author knows no other 
such institutions which existed during Dickson's term of office.
On page 92 of Khuri*s book, we are told that the appointment of 
"Mohammad al-Sharif" to the Municipality " marked the mobilization
Q
of the Shi a ,,, against tribal power". There is an element of
exaggeration in this statement, as the Agentfs account of Sharif, and not
al-Sharif, runs contrary to the assumption made by Khuri;
"Muhammad Sharif's detractors say that he encouraged the 
Bahrainis (i.e. the Baharnah) which however is quite untrue.
He is a Sunni and has no sympathy with them. On more than 
one occasion I had to find fault with him for taking a high 
hand and forbidding them to come to the Agency."^
There are other aspects of Khuri's work too which require some degree 
of modification and these will be noted in the course of the relevant 
chapters.
The author of this thesis is aware that it too may well be challenged 
by later research, but it represents an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
picture of Bahrain's history - political, economic and social - during 
those crucial decades when it began, with much difficulty and some 
reluctance, to abandon its medieval appearance and to enter into an era 
of unprecedented change. Modernization came in several forms and as 
a result of a multiplicity of factors, the author hopes the following 
chapters will provide a useful and thorough examination of the many 
processes which were at work.
"1 Daly; Note on Muhammad Sharif. I.O.R. 13/2/102, 12,6,192^.
Mohammad Sharif Awazi became secretary of the Municipality shortly 




Bahrain 1919 ~ June 1923 
Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa A1 Khalifah and the Administration
Until June 1921, Shaikh Abdullah, as the entrusted agent of his
father, had discharged various official duties, and in the process had
gained ample experience in the affairs of the Administration. Besides,
he wielded considerable influence over two of the oldest villages in




Shortly before World War One British warships en route to Mesopotamia
anchored in Bahrain, and Abdullah assisted in arrangements for the landing
2
of the Expeditionary Force. In appreciation of his services and
"possibly with a view to supplant his elder brother Hamad as Heir
3Apparent11, Abdullah was invested with a C.I.E. in 1913*
Shaikh Abdullah was keen on visiting England, and in 1919 be was 
invited there by His Majesty’s Government. Accompanied by his son 
Shaikh Mohammad, his secretary Jasim Mohammad Ghirawi and the then Agent 
Captain N.N.E. Bray, Abdullah proceeded to England on 6th June of that
if
year* The purpose of the visit was to convey to His Majesty the congrat-
5
ulations of Shaikh Isa on the successful outcome of the War. On the 1st 
of August he was granted an audience with His Majesty the King, and a month 
later on 1st September he was interviewed by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant- 
Secretary of State - India Office, at Abdullah’s request.
1 Abdullah’s Wazir in the area was: Abdullah bin Radi, from Jid Hafs
described by the Agent as a man of questionable integrity* See Major 
Daly to Col. Trevor, I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 1-C, 3*1.1922.
2 Report by Major Daly: Bahrain: Shaikh Isa bin Ali - Opposition to
Reform, I.O.R. 15*2.73* April 192^.
3 Col. Trevor to G. of I. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 24-S, 6.1.1922.
k Telegram from Political-Baghdad to Political-Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/2/72,
No. 8307, 31.7.1919.
5 J.G. Laithwaite: Memorandum on Bahrain 1908-1928. I.O.R. L/P+S/10
/10*H, No. B. 396, 8.10.1928.
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Acting on behalf of his father, Shaikh Isa, Abdullah communicated
certain requests to the British Government, without the knowledge of the
accompanying Agent. Hirtzel made a note of them and asked Abdullah to
submit the requests in writing. On September *+th, 1919 Abdullah
embodied them in a Memorandum which he signed: "Abdullah bin Isa - The
2
Successor". The three requests originally recorded by Hirtzel were as
follows:
"(1) The Shaikh of Bahrain wished to be placed on an equality
with other neighbouring Shaikhs. Asked for an example 
of inequality he referred to British jurisdiction over 
Arabs other than subjects of Bahrain, and to occasional 
intervention of the Political Agent to protect even 
Bahrainis.
(2) He wished to be allowed to nominate the Bahraini members 
of the Majlis (i.e. Majlis al->cUrf) without any 
interference on the part of the Political Agent. He 
allowed the foreign members to be nominated by the P.A., 
which was in itself a derogation from his rights, but he 
thought he ought to be left alone in the choice of his 
own subjects.
(3) Bin Saud is going to develop port of Ojair (where he levies 
Customs Duties at 8%), and Shaikh Isa wishes to develop 
the port of Zubarah on the Qatar peninsula, which he claims 
once belonged to Bahrain."^
A fourth request, added to the Memorandum, read:
"(if) My father hopes he may correspond with the Seat of
Government in London, should necessity arise
1 Note by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, I.O.R. 15/1/319, 1.9* 1919.
2 Memorandum from Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa. I.O.R. 15/1/319* ^.9*1919* 
Commenting on Shaikh Abdullah’s above visit to England, the Agent 
wrote: "He failed to deliver to His Majesty a letter from ... Hamad, 
the Heir Apparent, and the latter was not unnaturally chagrined as he 
had been neglected and was not asked to go to England". Daly’s 
Report of April 192*f, op. cit. It is worth noting here that in May 
1925 the British Government invited both Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah to 
visit England where they were accorded an audience by His Majesty, the 
King. A.R.P.A. 1925- I.O.R. 1^/2/296.
3 Note by Hirtzel, op. cit.
k Memorandum from Shaikh Abdullah, op. cit.
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In his communication, Shaikh Abdullah was careful to stress his 
father's desire to be left in full control of the internal affairs of his 
Administration.
On October 27th, 1919 Shaikh Abdullah arrived back in Bahrain via
Egypt, where he had a brief stay, and thereafter engaged himself in plans
for the setting up of a modern school in Muharraq, then the A1 Khalifah's
place of residence. Abdullah's authority now was considerably greater
1
than that of Shaikh Hamad the Heir Apparent.
The Ruler, the Agent, and the Rulings of the Bahrain Order-in-Council
1 Jurisdiction over sub.jects of Arab Rulers
2The Bahrain Order-in-Council was initially introduced in August 1913* 
but owing to the outbreak of World War One, it was suspended until February 
1919 when it was reintroduced, and was subjected thereafter to a number of 
Amendments carried out over the years. The Order was authorised by the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 189G-1913* its purpose was to bestow legal 
powers upon His Majesty's representatives in the Gulf, to enable them to 
exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over British subjects and 
dependents, and over those foreigners who were entitled to British 
jurisdiction, and also over Bahrain subjects in the employ of British 
subjects or foreigners.
Before the issue of the Order, Political Agents in Bahrain exercised 
legal rights over British Indians and foreigners, as indicated by the
1 A.R.P.A. 1919* I.O.R. 15/2/951. A notable arrangement for Abdullah's 
return to Bahrain was the request by Shaikha cAisha - his mother - that 
all houses of Bahrain be decorated with red and green flags for six 
days in his honour. Ibid.
2 To one writer, the Order conferred upon the Resident excessive powers 
normally invested in a Colonial Governor:
" ... Bahrain Order-in-Council, which in effect, defined Bahrain's 
status as that of a British Colony, with the Chief Political Resident 
- Persian Gulf having much the same powers over Bahrain as a Colonial 




’’Successive Political Agents have for ten years past been exercising 
magesterial and judicial functions, which are not authorised by any 
law, and by doing so have established fairly definite customs and 
usages. The Order in Council is intended to put such a usage, 
or rather as much of it as convenient, on a legal basis ... and in 
fact section 82 says that the Political Resident or an officer 
subordinate to him can force 'the observance of any reasonable 
custom existing in Bahrein unless this Order contains some express 
and specific provision incompatible with the observance thereof*.”^
After the introduction of the Order, three main Courts were created
by the Agency in Bahrain: the District Court, the Joint Court, and the
2Sessions Court. Cases of appeal from the Agency Courts were made to
the Chief Court at the Residency in Bushire. Also, the Order recognised 
and defined local institutions such as Majlis al-C\jrf, the Salifah Court, 
and the Shara0 Qadi. The Order entitled the Agent to certain rights 
over the affairs of these institutions, rights which were previously 
exercised by the Ruler, to the exclusion of the Agent. More specifically, 
it empowered the Agent to select half the members of the Majlis al- Urf; 
to accept or reject any of the Shaikh*s nominees; and to sanction the 
appointment of the Shara^ Qadi and the Salifah judge. The new regulations, 
which aimed at ensuring fair play, were nonetheless an encroachment on the 
Shaikh's customary, rights. . They gave rise to serious disagreement 
between the Shaikh and the Agent, in the following areas:
(a) Jurisdiction over dependents of certain local Arab Shaikhs.
(b) Majlis al-^TTrf.
(c) The Salifah Court.
On the following pages we intend to discuss the first two items above, 
leaving the last one to the Chapter on the Diving Industry of Bahrain.
The reduction of the Shaikh's power, as a result of the Order was
1 Major A.P. Trevor to P.A., Bahrain, I.O.R. 15/1/299* 5*5* 1915*
2 Also, see Chapter Three, under: The Administration of Justice.
38
resented by him, his family and his tribal allies. To the British
Political Authorities, the Order provided safeguards against abuse of
authority. However, its enactment in February 1919, coming after
President Wilson*s declarations of 1918, dispelled any local hopes of
independence which those declarations had aroused among the small nations
of the Middle East.
As of July 1909» Shaikh Isa had agreed to concede judicial power over
foreigners in Bahrain to the Agent. To this effect he wrote;
nIt is not hidden from you that I have had considerable trouble in 
many cases (that arose) in my territory in which foreigners were 
involved. For this reason, I wish that I may not be held 
responsible in these cases and I would be grateful to the British 
Government if they remove this trouble and responsibility from me.
I mean that it (the British Government) should pass orders in all 
cases in which the foreigners only are concerned, but not in other 
oases. And in cases that occur between foreigners and my 
subjects, it is necessary that you and I should settle them 
jointly.'*»1
Later on9 Shaikh Isa explained that the above concession was not meant
to include the dependents of local Arab Shaikhs with whom he had reciprocal
2judicial arrangements.
Prior to the occupation of Hasa by Ibn Saud in May 1913, Najdis, 
Hasawis, Qatifis in Bahrain were subject to the Political Agent*s juris­
diction. After May 1913, Ibn Saud regarded them as his subjects and 
delegated authority over them to Shaikh Isa. When the Bahrain Order was
introduced in August 1913, the Agent insisted that these Arabs were Turkish
3
subjects, i.e. foreigners and therefore entitled to British Protection. 
Meantime, Shaikh Isa presented a letter to the Agent in which Ibn Saud had 
authorised the Shaikh to exercise judicial rights over them. The letter 
read;
1 Translation of a letter dated 16th July 1909 from Shaikh Easa bin Ali 
Alkhalifah to Captain C.F. Mackenzie, P.A., Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/2/6, 
File No. A/9, p. 6*f.
2 No. B-^22 of March 1930, pp. 2-3, op. cit.
3 Major Trevor - P.A. to Col. Sir P. Cox - P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/319,
No. 556, 9.9.1913.
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f,I (i.e. Ibn Saud) have informed all my subjects residing in 
Bahrain and merchants of Najd, Hasa and Qatif that in all disputes 
between them they must make reference to your honour; and your 
son (i.e. Ibn Saud) hopes from you that you will keep an eye upon 
them and that their cases be settled at your hands according to 
the Orders of God and His Prophet
At this point, the Resident, who did not anticipate any serious
difficulties, advised the Government to avoid any definite ruling in the 
2matter. As the fate of the above Arabs remained undecided, Shaxkh Isa
on a number of occasions infringed the status quo by exercising judicial
3
authority over them, regardless of the Agent*s objectxons. By the end 
of May 1914 the Resident informed the Shaikh that Hasawis, Qatifis, Najdis 
and Qataris were British Protected persons, subject to the Political Agent*s 
jurisdiction.^
Shortly afterwards, in a letter to the Resident, Shaikh Isa voiced 
his concern over his own position as Independent Chief of Bahrain, adding 
that loss of a deputed right, a reference to Ibn Saud*s authorisation to 
him, was detrimental to his prestige and to the reputation of his 
Government.^
Throughout the War period, by informal arrangement, Shaikh Isa was
6allowed jurisdiction over the above Arabs. From mid-April 1920, the 
situation was clarified, with Ibn Saud agreeing, after consultations with
the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, to submit his subjects to the Political
7
Agent*s jurisdiction. Also, in August of that year, a similar
1 Translation of a letter dated 9th Sha'ban 1331 (14.7*1913) from Shaikh 
Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman Al-Faisal to Shaikh Isa, Ruler of Bahrain.
I.O.R. 15/1/319.
2 Sir P. Cox to Mr. J.B. Wood, Officiating Secretary to the G. of I. in 
the Foreign Department, Simla. I.O.R* 15/1/319, No. 3011, 3.10.1913.
3 Trevor to Shaikh Isa. I.O.R. 15/1/319, No. 525, 11.5.1914. Also, 
translation of a letter from Shaikh Isa to Major Trevor, P.A. I.O.R. 
15/1/319, 19th Jamadi II 1332 05.5.1914).
4 Major S.G. Knox, P.R., to Shaikh Isa. I.O.R. 15/1/319, No. 266, 28.5.1914.
5 Translation of a letter from Shaikh Isa to Major Knox. I.O.R. 15/1/319,
17th Ramadan 1332 (10.8.191*0.
6 Major Dickson to D.P.R. I.O.R. 15/2/12, No. 9-C, 17.1.1920.
7 For Ibn Saud*s authorisation to the Agent see: Telegram from the Civil
Commissioner to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and 
Political Department. I.O.R. 15/2/12, Mo. 4601, 15.4.1920.
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arrangement was made whereby Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim Al-Thani of Qatar
requested the Agent in Bahrain to exercise judicial authority over 
1Qataris. Following these arrangements, Major Dickson issued a Notice
to the public to the effect that:
"In accordance with the Government of India*s letter ... it is 
hereby notified that all foreign subjects, including Persians and 
subjects of Arab Rulers and Chiefs, other than those of Bahrain 
are while residing in Bahrain, entitled to the protection of His 
Britannic Majesty*s Government and their cases and complaints are 
subject to the jurisdiction of His Britannic Majesty*s Political 
Agent as has been the case for many years.
To avoid any ambiguities, Dickson specified the nationals of Arab
Rulers entitled to his jurisdiction. When he sent a copy of the above
Notice to the Amir of Manamah for promulgation to the public, the latter
3
suppressed it on the Shaikh*s instructions.
Q
2 The Disagreement over the Majlis al- Wrf
When the Majlis al-cUrf met on 2nd April 1919* the Agent noticed that
Shaikh Isa had effected changes in respect of the Arab members of the
Majlis without consulting him, as the Order stipulated. Shaikh Isa had
4removed an old member, viz. Haji Ahmad Ali Yateem from the membership of
1 Translation of a letter dated 5th Zi 1-Qacdah 1338 (22.7*1920) from
H.E. Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim Al-Thani, Ruler of Qatar, to Major 
Dickson. I.O.R. 15/2/12, No. 229-C, 7.8.1920.
2 Notice to the Public from Major Dickson, I.O.R. 15/1/319* No. 391*
26.11.1920.
3 Letter from K.S. Siddiq Hasan, Indian Assistant, to the Resident.
I.O.R. 15/1/319, No. 476-C, 6.12.1920.
4 Note that Yateem was a member of the Majlis since Captain Prideaux*s 
time, P.A. Bahrain, Oct. 1904 - May 1909, when the Majlis used to meet 
in the Agency building. In a letter to Capt. Bray, Shaikh Isa 
claimed that Yateem resigned his membership; but when the Agent wrote 
to him enquiring about his absence from the meeting of 2.4.1919,
Yateem did not confirm his resignation but simply noted that he had
not been invited - i.e. by the Shaikh - to the Majlis since its meetings 
were shifted to the Custom House. Vide, translation of a letter from 
Shaikh Isa to Capt. Bray, P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12, 12.6.1919* Also,
see Yateem*s letter to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12, 6.7.1919*
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the Majlis and appointed instead; Haji Abd Ali bin Rajab, v;ithout notify­
ing the Political Agent. The Shaikh*s action was regarded by the Agent
1
as one-sided and therefore in breach of the Rulings of the Order. By
replacing one of his Arab nominees with another, Shaikh Isa was asserting 
his customary rights, without the Political Agent*s intervention. His
other objective was to put the Rulings of the Order, enforced recently in 
February 1919? to test and to sound out the Government of India*s attitude 
thereon.
The established procedure governing the Shaikh's appointment of
members was described by A.P. Trevor, who served as Political Agent Bahrain
from November 1912 to May 191^? as follows;
"It has hitherto always been recognized that the Arab represent­
atives in the Majlis are appointed by the Shaikh, subject to the 
approval of the Political Agent as representative of the Protecting 
Power ...
The Political Agent would never disapprove of any suitable man, and 
the Shaikh has only to refrain from appointing thoroughly 
objectionable persons.
On 5th June 1919 the Agent wrote to the Shaikh disapproving of his
action and stating that
" ... any alteration required should be brought about by agreement 
and in writing ... and that at present this Court cannot carry 
out its duties ... "
Shaikh Isa responded by defending his position, and refused to with­
draw his appointees who, he insisted, should remain the same for a period 
of time. As regards Yateem, he wrote, he had accepted his resignation 
and had, in addition, nominated Abdullah bin Hasan ad-Dosari, Chief of the 
Dowasir, together with another peninsular Arab, Sagur bin Mohammad az-
2f
Zayani, to the membership of the Majlis.
1 See Minutes of the meeting held on 2.^.1919* I.O.R. 15/2/12.
2 A.P. Trevor, D.P.R. to Acting C.C. and Officiating P.R., Baghdad.
I.O.R. 15/V319* No. 2^f6~S, 28.12.1919*
5 Captain Bray to H.E. Shaikh Isa Alkhalifah. I.O.R. 15/2/12, No.
162, 5 .6.1919.
k Shaikh Isa's letter of 12.6.1919? op. cit.
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It was clear that neither side was prepared to shift from the
position it had adopted, and as from early April 19^9* the Majlis ceased 
1
to function.
In November 19^9* Major Dickson succeeded Captain Bray as Political 
Agent Bahrain and in January 1920 he wrote to the Shaikh suggesting the 
restoration of the normal functions of the Majlis, whose continued 
suspension was creating extra work for the Joint Court. He proposed 
1^ -th January as a suitable date for convening the Majlis. To accelerate 
the process, he submitted the names of his five nominees who were to 
represent the foreign community on the new Majlis. He also designated 
the Custom House as a convenient venue for its sittings.
Shaikh Isa replied to Dickson*s letter pointing out that he still 
awaited a Government reply to his requests which his son Abdullah had 
submitted earlier to the British Government on his behalf. He was 
hopeful that the Government would view his requests with favour, and
3
promised to send his son Abdullah to discuss affairs with the Agent.
Thereafter, Shaikh Abdullah met with Dickson and the discussion 
centred upon his father*s requests to the Government. Moreover, both 
sides decided to restore the meetings of the Majlis, which accordingly met 
on the 23rd January 1920 with Shaikh Isa giving his approval to the Agent*s 
appointees. More important, the Shaikh told the Political Agent that 
the resumption of the Majlis was intended for a period of six months only, 
during which time he awaited the receipt of a Government reply to his 
requests.'1'
1 A.R.P.A. 1919* QP*
2 Dickson to Shaikh Isa. I.O.R. 15/2/12, No. 10, 10.1.1920.
3 Translation of a letter from Shaikh Isa to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12, 
21st Rabi II, 1338 (13.1-1920).
b Telegram from Dickson to D.P.R. Bushire. I.O.R. 15/2/21, No. 18-C,
23.1.1920.
^3
It is noteworthy that three of Shaikh Isa*s five nominees were 
peninsular Arabs. They are the first three on the Shaikh*s list as 
follows:
1 Abdullah bin Hasan ad-Dosari
2 Abdur Rahman az-Zayani
3 Abdul Aziz al~Qusaibi 
k Yusuf Fakhroo
5 Haji Abd Ali bin Rajab 
Foreign members of the Majlis elected by the Political Agent were:
1 Mohammad Shareef Awazi
2 Haji Abdul Nabi bin Ahmad Bushehri
3 Mr. Tika Gangaram Tikamdas 
k Seth Budha el-Banyan
5 Hafiz Khanbhai Mohammad Ali Bohra
The Political Climate at the Time of Major Dickson - November 1919- 
November 1920
Shortly after Dickson took over as Political Agent Bahrain he found,
as his predecessor did before him, that there existed a strong current of
anti-English feeling. Earlier, Captain Bray drew the attention of the
Civil Commissioner in Baghdad to what he called:
M ... feeling of hostility to ourselves due to religion, economic 
and war reasons, assisted in a negative way by the Missionaries 
(i.e. American Missionaries of the Reformed Church) ...
Missionaries have ceased to convert, are entertaining largely, 
giving presents, holding Majlis and are friendly to those hostile 
to us.11^
In a letter to the Deputy-Resident, Dickson wrote about *wild
1 Captain Bray to C.C. Baghdad. I.O.R. 15-2.93, 27.5*1919i P* 22.
ZfZj,
political ideas* which Shaikh Abdullah had contracted from abroad, and
the fact that Shaikh Isa missed no opportunity to remind him of his
independenc e, vi z•
’’The recent world talk of the ’rights of small nations* and 
President Wilson’s utterances regarding the policy of self- 
determination etc., would seem to have had its effect on the 
mentality of the ruling house in Bahrain. I have since my 
arrival been frequently reminded by Shaikh Isa that Great 
Britain never interferes in our affairs, such pointed phrases 
as ’Hukumat al-Bahrain* (i.e. Government of Bahrain), ... ,
*Kul Dawlah fi hurraitha* (i.e. every state enjoys freedom), 
etc., have become rather common of late."^
Dickson believed that much of the Agency’s troubles with the Shaikh
and the people was caused by Y.A. Kanoo, the Agency interpreter, who
Trevor described earlier in 1917 as follows:
”(He) ... has risen from being a young man in quite a small way
of business to one of the most respectable and respected
merchants of Bahrain. This is almost entirely due to his
connection with the Agency."cL
Following Bray's advice, Dickson embarked upon the holding of regular
Majlis - Arab style - for the local people, wherein people with grievances
aired them out in the presence of the Agent. Also, he employed an
Iraqi Moslem by the name of Farhan Al-Rahmah as his personal assistant and
go-between in matters concerning the Agency, Shaikh Isa and Ibn Saud,
thereby reducing Kanoo*s connection with the Agency. As a result, the
latter charged Dickson with "lowering the Agency’s prestige" by making
himself accessible to the people. Dickson's assessment of Kanoo
included some interesting remarks:
" ... a past master in intrigue, he is rich, is looked upon by 
common people and wields great power. His policy as he had 
confessed to me on several occasions is 'Divide et Impera' in
1 Dickson to D.P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/319, 176 C/E 3, 6.12.1919*
2 Major Trevor, D.P.R. to Captain P.G. Loch, P.A. Bahrain. I.O.R. 
15/2/2^1, 22.6.1917* Note that in recognition of his services to 
the Agency, Kanoo was first awarded Kaisar-e Hind Medallion in 1911, 
Khan Sahib in 1917, M.B.E. in 1919, and C.I.E. in 192*f. See 
Dickson to D.P.R., I.O.R. 15/2/24-1, No. *f30-C, 15.11.1920.
Also, A.R.PaA. 1924-. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
^5
other words keep the P.A. and the Ruler in a state of enmity 
and manage them."^
The Government Replies to the Shaikh's Four Requests - May 1920
Before the close of 1919» British officials in the area exchanged
views over Shaikh Isa's requests. In December of that year the Deputy-
Resident set forth his reasons why the Shaikh was not eligible to be
treated on an equal footing with other Rulers of the Gulf. Both Shaikh
Isa and his father Shaikh Ali, he wrote, owed their positions to the
British Government, "who was responsible for the good Government of
Bahrain to a greater extent than in the case of other rulers". He went
on to describe the Shaikh's Administration:
" ... his Government is singularly inefficient and weak and is not 
nearly as good as most of the other Shaikhs. It's tendency is
to exploit the Islands and their inhabitants for the benefit of
the Alkhalifah and one or two leading Arab families.
After some initial delay, the Secretary of State for India eventually
communicated to Shaikh Abdullah the offical reply to the four requests
which he had submitted earlier on his father's behalf. The Shaikh's
first request was turned down on the grounds that the Government could not
permit him to exercise jurisdiction over subjects of Arab Chiefs, unless
the Rulers concerned were willing to conclude written agreements with the
3Shaikh conferring upon him judicial control of their subjects.
His second request for himself nominating members of the Majlis al- 
°Urf without the Political Agent's interference was rejected because it 
contradicted the rulings of the Bahrain Order in Council. Shaikh Isa's
1 See Dickson's note on Yusuf Kanoo and his past and present connection 
with local parties, attached to Memorandum No. ^30-C, op. cit., 
hereafter referred to as Dickson's Note.
2 A.P. Trevor, D.P.R. to Acting C.C. Baghdad. I.O.R. 15/1/319*
No. 2^6-S, 28.12.1919.
3 A. Carter, S.S.I., to Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa Alkhalifah. I.O.R. 
15/2/72, No. 11*f5/fc-A., 5.5-1920.
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other request for opening a port at Zubarah was dropped on the basis of
the difficulties surrounding the issue. Earlier Major Dickson expressed
his opposition to this request, basing it on the fact that the Shaikh of
Qatar would certainly resist the development of a new port in Qatar since
it would undermine his trade at Dohah, and so would Ibn Saud who had
c 1recently opened a trade centre at Ojair. Moreover, Dickson wrote:
’’The new move is obviously an attempt to extend his (i.e. Shaikh 
Isa’s) power territorially and financially at the expense of Ibn 
Saud and Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim and will only end in trouble 
... Further, I consider it is the thin end of the wedge to 
Shaikh Isa laying afresh his claim to be ruler of the whole 
peninsula of Qatar, which claim was definitely I gather quashed 
some fifteen years ago.”^
Shaikh Isa’s final request for direct correspondence with the High 
Government was denied on the grounds that the political relations of 
Bahrain with the British Government were always conducted through India, 
and that arrangement, the Shaikh'was told, would have to continue.
The Inauguration of the Municipality - July 1920
After a series of abortive attempts to institute a Municipality for
Manamah, Dickson eventually succeeded in getting Shaikh Isa to agree to
the scheme. On July 1st, 1920 the Municipality was inaugurated with
Shaikh Isa appointing his son Abdullah as its first President. ”At
Shaikh Abdullah’s request” , wrote Dickson, ”1 drew up the Manamah
3
Municipal scheme basing it on that of Basrah”.
Road construction and repairs, hygiene, sinking of artesian wells,
creation of Municipal police, were among the Municipality’s earliest 
4tasks.
1 No. 176C/E3, op. cit.
2 Ibid.
3 Dickson’s Note, para. 17*
4 Trevor to E.B* Howell, Officiating Secretary to G. of I., I.O.R. 
L/P+S/10/1039» No. 626-S, 10.11.1923.
k7
When first established the Municipal Council comprised eight members, 
four Bahrainis appointed by the Shaikh and four foreign subjects nominated 
by the Political Agent* The opening session witnessed demonstrations 
by large crowds who had assembled near the Custom House, the venue for 
the meeting, shouting slogans hostile to the Municipality. According to 
the Agent, the crowds were asked by certain interested persons, who included 
Kanoo, to demonstrate against the Municipal Council which was, they were 
led to believe, an alien body threatening the local institutions.
After a number of sessions, the Council became a powerless body as 
a result of:
"Shaikh Abdulla and the Secretary, scandalously mismanaged the 
Municipality, and the Council so cowed, that its meetings had 
become a farce.'*
To restore credibility to the Council, the Agent introduced a set of
bye-laws which made its decisions subject to majority vote. He also
decided to attend the Council*s meetings, ex officio., thus providing further
safeguard against foul play. Increased involvement in the affairs of
the country gave rise to greater resentment by the Rulers and especially
by Shaikh Abdullah and his supporters. A campaign against the Agent*s
intrusions in the Shaikh*s Administration began and a petition was
3organized against him by Shaikh Abdullah*s supporters. The campaign
coincided with Dickson’s end of service in Bahrain. Before leaving
Bahrain in November 1920, his final remarks about the political scene
there were as follows:
" ... that the political atmosphere in Bahrain is *bad* in these 
days ... and among Arabs (it may be put down) to the increased 
hostility displayed by Shaikh Isa and family towards this Agency.
1 Dickson’s Note, para* 19*
2 Report by Major Daly: Note on the Political Situation in Bahrain, 




The hostility ... may in the first instance be put down to 
President Wilson's 'Right of Small Nations* policy, and to the 
present State of Affairs in India and Egypt. The idea is 
abroad here, ... , that you have only to make yourself
unpleasant enough, and agitate enough and you will be given 
complete independence."^
Shaikh Hamad*s Elevation to the Administration - June 1921
After Dickson's departure from Bahrain, Khan Sahib Saiyed Siddiq
Hasan - the Indian Assistant - officiated for the Political Agent. The
Agency*s influence over the Administration of Bahrain had been on the
decrease. In January 1921, Major Daly took up office as Political Agent
Bahrain and one of his immediate priorities was to restore the Agency*s
prestige. When he first met Shaikh Isa, Daly reported how the Shaikh
cautioned him on the consequences of interfering in his domestic affairs.
Also, the Shaikh told him that his predecessor's transfer from Bahrain
was due to his efforts with the British Government. Describing
conditions in Bahrain early in 192% he stated:
"Bahrain is in a constant state of unrest owing to the political 
intrigues of a small party under the leadership of Shaikh Abdulla, 
the youngest son of the Ruler, and as the result of years of 
oppression by the ruling family. Instances of this oppression 
are far too numerous to quote, but details are on record of a 
large number of cases of recent date, which include illegal 
seizure of property, wrongful imprisonment with cruelty, and 
political murders, for which no one has been brought to trial, 
and no effort made to enforce justice.
Oppression In the past two years has amounted to terrorism, which 
appears to have been deliberate policy of Shaikh Abdulla for 
retaining complete domination over his father's subjects. To 
this end, it is essential that the Agency should have little 
influence. The constant changes of Political Agents and 
periods during which a subordinate held charge, admirably suited 
his purpose.
Shaikh Isa was now in his dotage, his decisions were influenced by
3his powerful wife, Shaikh Abdullah's mother. Shaikh Abdullah
1 Dickson to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/2A-1, 26.11.1920.
2 Daly's Report of 1921, op. cit.
3 Daly described her as follows: " ... a masterful person, and has the 
greatest influence on Shaikh Easa. This lady holds a regular court, 
and imprisons and punishes at will, with total disregard for the most 
elementary laws of even Arab justice." Ibid.
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represented his father on the Administration of Bahrain, held the office
of President of the Municipal Council and the Education Committee. Apart
from the tribal elements, his supporters included; Jasim Mohammad
al-Chirawi , his Secretary and member of the Education Committee, and also
Hafiz Wahbah - the Egyptian Headmaster of al-Hidayah School- On the
other hand, Shaikh Hamad had no control whatsoever over the affairs of the
Administration despite the fact that the majority of the Shaikh*s subjects
desired to see him replace Abdullah on the Administration- Several
attempts by intermediaries, acting on advice from the Agent, to persuade
Shaikh Isa to relieve Abdullah from office and to appoint Hamad in his
place produced no results with the Shaikh. Fear of Abdullah supplanting
Hamad in the question of succession to Shaikh Isa, finally forced Daly to
2write to the Shaikh urging him toelevate Hamad to the Administration.
On the 18th of June, 1921 Shaikh Isa agreed to the Agent*s suggestion
and in confirmation of the same wrote:
"I have appointed my ... son Shaikh Hamad as my assistant in the 
management of the affairs of my administration under my guidance, 
and I have freed (i.e. relieved) my son Abdullah from the ...
Administration.*’-
3
Thereafter, Shaikh Hamad replaced Shaikh Abdullah as the President
of the Municipal Council. A Sunni Persian merchant by the name of
Mohammad Sharif Awazi, upon whom the title of Khan Sahib was conferred in
June 1919, was appointed Secretary to the Municipality, by the Agent.
Awazi replaced Mohammad Akhtar, an Indian Moslem, dismissed earlier on
h
account of ’tactless behaviour and dishonest methods*.
1 Note that Chirawi’s uncle Ali bin Abdullah was Shaikh Isa’s Financial 
Secretary and Confidant. See Dickson’s Note, op. cit.
2 Daly’s Report of 1921.
3 Translation of a letter from Shaikh Isa bin Ali Alkhalifah to His 
Majesty’s P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/73, 18.6.1921.
k A.R.P.A. 1921. I.O.R. 15/2/296. Note that A. Rihani in Around
the Coasts of Arabia, p. 303, mistakenly regarded Mohammad Sharif as 
a Shicah.
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These measures were lauded by the notables of Bahrain, Sunnis as well
as Shiahs, who now sent letters of thanks to the Agent. To con-
solidate Hamad’s image as the successor in the public eye, arrangements
were made for a public meeting in which a number of speakers were supposed
to deliver talks and poems, expressing their joy over the occasion.
This projected meeting failed to materialize owing to the reasons adduced
by the Agent below:
"Abdulla backed by his evil Adviser Jasim Ch&rawi has intimidated 
people ... and has ... succeeded in discouraging the movement 
which would have consolidated Hamad’s position and restored lost 
Agency influence. Hamad is greatly perturbed and has asked me 
for definite assurances of our support against Abdulla.'^
In July 1921, Major Daly asked Chirawi to give a written commitment
to the effect that he would cease from "creating ill-feeling between the
3Representative of His Majesty’s and the Government of Bahrain". In 
November of the same year he was tried by the Political Agent’s Court 
allegedly for breaching his earlier commitment, and was sentenced to two 
years banishment from Bahrain. His guilt was thus described by the 
Court:
" ... has acted in a manner dangerous to peace and order, and has 
endeavoured to excite enmity between the people of Bahrain and
His Majesty and has, ........  , intrigued against His Majesty's
authority ...
Hafiz Wahbah, who witnessed the events of 1920-21, left.us some 
critical remarks about the Agent's actions. He blamed Daly for
1 These letters and their translations are preserved in I.O.R. 15/2/121.
2 Telegram from Daly to the P.R. I.O.R. 15/2/73* No. 56-C, no date.
3 See translation of a document given by Jasim bin Mohammad al-Chirawi
and filed in the Political Agency, Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/2/10^,
17-7.1921.
k For the Court's Order, see I.O.R. 15/2/10^. It is worth noting that
in May 1923* the Bombay Barrister questioned the legality of the
sentence passed by the Agent's Court on the grounds that Chirawi was 
a Bahrain subject not liable to deportation under the Bahrain Order- 
in-Council. To this Daly replied: "Chirawi, as the name implies,
is a Persian of Persian parents and was not born in Bahrain. It was 
only because he was not a Bahrain subject that he himself admitted 
that he was liable to deportation under the Order in Gouncil and the 
Shaikh confirmed and witnessed the document he gave ..." Daly to 
the P.R. I.O.R. 15/2/10^, No. 59-C, 8 .5 .1923.
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driving a wedge between Shaikh Isa’s two sons, and for unlawfully 
deporting Chirawi after holding him responsible for fomenting trouble 
between the Agency and the Ruler.
Daly’s task of improving the Administration of Bahrain was hemmed 
in by grave difficulties, but he was determined to carry it out despite 
all the odds. In a letter to the Resident, he spoke of the time lag 
between the Rulers and their subjects. He also spoke against Government 
policy which then advocated the use of 'indirect and pacific means' with 
the Shaikh, and added:
"It is evident from the files in this Agency, that no improvement
as regards the internal administration of Bahrain has been
effected, and several Political Agents have left on record notes 
concerning the unsatisfactory state of affairs. There is 
evidence on all sides that oppression has much increased of quite 
recent years, whereas the population is more enlightened and less 
inclined to submit to such treatment.
At this juncture the Baharnah representatives saw the Agent and told 
him of Britain's dual responsibility towards the Ruler and his subjects. 
They argued that since Britain was committed to the protection of the 
Shaikh's Government against all sorts of threats, it was incumbent upon 
her, as Protecting Power, to remove the yoke of oppression from the people.
They wanted Britain to check misrule in Bahrain or else they threatened
to seek the protection of another Arab Ruler whose identity they did not 
reveal. These views seem to have reasoned well with the Agent who 
commented:
"I respectfully submit that these representations made on most 
adequate grounds, as we have ample proof, are worthy of 
consideration.*'
On December 21st, 1921 the Resident arrived in Bahrain. Prior to 
his arrival Shaikh Isa had attempted to obtain a testimonial letter from 
the leading Baharnah vouching for their community's satisfaction with the
1 Khamsuna °Aman fi Jazlrat al-CArab - Fifty years in Arabia (Egypt 
1960), p. 15.




Shaikh’s Administration, but he did not succeed- On the first day of
his visit, the Resident was met by a large deputation of Baharnah at the
Agency Court Room, where he was handed a petition which, inter alia, read:
" the Shiah Community is in a state of great humiliation and 
subject to public massacre- They have no refuge, the evidence 
of none of them is accepted, their property are subject to plunder 
and themselves liable to mal-treatment every moment.
The deputation put to the Resident their community's specific
grievances including the case of a man who lost his father and was himself
threatened. The Resident granted him Agency protection and commenting
upon the matter he wrote to the Government:
"It is obviously not desirable to make the Agency into a Court 
of Appeal against the decisions of the Shaikh, but on the other 
hand, as the deputation pointed out, Bahrain subjects are afraid 
to take the law into their own hands as the Shaikh is under our 
protection, and they urge with some reason that we ought to take 
steps to prevent the Shaikh from abusing his authority.",.
Acting on a request from the Resident, the Agent despatched a
detailed report about specific cases of maltreatment which the deputation
had raised. The report constituted the Resident's evidence to the
5
Government on what he termed: 'Bahrain Misrule'* More importantly,
the Resident announced the futility of the offical policy which required 
the use of 'persuasion' with the Shaikh:
1 Col. A.P. Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. ^5-S, 13-1-1922.
2 Translation of a Petition presented to the Resident on 21*12.1921.
Appended to the Resident's letter to the Government. I.O.R. 15/2/83, 
No. ^95-S, 30.12.1921. Note that the Agent did not reveal the names 
of the petitioners for the following reason: "As I deemed it better
that it (i.e. the petition) should not be translated in my office for 
fear of possible persecution of the signatories, should their names
be disclosed, I have made a translation which I attach." Daly to the 
Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/83, 23-1-1922.
3 No. ^95-S, op. cit.
Report from the P.A. to the P.R.: 'Some Examples of Oppression of
Bahrain Subjects by the Ruling Family in Bahrain*. I.O.R. 15/1/327,
No. 1-*C, 3-1-1922. The report contained actual cases of arbitrary 
taxation, extortion of money, expropriation of land, forced labour, 
compulsory collection of fish and fowl, and acts of political violence.
5 The Resident's letters to the Government bore the title: 'Tyranny
of the Shaikh of Bahrain and his Family over Bahrain Subjects*. See
I.O.R. 15/2/83, No. ^95-S, op. cit., I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 23-S, 
6.1.1922; I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 24-S, 6.1.1922; I.O.R. 15/1/327,
No. ^5-S, op. cit. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 76-3, 19-1-1922.
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,f ... that the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government after the 
events of 19C&-5 that 'the amelioration of the internal Government 
should be brought by indirect and pacific means through the 
increase of influence with the Shaikh by gaining his confidence 
and trust' has not proved a success."^
The Resident attributed the problems facing Shaikh Hamad's 
Administration to the resistanceputupty his younger brother, and towards 
solving them he suggested:
a) That Shaikh Abdullah should be asked to leave Bahrain to the 
mainland for a period of time. That his return to Bahrain 
should be made conditional upon guarantees by the Ruler that 
his son would cease meddling in local affairs.
b) That the Government should tell the Shaikh that mis-treatment
of his Shiah subjects was laying her open to accusations of 
collusion with the Shaikh in Bahrain misrule. ^
A few articles critical of the Agent's interference in the
Administration of Bahrain appeared in the Egyptian paper Al-Akhbar during
3January 1922. The Agent blamed them on H. Wahbah whom he described as 
"notoriously anti-British" , and accused him of being "Abdullah's right-
5
hand man in diffusing propaganda".
In their opposition to Shaikh Hamad's Administration the disaffected 
elements resorted to acts of violence and on 12th January 1922 they fired
on Manamah Police posts with the object of terrifying the Police.^ As
a result, the Agent drew the Shaikh's attention to the dangers facing the 
country, and asked him to take necessary measures aiming to contain the 
explosive situation before it deteriorated further and dragged various 
factions into acts of violence. Realising the seriousness of the
1 No. 23-S, op. cit.
2 No. 2^-S, op. cit.
3 Telegram from the P.A. to the P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/327* No. 10-C, 12.1. 
1922. ■
k Maj. Daly to P.A. Kuwait. I.O.R. 15/1/327* no number, 22.1.1922.
5 No. ^5-S, op. cit.
6 Telegram No. 10-C, op. cit.
3b
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situation, Shaikh Xsa resorted to the Agent for advice.
At this point in time, Hafiz Wahbah arrived from Kuwait. Earlier
he had been blamed for "creating dissension between the Agency and the
2
Government of Bahrain". His presence in Bahrain now was not desirable
and Shaikh Isa, acting on advice from the Agent, denied him entry into 
the country.
On the 31st of January 1922, the Government of India sent a cable to
the Resident which read:
"Government of India are not prepared to consider drastic action 
regarding Bahrain misrule until they are satisfied that all local 
resources of bringing pressure to bear are exhausted and that 
such intervention is imperative to secure protection of 
foreigners and our own position in Bahrain."^
It was clear that as long as the foreigners and the British position
in Bahrain remained unharmed by *Bahrain misrule *, the Government was not
prepared to consider anything other than moral pressure with the Shaikh.
In other words, the Government was still committed to its earlier policy
which had so far failed to convince Shaikh Isa to reform his
Administration. The Government believed that Abdullah*s presence in
Bahrain boded less risk* than if he had been on the mainland where he could
have rallied greater tribal support and hence posed a bigger threat.
They urged the Resident to proceed to Bahrain in order to:
" ... impress your personal influence on Shaikh and his family 
and restore prestige of Agency. You should warn Shaikh of 
the danger he runs from his own subjects and make it clear if 
misrule leads to uprising Government will find it difficult to 
render him any support whatsoever."^
Thereafter Shaikh Abdullah was confronted with the evidence against 
him. He admitted to his role in the disturbances and pledged to rectify
1 Telegram from the Resident to the F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/1/327, no number,
15.1.1922.
2 Daly to the Resident. I.O.R35/1/327, number not legible, 22.1.1922.
3 Telegram from Foreign, Delhi, to Political, Bushire. I.O.R. 15/1/ 
327, No. 119-S, 31.1.1922.
Ibid.
55
his own position and to support Shaikh Hamad’s Administration* Despite
1
uncertainty expressed by Hamad over his brother’s latest pledge ,
2nevertheless Abdullah was allowed a fresh start.
The Baharnah Uprising of February 1922
On February 6th, 1922, while a Fidawi was escorting a Baharnah
villager who was under arrest in Manamah, several Baharnah accosted the
Fidawi, overpowered him and released their kinsman. According to the
Agent, the villager was wrongfully incriminated, unlawfully arrested and
beaten up. In Manamah, the Baharnah closed their shops in protest,
bringing business in the bazaar to a standstill. They were determined
to press their case with Shaikh Isa who, according to the Agent, was
3
"oblivious to the fact that he was sitting on a volcano". This
communal action by the Baharnah posed a serious challenge to the authority
of the Shaikh who sought advice from the Agent. The latter, not
desiring to get involved directly between the Euler and his subjects,
if
urged Shaikh Hamad to find ways of appeasing the Baharnah. It was
decided that a deputation of leading Baharnah, accompanied by a number of
. . 5Sunni personalities, should seek an audience with the Ruler. During
the meeting, the Baharnah submitted the following demands to Shaikh Isa:
1 Translation of a private letter from Shaikh Hamad to the Political
Agent. I.O.R. 15/1/52?, attached to Daly’s Memorandum to the 
Resident. I.O.R. 15/1/527, No. 50-0, 7.2.1922.
2 Ibid.
3 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 29-C, 7*2.1922.
k Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 3^-0, 13*2.1922.
5 The leading Sunnis who accompanied the deputation to the Shaikh were:
Abdul Aziz al-Qusaibi, Yusuf Kanoo, and Mohammad Sharif Awazi.
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"(I) No one except the Ruler and Shaikh Hamad, to decide (Court) 
cases or to have the right to punish in any way*
(2) Gases which Shaikh Hamad cannot decide to the satisfaction 
of both parties to be referred by him to the Sharac ,
Majlis al-cHrfi or Salifah as the case may be*
(3) No one to be dragged off to the Ruler*s Court without 
notice, but to be served with a summons signed by Shaikh 
Hamad.
(*f) Documents concerning gardens leased to subjects by the
Ruling family to be in duplicate, a copy in possession of 
each party, and to be witnessed by independent witnesses.
No conditions other than written in the document to be 
enforced.
(5) Steps to be taken to stop the Shaikh's camels being allowed 
to enter and graze in private gardens.
(6) 'Sukhrah' (i.e. forced labour; also commandeering of 
donkeys) to cease.
(7) The practice of placing calves belonging to the ruling 
family with Bahraini bakers to fatten free of charge, 
to cease.
(8) The prison to be put in proper order and a reasonable house 
provided for the same.n^
After consulting with the chief members of his family, Shaikh Isa
agreed to concede the above demands except the one for the abolition of
what the Agent referred to as a religious tax. Whether Shaikh Isa
intended to keep his word remained a matter open to different 
2interpret at ions.
On March 7th, 1922 the Resident visited Bahrain and while there 
communicated Government instructions to Shaikh Isa to the effect that 
"if misrule leads to uprising, Government will find it most difficult to
3
render him any support whatsoever”• The Resident also cautioned
Shaikh Abdullah not to oppose Shaikh Hamad's Administration and urged
Zf
Hamad to show firmness in dealing with "oppression".
1 No. 3^-G, op. cit. See also A.R.P.A. 1922. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
2 Ibid.
3 No. 119-S, op. cit.
Col. Trevor to D. Bray, F.S.G.I* I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 209-S,
11.3.1922.
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After the visit both Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah frequently sought
the Agent*s advice, and admitted to him that the difficulties facing them
were caused by fpast misrule*. Commenting upon this change of
attitude, the Agent noted:
"They have been compelled by recent events to realize that such 
tyrannical rule as they have exercised in the past is, with the 
spread of democratic ideas, bound to come to an end."^
Since February 1922 the Baharnah had refused to pay discriminatory
taxes, with Shaikh Hamad pursuing a conciliatory attitude towards them.
His efforts, however, were thwarted by Shaikh Khalid and his sons whose
attempts at collecting taxes continued, giving rise to protests by the
Baharnah. As a result, some fifteen hundred persons or more, all of
them Shiahs, gathered at the Agency during April of that year protesting
at Shaikh Khalid*s actions. As they refused to leave, the Agent asked
Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah to talk to their representatives. Thereafter
the crowds dispersed after they had obtained assurances from the Shaikhs
"to instruct Shaikh Khalid to cease interference with liberty of persons
and to postpone collection of taxes ..." Besides, they were given an
undertaking to the effect that the Rulers would consider their complaints
regarding taxation and the administration of justice. Subsequent to
the above incident, Shaikh Hamad and Shaikh Abdullah informed the Agent
of their desire to introduce reforms with a view to eradicating the
2
"obnoxious taxes" in preference to "reasonable and just taxation". In 
addition to revenue from the Customs, the Shaikhs collected the following 
taxes:
"1 Date-garden tax. Collected quite arbitrarily ... from Shiahs 
only.
2 *Raqabieh*, literally *neck~tax* or *poll-tax* levied on males 
at varying rates in different localities. It has been 
collected from Shiahs only and is particularly obnoxious to them.




3 Fish-tax. Levied from Shiahs only at varying rates.
k A special tax on Shiahs during Muharram.
5 A variety of taxes collected in kind from Shiahs only.
6 A pearling tax. This was originally collected from all 
pearling boats, v/hich are mainly owned by Sunnis. Of late 
years a large number of the boat-owners have ceased paying.",-.
On being asked to advise on reasonable future taxation, the Agent 
after sounding local opinion, submitted the following scheme to the 
Shaikhs:
"1 Date tax of 1-1Gth on gardens watered by flow, and 1-20th on
those watered by lift, to be collected uniformly. This tax 
is admissible under SharaQ law.
2 Fish tax of 1-1Oth on fish caught in the local fish traps, 
and 1-20th on fish caught otherwise.
3 Abolition of •Raqabieh' and all other taxes on Shiahs, and 
substitute therefor a very light ground tax for all houses, 
other than those in the towns of Manamah and Muharraq, which 
pay municipal taxes. To be collected without religious 
distinction.
k The impartial collection of the existing pearling tax."-^
As the Sunnis were virtually immune from taxation, it was anticipated 
that they would oppose the introduction of the above scheme. In the 
event of such opposition the Shaikhs wanted to know if the Government of 
India was prepared to back the scheme regardless of Sunni opposition.
The Agent was in no position to speak for the Government, but he informed 
the Resident that if the Sunnis refused to pay taxes, the Shiahs would 
follow suit, in which case the Shaikh*s income would be drastically cut. 
Already, he added, the Shaikhs were in debt as a result of the Baharnah 
refusal to pay revenue. One way of making the scheme acceptable to both 
sections of the population was for the Government to give it its approval. 
At this juncture the Shaikhs were at a loss as to how to collect revenue 
from the Shiahs without provoking further protests. They resorted to
1 Khurifs statement in Tribe and State in Bahrain, p. 53* that " ... 
fish traps (weirs) were left free of Alkhalifah control", runs counter 
to item 3 above, which confirms the collection of fish tax, hence 




the Agent who advised them to open a Government Office to be run by two 
clerks. This office was destined to become the precursor of a central 
bureaucracy.
Early in May 1922, the Government of India cabled the Resident:
"It is the ardent desire of the Government of India that they 
should not be drawn into interference between the Ruler of 
Bahrain and his subjects. But as the proposed reforms are 
mainly due to their warning against oppression, etc., and appear 
sound in themselves, you are authorised to inform the Shaikh that 
Government welcome his scheme and will lend their moral support 
to an honest attempt to put it into force impartially.
This authority is given on the understanding that you felt that 
more than moral support is unlikely to be required.
Although the Government promised moral backing for the reforms, it
was nevertheless keen to avoid any accusation that their introduction was
imposed upon the Shaikh by them.
In June 1922 a reconciliation, apparently on firmer grounds than
before, was effected between Shaikh Abdullah and the Administration of
Shaikh Hamad. By virtue of the same, Shaikh Abdullah was promised
"an attractive allowance from the revenues of the Islands" in return for
3
assisting Shaikh Hamad in the conduct of affairs. Commenting upon the
same, the Resident noted:
"If an arrangement between Shaikh Hamad and Shaikh Abdullah can 
be arrived at on a pecuniary basis, so much the better; such an 
arrangement is more likely to be lasting than any other.
The above reconciliation was described by the Agent as a serious blow
to the disaffected tribal elements, since it separated Abdullah from the
5tribal camp which opposed Shaikh Hamad’s Administration.
1 Ibid. Also see Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/151, No. 304-S, 
1071922.
2 Telegram from Foreign, Simla, to the Resident, Bushire. I.O.R. 
15/2/129, No. 5^9-S, 2.5.1922.
5 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/1/527, No. 105-C, 27.6.1922.
4- Trevor to Daly. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 506-S, 6.7.1922.
3 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 111-C, 13-7.1922.
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The Dowasir Tribesmen Seek Support from the Mainland
During July of the same year, Abdullah ad-Dosari, chief of the
Najdi Dowasir, and Ahmad ben Lahe j, head of a smaller group of Najdis,
visited Ibn Saud, hoping to enlist his support in their stand against
Shaikh Ramad*s plan for tax-reforms: a plan which was envisaged to place
both Shiahs and Sunnis on an equal footing* Subsequent to this visit
'I
it was reported in Bahrain that Ibn Saud had pledged them support.
It is important to know that the Dowasir had settled in Bahrain, in
p
Budayya and Zallaq, in I8A5 . They had acknowledged Shaikh Isa*s
Chiefship only in name and were opposed to recognising Shaikh Hamad as 
his successor. Lorimer provides this account of their earlier dealings 
with Shaikh Isa:
” ... their relations with the Shaikh of Bahrain are distant though 
not unfriendly. They insist on being dealt with through their 
own chiefs, and they have given the Shaikh of Bahrain clearly to 
understand that, if he should take any action affecting them of which 
they disapprove, they will quit Bahrain in a body.”^
After the Baharnah uprising of February 1922, they approached Shaikh
Hamad offering him support against the former, but he very wisely turned
them down. He was careful not to get involved in their designs,
which conflicted with official advice, not to mention the fact that he
could have alienated Baharnah support at a time when he could not afford
to lose it. Their threat to abandon the islands in a mass was taken
seriously by Shaikh Hamad who maintained good relations with Ibn Saud and
intended to keep them so. In the past such threats worked to the




2 Lorimer: Gazetteer.... Historical Part I-B, p. 883, op. cit.
3 Ibid., Geographical and Statistical, Vol. II, p. 2^9* 
if No. 111-C, op. cit.
5 Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 529-S, 16.7.1922.
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The movement for reform in Bahrain was a source of concern to Ibn Saud 
who feared lest it should spread among his own Shiah subjects in Hasa and 
Qatif* many of whom came from Bahrain and had relatives there. According 
to an offical report, Ibn Saud taxed them heavily during 1922 as a result 
of which they approached the Agent in Bahrain desiring to settle there.
The Agent refused to consider the matter for fear of providing an excuse 
for Ibn Saud to interfere openly in the affairs of Bahrain.
The Foreign Office Intervenes
During the first half of 1922 Persian newspapers put out articles on 
Bahrain alleging that the British Authorities there condoned the mis­
treatment of Shiahs. These allegations were heeded by the Foreign
2Office which on two occasions, March and May 1922, communicated with the
India Office drawing its attention to the "highly unsatisfactory state of
affairs in Bahrain" and to the damage it was causing to the interests of
the British Government. During July of that year the Resident
summarized the Foreign Office views to the Agent, as follows:
"The Foreign Office points out that the gross injustice involved 
by the Sunni immunity from taxation and victimisation of Shiahs 
with British connivance affords opportunity for anti-British 
agitations in Persia and elsewhere."^
In Bahrain Shaikh Isa remained adamant to suggestions of reform and
the Resident believed that nothing short of a rebellion by the Baharnah
k
could force him to introduce improvements to his Administration.
Moreover, Shaikh Isa would not allow Shaikh Hamad to take any decision 
affecting the Administration without his prior consent. With the
1 No. 111-C, op. cit. Also, A.R.P.A. 192?. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
2 F.O. Letter No. E 26^9/16Vf/91> op* cit.; L. Oliphant to S.S.I.O.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 5373/1^7917™29-5- 1922.
3 Telegram from the Resident to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/127* no. 1217*
II.7.1922.
k Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 5^2-S, 22.7.1922.
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Government of India committed only to moral support of Shaikh Hamad's
plan for tax-reforms, and with Ibn Saud pledging to assist the Dowasir in
their effort to resist the implementation of that plan, the Agent
preferred to bide for time and to watch the developments, especially in
view of Ibn Saud's renewed interest in Bahrain affairs.
In Persia the press campaign against the British position in Bahrain
continued unabated. During September 1922, the British Consul in Shiraz
sent translations of extracts from Shirazi papers to the British Minister
in Tehran, drawing his attention to an appeal in one of them for the
appointment of deputies in the Majlis to represent Persian interests in 
1
Bahrain. One article demanded, inter alia, the appointment of a
2
'Karguzar* - Persian Governor - in Bahrain , and one accused Major Daly of
3
mistreating the Persians. Another alleged that five hundred Najdis
were allowed a Consul in Bahrain, whereas 30,000 Persians were under the
4
control of a foreign official, a reference to the Political Agent Bahrain.
In a letter to the Government, the Resident described these allegations
as "wild and baseless" and blamed them on "anti-British agitators". The
aim of the campaign, he wrote, was to enlist the sympathy of the Persian
5
Government and to revive the Persian claim to Bahrain. On the other
hand, the Foreign Office was gravely concerned over the negative effects 
of the campaign on British interests in Persia, and in early December 1922 
it intervened with the India Office urging the introduction of reforms on 
the following lines:
1 H.G. Chick, His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz,to Sir P. Loraine. I.O.R. 
15/1/319, No. 71, 30.9.1922.
2 Istakhr, No. 24, 17.9*1922. I.O.R. 15/1/319-
3 CAsr-i Azadi, No. 116, 21.9-1922. I.O.R. 15/1/319- 
^ cAsr-i Azadi, No. 120, 17.10.1922. I.O.R. 15/1/319.
5 Trevor to D. Bray, F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/1/319, No. 772-S, 17-10.1922.
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"that steps may be taken forthwith for the introduction at Bahrain 
of reforms tending to ensure the equitable treatment of Shiahs.
Such action would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be 
likely to diminish in future the agitations as reported by the 
British Resident and Consul General at Bushire."^
The Situation in the First Half of 1923
The faltering of the reforms represented a serious blow to the
Baharnah hopes for achieving parity with the Sunni Arabs. Haji Ahmad bin
Ali Khamis, one of their leaders, told the Agent that it was incumbent upon
the Government of India to ensure a fair and just Administration in
Bahrain; that on his accession to the Rulership of Bahrain, Shaikh Isa
had committed himself to such an undertaking and therefore he ought to
honour it; that the Baharnah would seek redress to their grievances and
that in India they had friends who were prepared to expose their complaints
2
to public scrutiny through the Indian press.
The increased political awareness of the Baharnah was induced, 
according to the Agent, by a number of factors, internal and external, viz. 
The Rulers* enhanced wealth and power, the pursuit of harsh policies 
against the Shiahs, the spread of newspapers which covered the events of 
Iraq, India and Egypt, travel and interaction with foreigners especially
3
during the pearling season.
During January 1923 a number of leading persons made a final attempt 
with Shaikh Isa to try to get him to agree to the Manamah Municipality's 
scheme for Water and Electricity Supply, but the Shaikh remained as 
unyielding as ever. Towards the end of January, the Resident informed 
the Government that so far persuasion had failed to produce results with
1 L. Oliphant, F.O., to S.S.I.O. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. E 13^76/ 
l6¥f/9% 7-12.1922.




the Shaikh. He also admitted that as reforms were pro-Shiah they were
bound to create strong reaction with Ibn Saud. He summed up the
position as follows:
” ... it is not necessary to consider for the purpose of practical 
politics, more than the minimum necessary for the removal of the 
most flagrant abuses ...
The decision as to which course should be adopted must be governed 
by question of imperial policy ... ... Forcible intervention is
bound to attract hostile criticism, but so too is inaction; and 
at any rate the former has the merit of achieving some good, while 
the latter may be merely to put off the evil day.n^
Early in March of the same year, the Foreign Office again communicated
with the India Office urging them to adopt a policy of reforms in Bahrain
2
on the lines indicated in their earlier letter of December 1922. Despite
the mounting pressure, the Government of India preferred to see the Shaikh
taking the initiative for reforms rather than appearing as their mere
recipient. For the first time the Government contemplated the use of
drastic action against the Shaikh as a final resort:
,f ... it is our protection alone which has hitherto prevented his 
subjects from rising against him, and that if he now introduces 
reform we shall back him up in carrying them out, but that if he 
does not we are determined to do so ourselves even if this means 
his enforced retirement and the deportation, if necessary, of 
Abdulla to India.1'
3
During April 1923, Colonel Trevor left on recess and Colonel S.G. Knox 
officiated for him as Resident. On April 20th a fight broke out between 
a Najdi and a Persian over a watch in the main market place in Manamah.
Soon the quarrel widened and engulfed members of both communities. In the 
clashes which followed several Najchs and Persians were wounded. In his 
report about the incident, the Agent mentioned that the casualties would 
have been higher if it had not been for the efforts of the small Police Force
1 The Resident to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. kZ-S, 27.1.1923.
2 L. Oliphant to S.S-.I.O. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. E 2313/67/91,
8.3.1923.
3 Telegram from the Viceroy, Foreign and Political Dept., to S.S.I.O.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, 17.^.1923.
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which was able to contain the violence. In fact, the Force was formed
chiefly of Persians and was controlled by Mohammad Sharif Awazi, Secretary
to the Municipality, himself a Sunni Persian. On May 10th fresh
disturbances erupted beti^een the two sides of the conflict leaving eight
1
persons dead and many more wounded. Hostilities continued throughout
the following day and a force of Najdis, firing rifles, attempted a
2
landing near the Agency but were deterred by the armed guards* The
Persians of Bahrain reported the matter to the authorities in Tehran.^
On 12th May, third day of the clashes, the Dowasir attacked the Baharnah 
c*>*village of Ali, wounding several persons and setting a number of houses
A
ablaze.
In a subsequent letter to the Resident, Ibn Saud claimed that the 
attacks against his subjects were instigated by the Persians, and blamed 
Mohammad Sharif, for the severity of the Police action against the Najdis. 
Furthermore, he accused the Agent of failure to stop the troubles at an
earlier stage and suggested the conduct of an enquiry into the affair in
5order to determine the cause of the trouble.
In his reply to Ibn Saud, Colonel Knox described the dispute as:
"of the most trifling character, the repair of a watch of Rs. 5 value and
the root trouble was religious fanaticism at the trying period of the 
6Ramazan fast". He spoke of evidence pointing to the role of Abdullah
al-Qusaibi, brother of Abdul Aziz al-Qusaibi, Ibn Saud's Agent in Bahrain,
1 Telegram from Col. S.G. Knox to S.S.C.O. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1059 j P- 2^ -8,
11.5.1925.
2 Telegram from Daly to Col. Knox. I.O.R. 15/2/15% No. A-51, 11.5.1925.
5 Telegram from the Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, to S.S.I.O.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1059» p. 257, 11.5.1925.
4 Telegram from Daly to Knox. I.O.R. 15/1/5^% No. 62-C, 12.5.1925.
Also telegram from Knox to His Majesty's Minister in Tehran. I.O.R. 
15/1/5^% No. 105/^0, 15.5.1925.
5 Letter from Abdul Aziz ben Abdur Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa'ud to Col.
S.G. Knox. F.O. 571: 89V7, 5th Shawwal 15^1 (22.5.1925).
6 Col. Knox to H.H. Imam Sir Abdul Aziz ben Abdur Rahman al-Faisal al-
Sa'ud. F.O. 571: 89^7 , No. 172, 1^-20th June, 1925.
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in rousing the Najdis against the Persians and ruled out a purely Anglo-
Saudi enquiry on the grounds that it could invite Persian interference not
1only m  Bahrain but also m  al-Hasa.
During the first half of May 1923 Colonel Knox attempted to assess
the situation in Bahrain with regard to the introduction of reforms there.
On the ninth of May he sent a telegram to the Colonial Office arguing for
the maintenance of the status quo in Bahrain which if altered by action
against the Shaikh would antagonize other Sunni Shaikhs in the area as
well as Ibn Saud, he wrote."Misrule", he added, was no worse than the state
of affairs twenty years ago and that raising the issue now would expose
the weaker aspects of the British case before international opinion.
He concluded his views as follows:
’’You will not carry responsible Sunni opposition with you 0 * * 
unless you allow for the privileged position of Sunnis.
In a subsequent letter to the Government of India Knox stated that
the anti-British agitations in Tehran were not a genuine effort for the
"removal of the inequities under which Shiahs are supposed to suffer in
Bahrain". He believed the agitations aimed at reviving the Persian
claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrain and that they would not subside by
enforcement of pro-Shiah reforms in Bahrain. Knox reiterated his earlier
view for the preservation of Sunni supremacy:
"But if the intention is to tax Sunnis and Shiahs equally, I very 
much doubt whether the influential opinion of the island will 
support such a proposal* Unless the well understood privileges 
of the Sunnis on the Sunni side of the Gulf are to be preserved to 
a material extent, the position of the Sunni ruler will be 
weakened.’’
3
In a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, the Viceroy 
disagreed with some of Knox’s above views, and described his letter as 
"hastily drafted". He disputed Knox’s statement that reforms were chiefly
1 Ibid.
2 Telegram from Col. Knox to S.S.C.O. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, P- 253, 
9.5*1923.
3 Col. Knox to Government of India. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 222-S, 11.5* 
1923.
67
desired by the foreign community in Bahrain, adding that they represented
a long-standing local demand. Contrary to Knox's view, the Viceroy
supported the raising of the issue with Tehran:
,fThus he overlooks the fact that the Foreign Office consider that 
the time has come to face the direct issue with Persia; that 
should Persia be so ill-advised as to appeal to the League of 
Nations over Bahrain, our acquiescence in the misrule would 
perhaps be the really serious flaw in our case; that even if the 
misrule is no worse than twenty years ago (which, judged by the 
official reports, we doubt) publicity is a new factor that can’t 
be ignored ...TT^
He agreed with Knox's view that after the departure of Sir Percy Cox
and the termination of Ibn Baud's subsidy, the latter was "particularly
difficult to handle". He summed up Government attitude as follows:
"We have never contemplated the introduction of all desirable 
reforms at one swoop. All we want is to put ourselves right 
with the world and the Bahrainis by the introduction of some 
measure of justice and equitable taxation.
Shaikh Isa's Involuntary Retirement
Following the disturbances of May 10-12th 1923 the Resident proceeded 
to Bahrain, arriving there on the lAth. On the 18th of May, he effected 
Abdullah al-Qusaibi's departure from Bahrain by asking him to deliver a 
letter from him to Ibn Saud. He then warned the Dowasir Chiefs either 
to cease hostilities or else face a ban on their pearling fleet. His 
next step, the raison d'etre of his visit, was to bring about Shaikh Isa's 
'voluntary abdication* by asking him to step down in favour of Shaikh Hamad. 
The Resident's attempts failed to convince the Shaikh who was reported to 
have said:
"You can kill me or turn me out, but while I am alive, I will not 
retire."
He was also reported to have said:




” ... his private opinion was that Shaikhdom of Bahrain was to 
himself not worth a cigarette.”^
At the request of the Resident, Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah made
further attempts with their father who refused to give in to their demand
and asked them ” ... to consult the tribes and send him a letter announcing
his deposition”• To this the Resident answered:
”1 see no necessity for consulting the' tribes when Government 
consistent with public weal, have decided that Shaikh Isa is too 
old to take active part in the administration of public affairs, 
which have been entrusted to Shaikh Hamad as his father’s agent
On 26th May, Knox held a Majlis for the representatives of the people
in which Shaikh Isa’s forced retirement was announced. A speech was read
by Shaikh Mohammad on behalf of Shaikh Hamad promising to carry on ”his
3
father’s policy of working for the good of the people ...” There
followed another speech by the Resident who praised Shaikh Isa’s 55 years
of rule, and attributed his retirement to his unwillingness to carry out
reforms ”which had been found necessary to introduce to bring Bahrain up to
the level of modern civilisation”. He also gave assurances of British
support for Shaikh Hamad:
” ... that the reforms would lead to ultimate benefit of Sunni 
community ... and that Shaikh Hamad’s rule, assisted by his 
brother Abdullah, and supported by His Majesty’s Government against 
external aggression and internal sedition, would lead Sunnis to 
their right place.
Knox wound up his speech by warning the Shara Qadis of the 
consequences of allowing leading persons to interfere with the admini­
stration of justice; the Ruling family not to rely heavily on the country’s 
revenues; and the Baharnah not to expect Immediate equality of treatment
5
with Sunnis nor to anticipate a swift abolition of the latter*s privileges.
1 Telegram from the Resident to the S.S.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039? 
p. 233, 20.5.1923.
2 Ibid.





On June 15th Knox communicated with Ibn Saud over the action taken by
the British Government in Bahrain. He attributed Shaikh Isa's removal
from active rulership to his old age resulting in his loss of control of
the Administration and to the emergence of a number of irresponsible
persons who maltreated the Baharnah. He assured Ibn Saud of the British
Government *s intention to back the rule of A1 Khalifah over Bahrain:
"We firmly believe that the steps that the British Government has 
been reluctantly forced to take will eventually conduce to the 
stability of the rule of the A1 Khalifah family, will prevent 
foreign interference and preserve the essentially Sunni influence 
in the administration of the islands and the progress of all Sunni 
elements of the population."^
1 S.G. Knox, P.R., to H.H. Shaikh Sir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman 
al-Faisal al-Sa'ud. F.O. 571: 89^7, no. 17^, 15.6.1923.
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Chapter Three
The Enactment of Reforms Under the New Regime of Shaikh Hamad
The introduction of administrative and institutional reforms in 
June 1923 was a novelty for Bahrain. It was bound to engender oppos­
ition among the tribes and influential groups who were the sole bene­
ficiaries of the status quo which had existed until May of that year. 
Reforms meant the introduction of administrative changes, leading, in the 
end, to the erosion of the absolute powers of the ruling class. The 
plan for levying equal taxes, such as land-revenue, from all the 
inhabitants without distinction, though egalitarian in spirit, would, in 
effect, have amounted to imposing taxation for the first time upon the 
dominant groups. The bulk of the productive land was in the possession 
of the Rulers who were immune from any form of taxation. The idea of 
taxation by the State, no matter what form it took, would have engendered 
resentment among the powerful classes. Hereafter we intend to discuss 
the reforms which the new Administration of Shaikh Hamad sought to 
implement, the resistance shown by the tribal class to their enactment, 
leaving out reform of the pearling industry to the appropriate section.
The Institution of a Civil List - June 1923
The Civil List was the earliest reform executed by Shaikh Hamad's 
Administration. By determining the salaries and allowances of the 
Ruling Family, it was possible to control expenditure, to halt waste of 
public revenue, and to allocate some of it for the first time for public 
services, an important objective of the reforms. The total allocations 
on the Civil List, drawn up in June of that year, amounted to Rs. 30,000 
monthly. Out of which Rs. 4,000/- was Shaikh Isa’s monthly salary, 
plus an extra Rs. 2,000/- to cover up the cost of the Shaikh's Summer move
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from Moharraq to Manamah. This was believed to be sufficient, for the 
Shaikh had a private income of Rs. 2,500/- monthly from his date-gardens 
which he was allowed to retain. These allocations were deposited in the 
Eastern Bank Limited, chosen by the Administration in June of the same year 
to function partly as the State Bank.
The Customs: Reorganisation under a British Director
The Customs represented the chief source of revenue for the Government,
income from which, it was envisaged, would finance the projected reforms.
During June 1923* the Administration applied to the Government of India
for a British Customs Director. Earlier, it had been farmed by a Hindu
2firm whose Director, for his own reasons, kept the accounts in Sindhi.
Such was the state of disorganisation in the Customs that the Resident
3described it as "the Augean Stables".
In August 1923, Mr. G.N. Bower, Assistant Collector in the Imperial 
Customs, Calcutta, v/as despatched by the Government of India to organise 
the Customs in Bahrain. He discovered instances of "huge embezzlement" 
by the previous Director and of special arrangements with well-known
4
merchants allowing them to pay their Custom dues on an annual basis.
These practices ceased to exist under Bower, and receipts for one Hijri
month, corresponding to 4th October - 3rd November 1923, exceeded
Rs. 100,000. The daily income amounted to Rs. 1,000 for the first time.
1 Daly to Col. Knox, I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 77-0, p. 183, 10.6.1923-
2 Captain Prior, P.A., to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. C-84, 
29.6.1929.
3 Col. S.G. Knox, P.R., to the Government of India. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/ 
1039, No. 330-S, 1.7.1923.
4 Daly to Knox. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 131-C, 4.10.1923. Note that 
the Hindu Firm lost its contract just before Bower v/as appointed in 
August 1923, and not in 1924 as Khuri stated in Tribe and State in 
Bahrain, p. 52.
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Increased receipts from the Customs made it possible for the Administration
to improve the existing facilities and to introduce new ones such as the
construction of a light railway and the addition of bigger and proper
warehouses. Under the Hindu Director, the Shaikh was allowed to draw
drafts on the Customs. After its reorganisation, such practices were
disallowed and the revenue increased to such an extent that Bahrain’s
2
finances were described by the end of 1923 as "pleasingly solvent".
Both the introduction of the Civil List and the Organisation of the 
Customs enabled the Administration to draft the first monthly budget. Now 
that income outstripped expenditure, a feeling of security and stability 
spread through the country* Trade and cultivation flourished and many 
Baharnah who had formerly desisted from investing their money, now availed 




By 1923» the various taxes imposed upon the Baharnah under the old 
regime had ceased to exist as a result of the uprising of February 1922. 
Instead the new regime considered the introduction of land revenue, which 
in turn necessitated land surveys and the registration of property.
Earlier plans, devised by the Agent, envisaged a system similar to the 
Tapu System of Iraq. The problem facing the new Administration was that 
the bulk of the cultivable land was in the possession of the Eulers "who
1 A.P. Trevor to G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No . 622-S, 10.11.1923.
2 Trevor to G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 716-S, 22.12.1923.
3 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 208/C/9/2, 17-12.1923.
k Vide the next chapter.
3 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 13/2/12?, No. 28-C, 11.2.1923.
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have never paid revenue". After the enactment of the reforms in June 
1923 the price of land rose, increasing the temptation to lay claim to 
other people's lands. To guarantee security of persons and property the 
new Administration drew up plans for a land survey. Lack of local expertise 
led to its postponement until early 1926 when a team of Indian Surveyors, 
engaged by the State, began work in Bahrain.
The Administration of Justice
In July 1923» the Agent described the absence of proper native courts
2as "the root grievance of Bahrainis". The local judicial system, then
Q
in operation, consisted of a Sunni Shara Court and a Sunni Qadi, Shaikh
Qasim al-Mehzac„ Two Shicah Qadis, Shaikh Khalaf al-CAsfour and Shaikh
Salman bin Ahmad al-Hirz of Jid Hafs, dealt with cases which were referred
•  *
to them. The Agent blamed the shortcomings of the system on the
sectarian policies of the days
"Owing to the extremely bitter relations in Bahrain between Sunnis 
and Shiahs, which attitude has for their own ends been deliberately 
encouraged by the rulers for years, I see no possibility of 
obtaining justice for Shiahs in any purely native Court.
The Agency Courts were the only Courts which functioned efficiently,
viz.
(1) The Political Agent's Court, also called The District Court, dealt 
with cases in which British subjects and foreigners were involved. 
Indian Criminal and Civil Codes were applied in this Court in addition 
to some other Indian acts.
(2) The Joint Court in which both the Agent and Shaikh Hamad, the latter 
from 1923 onwards, investigated cases between Bahrain subjects and
1 No. 622-S, op. cit.
2 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 99-0, 25.7-1923-
3 No. 28-C, op. cit.
7^
1
British subjects or British Protected persons. The Agent’s 
rulings were based on the Indian Criminal and Civil Codes, but the 
Shaikh was at a disadvantage since he had no set of laws to guide him. 
Commenting on this inadequacy, the Agent wrote:
"At present in cases in which the police arrest British protected 
persons and Shaikh’s subjects for one and the same offence, often 
committed in confederacy, the Bahrain subjects are dealt with by 
some member of the Shaikh’s family and the others by the Political 
Agent with incongruous results."^
The Institution of Shaikh Hamad’s Court - July 1923
During July 1923 Shaikh Hamad's Court, also called the Bahrain State
Court, was created to satisfy a long-standing Baharnah demand for a proper
Court. Its institution indicated that the new Administration meant to
put an end to the earlier practices whereby "every member of AlKhalifah
3
family used to convict and punish Baharnah peasants without trial".
The example of the Joint Court was taken into consideration when the
kCourt was created. It was convened twice a week at the Custom House. 
Records of cases were kept, and parties in a case were summoned and not 
"dragged without notice", as had been the case in the past. Besides, no 
one except Shaikh Hamad dealt with cases. A major shortcoming of the
Court was absence of Codified laws to which the Shaikh could refer when
pronouncing sentences. One solution suggested was the use of the trans­
lations of Indian Criminal and Civil Codes, such as were In use in Aden and 
in Zanzibar during 1923- However, this deficiency remained difficult to 
remedy and continued to be a nagging problem of the 1930s and the early 
19 0^s.
1 Before the elevation of Shaikh Hamad to the Administration, Shaikh 
Abdullah represented Shaikh Isa on the Joint Court. In 1919 this 
Court used to sit at the Agency Court room. Thereafter, it was 
regularly convened on Wednesdays in the Shaikh’s upper room at the 
Custom House in Manamah.
2 No. 28-G, op. cit.
3 No. 622-S, op. cit.
4 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/2/133, No. 37-C, 17.3-1923.
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Another chronic grievance was the appalling prison conditions. The
prison, a forlorn godown in the house of the Amir, was once described by
the Agent as "the Black Hole of Calcutta". Measures to improve these
•1
conditions were adopted by the nev; Administration.
Shortage of Trained Local Personnel
From the start, reforms were beset with various difficulties, not
least was the lack of capable men either among the "Ruling Family" or the
2
"notables of Bahrain". Shaikh Hamad showed a keen interest m  the
3
reforms and was actively engaged in them. This was in line with the 
Government of India*s instructions to see the Shaikh "actively associated 
with measures of amelioration and not merely following passively in the
Zf
wake of changes pressed upon him".
Towards the end of 1923i Mr. Bower*s term of office as Director of 
Customs was to expire soon and the Administration hoped to replace him with 
another British Director. As the Customs had been put in Order by Bower, 
the Government of India saw no harm in engaging an Arab functionary to 
succeed him. The Agent disagreed, arguing that there was local opposition 
to the appointment of an Arab functionary and, that, in the absence of an 
efficient local Arab, Shaikh Hamad was anxious to have an English 
Director. Finally, in January 1924, Mr. C.L.L* de Grenier, formerly 
accountant in Baghdad and Bushire, was appointed Director of Customs under 
a three year contract with the Government of Bahrain.^
1 No. 99-C, op. cit.
2 No. 622-S, op. cit.
3 No. 208/C/9/2, op.
4 Telegram from F.S.G.I. to the Resident. 
1688-S, 8.12.1923.
5 No. 208/C/9/2, op. cit.
6 A.R.P.A. 1924. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039? No.
76
The Resistance to the Reforms - June-December 1923
During the second half of 1923* alongside the reforms the country- 
witnessed the emergence of a movement opposing their introduction. The 
opponents of the reforms organised meetings, produced petitions, memorials, 
cables and press-articles in defence of their case. The movement had 
the support of Shaikh Isa, his wife and certain other members of his 
family, the Dowasir tribesmen, tribal Nakhudas and a few Sunni merchants.
The Baharnah, who were to benefit from the reforms, were subjected to 
a campaign of intimidation itfhich included scattered acts of violence
committed against them. In June 1923, the Dowasir attacked the Baharnah
c— 1
village of Ali, killing and wounding a number of persons. Following
this attack, one of their chiefs, Ahmad bin Abdullah ad-Dosari, was
detained, questioned by Shaikh Hamad and, together with his men, convicted
and penalized.
Besides intimidation, acts of violence served to show that Shaikh
Hamad's Administration was unable to provide protection for the Baharnah.
Nevertheless, for the first time the Administration In Bahrain arrested,
tried and fined a Dosari chief. Moreover, the Chief was required to
give an undertaking to the effect that he would not attempt to rally support
against the Shaikh inside or outside Bahrain, breach of which made him
liable to deportation and confiscation of his tribe's property. However,
the penalty imposed upon the tribe was out of proportion with the severity
of the crimes, as the Agent's commentary below indicates:
"In the CAli affair they were fined Rs. 15,000, about Rs. 13,000 of 
which was paid as compensation to those who had suffered and the 
heirs of those killed, but as they had killed three persons, 
wounded four seriously and looted most of the village, they may be 
said to have got off very lightly. On the other hand, they have 
been guilty of many similar crimes against the Baharnah in the 
past, ... '»
1 Telegram from Daly to Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 82-C, 2^.6 . 
1923.
2 Daly to Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 106-C, 22.8.1923.
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It was at this time that Ibn Saud*s regular subsidy from the British 
Government was halted and there was evidence to suggest that he was more 
inclined now, than ever before, to lend support to the Najdi Dowasir in 
their stand against the Administration in Bahrain. As a result, Shaikh
Hamad expressed concern over the situation and the Resident subsequently
2
assured him of Government backing for the reforms.
C O""On the night of August 10th, a Shi ah Alim Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad
and his colleague Hasan bin Ramadan were stabbed to death on the road
C C ■"between Budayya and Diraz. It was reported that the Alim was murdered 
because he had called the villagers to testify in the Ali case, a call
the Baharnah dared to heed for the first time. Formerly, they were so
intimidated by the Dowasir, that they had refused to supply evidence against
3
them. Meantime, the Baharnah forwarded a petition to Shaikh Hamad 
demanding that the culprits be brought to justice.
The First Outrage at Sitrah - September 1923
On 18th September 1923 a camel belonging to Shaikh Khalid, Shaikh Isa*s 
brother, was found wounded in a village in Sitrah, an island peopled 
exclusively by the Baharnah. Shaikh Khalid wielded great influence there 
and collected ,raqabieh*, i.e. neck-tax, his chief source of income from 
the people there. For years, the Shaikhs allowed their camels to graze 
in date-gardens leased to the Baharnah, who complained about the damage the 
camels caused to their plantations and the financial loss that accompanied 
it. This incident instigated an attack by the Khalids against the
1 Ibid. More on Ibn Saud*s subsidy can be found in the Residents 
letter to H.H. Imam Sir Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur Rahman al-Faisal al-Sa^ud. 
F.O. 371: 8947, No. 173, 14.6.1923.
2 Telegram from Knox to Daly. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039» No. 657, 24.6.1923-
3 No. 106-C, op. cit.
4 Petition signed by a number of Baharnah heads, dated 13-8.1923.
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villagers in the course of which one villager was killed. On September
19th, Shaikh Hamad summoned the Khalids to appear before his Court. This
they chose to ignore, stating their willingness only to be tried by the 
Shara° Qadi•^
Failure, on the part of the new Administration to try the 
transgressors was bound to produce accusations of slackness, which had been 
levelled earlier at Shaikh Isa’s regime. Firmness in dealing with the 
matter would have bolstered the image of the new regime. On September
22nd, acting on advice from the Agent, Shaikh Hamad held a Court for the
trial of Shaikh Khalid, the former’s uncle, and two of his sons and 
followers. Having established their guilt, the Court fined Shaikh Khalid 
Rs. 2,000 for aiding and abetting the attack and ordered him to vacate
Q
Sitrah, his place of residence, and to move to Rafaa • His son Ali, 
described as the "ringleader” was convicted of organising and executing 
the attack. He was initially sentenced to banishment for life, but later 
on his sentence was commuted to ten years at Shaikh Hamad’s request.
An allowance of Rs. 300/- monthly was ordered for him while serving his 
sentence in Indial His brother, Salman, was sentenced to one year 
banishment, and two of Shaikh Khalid’s servants were given prison 
sentences
These sentences were seen by the Baharnah as very lenient, and they 
failed to deter further acts of violence committed in early 192^. But 
the fact that Shaikh Hamad acted at all against his close relatives was 
seen as a triumph for the rule of law and order.
1 Daly to Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/1.0/1039, No. 122-C, 20.9.1923.
2 Daly to Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039» No. 123-C, 23-9-1923.
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The Campaign Against Major Daly
The action taken against the Dowasir and - more especially - against
Shaikh Khalid and his sons bore, according to Shaikh Isa, the mark of
Major Daly, whose influence upon Shaikh Hamad*s Administration was
paramount. Both the tribes and the disaffected members of the Ruling
Family were now involved in a campaign against the Agent whose interference
in the internal affairs of the country was, they believed, in excess of
the powers invested in him. Also, a few merchants, who had been adversely
affected by reform of the Customs, agitated for the abolition of the
1
landing tax on goods.
Early in October 1923, Shaikh Mohammad bin Abdullah v/rote a letter
to the Secretary of State for India, complaining about the Agent*s
violations against local institutions, about his hostile attitude to the
Ruling Family, his unlawful arrest of Ahmad ad-Dosari, and his refusing
2
Wahbah entry into Bahrain.
Following on the above letter, the Syrian paper Fata el-Arab
published an article by Shaikh Mohammad in which he criticized Colonel
Knox for retiring Shaikh Isa against his will and for threatening to
3confiscate the property of the Dowasir. Shortly afterwards, another
article, also by him, appeared in the Syrian paper Alif Ba which was
A-critical of the British Political Authorities.
In fact, Shaikh Mohammad's activities against the reforms, including 
his frequent visits to Kuwait and Iraq from where he sent cables to various
1 Daly to Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 131-C, A-.10.1923*
2 Letter from Mohammad bin Abdullah Al-Khalifah to S.S.I., 20th Safar 
13^2 (2.10.1923). I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, pp. 37-8.
3 Extract entitled 'Nejd, Iraq and Bahrain* from C.E.S. Palmer, His 
Britannic Majesty's Consul at Damascus, to the Resident. I.O.R. 
13/1/327, 1.11.1923.
A- Extract entitled 'Situation at Bahrain* from Palmer to the Resident. 
I.O.R. 15/1/327, 5 .H.I923.
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addresses, v/ere known to British officials in the area. But whether he 
sent them with his father*s knowledge, i.e. Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa, there 
was no conclusive evidence.^
The Protests of Shaikh Isa
One aspect of Shaikh Isa*s protest against the new Administration was
his persistent refusal to receive his monthly stipend of Rs. ^,000 as
determined by the Civil List. As a result, money accruing to him was
deposited in an account, opened in his name, at the Eastern Bank. By
October 1923, Rs- 20,000 had accumulated in the Shaikh’s account. Despite
attempts by Shaikh Hamad to persuade his father to accept his stipend,
Shaikh Isa doggedly refused and instead demanded that it be increased to
Rs. 30,000 per month.^
In his efforts to gain the sympathies of the Government of India,
Shaikh Isa wrote a number of letters, and sent a series of telegrams
complaining about the Agent’s encroachments upon his domestic affairs and
asking the Government to restore him to his former position of rulership.
During October 1923, he sent two cables to Baghdad and Delhi complaining
of Major Daly and urging the Government to hold an enquiry into the affairs 
3
of Bahrain.
Colonel Trevor, who was on leave, returned to office on 21st October. 
Both Shaikh Isa and the tribal elements hoped that his return might augur 
changes in policy. Accordingly they organised a petition which was 
delivered to the Resident on the day following his arrival. The 
signatories, apart from Shaikh Isa, included the Dowasir who v/ere angered
1 Trevor to Government of India, No. 622-S, op. cit.
2 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/1/327, No. 200-C, 8.12.1923.
3 Col. Knox to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 568-S, 9.10.1923.
^ See Translation of a petition signed by Shaikh Isa and certain Arabs of
Bahrain protesting against the reforms, delivered to the Resident by
one of Shaikh Isa’s servants on 22.10.1923. See enclosures to the 
Resident’s letter to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 601-S, 27.10.1923*
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by their chastisement earlier and the Sunni pearling Nakhudas who feared
that the Government intended to collect taxes on their pearling fleet and
to reform the Salifah Court* It was also reported that the Nakhudas were
partly instigated by merchants like Yusuf Kanoo and Yusuf Fakhroo who told
them that reform of the pearling industry was designed to help the divers
at the expense of the Nakhudas.
The petition was critical of Daly's control of the Shaikhfs
Administration, of his high handedness during the riots of May 1923» of
his raising a police force made up entirely of Persians and controlled by
a Persian. The petitioners resented Shaikh Isa's forced retirement and
the transfer of Customs revenues to a British Bank. They blamed the
abolition of local Courts on Major Daly and criticised him for ordering
the arrest and fining of Ahmad ad-Dosari. In the end they demanded the
restoration of Shaikh Isa to the Rulership and threatened to leave Bahrain
2
in protest if their grievances were ignored by the Government.
The above petition was followed by a Cable to the Government of India 
dated 23rd October in which Shaikh Isa expressed regret over the sad state 
of Bahrain subjects who, in his view, had lost their national rights under
the "so-called reforms". He reiterated his earlier request for an
3enquiry into the affairs of Bahrain.
1 Daly to Col. Knox. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 1^1/1/9, 17.10.1923.
2 See Petition, op. cit. The signatories to the petition were:
Shaikh Isa ben Ali, Sayed Abdullah ben Sayed Ibrahim on behalf of Sada 
tribe, Ahmad ben Hashed on behalf of A1 Bu-Falaseh tribe, Jabur ben 
Mohammad Mosallam on behalf of Mosallam tribe, Shabin ben Sagur al- 
Jalahamah on behalf of Jalahamah tribe, Abdul Wahab Zayani on behalf 
of Zayani tribe, Mohanna ben Fadhel on behalf of Naim tribe, Mohammad 
ben Hashed on behalf of Manan'ah tribe, Ahmad ben Abdullah ad-Dosari
on behalf of Dowasir tribe, Mohammad ben Rashed A1 ben Ali on behalf of 
A1 ben Ali tribe, Ahmad ben Jasem ben deodar on behalf of ben Jodar 
tribe.
3 Telegram from Shaikh Isa to the Viceroy. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039»
23.10.1923.
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The Baharnah Support the Reforms
The campaign against the reforms gave rise to concern among the 
Baharnah who feared that the Government of India might be pushed into 
abandoning the policy of reforms, on which they relied for a more balanced 
form of Government* On the 25th October 1923? their leaders submitted 
a petition to the Resident signed by 328 Baharnah. In it, they defended 
the reforms and described their introduction as a step in the right 
direction. They said they were satisfied with Shaikh Hamad's Admini­
stration and voiced their concern over the future of the reforms. They 
appealed to the Government to allow Major Daly to stay in Bahrain until 
the reforms were firmly established. They were alarmed by rumours of 
his imminent departure from Bahrain, in which case, they wrote, reforms
would discontinue and a return to the chaotic conditions which prevailed
1
earlier would follow.
On the 26th October, the day the anti-reform group held their Congress, 
seven leading Baharnah, headed by Haji Ahmad bin Ali Khamis, submitted a 
second and extended petition to the Resident which, inter alia, contained 
nine specific ‘supplications1, a summary of which appears below:
(1) They expressed satisfaction with Shaikh Hamad’s Court established 
in July 1923) and looked forward to further judicial reforms.
(2) As native and loyal subjects of Shaikh Hamad they denounced 
the agitations against the reforms and hoped for their smooth execution.
(3) They appealed for reform of the Salifah Court suspended earlier, 
and desired the Government to appoint new judges, known for their integrity 
and fairness. The previous judges, they wrote, were biased and favoured 
the Nakhudas at the expense of the divers.
1 Petition without date presented personally to the Resident by three 
of the signatories on 25th October 1923- I.O.R. 15/2/88. See
enclosures to the Resident's letter No. 601-S, op. cit.
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(k) They wanted to see an end to the depredations caused by the 
Shaikh*s wandering camels whose chief sufferers were the Baharnah tenants 
of those gardens,
(5) They wanted the Government to levy equitable taxes from all
the population, Shiahs as well as Sunnis; they rejected the discriminatory 
taxes imposed exclusively upon the Baharnah and cited Raqabieh, neck-tax, 
as an infamous example of the same.
(6) They demanded proper care and attention for prisoners and 
objected to their jailing in a derelict godown in the house of the Amir.
(7) They desired Sunni Nakhudas to release their Shiah divers from 
duty on the 10th of Moharram - a day of mourning for the Shiahs.
(8) That the Government should help reduce the taxes, levied in 
kind, from Baharnah fishermen who caught fish by weirs.
(9) That equal opportunities be given to Baharnah boys who, unlike 
their Sunni opposite numbers, were deprived of schools.
They concluded their petition by asserting their willingness to raise 
their case with the *Great Parliament of the High Government1, if their 
supplications were ignored.
The Congress of October 1923*
On 15th Rabi° I, 13^ +2, i.e. 26th October 1923, the tribal groups 
opposed to the reforms summoned their supporters to a *Congress*. This 
meeting was organised by Abdul Wahab Zayani, whose family was engaged in 
the pearl-trade, together with Ahmad bin Lahej. Zayani, described by 
Rihani as the leader of the national revival in Bahrain, had been agitating
1 Translation of Petition from seven Baharnah representatives, handed to 
the Political Resident on 26th October 1923. I.O.R. 15/2/88. It bore 
the signatures of Haji Ahmad bin Khamis, Saiyed Ahmad bin Saiyed Alawi, 
Ali bin Hasan, Abdul Rasul bin Rajab, Ahmad as-Samak, Muhammad al- 
Darazi, Abd Ali bin Rajab.
8*f
'I
for a parliament for some time. Earlier in 1921, his campaign for 
constitutional rights made him unpopular with Shaikh Isa, and also with 
Major Daly who he criticised for interfering in the domestic affairs of the 
country. He was unofficially asked to leave Bahrain for a while and he 
therefore proceeded to Bombay just after Jasim Chirawi, Shaikh Abdullah’s 
secretary, had been deported to India in November 1921. Both men
p
returned to Bahrain, separately, in 1923*
During the second half of 1923, Rs. 130,000 were reported to have been
paid in subscriptions to Zayani towards financing the movement against the
reforms. He was also reported to have introduced the idea of ’Parliament*
3m  the guise of a ’Congress'. Those who attended the Congress were 
exclusively Sunni Arabs, although Rumaihi notes that before it was convened
Zayani had tried to engage the support of Abd Ali bin Mansour Rajab, a
. c kleading Shi ah, but the latter refused. Official correspondence
pertaining to this period contains nothing to show that such a contact had
actually taken place. The Congress met and produced a petition, said to
have been written by Zayani, and also appointed twelve members to follow up
its decisions. At this time, Shaikh Hamad who was anxious to contain
the situation, summoned the tribal elements as well as some leading merchants
to a Majlis with a view to discussing the affairs. Those invited all
attended, except Zayani and the two Najdis, bin Lahej and Ahmad bin
5
Abdullah ad-Dosari. The Majlis failed to placate the petitioners.
1 Rihani, Muluk al~Arab - Arab Kings - Vol. II, p. 2^8, footnote 2.
Note that according to Zayani*s statement of December 1923 to the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, he was now sixty-seven years old.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, p. 50.
2 Daly’s No. 1VI/1/9, op. cit.
3 Resident's No. 57-T, op. cit.
k Rumaihi, Bahrain - Social and Political Change ..., p. 181, op. cit.
3 Telegram from the Viceroy to S.S.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, 2.11.1923*
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The, Resident 's Reply to the Petitioners
In his reply to the petition of 22nd October 1923 the Resident informed
Shaikh Isa that the decision to initiate reforms in the administration of
Bahrain was not taken at the "personal wish of Knox or Daly", but that the
High Government, after a thorough investigation, became convinced of their
necessity. He added:
" ... You have never introduced any reform either at the urgent 
request of the Government or in fulfilment of your own promises.
And as the tyranny and oppression in your island has become a 
public scandal it became necessary for the High Government to take 
action ... 11 ^
Alongside the above reply, the Resident sent two letters to the
Baharnah in response to their earlier petitions. He told them that
reforms were instituted by Order of the High Government which was committed
to them as a fixed policy, regardless of whether he or the Agent were in or
out of office. As regards the issues raised by the seven Baharnah leaders,
he gave reassuring answers and stressed that the Administration would
2consider them in due course.
Acting on the Residents instructions, the Agent subsequently
published the following Notice to the people:
"As it appears from petitions I have received ... that people are 
in doubt as regards the continuity of policy regarding reforms,
I Colonel Trevor, hereby inform and make it clear to all people 
in Bahrain that His Majesty's Government after exhaustive inquiry 
decided last May that the condition of affairs in Bahrain Islands 
urgently demanded reform and therefore ordered reforms to be 
initiated. Be it known therefore that the Orders of Government 
will be carried out and the policy of reform recently initiated 
pursued vjithout deviation."
5
1 For Trevor's reply to Shaikh Isa's Petition, see enclosures to his 
No. 601-S, op. cit.
2 Letter to the Baharnah signatories of the petition without date handed 
to me on 25th October 1923 by three of their number. I.O.R. L/P+ 
S/10/1039, No. 277, 27.10.1923. Also, letter from A.P. Trevor to 
Ahmad bin Khamis, Sayed Ahmad ben Sayed Alawi, Ali ben Hasan, Abdul Rasul 
ben Rajab, Ahmad as-Samak, Mohammad Darazi and Abd Ali bin Rajab.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 278, 27.10.1923.
3 See enclosure two in Trevor's letter to the G. of I. No. 622-S, op. cit.
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In a communication to the Government the Resident reported that the 
petition and counter-petitions showed that the reforms were unwelcome to 
the Shaikh, his family and the Sunni Arab Nakhudas, but they were 
particularly welcome to the Baharnah. "This is as it should be”, he 
added, "as the reforms are in the interests of the latter."
The Resident*s Visit to Bahrain - 1st-7th November 1923
There followed a visit to Bahrain by the Resident which lasted through­
out the first week of November 1923- On the first day of his arrival 
there, he was presented with a petition, on behalf of the Congress, on 
board the R.I.M.S. Lawrence. In it the petitioners asked a number of 
questions in respect of the reforms:
"Is it Reforms* to dismiss the Amir of the Town from his duties 
against the wishes of the people? Is it •reforms* to deport 
people and imprison and fine ... without trial? Is it 
•reforms* for Major Daly himself to act like a Qadi, as if he were 
the Sharac and the Qadi?" ... etc.
The petitioners held the Resident responsible for not heeding their
earlier demand for a parliament and were now asking for the following six
demands which constituted, they wrote, the decisions of the Congress:
"(1) Our Shaikh Isa to remain the Ruler ... without any inter­
ference from the Consul (i.e. P.A.) ... If he should of
his free will appoint Hamad as his Agent we will accept him.
C (j
(2) All court cases to be sent to the Shara or Urfi, which is 
in accordance with the Shari^a.
(3) A national Parliament to be started to look after the 
interests of the people as in other countries.
(*f) A Court of four acceptable persons skilled in diving affairs 
to decide all diving cases.
(5) The Consul to be forbidden to break the good relations
existing between Great Britain and the Bahrain Government, 
or to interfere in internal matters.
1 Trevor to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 602-S, 27-10.1923-
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(6) We have selected twelve persons to represent us."
On the final day of his visit to Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad summoned the
petitioners to a meeting with the Resident, held at the latter*s request.
All attended the meeting except bin Lahej who initially absented himself
but was later brought in at the Residents insistence. An oral message
was delivered by the Resident which was also read out in Arabic. The
Dowasir tribesmen were told that His Majesty*s Government backed Shaikh
Hamad and was opposed to mass exodus by them; that the Rulers of the Gulf
States had been asked by the Government not to give asylum to Heads of
tribes or Nakhudas; that if they chose to defy these instructions, their
property would be subject to confiscation by the Government, their divers
would be freed from contractual obligations, and their boats would be
2banned from pearling in Bahrain. When the meeting came to an end,
both Zayani and bin Lahej were detained and subsequently deported to India. 
This was done in accordance with an earlier request for their banishment, 
submitted by the Administration in Bahrain and sanctioned by the 
Government•^
Before leaving Bahrain, the Resident saw the Baharnah representatives 
who handed to him a petition in appreciation of the Governments positive 
attitude towards the reforms. This petition occasioned the following 
commentary from the Resident to the Government:
1 For the above petition see enclosures to Shaikh Isa*s Memorial of 
13-2.192^- I.O.R. 15/2/73, op. cit. The twelve persons appointed as 
representatives v/ere: Abdul Wahab Zayani, Abdul Latif bin Mahmood,
Sa-ad Abdullah bin Ibrahim, Husain bin Ali al-Mannaee, Mohammad bin 
Rashid bin Hindi, Ahmad bin Kasim al-Jodar, Shahin bin Sagar al- 
Jalahimah, Isa bin Ahmad ad-Dosari, Ahmad bin Lahej, Mohanna bin Fazal 
an-Naeemi, Jabur bin Mohammad al-Mosallam, Mohammad bin Subah* Ibid.
2 See enclosure three to Col. Trevor*s No. 622-S, op. cit.
3 Letter from Shaikh Hamad, Deputy to Government of Bahrain. I.O.R. 
15/2/127i 27 Rabi al-Awwal 13^2 A.H. (7.11.1923).
"We are now insisting on reforms to ameliorate the lot of the 
down-trodden inhabitants of Bahrain, and judging from this 
petition are doing it with some success."^
The Dowasir Leave Bahrain
Early in November 1923» it was reported that a large section of the 
Dowasir tribesmen under their Chief, Ahmad bin Abdullah ad-Dosari, had left 
Bahrain for Dammam. They left behind their property and an estimated
1,000 men who stayed in Budayya0 under another Chief, Isa bin Ahmad ad-
* . k c-*Dosarx. Earlier, during the attack on Ali, Isa had restrained his men
and in appreciation of this role the Administration of Shaikh Hamad had
considered appointing him to the leadership of the tribe instead of the
2
intractable Ahmad. The division of the Dowasir into two sections, one 
in Bahrain and the other in Dammam, was viewed by the Resident with some 
suspicion:
"The object of the manoeuvre was fairly obvious, viz.,to keep a 
foot in both camps, and to prevent confiscation as much as possible 
by pretending that most of the property in Budaiya belonged to the 
section who remained."
3
The belief that Ibn Saud might try to employ the Dowasir of Budayya* 
for his own ends, led the Resident to write to the Government of India 
seeking their approval for a letter to him to the effect that any inter­
ference in the affairs of Bahrain would be "in breach of article VI of his 
treaty with us". Moreover, he was to be told that the Government would 
reciprocate by restricting "export of supplies to his territory from India
if 5
and Iraq". To this the Government agreed.
In Bahrain, the Administration viewed the Dowaair exodus with a sigh
of relief, as the official commentary below indicates:
1 Trevor to G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 662-S, 2^.11.1923. This
latest petition from the Baharnah was signed by Mulla Hasan bin ash-
Shaikh Al-Majid. Ibid.
2 Daly*s No. 80-C, off, cit.
3 No. 622-S, op. cit.
^ Trevor to G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 631-S, 11.11.1923*
5 J.E. Shuckburgh to the Under-Secretary of State for India. I.O.R.
L/P+S/10/1039, 17.11.1923.
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"Their departure from Bahrain has assisted Shaikh Hamad to assert 
his authority more than would ever have been possible had they 
remained engaged in constant intrigue with the Sultan of Nejd."^
Zayani Resorts to Law
After his deportation to Bombay, Zayani filed a suit in the High Court 
stating that his detention there by the Commissioner of Police was unlawful, 
and that he should be free to reside anywhere in Bombay* As a result, 
the High Court ordered the Commissioner to produce the petitioner on 
7th December 1923 and to submit evidence for his detention. As the 
Commissioner failed to supply the required evidence on the set date, the 
High Court allowed Zayani freedom of residence within Bombay Presidency, 
and asked the Commissioner to furnish the required documents not later than 
13th January
Subsequently the Government of Bombay corresponded with the Political
Agent in Bahrain and asked him to send a warrant or "a proper authority
2m  some other form" for both men, i.e. Zayani and bin Lahej. Them
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs thus summarized the affair to the Government 
of Bombay:
"I am not clear, however, under what authority the Political Agent 
- Bahrain - has acted. The Bahrain Order-in-Council applies to:
1) British Subjects 2) Foreigners 3) Bahrain subjects 
registered in the Political Agency as being in the service of British 
subjects or foreigners. It is not clear what Court has dealt with 
these persons. The Warrant mentions the Court of the Shaikh of 
Bahrain, but is signed by the Political Agent ...
... al-Zayani seems to have been deported without any formalities
itfhatever and there is no warrant for him. I can see no defence 
could be put up for his detention."^
1 A.R.P.A. 1923, op. cit.
2 J.E. Hotson, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to P.A. Bahrain.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 1775-B, 11.12.1923-
3 Extract from a note by the Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, to the 
Government of Bombay, No. 230?, 17-12.1923; attached to Hotson*s 
letter to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, 19-12.1923.
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The Second Outrage at Sitrah - January 192**
On the night of 7th-8th January, a second attack was made against the
Baharnah village of Wadyan in Sitrah, in which a number of men and one
woman were killed and several others wounded. It was established from
accounts of witnesses that Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid, Shaikh Isa's nephew
c 2and son-in-law, had led the attackers, most of whom came from Rafaa .
The raid was timed to take place while Shaikh Hamad was on a hawking trip
to Lingah, in South Persia. The object of the attack was to take revenge
upon those villagers who testified in the first outrage of September 1923
as a result of which Shaikh Ali bin Khalid had been banished to India and
his brother Salman to the mainland* Besides this the attack also aimed
3
at saddling Shaikh Hamad's Administration with further difficulties.
While Shaikh Hamad was absent from the country, his younger brother
Shaikh Mohammad, acted for him. When the Khalid's role in the above
offence was established beyond doubt, they expressed their willingness to
Shaikh Mohammad to stand trial but only before the Shara0 Court. To this
the Agent objected, knowing only too well that the outcome of such a trial
was a foregone conclusion. When he sounded out the Sunni Qadi over the
same, the latter was reported to have said:
" ... that this was a political crime the punishment for which 
should be dealt out by the Ruler, or failing him, His Majesty's 
Government".^
The Baharnah submitted two petitions to the Agent dated 1st and 5th
5
Jamadi II, 13**2, corresponding to 8th and 12th January 192**. Also, two
1 Telegram from the Resident to the G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^2, No.
51, 10.1.192**.
2 The Resident to G. of I. I.O.R. L/P-^/10/10**2, No. 5^-S, 17.1.192**.
Note that Ibrahim was married to Moozah, Shaikh Abdullah's sister.
3 Ibid.
** Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10**2, No. 13-C, 13.1.192**.
5 The petitions were signed by: Mohsin ben Abdullah ben Rajab, whose
father Abdullah ben Rajab was the representative of the British India 
Steam Navigation Company in Bahrain in 1873- See Lorimer, p. 921, 
Historical Part IB, Saiyed Mohammad al-Biladi, Abdor Rasul ben Rajab, 
Abdol Ali ben Rajab, Mahdi ben Ahmad ben Saif, Hosain ben Madhoob, 
Matrook ben Mohammad, Haji Ali ben Hasan, Saiyed Mohamad ben Saiyed 
Hosain. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10**2.
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messengers delivered a separate petition to the Resident in Bushire on 
behalf of their community on January 12th, These petitions stated that 
in their view the sentences passed against the offenders in earlier cases
failed to prevent further acts of violence against members of their
2 c-community. The attacks at Ali and Sitrah came only six months after
the reforms had started and therefore their implications did not escape the
Agent, who wrote:
M .., any scheme of reforms aimed at the improvement of the status 
of the oppressed Shiahs of Bahrain, is rendered perfectly useless 
as long as their lives are in constant jeopardy. Of v/hat avail 
is Hamad*s Court, in which for the first time Bahrainis have an 
opportunity of obtaining redress, if after decisions therein, the 
witnesses can be murdered with impunity?"^
Shaikh Hamad returned to Bahrain on January 14th in response to a
if
cable from the Resident. There he found large crowds of the Baharnah 
gathered at the Agency demanding prosecution of the culprits. He told them 
that he was seeking the advice of the British Government in the matter.
By this time, the chief offenders had already escaped to the mainland and
the Shaikh, acting on advice from the Agent, ordered the arrest of the rest
5
of the suspects.
At this point, H.M.S. Crocus arrived in Bahrain, and the Baharnah 
representatives received a letter from the Resident assuring them of the 
commitment of the Government to improve the Administration of Bahrain on 
a gradual and steady basis. In a letter to the Government of India, the 
Resident noted:
1 No. 56~S, op. cit.
2 See petition of 5th Jamadi II, 1342. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1042.
3 Daly*s No. 13-C, op. cit.
4 No. 56-S, op. cit.
5 Telegram from the Resident to the G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1042,
No. 90, 15-1-1924.
6 Col. A.P. Trevor to the Baharnah signatories to the two petitions.
I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 16, 16.1.1924.
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"... I may observe again that Bahrain Shiah community after years 
of oppression are absolutely incapable of doing anything for 
themselves and can only petition us and whine. If they banded 
together and resisted the oppression of Khalifah family I think 
they could have done a great deal long ago ...
This being the case, our task in Bahrain of bolstering up a ruling 
family, which cannot rule justly or efficiently, and of helping at 
the same time a community which cannot help themselves is an 
extremely thankless one."^
The Resident's letter drew a firm response from the Government who
cabled him, ordering the arrest and punishment of the perpetrators of
Sitrah crimes. Above all, they wanted to see Shaikh Hamad assuming the
proper obligations of rulership, viz.
"You should inform Shaikh that Government desire and expect him to 
keep order amongst his own subjects even should it involve the arrest 
and punishment of members of his own family. In such action he will 
have the full support of Government
The Culprits Stand Trial
On 25th January 1924-, the Resident visited Bahrain. On the following
day, Shaikh Khalid accompanied Shaikh Hamad to the Agency to meet him.
The Agency was surrounded by crowds of Baharnah who were "groaning or
3
moaning: justice". During the meeting, the Resident informed the
Shaikh of the Government's wish to see the culprits tried and punished,
regardless of who they were. Shaikh Khalid, whose presence there was
0
demanded by the Resident, was ordered to vacate Rafaa and to move to
Moharraq. A commitment was obtained from him to the effect that he would
4-
discourage his sons from further acts of lawlessness.
As the chief offenders, Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid, his brother Shaikh 
Salman bin Khalid, and Abdur Razzaq - a distant relative of A1 Khalifah,
1 No. 56~S, op. cit.
2 Telegram from the G. of I. to the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/104R,
No. 195-S, 21.1.1924-.
3 Col. Trevor to the G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^+2, No. 89-S, 2.2.1924-. 
4- Ibid.
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had absconded to the mainland they were tried in absentia. The trial
was conducted by Shaikh Hamad, in the presence of Major Daly. Some of
those arrested v/ere Najdis and Hasawis, whose cases were dealt with by the
Agency Court. The absconders were given death penalties, and their
property was subjected to confiscation by the State. In fact, Salman bin
Khalid and Abdur Razzaq had been serving one year banishment for their role
in the outrage of September 1923- Many others v/ere sentenced to various
terms of imprisonment ranging from ten years to six months, and a few were
1
acquitted after proving their alibis.
The Agent was satisfied with the proceedings of Shaikh Hamad*s Court
and he described the evidence supplied by the witnesses for the prosecution
as "very conclusive and left no shadow of doubt as to the guilt of the 
2
accused".
The Creation of a Force of Levies
Following the above outrages , the maintenance of law and order was 
to receive greater attention from the Administration. Towards the end of
1923 Shaikh Hamad's Administration applied to the Resident seeking Govern-
3
ment approval to raise and train a force of armed police. The Resident 
agreed to this suggestion and recommended it to the Government of India 
adding that members of the force ought to be derived from Arabic-speaking, 
trained Baluchis, preferably ex-recruits of the Muscat Levies. Local 
Arabs, he wrote, were "unsuitable", and the Persians were "objectionable to
1 Col. Trevor to the G. of I. I.O..R. L/P+S/10/1042, No. 108-S, 9-2.1924.
2 Maj. Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/131, No. 32-C, 29-1-1924.
The Agency Report for 1924 offers the following commentary on the 
death sentence passed in the above trial: "Doubtless Shaikh Hamad
brought himself to pass such a sentence in consideration of the fact 
that they (i.e. the absconders) were safely out of the v/ay, and that 
it v/as extremely unlikely that it could ever be carried out". I.O.R. 
15/2/296.
3 See translation of Shaikh Hamad's letter to the Resident. I.O.R. 
15/2/127, 27 Rabi I, 1342.
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the Arabs”. In fact, Shaikh Hamad had a number of armed fidawis, whom 
he described as: "half-hearted supporters of reforms and at heart prefer
old regime as giving more opportunities for squeezing, etc.” If he had
had a police force at his command, it would have certainly bolstered his
2
authority vis-a-vis the recalcitrant tribal elements, he added.
Subsequently, the Government of India approved the creation of the
levies on the lines suggested by the Resident. By June 192^ f a force of
levies, whose recruits were exclusively Baluchis, was raised under the
k
command of Captain A. Campbell of the Indian Army. It comprised 150 men,
c *5detachments of whom were posted in Muharraq, Budayya and Sitrah.
Shaikh Isa's Memorial to the Government - February 1924
Acting in his capacity as Shaikh Isafs authorised Agent in Bombay,
Abdul Wahhab az-Zayani engaged the legal services of Mohammad Ali Jinah, 
barrister-at-law, then associated with the Bhaishankar Kanga and Ghirdarlal 
firm of Barristers, Attorneys for Shaikh Isa. On behalf of the Shaikh, 
the firm sent a detailed Memorial dated 13th February 192^ to the Viceroy 
and Governor General of India. It stated that Shaikh Isa*s installation 
as Ruler in 1286 A.H. was effected by "the will and with the approbation of 
the Chiefs of all the tribes", that the Shaikh*s rule was "peaceful and 
popular", and that "there have been no complaint of any maladministration 
or misrule ... or any breach of treaty engagements with the British
1 No. 622-S, op. cit.
2 Telegram from the Resident to the G. of I. I.O.R- L/P+S/IO/IO^,
No. 128, 22.1.192^.
3 Telegram from the G. of I. to the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10*f2, 
No. 222-S, 2^.1.192^.
k A.R.P.A. 1924, op. cit.
5 Telegram from the Resident to the G. of I. I.O.R. L/P+S/IO/IO^R,
No. 229* 7.2.192^. Note that from January 193^ + the Police Force was
formed, almost entirely, of Bahrain subjects. See letter from the 
Adviser to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/297, No. 923-9A, 6.1.193^.
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1
Government1' • It also underlined the negative aspects of the policies
pursued by the Agent, accusing him of arrogating to himself, to the
exclusion of the Shaikh, the "legislative, judicial and executive 
2
authority". The British Authorities, it was alleged, had persistently 
refused to consider the complaints of the petitioners and had imposed the 
reforms upon the Shaikh and his subjects. As a result, they were forced 
to convene "a Congress of the aristocracy and intelligentsia of the land", 
the decisions of which were communicated to the Resident whose reply to 
the same was "insulting and minatory". Shaikh Isa urged the Government 
to reconsider its earlier decision, which resulted in his forced retirement 
in breach, he claimed, of the contractual rights his treaties vfith Britain
if
bestowed upon him.
On 22nd March 192^ f, the Resident, to whom the Memorial was sent for
consideration and comment, put forth his views regarding the issues raised
by the Shaikh. He described the Memorial as "a farrago of suppressio
5
v e n  and suggest10 falsi". He pointed out that Shaikh Isa's appointment
to the Rulership of Bahrain was effected with British backing, that the
Shaikh repeatedly ignored official advice to reform his Administration and
to channel funds for public services. As regards the Shaikh's statement
that his rule was "peaceful and popular", the Resident commented:
" ... it has been peaceful from outside aggression thanks to the 
protection of the British Government, but by no means so internally 
for the indigenous population ... have been ill-treated, looted and
murdered .............  with perfect impunity by every member of
his own family ...; and popular with a small section of the Sunni 
tribal heads and nakhudas because they could do what they liked.
1 Memorial from Shaikh Esa bin Ali AlKhalifah to H.E. Sir Rufus Daniel
Isaacs, Viceroy and Governor General of India, Bombay, 13.2.192^.
I.O.R. 15/2/73* Attached to the Resident's No. 57-T, op. cit.
2 Ibid., para. 6 .
3 Ibid., para. 13.
k Ibid., para. 16-17-
5 No. 57-T, op. cit.
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It is emphatically unpopular with the Shiah majority as countless 
petitions and reports have shown,
Commenting upon the allegation that Major Daly abolished all law- 
Courts, he wrote that only the Salifah Court was "in abeyance from 
inanition, as no one desires to go before it as no justice can be obtained". 
All the Courts were functioning normally, and what was abolished, he added, 
was the:
"Majlis which every Shaikh and Shaikhling had: these were not
Courts but irresponsible vehicles of oppression, every Shaikh 
fining, imprisoning and expropriating the rayats (Shiahs only 
bien entendu) at his own sweet will."^
The Resident refuted the statement that the Agent pursued "repressive
and reactionary" policies which were, according to the Memorial, provocative
to the Arabs and harmful to the country. To this he replied:
"Any intelligent person however cannot fail to see a vast improve­
ment. Even Bin Saud (who officially opposes the reforms and 
supports Shaikh Isa as the protagonist of Islam) admitted in private 
conversation ... that the state of the Islands has vastly improved 
while the Shaikhs are better off financially than they ever v/ere 
before.1'
V/ith the removal of the chief obstacles to the enactment of the reforms, 
the resistance to them had gradually died out. First there came the 
retirement of Shaikh Isa, then the chastisement of the disaffected tribal 
elements followed by the creation of the armed Police. Shaikh Hamad*s 
position as Deputy-Ruler, was now firmly secured especially after Shaikh 
Abdullah had agreed to serve the new Administration. Major Daly emerged 
as the actual architect of the reforms. It was he who backed Hamad^ 
elevation to the Administration, ensured Baharnah support for the new 
regime, and continued to serve until 1926, thereby becoming the longest 
serving Political Agent in Bahrain.
1 Comment on Memorial dated 13.2.192^ from Shaikh Isa bin Ali AlKhalifah 
to H.E. the Viceroy. I.O.R. 15/2/73, pp. 1-2.
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 5
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Chapter Four
Reforms and Reappraisal of Policies: Bahrain 192^-9
First a brief Introduction
The resistance to the reforms had, by the end of 192^, almost subsided 
and the people became reconciled to the benefits to be gained from
Q
organised government. The relations between the Rulers and their Shi ah
subjects were, from 1925 onwards, showing gradual improvement, though the
bitterness engendered by previous years of mistreatment still formed an
obstacle to real harmony.
By the spring of 1925 bwo of Shaikh Isa*s supporters, Shaikh Abdul
Wahhab az-Zayani and Shaikh Khalid bin Ali, had died. Early 1926 saw a
change in Shaikh Isa*s attitude towards Shaikh Hamad's Administration and
in May of the same year Shaikh Isa agreed to draw on his allowances from
1
the State, after refusing to do so for about three years.
The second half of 1926 witnessed a number of attempted murders,
some with fatal consequences. On 1st August 1926 Ismail Shah Murad, a
sepoy of the Levy Corps, shot and killed Subedar Niaz Ali Khan and
Havaldar Nuur Daad of the same Force. He then shot at Major Daly who
was fortunate enough to have escaped with minor injury. No political
motive was mentioned for the attack, the repercussions of which were
2
reported in the Persian press. Ismail was tried and executed on 21st 
September. Two other members of the same Force, Mohammad bin Kunari and
1 Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/73, number illegible, 30*5*1926.
2 During 1930, the Persian paper Shafagh-i Surkh published an article on
Bahrain which included the following statement about Major Daly:
M ... it was unfortunate that he was only struck in the ear by the 
bullet that was fired at him some years ago at Bahrain'1. The 
British Minister in Tehran responded to the same by sending a personal 
letter to the Persian Minister of Court in Tehran, in which he
described the above account as "outrageous11. See Sir R. Clive to
Mr. M.A. Henderson. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^5, E6026/l93/9% 28.10.1930.
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Murad bin Dilpul attempted to assassinate Haji Salman bin Jasim, the 
Bahraini Inspector of Police, but he escaped unhurt. Both men were tried 
and given prison sentences."*
In the wake of these incidents the Levy Corps was disbanded and 
Charles Belgrave - the Adviser - was sent to India to enlist new recruits 
of ex-Sepoys from the Punjab. Subsequently a new Police Force was formed 
and from 13th November 1926 Captain L.S. Parke was appointed in charge of 
the same.
More serious was the attempt on Shaikh Hamad's life on the night of 
13th October 1926. The assassin, who fired four shots at the Shaikh, 
missed his target. The attempt revealed the extent to which Hamad*s 
opponents were prepared to go in their resistance to his Administration.
A reward of Rs. 8,000/- was offered for information leading to the 
culprit’s arrest, but without success.
New evidence emerged during the second half of 1929? in consequence
of which Shaikh Hamad was advised to deal with the matter. Subsequently,
the Bahrain Court was convened at the Shaikh's request to investigate the
charges against three members of the Ruling family accused of various acts
2of violence including the attempt on Shaikh Hamad's life. Shaikh
Salman presided over the Court, assisted by Shaikh Abdullah, the Adviser 
and four assessors: two Sunnis and two Shi ahs. The accused were
Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid, known for his earlier opposition to Shaikh 
Hamad, Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah al-Ghatam and Shaikh Humud bin Subah.
Shaikh Ibrahim was charged with the assassination attempt on Shaikh 
Hamad. He was confronted with the evidence which included a letter he 
had written and ten rounds of ammunition which he had given to Habib bin
1 A.R.P.A. 1926. I.O.R. 15/2/296. Note that Haji Salman died on
26 October 193^ • He was described as "a loyal and capable officer". 
A.R.P.A. 1934. I.O.R. 15/2/297.
2 A.R.P.A. 1929. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
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Q
Sa ad for use in the plot. He admitted to writing the incriminating
letter and to handing over the ammunition, but denied any complicity in 
the plot. The Court found him guilty, but Shaikh Hamad stopped short of 
taking action in the case. It is worth noting that when the incident
happened, Ibrahim was supposed to be serving a term of exile on the 
mainland.^
In the second case al-Ghatam, a relation of the Ruling Family, was
retried for ordering an attack in 192^ on the house of a former Baharnah
tenant of his from Farsiyah village. Two men were killed in the attack
and the case was originally tried by Shaikh Hamad, who on finding him
guilty of the charge against him, ordered him to pay the relatives of the
victims Rs. 7 05OO/-. The motive for the attack was the victims'
refusal to pay taxes which had been previously levied by the Shaikhs and
were abolished shortly before the crime took place. After hearing the
new and the old evidence, the Court now decided that the previous
sentences should stand.
In the third case, Shaikh Humud was retried for his involvement in
can attack in 1921 on Haji Husain al- Uraibi, one of his tenants from the
Q
village of Tubli. Uraibi was killed in the attack and his son, who was
gravely wounded, was thrown into prison. The motive for the attack was
long-standing dispute over land-boundaries and water rights. After
hearing the testimony of the witnesses, the Court decided that the
evidence as to his presence at the scene of the assault was insufficient,
but was satisfied that the affair was instigated by him. He was
ordered to pay two blood monies to the relatives of the victim who, as
2
xn the prevxous case, refused to accept the money.
1 C. Belgrave to the P.A. I.O.R. 19/2/88, No. 355, 19-8.1929*
2 Ibid. Note that after his conviction in 1929, Shaikh Humud forfeited 
his post as President of the Majlis al-Tijarah. A.R.P.A. 1929-
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Official Concern Over the Bahrain Reforms - 192A-
By the end of July 192^, the Government of India wrote to the 
Resident expressing their concern about the Bahrain reforms and stating 
their view that they had exceeded what was originally intended. They 
wrote;
MThe Government of India welcomed the proposal that reforms 
should be introduced into the Administration of Bahrain, but had 
no desire to proceed further or faster than they could carry the 
Shaikh wholeheartedly with them. On seeing the details of the 
schemes actually recommended they have felt that both the 
Political Resident and the Political Agent Bahrain have shown a 
tendency to treat the island too much on the lines of a Native 
State in India ...
Answering the above communication, the Resident pointed out that 
Shaikh Hamad was in full agreement over the four chief reforms: the
Customs, Municipal Sanitation, the Revenue Settlement, and Pearling 
reforms. Moreover, he was surprised to find that in the latest edition 
of the Foreign Office ‘Consular Instructions1 Bahrain was listed under: 
British Protected States, along with the Federated Malay States and the 
Principal Native States of India, Nepal and Hadramout. The level of
2
development between these States, he wrote, showed great fluctuations.
In a letter to the Agent in Bahrain, the Resident conveyed the views 
of the Government and noted that only 'moderately conceived objective* 
would receive their approval and that anything which would entail greater 
commitment would be objectionable to them. He put the following question 
to the Agent:
"Shaikh Hamad, I take it, at present holds all the reins of 
Government in his own hands. Is there a likelihood of his 
delegating any powers in the near future to a competent Cabinet 
of indigenous Ministers, or even to one Vazir?"^
1 C. Latimer, Deputy-Secretary to G. of I., to Col. F. B. Prideaux, P.R.
I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 36-X, 25.7.192^.
2 Prideaux to Latimer. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. Wf-S, 2^.8.1924.
3 Prideaux to Daly. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. W - S ,  26.8.192^.
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In his reply to the above letter, the Agent gave a number of reasons
which necessitated the introduction of the reforms. He listed the
original reforms which were planned by the Agency with the approval of
the Shaikh, viz. Justice, Diving, Land Survey and Registration of
Property. The Levies were created as a result of a request from Shaikh
Hamad with a view to preserving Law and Order. The Municipality was
established before the start of the reforms and the municipal schemes
realized thereafter were part of the normal development of any town.
The Bahrain Court, instituted in July 1923, ensured a reasonable measure
of justice for Bahrain subjects and the diving reforms aimed at ensuring
a fair treatment for the divers against their Nakhudas. Land Survey
and Registration of property was meant to stop confiscation of land and
boundary disputes. Daly concluded his letter with some interesting
remarks, indicative of his understanding of the situation in Bahrain:
"That Bahrain is gradually becoming more civilized may or may not 
suit us, but I fail to see how we can stop it. Every year more 
people from here go to Europe in the pearl trade and come back 
somewhat enlightened, and a number of educated people now come 
here frequently from India. It is not possible therefore that 
ideas should remain fixed. It was precisely because Shaikh 
Easa refused to move a little with the times, while his subjects 
were advancing, that gave rise to necessity for a more 
enlightened Ruler.
I think the Government of India may rest assured that nobody 
wants to introduce any more Reforms* or to commit them in any 
way further. Improvements in the administration will however 
gradually take place unless we take it upon ourselves to forbid 
Hamad to carry out his ideas. It seems to me that once the 
*Record of Rights* is completed and the diving books are brought 
into use and the simple rules are got out for the Court the
*reforms* may be allowed to die a natural death.
The above exchanges over the reforms revealed the Government*s lack 
of familiarity with the specific issues of Bahrain which had necessitated 
the policy of reforms in the first place. They also throw light on 
the pressures to which the Agent was subjected while planning and super­
vising the implementation of the reforms, both from the Government and
1 Daly to Prideaux. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 209/9/1, 31.8.1924.
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from the opposing tribal elements as shown in the previous Chapter,
Land Survey and Record of Rights - 192^-26
Land Survey and registration of property was a question of great
urgency to Shaikh Hamad^ Administration. Its implementation would have
halted what was officially described as:
" ... the process of squeezing the indigenous Shiah population 
out of their gardens - a practice which has been going on for 
years.1^
The survey, it was envisaged, would enable the Administration to
levy land revenue from all landowners regardless of class or status-
Much of the bitterness among the Shi ahs was caused by the loss of their
lands over the years. Many cases litigated in Shaikh Hamadfs Court
involved two owners claiming the same plot or garden. To do justice
to the rightful owner, the Resident suggested the following:
MA great deal of the land held by the Alkhalifah family and 
well-to-do Sunnis has undoubtedly been filched from the original 
Bahraini holders. It will not be possible however to rectify
the oppression of years, and I would suggest that when a land 
owner can furnish proof of possession for a definite period, say 
ten years, his right to the land should be considered valid.
As early as November 1923* Shaikh Hamad applied to the Government
of India to help find a team of surveyors to work in Bahrain. In the
following year both Shaikh Hamad and Major Daly dealt with cases which
involved land-disputes, and the experience they gained, while sorting
them out, proved to be of great help to the surveyors later on. Some
such cases obliged the Government to make up for damages sustained by
owners under the old regime :
Resident*s No. 622-S, op. cit. Note that by *gardens* is meant 
date-groves locally known as date-gardens*
2 Ibid. Owners whose lands or date-gardens were illegally seized 
complained to the Political Agency. Their letters of complaint 
are preserved in the Agency File. I.O.R. 15/2/83-
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n . a large number of cases have come to light in which 
Shaikh Isa (generally as the result of false information 
supplied by his fidawis) has sold the same land several times 
over, or in selling a plot of Government land had given documents 
which included neighbouring plots already owned by others. In 
such cases Shaikh Hamad has either compensated the injured 
parties by grants of other plots of Government land, or by 
refunding the purchase money taken by Shaikh Isa.11^
Also in 192^ the Government of Bahrain opened a Land Office to
register sales and transfer of property and to deal with cases of land
disputes, A year later an initial sura of Rs. 25,000 was earmarked for
the implementation of the Survey, to be increased thereafter to Rs. 30,000
to cover the total cost of the scheme. In April of the same year,
i.e. 1923» the Administration in Bahrain asked the Surveyor General of
India to help furnish them with staff to survey Manamah Island north of
Jabal Dukhan, the islands of Moharraq and Sitrah, and to produce maps to
scale for the same. The Administration then estimated the inhabitants
of Manamah at 30,000, and those of Moharraq at 20,000, and described the
land as a stretch of about 13 miles along the coast of the main island,
whose breadth varied in size and whose cultivation included date-groves
and lucerne.^
In May 1925, both Shaikhs Hamad and Abdullah accompanied by Major
Daly, left for an official visit to England. Captain G.L. Mallam, the
then officiating Agent, followed up the preparations for the Survey. At
this time, the Surveyor General drew up a plan which would have cost the
Administration in Bahrain Rs. 70,000. This was in excess of what had
3
earlier been allocated. Eventually, the staff was reduced and the 
cost was brought down to Rs. 39*000, with the Survey to be completed in 
six months.^
1 A.R.P.A. 192^, op. cit.
2 Daly to the Surveyor General of India. I.O.R. 13/2/130, No. 37/9/3, 
28.^.1923.
3 Captain Mallam to Col. C.G. Crosthwaite, Acting Resident. I.O.R. 
15/2/130, No. 78/9/3, 6.9.1925.
Telegram from P.A. to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/130, No. 1017, 
30.9.1925.
In early 1926 the Indian staff began to arrive in Bahrain and during 
March of the same year a Land Registration Department was created to 
replace the earlier Land Registry Office. The new Department was 
initially run by a clerk, a surveyor and an assistant. It took the 
public some time to appreciate the useful work the Department was carrying 
out. This included the maintenance of records of all sales of 
immovable property. On completion of a sale, an official of the
Department was despatched to measure and prepare a plan of the property
in the presence of the owner. A brief description of the property was 
published and a period of one month was allowed for objections to the 
sale. In the absence of objections, the sale was allowed to take place
and a new land deed was made with the plan of the property shown on its 
back. A registration charge of Rs. "10/- was collected on each sale
conducted and a copy of the deed was kept by the Department, and an 
identical copy by the owner.
Also during 1926, the Survey Department was started as a branch of
the Land Registration Department. Its achievements during the year
included the completion of a plane table survey of Manamah city and
surveys of ten villages. In 1927, 369 transfers of property were
registered by the Land Registration Department, as against 200 transfers
in the previous year. Another fifteen villages were surveyed and
Records of Rights and an index of maps for another five v/ere made. The
Department also supplied the Agency and the Bahrain Courts with a large
number of plans and reports on houses and date-gardens which were
involved in claims and counter-claims. The total cost of the survey
carried out until 6th January 1927 amounted to Rs. 3^,000 including the
2
cost of equipment used in the process.
1 Report by the Adviser on the Land Registration Department. I.O.R. 
15/2/296, 20 Shacban 13^5 (23.2.1927).
2 Ibid.
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While carrying out their work the surveyors came across a number of
difficulties, such as overlapping boundaries of plots or gardens, disputes
over water rights, and small gardens with numerous shares. Commenting
upon the same, the Adviser wrote:
"Neither the owners nor the tenants show the slightest sympathy 
with the work, on the contrary they consider it unnecessary 
trouble* The owners who are generally Shaikhs have no knowledge 
of the size of the boundaries of their properties, and if they 
hold documents, the documents do not show the boundaries clearly.
They appoint persons as their Agents to appear with their 
documents with the surveyors. The Bahraini tenants give little 
assistance seeing no benefit in the work, considering that their 
importance as possessors of knowledge of the garden boundaries 
will be diminished when the settlement is over."^
The Institution of the Department of Waqfs
Until 1926 Waqf property in Bahrain was managed by Mutawallis, i.e. 
executors or administrators of Waqfs. Government control of the Waqfs 
had not yet existed making it easier for the former to indulge in corrupt 
practices. Funds left for mosques, schools and charities were mis­
appropriated by those in charge of them. To this effect the Adviser 
wrote:
" «•» the worst offenders in this respect being the old Sunni 
Qadi, ..., and his numerous sons and nephews, who occupy, but do 
not function in, many paid positions in mosques and non-existent 
schools. These facts were so well known that foreign newspapers, 
Egyptian and Iraqi, commented on the subject
In 1927, following the conviction of the Sunni Qadi of Moharraq for
Waqf irregularities, the Government of Bahrain instituted a Department
c 3 cfor Waqfs, Sunni as well as Shi ah. Three Sunni Shara Qadis were
appointed in charge of the Sunni Waqfs: Shaikh Abdul Latif bin ash-
Q
Shaikh Mahmud, Shaikh Abdul Latif bin ash-Shaikh Mohammad bin Sa ad, and
1 Ibid.
2 The Adviser to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/130, No. 328/2?, 25 RabiC II, 
13^ 6.
3 Captain Alban to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/130, No. C-95» 26.8.192?•
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Shaikh Abdul Latif bin Jodar. They were assisted by Mohammad bin Rashid
1
A1 Khalifah, a former judge on the Bahrain Court, and a clerk® The
C C OShi ah Waqfs were entrusted to the Shi ah Qadi Sayed Adnan bin Sayed 
c c 2Alawi, Sayed Husain al-Mutawwa and two clerks* Shortly after it was 
introduced, the Department asked the public to produce all Waqf documents 
in their possession, which were then scrutinised for authenticity, 
registered and duplicated for the records. The Department*s 
administrative and supervisory tasks included accounts of endowments, 
expenditure on repair and maintenance, the collection and disbursement 
of the Waqfs. Two months after it had been started, apart from the 
duplicating of the documents, very little progress was made in respect of 
accounts, registers, and inspection of Waqf property. To assist the
Qadis in their task, Shaikh Hamad appointed a Council of notables, Sunnis 
as well as ShiCahs, presided over by Shaikh Abdullah. A separation was 
made between the purely religious and the administrative affairs. The 
Qadis were entrusted with the religious aspect of the Waqf's work, and the 
lay members of the Council were made responsible for the secular side of 
it. Shortly afterwards, the Qadis became disenchanted with this 
division and with the members of the Council who, they believed, were
Q
encroaching upon their position as exponents of the Shara . On the 
contrary, the public viewed the new measures with satisfaction."^
In December 1927? the three Qadis asked Shaikh Hamad to abolish the 
Council and to restore to them full control of the Waqfs. They even 
organised a petition, signed by Sunnis as well as Shi ahs, in support of 
their case. Nevertheless, the Administration initially ignored their 
demand believing that the Qadis were more important to the Shara Court
1 See Official Notice from Shaikh Hamad to the three Qadis. I.O.R. 
19/2/133, No. 1027/25, 21st Dhul Qacd, 13^5-
2 The Adviser to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/130, No. 119/27, 12th Safar 13^6.
3 No. 328/27, op. cit.
107
1
than to the Waqf Department.
After the death of the ShiCah Qadi Sayed °Adnan in November 1928 
the ShiCah Waqfs were temporarily entrusted to Shaikh Mohammad Ali 
al-Madani, the former*s executor. Thereafter, both Shaikh Abdullah
mi C
bin Mohammad Saleh and Shaikh Ali bin Hasan al-Musa were appointed Shi ah
Qadis. The former was willing to take charge of the Waqfs and was
therefore entrusted with their affairs; Shaikh Ali, on the other hand,
refused to have anything to do with them. The rural Baharnah voiced
their opposition to Shaikh Abdullah*s handling of the Waqfs, and as a
result a Committee of laymen was elected in May 1929 to run their 
2affairs. The Committee consisted of six persons from the villages and
four from Manamah. In order to placate the feelings of Shaikh Abdullah,
3
the Qadi, no president was elected for the Committee , whose members were
so successful in their work that they were able to discover new Waqfs,
and to raise income by Rs. 50»000.
Meantime the Administration decided to leave the Sunni Qadis in
charge of the Sunni Waqfs until such time as the public pressed for State 
5intervention.
The Return of the Dowasir Tribesmen - 1927
The Dowasir departed Bahrain against the wishes of the Government.
As a result, their property was seized and their divers were freed from 
contractual obligations with them and from any debts which they owed to 
them. They were now settled in Ibn Saud*s territory in Dammam, which
1 Belgrave to Col. Barrett. I.O.R. 15/2/150, No. C-17, 18.12.1927-
2 Captain C.G. Prior to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/127* No. C/8^, 29^
6.1929.
5 Belgrave: Notes on Expenditure (Budget) 15^7 (1928-9). I.O.R.
L/P+S/10/10Vf.
b A.R.P.A. 1929* op. cit.
5 A.R.P.A. 1951. I.O.R. 15/2/297.
provided relatively easy access to Bahrain* More important, news of
Ibn Saud pledging to support them in regaining their confiscated property
remained a cause for concern for the Administration in Bahrain.
Individual attempts by the Dowasir to retrieve their belongings from
Bahrain were made from time to time. During January 1924 one of them,
Ibrahim bin Abdul Latif ad-Dosari, delivered a letter to Shaikh Hamad
from Ibn Saud in which the latter requested Hamad to assist Ibrahim in
recovering his two jolly-boats from Budayya0. Shaikh Hamad referred
the matter to the Agent,who, believing that the attempt represented the
thin end of the wedge, refused to concede the demand.
In February of the same year, the Resident wrote to Ibn Saud drawing
his attention to the circumstances which forced the Government of Bahrain
to take action against the Dowasir, to the "unfettered license" which
they enjoyed under Shaikh Isa*s regime, to the resistance they showed to
the changes contemplated by Shaikh Hamad*s Administration, and to their
departure in defiance of Col. Knox*s earlier warning. He also reminded
him that any support for the Dowasir against the Administration in
Bahrain would be in violation of his treaty commitments with Britain.
cThe Dowasir of Budayya , he added, were Bahrain subjects and the decision
to punish them for disobedience was a matter which concerned only the
2
Government of Bahrain and the British Government.
In replying to the Residents above letter, Ibn Saud denied any 
knowledge of talks he was alleged to have held with the Dowasir or of 
promises he had made to them towards recovering their possessions in
Bahrain. Nevertheless, he pointed out that "the Islamic State of Bahrain
c 3and its Shara has no right to confiscate the property of Muhajirin."
1 Telegram from the Resident to the S.S.C. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, 
31.1*1924.
2 Translation of a letter from Col. A.P. Trevor to H.H. the Sultan of
Najd. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1042, No . 49, 14.2.1924.
3 Translation of a letter from the Sultan of Najd to the Resident.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1042, No. 77, 16th Rajab, 1342.
109
Reporting the contents of the Sultan’s letter to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, the Resident commented:
11 ... he styles the recalcitrant tribesmen as ’Muhajirin* and 
seems inclined to give the matter a religious turn and pose as 
the champion of Islamic custom. As a matter of fact, the 
appeal to the Shara has, in the past, always been the last 
resort of the Dowasir. Whenever they have been taken to task 
for misdeeds they have invariably offered to submit to the 
decision of the Shara0 which in the case of so powerful a body 
as they were when in Bahrain, has always resulted in their 
escaping scot-free, since, needless to say, the local Qazis were 
afraid to give a decision against thera."^
During March 192^ f, the Dowasir appealed to the Sunni Qadi in Bahrain
to intercede with Shaikh Hamad on their behalf, but the attempt failed
owing to Major Daly’s opposition. His aim was to see that they
received sufficient punishment for non-compliance with the laws of Bahrain,
and that their return to Bahrain should not take place before the arrival
of the Levies. Towards this end, he wrote:
"To allow them to return would be a distinct breach of faith 
and reversal of the policy of the reforms, aimed at securing 
reasonable rule for the Shiahs, and after the solemn warnings 
they received before they left, it would be construed by them 
as a sign of weakness to allow them to return."^.
The status of the Dowasir of Bahrain was highlighted by an incident 
of 26th August 192^ in which a Dosari nakhuda from Budayya0, Ibrahim bin 
Buti, tied a diver to the mast of a boat anchored off Manamah pier and 
left him naked without food or water. On being told of the diver’s 
ordeal, the Assistant Political Agent ordered his release and the arrest 
of the offending nakhuda, who was tried and sentenced to four months 
imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code. When Ibn Saud learnt of the 
case, he demanded the nakhuda’s immediate release, arguing that he was a 
subject of Najd regardless of the fact that the crime was committed in 
Bahrain. It was pointed out to Ibn Saud that the accused was a Dosari 
from Bahrain, therefore a Bahrain subject, and that as he had committed
1 Letter from A.P. Trevor to the S.S.C. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^2, No. 1^/ 
163, 2.3.192^.
2 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 13/2/8 7, No. 88-C, 31.3*192^.
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the crime in Bahrain he was answerable to Bahrain laws in the same way
as Bahrainis in Najd were subject to Najdi Courts for crimes committed 
1
in Najd territory.
Early in September 1926, Col, F.B, Prideaux, the. then Resident 
visited Bahrain, His visit lasted from 3rd to 19th September, At 
this time, Major Barrett had succeeded Daly as the new Political Agent 
in Bahrain, There followed an interview between Shaikh Hamad, the
p c
Resident and three Dosari Chiefs, Abdul Latif bin Ibrahim , Isa bin Sa ad
and Ahmad bin Abdullah bin Hasan. They complained of the heavy taxes
levied from them by the Wahhabi Amir of Qatif, and raised the question
of their readmission to Bahrain. The Resident warned them not to expect
to be allowed back as privileged tribesmen, a position they had formerly
arrogated to themselves. More specifically, they were told that:
" ••• they could never again claim to be internally independent 
of the Ruler of Bahrain. They would have to pay the same taxes 
as other agriculturists and traders, they must be submissive to 
the Shaikh*s Courts ... , and they should accept the police post 
which had been established in their chief town. Their official 
headmen would be nominated and could be changed, if necessary, 
by the Ruler, and their Bahraini tenants and negro divers be 
fully protected and have equal rights of citizenship with others 
of their class."
These conditions were disagreeable to Ahmad bin Abdullah, who had 
earlier ordered his men out of Bahrain, and therefore he rejected them 
and discouraged the other two Chiefs from accepting them.
When Colonel Haworth succeeded Prideaux as Resident in January 1927* 
he paid two visits to Bahrain on 29th January and again on 2*fth February. 
During his second visit, which lasted for nine days, he learnt about a
1 Daly to Prideaux. I.O.R. 1 5 /3 /V 6 , no number, 13.10.192^.
2 Note that Shaikh Hamad showed his sympathy to the Dowasir by retaining
the brother of Abdul Latif bin Ibrahim in his personal service.




letter which Ibn Saud had sent to Shaikh Hamad asking him to return the
confiscated property to the Dowasir. Shaikh Hamad viewed this
request with favour and spoke of the •disgrace1 he had felt over the
confiscation of the Dowasir property carried out in his name. The
Resident concurred with the Shaikh*s views and agreed to allow the
Dowasir to return to Bahrain, on condition that they abandoned their claim
to special privileges and subjected themselves to the laws and rules of
Bahrain on a par with all the citizens. On his part Shaikh Hamad
assured the Resident of their willingness to return as ordinary
individuals and to accept the police post established in their tom. In
a letter to the Government, the Resident described the Ruler^s ties with
the Dowasir as follows:
"In this reference it must be noted that Alkhalifah are a Sunni 
people governing a Shica population, and they do not desire to 
weaken themselves by the expulsion of a powerful Sunni support."^
Continued opposition to their return to Bahrain amounted, in Arab
eyes, to disallowing an Arab Ruler to forgive an Arab tribe, he wrote,
adding that:
" ... there was no point that the odium of keeping them out against 
the obvious wishes of the Ruler should rest on US«M2
Having returned to Bahrain, their first task was to retrieve their
belongings. They then asked the Government of Bahrain to return to them
the rents collected from their property during their absence, and also the
cash which their divers owed to them. Already, the State had to buy
back some of their houses which it had sold earlier, and to compensate
their owners for money spent on maintenance and repair. Besides
this, the Government had to call back all leases of date-gardens owned
by the Dowasir, which had been leased out after their departure. This




operation cost the State Rs* ^0,000. Furthermore, they asked for
Rs* 6^f,000 in lieu of rents collected by the State while they were away,
plus Rs. 200,000 to 300)000 as compensation for debts owed by their
1
previous divers and which had been cancelled by the State.
In a gesture of goodwill towards Ibn Saud, who Shaikh Hamad admired
as the great Arab ruler, Shaikh Hamad decided to concede to the Dowasir
all of their demands. In support of this decision the Shaikh informed
the Agent that the confiscation of the property of a tribe leaving a
Ruler's dominions was contrary to Arab customs, and that he had agreed to
it against his wishes. He sympathized with the Dowasir because they had
left Bahrain, not in defiance, but out of fear of Government action against
them. Unlike A1 ben CAli before them, the Dowasir did nothing to disturb
the peace of the island. The Agent disagreed with the Shaikh's last
statement and drew his attention to the outrages they had committed against
the people of Ali and against the two Shi ah Alims. Moreover, he told
him that the Dowasir affair had nothing to do with Bin Saud's wishes. To
which Hamad replied:
" ... Bin Saud was the one big Arab Ruler and it was natural for 
all smaller Shaikhs such as himself to look up to him and try to 
please him.''^
Shaikh Salman bin Hamad and his uncle Shaikh Abdullah agreed with the 
Adviser that Shaikh Hamad was unduly receptive to the Dowasir demands.^ 
Meantime the Agent suggested the return to them of only one-third of the 
rents collected from their property - sufficient to enable them to 
re-establish themselves. On the other hand, the Resident wrote to the 
Government that compliance with all their demands would be interpreted by
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/8?, No. 93^, 20th Shawwal 13^5-
2 Major Barrett to the Secretary to the Political Resident. I.O.R.
L/P+S/10/10^2, No. C-53, Hf.lf.1927.
3 No. 93^, op. cit.
1+ No. C-53, op. cit.
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them as a sign of weakness rather than forgiveness and would convey the
impression that British attitude towards them was rash in the first place*
He concurred with the Agent in that:
11 ••• no diver shall be forced to go back to the Dowasir with his 
previous debt maintained against him. The pearl diving trade is 
built upon a form of slavery dependent upon the debts of the 
divers; and the cancellation of such debts will certainly be a 
very severe handicap to the Dowasir tribe
Leniency for the Prisoners
During May 1925* while Daly was away on leave, Shaikh Hamad approached
the acting Agent with a request to sound out the Government about grant of
leniency to four prisoners, Bahrain subjects, who were serving prison
sentences in a Karachi jail in connection with the second outrage at
Sitrah. The Shaikh was encouraged by the improved relations between the 
cSunnis and the Shi ahs and by a general atmosphere of stability within the 
country.^
The Shaikh's suggestion received the approval of the Resident who
recommended it to the Government v/ith a request that leniency should also
3be extended to the two Hasawis sentenced in the same case. The Shaikh's 
application came at a time when the Government of India was considering the 
legality of imprisoning the Shaikh's subjects in an Indian jail. The men
1 Gol. Haworth to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^2, No. 138-S, 1.5-1927.
2 Translation of a letter dated 1st Rabi° I, 1 3 ^  (20.9-1925) from Shaikh
Hamad bin Isa Alkhalifah - Deputy Ruler of Bahrain, to the P.A. I.O.R. 
15/2/88. The four prisoners were: Salim bin 'Ambar - personal servant
of Salman bin Khalid Alkhalifah, sentenced to ten years imprisonment, 
Ibrahim bin Mubarak bu-Khammas - eight years, Abu Humaidah to three 
years, Jasim bin Abdullah Daghath to two years. Daly to Captain B.S. 
Horner, Secretary to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 29/1/16, 
1^.2 .1926.
3 Col. C.G. Crosthwaite, P.R. to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 3^6-S,
23.9-1925.
were then released, and on arrival in Bahrain they were kept in the 
Shaikh's prison for a short period of time and were let out on 6th
-i
February 1926.
V/hen Daly returned to office on 2^ -th November 1925 he submitted 
certain clarifications to the Resident regarding the circumstances which 
surrounded the initial trial, noting that the procedures followed by the 
Shaikh at that time conformed to the instructions of the then Resident.
He blamed the Government for failing to question the legality of the 
Shaikh's action. The men's release from the prison by the Shaikh without 
retrial, enabled them to escape with inadequate punishment, he wrote.
On 16th March 1926 the two Hasawis were released. When asked about 
their role in the attack, they admitted that they had acted on orders of 
the Khalids.
By the end of July 1926, Ali bin Khalid, sentenced to banishment from
Bahrain for his part in the first attack at Sitrah, returned to Bahrain
without securing Shaikh Hamad's prior consent. He was arrested, tried
by Shaikh Hamad's Court and sentenced to six months imprisonment for
breaching the Court's earlier order. Commenting upon Shaikh Hamad's
action, Daly wrote:
"Although the punishment of six months imprisonment for a ... 
murder cannot be considered adequate from our point of view, the 
fact that a member of AlKhalifah can be sent to prison at all is 
so revolutionary that it cannot fail to have much moral effect on 
badly behaved members of the family .
In September 1926, Major Barrett replaced Daly as the new Agent in 
Bahrain. Early in January 1927» Colonel Haworth took over from Prideaux
1 No. 29/1/16, op. cit.
2 Ibid.
3 Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. W V 1 6, 29.3.1926.
k Daly to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 73/5/18, 1.8.1926.
5 Ibid.
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as Resident and suggested to the Government a review of the British 
position in Bahrain. The Governments response to this and the changes 
made as a result, are discussed separately in the next section. Suffice 
us to mention here that the reassessment resulted in changes in policy 
outlined below:
"It is the policy of the Agency to efface itself, as far as possible, 
and except for giving a lead in matters appertaining to Education 
and the Municipalities on one or two occasions ... this policy has 
been consistently followed. Sir Denys Bray's advice that direct 
British control should be relaxed even at the sacrifice of a 
certain amount of efficiency is being borne in mind
As a result the Shaikh was allowed a greater say over the domestic
affairs of Bahrain than previously. At this time, Ibrahim bin Khalid
A1 Khalifah, sentenced to death for his part in the second outrage at
Sitrah, corresponded with Shaikh Hamad hoping to negotiate terms for
returning to Bahrain. Having caught wind of the arrangements which were
being made behind the scenes, the Adviser wrote a protracted letter to the
2
Agent which the latter described as 'Belgrave*s letter of protest*.
The letter referred to the Shaikh's efforts to effect reconciliation 
between the Khalids and the Baharnah, and that the arrangements being made 
had an air of disingenuity about them since their aim was to persuade the 
witnesses to retract their earlier evidence. The injured party would be
c
compensated and the Khalids would be saved a retrial by the Shara Court.
Belgrave concluded:
"In your (i.e. Agent's) letter to Shaikh Hamad you point out that 
murder is a crime against the State and that the prosecution for 
murder does not depend on the wish of the injured parties to 
prosecute ...
In the exchanges that followed over the matter between the Shaikh and 
the Agent, the latter underlined the gravity of the Khalids' guilt and the
1 A.R.P.A. 1927. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
2 Major Barrett to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. C-6 8, 1^-.2.1928.
3 Belgrave to Barrett. I.O.R. 15/2/88, no number, 10.2.1928.
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enormity of the evidence against them. But the Shaikh insisted that they 
were guiltless and that when he sentenced them to death, he acted not out 
of conviction but rather a desire not to go against the wishes of Major 
Daly. Moreover, the Shaikh described the original trial as illegal 
because it was not conducted by the Shara°. Disagreeing with the Shaikh's 
views, the Agent reminded him that there were twenty-seven witnesses for 
the prosecution in the Wadyan case, and that in civilized countries many 
individuals were executed on evidence much less incriminating than had been
recorded in this case. His advice for the Shaikh was to send them to the
c 1
Shara Court for retrial. The Agent reported the matter to the
Resident as follows:
"I think it is a point gained that a Persian Gulf Ruler should set 
himself to gain his end by suborning witnesses and compensating 
the injured rather than by main force and the murder of Shiah 
opponents, as would have been the case five or six years ago.
If the witnesses stick to their story and the Qadis are strong the 
accused will be convicted. It is possible however that Ibrahim 
and Salman may be acquitted by the Qadis or that some compromise 
may be arranged but in either case they will have been brought to 
trial and other members of the Ruling family will have been put to 
an amount of trouble and inconvenience to themselves that v;ill 
have taught them that they are not above the lav; and that the 
Baharnah are not animals to be killed whenever they do not please 
them ...
On 28th April 19^8 the Khalids, Ibrahim and Salman, and their relative 
Abdur Razzaq returned to Bahrain. Tv/o days later, Shaikh Hamad held a 
Majlis with the aim of reconciling them with the Baharnah. It was 
attended by the Shi ah Qadi, and by Hasan bin Marzouq, representative of 
the minors of the victims and headman of Sitrah where the attack happened, 
Abd Ali bin Rajab, an influential Baharanah and the Adviser. The latter 
asked the minors if they were willing to drop prosecution, to which they 
replied in the affirmative, adding that they were in receipt of assurances
1 C~6 8 , op. cit.
2 Ibid.
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from the Shaikh to the effect that the Khalids would not indulge in
1offences against them in future# A proclamation prepared in advance of
the meeting was read out which, inter alia, contained the following:
"The Bahrainis who are connected with the Sitrah question have 
informed me (i.e. Shaikh Hamad) in the presence of Sayed Adnan 
the Shiah Qadi in Bahrain, that they have withdrawn this case, for 
this reason we have permitted the sons of the Shaikh Khalid to 
return to Bahrain.
For the first time, since Daly's departure from Bahrain, Shaik Hamad 
acted contrary to the Agent's advice by not ordering a retrial of the
c
Khalids before the Shara Court. Nevertheless, the Shaikh's decision
and the accommodation reached thereon, received the Agent's approval for
the following reasons:
"The proposals for this settlement had obviously emanated from 
Shaikh Hamad, and I considered it best not to oppose it. I 
understand that blood-money will be accepted and that the 
equivalent of the property looted will be returned to the people 
of Sitrah.
I trust that the biggest grievance which Shaikh Isa had against 
the British Government has now been removed and that at the same 
time the Shiahs are protected against a recurrence of the 
disgraceful events of '\923»u^
The above accommodation involved monthly allowances ordered for the
three offenders by the Shaikh, and also the return of their property to
them which had been seized earlier by the State. Commenting on this,
the Resident noted:
"Bahrain has much changed. The Khalifah family are fully aware 
that they cannot now indulge in their old practices and in the 
circumstances I consider it advisable to accept the compromise 
which the Baharnah have made and so terminate the incident. So 
doing is more likely to bring the Khalifah and Baharnah together 
than keeping open a source of dislike and distrust between them."^
1 Belgrave to Barrett. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 52, 3«5*1928.
2 Translation of a Proclamation No. 290/17 of 1346. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/ 
104-2.
3 Barrett to the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/104-2, No. C-151* 4-.5.1928.
4- Adviser to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 977/2A, 22nd Dhul Qa°d,
1346.
5 Col. Haworth to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/88, No. 203-S, 16.5.1928.
The Consolidation of the British Position in Bahrain; Appeasement and
Indirect Control
During September 1927 Colonel L.B.H. Haworth, the Resident, sent two 
comprehensive despatches to the Government of India on the subject of 
Bahrain and its future status. Y/hile expressing concern about 
criticisms levelled by the outside world at excessive British involvement 
in Bahrain, Haworth singled out three factors which directly affected the 
British position there: (a) Persia's persistent claim to the Sovereignty
of Bahrain and the Foreign Office's reluctance to discuss the status of 
that place; (b) the resurgence of Wahhabi power; (c) the retirement 
of Shaikh Isa from active rulership and the appointment of Shaikh Hamad 
to the same with whose consent Britain was intervening in Bahrain.
He then dealt with each factor in its historical perspective in great 
detail. Persia's claim to the sovereignty of Bahrain, he wrote, was 
based on the Persian occupation of the islands in 1602, when they expelled 
the Portuguese, and when they regained them in 1753, and finally lost them 
to the Arabs in 1783, discounting the fact that the islands came under 
Muscat in 1718, and subsequently under the Huwalah Arabs and the Wahhabis, 
in addition to long periods in which the Shaikhs were independent. The 
Persian case also relied on the unratified agreement which Captain Bruce 
negotiated in 1822, and on the Foreign Office communication of 1869 in 
which Lord Clarendon allegedly acknowledged the justice of the Persian 
protest.
Haworth pointed out the flimsiness of the Persian case and commented
on British control of Bahrain's affairs which was, according to him, in
excess of British rights there, thus:
"But the real danger is not from Persia, since, if the point was 
forced on us, we should have no hesitation and no difficulty in 
disposing of her very illusionary claims. But the resulting
1 Col. Haworth to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1041, No. 294-S, 1.9*1927.
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investigation would show the weakness of our own position in 
Bahrain, based, as it is, upon the continued content of the 
Sheikh. Our treaties give us no right to our present 
domination, a point mentioned by Sheikh Isa in his petition to 
Government, and which would certainly come out before an 
international tribunal. All that we could prove would be the 
independence of Bahrein and our protection based on custom and 
consent, but should Sheikh Hamad desire it, or should Sheikh Isa 
intervene, any international tribunal would limit our powers of 
action in the islands. Except so far as dependent upon the 
goodwill of the Sheikh our past protection v/ould give us 
internationally no ground for maintaining our position in the 
future ...
British rights in the Persian Gulf relied not merely on the 
agreements concluded ... but on the custom, consent, and long«- 
established relations between the local chiefs and the Government 
of India.
Persia is not then the real danger except in so far as she would
expose the weakness of our position ...
The future danger to our policy is in the growth of the Wahabi
power and its extension to the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf."^
Haworth believed that the halting of Ibn Saud*s regular subsidy
(mid-1923) left him free to pursue his own policies towards his relations
with smaller Shaikhdoms, Bahrain included. He favoured more stable
relations with Ibn Saud, such as had existed under the Treaty of 19'1?-
In his second despatch Hav/orth examined the development of British
interest in the purely internal affairs of Bahrain. This interest began
in 1903 when Shaikh Isa refused to consider a suggestion from Lord Curzon,
the then Viceroy, to reform the Customs by appointing a British Director,
arguing that it was a matter which concerned him alone. After an
incident in 190^ - in which attacks were made on Persians and on a German
subject, British interference in the Shaikh*s administration became more
Q
crucial. When the Shi ahs in Bahrain were subjected to gross 
mistreatment during 1917 and after, Tehran protested to the British 
Government who, as a result, prevailed upon the Shaikh to introduce 
reforms, but to no avail. Thereafter, Shaikh Isa was retired and his
1 Ibid., paras. 69-7^•
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elder son Hamad was entmsted with real power and reforms were enacted.
The Shaikh's lack of iniative in matters of administration led to the Agent
assuming greater responsibilities and therefore occupying a position of
prominence on the Shaikh's Administration. Hence, the Agent's role
was transformed from one of extending advice to becoming actively engaged
in administrative affairs. On this point, he wrote:
" ... it is still obvious to the world that Shaikh Hamad does what 
the Political Agent wants him, that he frequently does what he 
does not want, because the Political Agent tells him."^
The Resident illustrated his argument by mentioning the case of the
Dowasir whose property was seized with the approval of the British
Government of India, though carried out under the Shaikh's seal. The
people of Bahrain were aware of the Shaikh's sympathies with the Dowasir
and that he punished them against his will. To help them retrieve their
property, Shaikh Hamad had personally asked their chiefs to get him a
letter of recommendation from Ibn Saud in order to facilitate his task
with the British Government.
Haworth viewed British presence in the Administration of Bahrain as
too obvious, represented as it was by a British Adviser who was also
co-judge on the Shaikh's Court, a British Director of Customs, and a
British Chief of Police, all of whom were appointed by the British
Government. He wrote:
"The British are still looked upon as the rulers, and how indeed 
can it be otherwise? We make and unmake rulers, we appoint 
administrators and officials. Every important point is referred 
to us • * • ” 2
Commenting upon the concept of independence and how it was construed by
the Shaikh, the Resident noted:
"We have, however, always publicly insisted upon his (i.e. the 
Shaikh's) independence and he has imbibed the idea of the fact 
that he is independent.
1 Col. Haworth to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10V1, No. 295-S, 1.9-1927.
2 Ibid., para. *+8.
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But with an uneducated Arab tribesman independent means the power 
to do many things which we do not approve. It means administer- 
ing the islands for the benefit of the Chiefs of the tribe to which 
he belongs, it means - as it means in many native States in India
- the exploiting of the people for the rulers, it means to a
bigoted Sunni the treating of the Shiahs as people of an 
unprivileged class .
He concluded by asking the Government to prevail upon the Shaikh to
apply for British protection, and urged her to extend it to him. The
British staff on the Administration of Bahrain could then, he maintained,
be reduced to one man and the Shaikh would be seen as the actual ruler,
as was the case in an Indian State. He wrote:
"Bahrain is more important to us than it ever has been. There 
is little doubt that with the development of Persia our strength 
on that coast will be weakened. It is for us to see that it is 
not weakened with the Arabs as well.
The Persian Gulf is vital to us as a point on the line from which 
our oil comes. Bahrain is a key point on the air route to India 
and the East, and without it we could not maintain a service.
We cannot lose Bahrain.
Sir R.H* Clive, the British Minister at Tehran, received the
Resident’s suggestion with grave reservations. He was largely concerned
about the impact on the Anglo-Persian relations of declaring Bahrain as
a British Protectorate. He demanded the postponement of this step to
such time when the outstanding issues were settled with Persia and a new
3treaty was negotiated and signed.
Haworth’s views brought about a visit to Bahrain by Sir Denys Bray, 
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, which lasted from 3rd to 
5th November 1927* The purpose of the visit was to assess the process 
of reforms and the extent of British involvement in Bahrain. He 
described the British position there as 'unassailable’ and was satisfied
1 Ibid., paras. 51-2.
2 Ibid., paras. 57, 60.
3 Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^1, No. E ^99/
18V91, 2^.10.1927-
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with British rights which were acquired by virtue of Britain's treaties
with the Shaikh. These rights gave the British Government control of
Bahrain's foreign affairs and jurisdiction over foreign nationals.
Although he was pleased with the reforms already effected, he saw British
influence in excess of British rights there. He favoured a halt to the
process of reforms:
" ... matters should be given a somewhat different turn or the 
Arab facade will fall and we shall be left with a British Island 
pure and simple."^
Bray desired the curtailment of the Government's commitments to the
Shaikh's Administration, thereby minimising the risk of losing Trucial
Arab Shaikhs to Ibn Saud whose popularity among them was on the increase.
He advocated a set of new goals:
"Our aim should be not efficiency, for with this as our goal we 
could stop nowhere, but to demonstrate that an Arab State can 
advance on Western lines under British protection and yet retain 
its Arab character.
British rule in Bahrain, he wrote, was 'over~>advertised* by the
presence of a Punjabi Police Force, uniformed as an Indian Regiment. He
favoured the gradual withdrawal of the Punjabis and their replacement
by Arab elements; the reduction of Britons to one instead of three and
the transformation of the Agent’s role to one of advice and supervision
rather than actual participation in the administration. He envisaged a
greater role for the Shaikh:
"It is no doubt very difficult to make the amiable Hamad rule, 
but it is better that he should rule and make mistakes than that 
he should rule and make no mistakes at all.”
Bray also tentatively recommended that a Council be appointed to run
the country on the following lines;
" ... it would seem worthwhile to give a trial to a Council with 
Hamad as President and Abdulla and Mr. Belgrave and a third Arab 
as members.1'
5





Concern Over the Westernization of Bahrain; A Reappraisal of the Reforms 
-  1929
In May 1929, the Government of India wrote to the Resident enquiring
about the extent to which it was possible to retrace the steps taken since
the commencement of the reforms. They feared that the modernization of
the Administration in Bahrain might backfire:
"As matters stand now, however, it would seem that the process has 
over-run its original limited objective. There are in Bahrain 
today a British Financial Adviser, a British Police Officer, and 
a British Customs Officer; that is, actually more administration 
than in an ordinary Indian State ...
There is an imminent danger that with this example before their 
eyes the minds of the smaller Arab rulers may be turned 
increasingly in the direction of Ibn Saud, as the greatest Arabian 
figure. Their fear of Wahabi absorption may be less than their 
fear of losing their local and Arab individuality in exchange for 
an uncongenial Western regime, however efficient and profitable 
that regime may be."^
They issued instructions to the Resident requiring him to consider 
the situation in Bahrain with regard to their remarks above, and to 
decide the extent to which it was feasible to go back on the reforms.
In June 1929, C.G. Prior, the Agent in Bahrain, acting on a request from 
the Resident, responded with a report on the reforms already completed, 
the extent of British interference in the Administration of Bahrain, and 
whether It was practical to reverse the process. He went over British 
relations with Shaikh Isa from 1904 until 1923, underlining areas of 
disagreement, the shortcomings of the Shaikhfs Administration and the 
introduction of reforms such as organisation of State finances, the Civil 
List, reform of the Custom House, the Opening of Government Offices, reform 
of the Diving Industry, Survey of towns and villages, the creation of the 
Levy Corps, the Bahrain Court, and reform of the Education System and 
Waqfs.^
1 Deputy-Secretary to G. of I., to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/127,
No. F164-N/29, 28.5.1929.
2 C.G. Prior to the Resident. I.O.R. No0 C“84, opQ cit.
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The Agent praised the enlightening impact of the reforms upon the 
people and the prosperity their enactment had engendered in the country, 
citing the triple rise in the value of land as an example. To this 
effect he wrote:
"The Bahama have had security and justice for the first time for 
150 years and have come to think of their rights. Divers 
serfage has been much ameliorated and there is little or no 
opposition to Government activities and crimes of violence have 
almost ceased ...
Instead of resisting reforms the public spirit now demands them, 
and an instance of this is the way in which the Shiahs have 
undertaken the charge of their Waqfs
Prior saw the services of the existing British staff on the
Administration of Bahrain as indispensable. The Adviser controlled the
finances of the State and acted as Co-judge on the Bahrain Court. The
Director of Customs, Hr. de Grenier, offered five years of invaluable
service to the State. As chief revenue officer he had increased State
revenue by 20% without raising customs duty. 97% of the revenue accruing
to the State was the result of his efforts. The Shaikh was satisfied
with the Director’s work and should the Government order his departure,
state revenue and the reforms would suffer immensely.
The institution of the Bahrain Court enhanced people’s confidence in
justice. Its abolition, Prior noted, would restore the old days of
favouritism and venality, and moreover:
" ... because most of the crimes of violence would be by Sunnis 
and against Shiahs, hence on the case being referred to the Sunni 
Qadi they would escape scot free or with light punishment ...
I feel sure that the Government of India could not favour a return 
to the chaos of the old regime where no State Court existed, and 
nothing to take its place except the Sharac ... , and the 
innumerable Courts maintained by petty Shaikhlings purely as a 
vehicle for their oppression,'^




and the public was showing greater appreciation for the various activities
of the Land Department, Prior adduced two reasons for retaining the
services of the British Commandant of Police: (a) the Forced great
contribution towards reducing the rate of crimes of violence; (b) the
imminent arrival of foreign employees of the Oil Company to start drilling
operations making his stay on the Force highly desirable.
Finally, he stressed the fact that there was nothing in the reforms
which could be discarded with impunity. What was earlier regarded as
♦startling innovations * had later on become an essential aspect of the
establishment, appreciated by the majority of the people. As regards
British relations with the Arab Shaikhs of the Gulf, he wrote:
"If we wish to have any influence with smaller Arab rulers, who 
have leanings towards Bin Saud, we must be able to offer them 
something in return for their friendship other than demands or 
threats,
It must be remembered that if we will not assert ourselves in 
Bahrain, others will, and the ground is steadily prepared for 
Bin Saud by his powerful and assiduous agent,
In a subsequent letter to the Government, the Resident concurred in 
the views of the Agent and refuted the claim that Bahrain was being 
hastily subjected to Westernisation, Government policy towards the 
Shaikh, he wrote, was motivated by "fear of interference", and that even 
the action which they reluctantly took against the Shaikh in 1923 was 
pressed upon them by the Foreign Office, Barrett was opposed to the 
reduction of the British Staff on the Administration of Bahrain since it 
would pave the way for *all the old oppressors* to resume their earlier 
practices. To illustrate the Shaikh*s soft character, he cited a recent 
incident in which divers who were protesting at the reduction of advances 
forced the Shaikh to withdraw a decision which he had taken the previous 
day. In the circumstances, how could Shaikh Hamad be left to cope
1 Ibid.
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without an Adviser, he enquired. He also praised the efforts of the
Director of Customs who had raised the annual revenue to over eleven Lakhs
of Rupees in contrast to the earlier days of the Hindu Contractor when
1
the State lost one Lakh of Rupees every year.
While pointing out the achievements of the reforms, Barrett
anticipated a large increase in the trade of the islands especially after
the establishment of the British air route. His concluding remarks to
the Government were equally interesting:
,fIn time the good works and the tyranny from v/hich the British 
rescued Bahrain and especially the Shiah Baharnah will be 
forgotten, and only the privileged position of the British 
occupying the chief posts will be noticed.
To avoid the odium which would fall on Britain, in course of 
time, from this cause, it is necessary to educate natives of 
Bahrain to take the place of the British Officials ...
Bahrain is a large trading centre with a large foreign population.
It is not part of Najd and would never be happy under Wahhabi 
rule. The real Bahraini, though an Arab, is a Shiah not a 
Sunni; and the history of the islands shov/s that for long 
periods it was subject to Persia. This, although not leading 
to any desire for Persian rule, must modify the tribal outlook*
If we interfere in Bahrain to put down misrule, depose its Shaikh, 
introduce reforms and then permit the country to sink back in the 
slough from which we have rescued it, then indeed we have forfeited 
Arab respect and cleared the way for Bin Saud. In 1920 Major 
Dickson reported 'our position in the island is founded on fear 
and not respect*. Nov; it is founded on respect. The Trucial 
Chiefs now see that our intervention has benefited Bahrain and 
even its Chiefs ... in time their aversion from contact with the 
European may be overcome through the influence of a civilized 
Bahrain. It will not be overcome through a reversion of Bahrain 
to the conditions of 1920 ...
All Arabs criticized our action in Bahrain when the supporters of 
the old regime were crying out under chastisement. The 
chastisement was salutary and Shaikh Isa's supporters have accepted 
the present regime, which is not unduly Westernized.
The Government of India's intention to reverse the process of reform
3m  1929* was clearly a hasty suggestion. It was obviously motivated by 
the dictates of wider policies and by unsubstantiatedboncern that Bahrain
1 Col. C.C.J. Barrett, P.R., to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 385-S, 
28.8.1929.
2 Ibid.
3 See Government's Letter No. 164-N/29, op. cit.
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was being exposed to excessive Western influence threatening to militate 
against Britain's friendly relations with other Shaikhs of the Gulf.
Originally, the Foreign Office urged the introduction of the reforms 
with a view "to ensure equitable treatment of Shiahs1'. By 1929 there 
remained much in the local administration which needed reforming. The 
events of the early 1930s, subject of a subsequent chapter, revealed a 
significant number of inadequacies especially affecting the Shaikh's
c
Shi ah Arab subjects in such areas as Education, Law and representation 
on various Government Councils. The desire to dismantle the reforms 
showed that the Government was a remote authority out of touch with the 
real problems of Bahrain. The arguments put forth by her representatives 
in the area in favour of the reforms confirmed that they were indispensable 
to the administration there and that Government fears about their 
negative impact upon other Shaikhs were exaggerated.
With the Persians asserting their national rights over their 
territory, Britain had to transfer her interests from Persia to a more 
congenial place. The Arab littoral of the Gulf was the natural choice 
and Bahrain, cut off from mainland Arabia and with which Britain had 
treaty relationships, offered the ideal place. The Persian threat to 
take the issue of Bahrain to the League of Nations during the late 1920s 
gave rise to serious speculations about the amount of control Britain 
exercised over the administration of Bahrain which, according to British 
officials, exceeded British rights as provided by the Treaties signed 
with the Shaikh.
The decision to appease the Bahrain Shaikhs, and to allay the fears 
of other rulers of the Trucial Coast, took the form of allowing the 
Dowasir to return to Bahrain, followed by the arrival of the Khalids and 
their subsequent reconciliation with the Baharnah regardless of the 
Agent's advice to order a retrial by the Shara Court. Equally 
important was the easing of British control of the Administration thereby 
allowing the Shaikh a bigger role in its affairs.
1 F.O. Letter No. E 13^76/1644/91, op. cit.
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During the tenure of Daly, who supervised the reforms, Shaikh Hamad 
had prosecuted the guilty members of the tribes and of his own family. 
After his departure from office, the Shaikh exonerated those very members, 




Pearl diving was the most important traditional industry in Bahrain,
Indeed before the advent of oil in 1932, pearl-diving was the mainstay
of Bahrain's economy. The livelihood of many merchants, creditors,
brokers, boat-owners and thousands of divers depended on the outcome of
the season. Dealers from Europe and India gathered every year in
Bahrain to buy the season's catch. Paris was the centre of the
European pearl trade , and Bahrain pearls were either taken there direct
or sent to Bombay where they were polished, pierced, graded and
re-exported to European capitals. In addition to pearls, Bahrain also
exported oyster shells to Europe and Zanzibar, though this aspect of the
pearling industry was of far less economic importance to Bahrain. A
successful season was advantageous to both the people and the local
Government. Money in the hands of the diving community meant enhanced
buying power, and this in turn ensured greater imports and therefore
increased revenue for the Government, which until 193^ relied chiefly on
2
the income from the Customs. Boat-building and sail-making were two 
other aspects of the traditional economy which flourished alongside
1 In 1923 several Bahrain merchants were reported to have visited 
Paris to dispose of their pearls. See A.R.P.A., 1923? op. cit.
2 On the economic significance of the pearling industry the Agent 
wrote in 1923:
" ... all the trade of Bahrain practically, is indirectly due to the 
pearling, and the ruler and his entire family and countless hangers- 
on live out of the Customs which indirectly result therefrom 




Pearling provided employment for the divers for about half the year.
During the rest of the year, the divers were supposed to live on their
earnings, but this was hardly the case. Boat-Nakhudas, i.e. skippers,
required their contractual divers to carry out certain duties during the
2off-season in houses or date-gardens owned by the farmer.
The main diving season, al-Ghaws al-Kabir, lasted from mid-May to 
the end of September, during which time contractual divers had to dive 
for their Nakhudas. The main season \\ras preceded by a less important 
and much shorter period of diving known as Khanchieh, and succeeded by a 
similar activity called Raddah, diving, i.e. the return of the boats to 
the banks after the great season. Divers were not obliged to dive for 
their Nakhudas during the Khanchieh or the Raddah diving. Every year 
the Shaikh issued a proclamation announcing the Rakbah: the start of
the season, and the Qufal: the closing date. The Rakbah was marked by 
traditional chanting and singing, with the families of the men bidding 
them farewell and wishing them a safe and prosperous trip.
1 According to official reports the numbers of new sailing craft built 
and sold in Bahrain were 119 in 1926, 7*1- in 1927, and 89 in 1928.
More craft were built in 192.6 to make up for the 30 or AO damaged by 
a cyclone which hit Bahrain on 1-2 October 1925* From 1930
onwards locally built launches were fitted with imported motor-
engines. Their numbers over selective years were as follows:
1933 ... 17, 1935 ... A, 1937 ... A, 1939 ... 9, 19^0 ... 16,
19*1-1 ... 2, 19A2 ... 3, 19*1-3 ... 1, 19AA ... 0, 19^3 ... 2.
There were also centres for canvas-weaving and sail-making industries 
at Daras, Markh, Ban! Jamrah, operated by the local Baharnah 
villagers. See Director of Customs' Annual Reports to the
Political Agency, I928-A5 . I.O.R* 15/2/296-301.
2 Belgrave to Colonel Prior: Slavery and the Bahrain Pearl Industry.
I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. 1337/A8, 9.2.1930.
131
Apart from the Futam:. a nose clip, and a loin-cloth and a basket,
9
no modern diving equipment was allowed. The banks were open to all 
divers from the entire Gulf region.
Taxes
No export duty was levied on pearls, and no systematic tax was
-i
collected by the State before 1924. Until 1920, the Ruler could by
customary right levy a 10% tax ad valorem on a single pearl fished in
2
Bahraini banks, provided its value amounted to Rs. 10,000 upwards.
1 Daly's No. 37-C, op. cit.
2 Colonel H.R.P. Dickson to D.P.R. I.O.R. 15/2/23, No. 284-C,
3-9-1920. An example of the Shaikh*s customary right is an 
incident documented by Dickson, the then Political Agent. On the 
night of August 30th, 1920, Haji Ahmad bin Ali Khamis, an eminent 
Baharnah and pearl merchant from Sanabis village took refuge in the 
Agency. Dickson accorded him protection on realizing the gravity 
of the dangers that awaited him outside the Agency. Earlier, he 
and Sayed Ahmad bin Sayed Alawi, a leading Shiah notable and the 
former*s partner, had bought a pearl for Rs. 42,000 from Darin on the 
mainland and brought it to Bahrain where its value had risen to
Rs. 200,000. Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa A1 Khalifah, who wielded 
great influence over Sanabis, demanded that Haji Ahmad paid 
Rs. 4,200 to him on account of the Shaikh's right levied at 10% of 
the price paid for the pearl. Haji Ahmad disputed the fairness of 
the demand, his argument being that the pearl was purchased outside 
Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah sent his fidawis after him, but he had 
fled his house and sought refuge at the Agency. In his statement 
to the Agent, Haji Ahmad cited an earlier, grim incident: MI
attempted to resist Shaikh Abdullah, three years ago, when he sent
for me and demanded Rs. 6,000 without a shadow of right on his side. 
For objecting to pay then, I was tied up with my legs and arms 
stretched apart and left three days in a burning summer sun without 
water or food. Seeing I was about to die, my relations came and 
paid the money and I was released.M While Haji Ahmad was under the 
protection of the Agency, Dickson sounded out the views of the 
following merchants considering that the matter was 'an important 
test case*: Haji Ali az-Zaiyani, Abdur Rahman az-Zaiyani,
Salman Al-Matar, Abdul Aziz Al~Qusaibi, Seth Saleh of Bohra 
Community, Muhammad Shareef Awazi. They were all unanimous that 
the Shaikh's demand was unfair and that the pearl was un-taxable 
since it was bought outside Bahrain. Dickson then begged Shaikh
Abdullah to inform him by what right he claimed Rs. 4,200 from the
merchant. Shaikh Abdullah alleged that T,all the Shaikhs' sons were 
entitled to such forced exactions from merchants. That the matter 
was now a custom and that the Shaikhs only took such money from the 
accursed Shiahs and not from their Arab subjects".
Shaikh Isa was displeased with Ahmad's refuge in the Agency and with 
the granting of protection by the Agent to one of the Shaikh®s 
subjects. In the circumstances, the Agent pleaded with the Shaikh 
to pardon Ahmad, which he did. The Baharnah hailed the outcome as
a victory for justice. Ibid.
From 1924, the year the pearling reforms were implemented, the Government 
of Bahrain charged a boat-licensing tax, a full account of v/hich is given 
under the pearling reforms.
According to J.G. Lorimer, two types of taxes were levied in Bahrain 
in the early 19th century, viz. Nob: a boat-tax collected during Autumn
diving, and Taraz: a poll-tax collected on behalf of the crew of a boat
during spring diving."'
The Customary Laws and Usages of Pearling
Under the Salafieh system, which operated widely in Bahrain, the sea- 
Nakhuda, i.e. captain of the boat, borrowed money from a creditor called: 
Musaqqam or Nakhuda el-Barr, i.e. Shore Nakhuda. From this loan the 
Nakhuda of the boat gave cash advances to his divers, equipped his boat, 
purchased provisions, Zad, for the consumption of the crew and also 
settled the boat-licensing tax. The principal cash advances granted to 
the divers were: Salaf offered at the beginning of the main season to
enable the diver to sustain his family while he was away diving.
Tisqam: given shortly after the end of the main season also to provide for
the diver's family during the off-season. Kharjieh: a less significant
sum given in the middle of the main season. Nakhudas used the Tisqam 
to tempt their divers to remain in their service in the following season.
The divers on the other hand expected larger loans in the wake of a 
successful season. After the enactment of the pearling reforms of 1924 
the advances were subjected to Government control and were announced to 
the public in a proclamation before the start of the main diving season.
Shares
The Nakhuda deducted the expenses from the profits obtained from the 
sale of the catch. He received one fifth of the proceeds, Khums el-Mihmal
1 Gazetteer. Part IV, p. 2241, Appendix (C).
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against equipping the boat, and also deducted the licensing tax, the cost 
of provisioning the boat and, above all, the advances made to the divers. 
The remainder was distributed to the crew so that each diver, Ghais, got 
three shares, each puller, Seib, two shares, the assistant Radif one 
share. In addition to the one fifth, the Nakhuda was entitled to a 
diver's share.
The Diving Systems
Khammas, Azil and Salafieh were three distinct systems by which a 
Nakhuda operated. The majority of the Nakhudas were of tribal descent,
who were allied to the Rulers. Under Khammas, more popular on mainland 
Arabia than in Bahrain, the Nakhuda himself financed the boat. No cash 
advances were given to the divers, and no creditors were involved in the 
process. Diving was done for about one month, at the end of which the 
Nakhuda and his crew returned to the shore. The catch was sold in the 
presence of the divers, the Nakhuda took one fifth of the profits and the 
rest was shared by the crew. Divers preferred this system because it 
bound them to shorter diving periods, after which they were free to join 
another Nakhuda. Also, it was devoid of the abuses which crept into
Salafieh, examined separately below. Khammas ensured the divers 
a fairer share of the profits without the risk of getting into debt such 
as carried over by the Salafieh diver year after year. Azil: under
this system a diver joined a Nakhuda's boat, supplied his own food-stuffs 
and paid one fifth of his profits to the Nakhuda of the boat. As in the 
previous system, he was entitled to witness the selling of the catch.
The third system, the Salafieh, was the most widespread in Bahrain.
A Salafi Nakhuda operated during the main season, controlled a lai’ge boat 
and therefore a large crew. The majority of his divers were
1 A. al-Shamlam: SinaCat al-Ghaws: The Diving Industry (of Bahrain),
pp. 63-6 5 , 108-116.
non-Bahrainis working on a contractual basise He operated either on
C “Madyan or Amil methods of boat-financing, both of which v/ere defined by 
the Government proclamation of 192*1-, cited further on, as part of the 




(a) Interest was chargeable on loans 
advanced by the creditor at not 
more than £0% on Tisqam and 10% 
on Salaf advances.
(b) Interest v/as chargeable on 
Nakhuda's advances to the divers 
at 20% on Tisqam and 10% on Salaf.
(c) Creditor v/as deprived of the right 




Creditor was entitled to buy 
the pearls at not more than 
20% less than the estimated 
market value.
(More about the Salafieh is provided under: The Pearling Reforms,
further on.)
The Shortcomings of the Salafieh System
Prior to the pearling reforms of 1924, a diver was held in virtual 
bondage by his employer, the Nakhuda. In principle, the diving system 
was a profit-sharing concern and as such commendable. In reality, it 
was a v/retched system. In a given season a diverrs earnings from the 
profits rarely equalled or surpassed the debts he had incurred during the 
season. These debts, on which interest v/as charged, often swelled after 
a few unsuccessful seasons. Most of the divers were illiterate and 
improvident and this compounded their problems® Nakhudas failed to 
keep proper accounts, and even if adequate accounts existed, the diver 
had no access to them. Inflated prices v/ere charged by the Nakhudas 
for the food-stuffs they supplied to the divers. If a diver died, his
son was required to dive and to settle his father's debts. If there v/as
135
no son to take the father's place on the boat the deceased's belongings 
were liable to seizure by the Nakhuda, Also, the Nakhudas sold the 
pearls to the merchants in the absence of the divers. The price 
obtained was usually higher than that disclosed to the diver. A Nakhuda 
was entitled to punish a disobedient diver and this took the form of 
flogging, tying him in the sun almost naked, and sometimes even depriving 
him of food and drink. Nakhudas were not required to report deaths 
which occurred at the banks and no investigation was conducted after the 
boats returned to the shore.
During the years 1921-22, the Salifah Court was presided over by an 
elderly man who acted as judge. He was described as 'venal* and v/as 
reported to have been in the pay of the Nakhudas. Divers were said to
have boycotted the Court on account of its partiality towards the
2
Nakhudas. According to the Bahrain Order-in-Council, the Court should
have consisted of one or more judges well-informed in diving lav/s, and
their appointment was to have been effected jointly by the Euler and the
Political Agent. Prior to his retirement in 1923? Shaikh Isa consulted
the Chiefs of the tribes and appointed the Salifah judge from the tribal
ranks without securing the Agent's consent.
The Salifah Court v/as suspended, though not abolished, during the
1923 season when the Administration asked the Sunni Shara Qadi to
investigate diving cases. Commenting upon the Qadi's findings, the
Agency report concluded:
"The appalling usury which such cases have disclosed calls 
urgently for remedy. Cases have occurred in v/hich the Nakhuda 
claimed as much as Rs. 2,000 from the diver, whereas after proper 
inspection of the accounts in the Qadi's Court it has been found 
that a considerable sum v/as actually due to the diver from the 
Nakhuda. A typical set of diving accounts which the Political 
Agent had the opportunity to examine ... disclosed that all
1 Adviser's No. 1337/^-8, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 1921. Also, A.P.P.A. 1922. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
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the divers v/ere apparently becoming in debt to the Nakhuda,
The debts are of such a nature that it would be impossible for 
the divers to pay them off, so that in accordance with the diving 
tradition they would be compelled to dive annually for the 
Nakhuda. It was found that if the diver could succeed in 
repaying the debt he would actually have recieved on the average 
5 or 6 Rs. per mensem for each actual month of diving. Even 
if the debts were not recovered from him the amount on the 
average v/ould not exceed Rs. 30 per mensem - a coolie in Manamah 
earns on the average Rs. per mensem. A diver*s work is 
extremely hard and fraught with danger. The system as at 
present worked, amounts therefore for all practical purposes to 
enslavement from which the divers have been unable in the past to 
obtain any redress from the powerful and united class of 
Nakhudas."^
The Pearling Reforms
Before the introduction of the reforms, the Administration in
Bahrain explored various ways of improving the diving system. One
possibility was to change the diver from a share-holder into a wage-
earner. To this effect, the Agent wrote:
"The ideal diving system would be one in which the divers worked 
for a fixed wage and the pearls would belong to the Nakhuda.
The work is strenuous and the divers would demand high pay and 
moreover half the attraction to the diver is the hope that his 
boat may get a big haul and he get a big share. In reality he 
seldom gets it as it is swallowed up by the Nakhuda; but it is 
what attracts men to the diving in the last instance.
In their attempt to improve the system, British officials were
careful not to alter the diving rules. They aimed at fairness for all
those involved in the industry and at removal of practices which v/ere
alien to the original rules of diving. The task was not an easy one.
In the Resident's own words:
"This reform presents the greatest difficulty if any, as any 
change introduced will be deeply resented by the Nakhudas or 
pearling masters, who under existing conditions have matters 
absolutely their own way. Besides this abuses in the pearling 
system are rife throughout the Gulf, and Nakhudas will consider 
reforms at Bahrain invidious ...
1 A.R.P.A. 1923* op. cit.
2 Daly's No. 37-C, op. cit.
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In these circumstances it might be argued that it is not 
advisable to take up the reformation of the Bahrain Pearling 
System independently of the other pearling centres, and that if 
reform is necessary the reform of the whole industry throughout 
the Gulf should be taken in hand. Against this however it may 
be said that Bahrain is the hub of the whole industry, that we 
exercise much more jurisdiction in Bahrain than in any other 
pearling centre and therefore incur more responsibility for 
abuses at that place, that if reforms are successfully introduced 
at Bahrain an improvement will slowly but surely result in the 
whole industry on the divers realizing that the hardships of 
their lot can be so greatly ameliorated ...
I would not suggest the slightest change in the general rules 
and usages of the pearling system which have been in force from 
time immemorial; what is necessary to enforce these rules with 
more regard to the interests of the divers and haulers, these of 
the Nakhudas being almost exclusively considered at present*
The first essential is that the Nakhudas should keep accurate and 
intelligible accounts, the second is that each diver should be 
given a copy of his account each season by his Nakhuda, and the 
third that the Salifah* (Pearling Usage) Court should be composed 
of men of position and integrity capable of understanding such 
accounts."^
As the pearling reforms would have directly involved Shaikh Hamadfs
Administration with the tribal elements, who were opposed to the reforms
in general, both reform of the pearling industry plus Survey and
Registration of Land were delayed for some time* Early in 1924 the
Administration sounded out the views of the Nakhudas over the
introduction of account books. They agreed to the introduction of the
books so long as the Government did not require them to reveal the actual
price for which they sold the pearls. They feared that the Government
2
would tax them in proportion to the value of the pearls. Sample account
books were prepared by the Resident which consisted of a general account
for the whole of the Nakhuda*s transactions, together with separate
accounts for each diver and hauler. The Qadi v/as entitled to scrutinize
3
the accounts and the diver for the first time had access to them.
1 No. 622“S, op. cit.
2 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. 68-C, 3.2.1924.
3 Trevor to Daly. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. 122-S, 15.2.1924.
It v/as learnt from the Agent in Kuwait that the Government there
collected a diver*s share from each boat, which amounted to circa Rs. 500
per boat. The Nakhudas, whose viev/s were invited on the Kuwaiti method
of taxation, refused to be taxed on a similar basis, and the Administration
2
decided to levy a boat-licensing tax instead. The collection of this
tax, also enforced during the main 192*f season, took into consideration
the size and number of the crew on each boat as follows:
1 - 5  seamen Rs. 75
6 - 1 5  seamen Rs. 100
16 upwards Rs. 200
This was the first time that the State, not the Ruler, had collected
a regular tax on pearling boats in Bahrain. Receipts from Pearling
Licences amounted in 192^ to Rs. ^-9,368 levied from 60^ boats; and in
1929 reached Rs. 55,000 collected from 533 boats; and in 19^0 income
3
from licensing dropped to Rs. 20,000 obtained from 191 boats.
Failure to register a pearling boat was punishable by a fine of
kRs. 5,000 and the boat v/as liable to confiscation by the State. As 
part of the reforms a large and well-equipped boom was purchased for use 
as Hospital Boat during the 192^ season. An Indian sub-Assistant
5
surgeon was employed to deal v/ith cases of illness among the crews.
There remained the question of interest to be charged on loans 
advanced by creditors to Nakhudas o£ to divers. The Resident recognised 
the right of the creditors to high interest on loans advanced by them to 
the Nakhudas on account of the great risks attendant upon the whole
1 No. 68-C, op. cit.
2 Resident to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. 27-T, 13-3.1924. Note 
that the pearling reforms, as revealed by the above account, began 
in 1924, and not from 1921 to 1923 as stated in: Tribe and State 
in Bahrain, p. 107, op. cit.
3 Director of Customs to the P.A.: Boat Registrations and Pearl
Licenses. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. PA/32, 12.5*1924. Also, Annual 
Budgets for 1929, 1940. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10¥w
4 See File on Pearling. I.O.R. 15/2/13^9•
business. A poor catch or a fall in trade, he wrote, could result in 
the creditor having to wait for years to recover his money. Similarly, 
Nakhudas v/ere also entitled to charge high interest on money advanced to 
their divers, money which had not yet been earned. Death, sickness or
'I
default could prevent them from ever earning it, he added.
Before the start of the 1924 season, Mohammad bin Subah, Chief of
the Ben Ali tribe which owned sixty pearling boats, approached Shaikh
Hamad with a request to relieve his tribe from boat^licensing tax.
The Chief believed that his men merited this privilege on account of their
long-standing alliance with the Rulers and on the strength of a document
he had obtained earlier from Shaikh Isa, countersigned by Mr. J.C. Gaskin,
Assistant Political Agent, 1900-1904, pledging tax-exemption for the 
2
tribe. When the matter was referred to the Resident, he wrote:
" ... documents of this nature given during the old regime granting 
exemption from revenue for no particular service rendered cannot 
be accepted. At the same time, as Muhammad bin Subah has such a 
document the Shaikh recognises that he is worthy of some 
consideration as an act of grace and as a special case he will be 
pleased to allow him to equip ten medium sized boats (tax Rs. 100) 
free of tax during his lifetime."
This concession somehow implied recognition of the privileged 
position of the tribes by the new regime. It was, moreover, 
incompatible with the reforming outlook which the regime sought to 
establish.
During the 1924 season, Shaikh Hamad issued a proclamation whose 
aim was to regulate the financial relations between Nakhudas and their 
crew. It called upon the former to follow the new system of accounts, 
as defined in the proclamation, and to produce accounts whenever required 
to do so by the Court. Also, to keep a separate account for each diver,
1 Col. Trevor to Major Daly. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. 233-S, 10.4.1924.
2 Daly to Trevor: Pearling Licenses. I.O.R. 15/2/132, 1*4.1924.
3 Trevor to Daly. I.O.R. 15/2/132, No. 232-S, 10.4.1924.
puller and assistant in their employ, and to show the nature and amount 
of every receipt and expenditure entered against their crew, and to sign 
and return the books to the men.
The proclamation also defined the Salafieh system, i.e. Madyan and
c **Amil, since it was the most widespread in Bahrain, and specified the 
amount of interest to be charged on loans from creditors to Nakhudas or 
those from Nakhudas to their divers as cited on page 13^ above. Under
c«
Amil, for a deal to sell the pearls to be considered legal, two 
conditions were essential:
(a) that both the shore and the sea Nakhudas v/ere in agreement over the 
price to be paid for the pearls,
(b) that two thirds of the crew consented to the selling price.
If for some reason the parties failed to agree over the value of the 
pearls, they were required to submit the matter to agreed arbitrators to 
determine their market value. The shore Nakhuda would then purchase at 
not less than 20% below the price estimated by the arbitrators. If 
agreement was still not possible, the two sides were required to refer the 
matter to a competent Court for decision. In these circumstances the 
Court was required to appoint reliable assessors to fix the price to be 
paid by the shore Nakhuda. If he still refused to purchase at the 
price determined by the Court, the sea Nakhuda v/as entitled to sell the 
pearls to whomsoever he v/ished provided that two thirds of the crew 
consented to the sale. He was also supposed to inform the shore Nakhuda 
of the time and place where he would receive the payment in order to 
refund the shore Nakhuda the full advance taken from him. One third of 
the crew were required to be present to witness the refund.
Under Madyan (also refer to page 13^) the shore Nakhuda was denied
1 The men were told to obtain the account books from a Government office 
at the Customs, against a payment of six annas per book.
the right to buy the pearls of the boat he had financed, unless the sea 
Nakhuda and at least two thirds of the crew agreed to sell them to him.
He v/as required to pay the full price at which the crew were willing to 
sell and was denied any reduction on the market value of the pearls and 
he had no right to object to their sale to any person to whom the crew 
might v/ish to sell.
The proclamation concluded by spelling out the penalties against 
any infringements. A first offence was punishable by a fine of Rs. 300, 
a second by Rs. 1,500 and the withdrawal of a Nakhuda*s pearling license 
for a period of five years.
Before the introduction of the new system of accounts, the 
Administration sought to verify old accounts, and this involved Nakhudas 
v/ho had claims of huge debts against their divers. Some such debts had 
accumulated over a period of twenty years or so. On inspection of the 
accounts their lack of clarity and reliability were revealed. Many
Q
Nakhudas v/ere asked to take their cases to the chief Shara Qadi because 
they accepted his decisions. The Qadi, on his part, attempted to reduce 
the debts to a reasonable figure acceptable to the diver. Outstanding 
debts thus settled by the Qadi v/ere then entered into each diver's book.
Finally, the Administration stipulated a minimum income of Rs. 260
for each diver during the season v/hich lasted roughly four months plus
2
ten days, i.e. 130 days at Rs. 2 daily. Examination of the divers' 
previous accounts shov/ed that the majority earned less than Rs. 1 per 
working day, whereas the advances they received from their Nakhudas 
amounted to Rs. 2 or 3 per day.
1 See Translation of a Proclamation in Arabic ... issued by Shaikh 
Hamad bin Easa Alkhalifah - Deputy-Ruler of Bahrain to regulate the 
financial relations between pearling Nakhudas and their crews.
I.O.R. 15/2/132.
2 During the 1930s the pearl-trade was hit by recession causing a sharp 
drop in sales, and the minimum earnings of Rs. 260 for each diver was 
no longer possible. See account of the 1930s further on.
At first, the Nakhudas refused to submit to the new system of
accounting and they even tried to incite the divers against it by telling
them that it did not work in their favour. The divers, on the other
hand, took advantage of the reforms, filing their complaints to the Courts
more frequently than before. Eventually, though somewhat reluctantly,
the Nakhudas accepted the new system and started keeping a general account
of expenditure on each boat, value of pearls sold, and shares given to
each diver. Previously, they had refused to reveal their accounts
1
except to the Salifah Court whose decisions they influenced.
In addition to the Nakhudas* opposition to the account books, the
Administration had difficulty over finding adequately trained local
clerks to operate the system. In 1925 they v/ere compelled to employ
an Indian clerk to keep the accounts v/hile Bahrainis v/ere being trained
2
as Diving Clerks for work with the Nakhudas. In September 1925, after
the main season, the Nakhudas submitted a petition to Captain Mallam, who
was officiating for Major Daly, now on leave. They protested at what
they regarded as Government interference in the affairs of diving. They
spoke against the new accounting system and against the sanctioning of
the sale of the pearls by the crews of the boats. They asked for the
restoration of the Salifah Court to its former status, and for the right
to sell the pearls without the interference of the divers* representatives.
Such an interference, they claimed, harmed their dealings with the
3creditors who financed their boats.
They wanted a return to the old days when they exercised authority 
over their divers, punishing the recalcitrant among them at sea. Under
1 A.P.P.A. 192^ 1-, op. cit.
2 A.P.P.A. 1925, op. cit.
3 See Translation of an Arabic Petition dated 8th Rabi-»ul Awv/al 13^ 4-
(26.9.1925) from diving Nakhudas of Bahrain to the Government of
Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/2/132.
the reforms, they were supposed to file complaints only after they had
returned to the shore. The submitting of complaints to the Authorities,
they argued, v/as a time consuming business, causing them delays and
financial loss. To allow them to castigate the disobedient divers, they
1
wrote, was a better way of dealing with the problem.
After Daly returned from leave, he dealt with the issues the 
Nakhudas raised in this petition. As regards the Salifah Court, he 
wrote, it had stopped functioning before the start of the pearling reforms. 
The divers boycotted it because it was biased against them. Among them 
was a large number of British protected persons for whom he felt 
particularly responsible. Daly went on to distinguish between tv/o 
things: the customary diving rules and the customary practises,
describing the latter as a distortion of the original rules. Abuses 
were inherent in the customary practises which saddled the diver with 
uncontrollable debts aiming to hold him in bondage. It v/as to free him 
from the burden of debts that the State controlled the amount of Salaf 
and Tisqam every season. Daly believed that if the reforms in the 
industry continued over a number of years, the debts would be wiped out, 
diving disputes would diminish significantly, and thus no need would be 
felt for a Salifah Court. The system of accounting, which the Nakhudas 
saw as complicated, would then become much simpler. However, Daly failed 
to realize that a number of unprofitable seasons, such as Bahrain 
witnessed in the early 1930s, i.e. four years after he had left Bahrain, 
also increased the divers* debts despite control of the advances by the 
State.
Daly referred to the rivalry among the Nakhudas to recruit divers 
and the harm coming to the latter as a result. A Nakhuda acquired a 
diver simply by settling his debts to his previous Nakhuda. The actual
1 Ibid.
price paid remained a secret between the two. But the figure quoted to 
the diver, which represented his debts, was in excess of that paid to the 
first Nakhuda. The new Nakhuda then enticed the diver with larger 
advances, especially in the first few years. As years went by a diver's 
debts increased beyond his control and the earnings he received in the 
season from the Nakhuda were less than what he deserved. This rivalry 
among the Nakhudas, he wrote, raised the cost of 'enslaving a diver for 
life'. But Daly also recognised the gravity of the risks facing the 
Nakhudas. These he defined as death and sickness among divers, and 
frequent cases of runaway divers, all of which resulted in the Nakhudas' 
financial ruin. The reforms were designed to ensure justice and this 
included giving the diver his actual earnings. Fairer treatment rather 
than the restoration of the Salifah Court would, in the end, attract 
divers from the Gulf States to work in Bahrain, Daly wrote. He quoted 
some of the 'enlightened' Nakhudas as saying that a Salifah Court was no 
use to them if it did not run on the old lines. Earlier, Trucial 
Shaikhs had resented the suspension of the Salifah Court, a local 
institution of Bahrain. Daly concluded by expressing his belief that 
in due course the Chiefs of the Gulf States would appreciate the benefits 
of the pearling reforms carried out in Bahrain and would even seek to 
adopt them in their respective States.
The Industry Faces Hard Times
Bahrain's pearl trade was slack during the years 1920-21, particularly 
in 1921 when a number of small traders went bankrupt. During the second 
half of 1922 the market improved and continued so doing in 1923 as the 
official commentary below reveals:
1 Daly to Captain Stuart-Horner, Secretary to the P.K. I.O.R. 15/2/132, 
No. 93/9/5, 20.2.1926.
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"In 1923 the pearl market v/as exceptionally good. Mr. Ruben 
visited Bahrain ... and bought a considerable stock of pearls.
Mr. Pack representing Rosenthals also came and bought pearls
valued at between 30 and 60 Lakhs of Rupees ..............
It is notable that no purchases for the British market seems 
to be forthcoming. The trade seems almost entirely confined 
to Jewish firms in Paris."
For the first time in 192*f, the Annual Report of the Agency
mentioned the introduction of Japanese pearls in international markets
and the threat it posed to Bahrain's pearl trade:
" ... the pearl market ... v/as somewhat dull. This is largely 
attributed to the uncertainty of the rate of exchange between 
India and France, the bulk of the best Bahrain pearls going 
annually to Paris. Another factor which is believed to have 
contributed to slackness in the trade is that the important 
European buyers adopted a cautious attitude, owing to the 
introduction of Japanese pearls, which they feared were mixed 
with the local variety. The State has strictly prohibited 
the importation of cultured pearls, with a view to protecting 
the Bahrain industry, but smuggling is extremely difficult to 
check and cultured pearls when mixed with genuine Gulf pearls 
cannot be readily detected even by experts, without the aid of 
X^ray apparatus
In 1925 the pearl market deteriorated during the second half of the 
year, and in 1926 it became worse than before. The catch was below 
average and European purchases fell sharply. The Rosenthals of Paris 
reduced their purchases by 65% over the previous years. Increased 
circulation of cultured pearls and the fluctuating value of the French 
Franc were cited as the main causes. Many Bahrain merchants v/ere unable 
to sell their pearls and a number of bankruptcies were reported. The 
Government of Bahrain issued instructions to shopkeepers to postpone the 
collection of debts which divers ov/ed to them.
Merchants, who were short of ready cash, v/ere unwilling to finance 
their Nakhudas until they had recovered part of the money lent earlier. 
Nakhudas v/ho had signed 'sanads' pledging to repay their creditors in 
annual instalments failed to do so, and the sanads were used against them
1 A.R.P.A. 1923, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 192^, op. cit.
1^6
in cases filed by the creditors. The Nakhudas had no cash either and
they offered instead their divers' debts and boats, which the creditors
rejected. The Government formed a temporary Court to try and break the
deadlock between the two sides. It consisted of the members: Khan
Bahadur Abdur Rahman az-Zayani, Haji Mohammad bin Hindi, Haji Abd Ali bin
Rajab, and the Adviser as President. The Court enquired into the most
urgent cases and after great difficulty was able to persuade the
creditors to accept Nakhudas' boats and their divers' debts. The
Nakhudas were also persuaded to accept less cash to themselves and to
their divers from their creditors. Commenting upon the settlements
effected, the Adviser wrote:
"It appears that in every case the tajjars (i.e. merchants) have 
got the best of the bargain. They have acquired boats or 
divers from their Nakhudas, but against this must be considered 
the fact that they have made very large advances to these 
Nakhudas in former years and according to them, they have not 
received reasonable profit on the money lent. 11
Accordingly, the divers* Ti.sqam advance was reduced from what it had
been in the previous year. It was now Rs. 80 and Rs. 60 for a diver and
a puller respectively. They had not been consulted over the reductions
and the only justification for this was, according to the Adviser, absence
of an organisation to represent them, and also a belief that they would
have rejected the reductions anyway. The cuts infuriated the divers
who argued that since their earnings for the 1926 season were less than
average, the Tisqam for the next season should not have been cut back.
The Administration insisted that the decision was in favour of the divers
2
and it aimed at reducing their debts.
Towards the end of 1926, less than two months after Daly finally 
left Bahrain, the Administration reconstituted the Salifah Court so that 
it now consisted of four members one of whom was a diver. Rashid bin
1 Adviser to the Agent. The Pearling Industry. I.O.R. 15/2/296,
25 ShaGban 13^5 (28.2.1927).
2 Ibid.
1V7
Mohammad A1 Khalifah, a member of the Ruling family, v/as appointed its 
1
President. Shortly afterwards the duties of the Salifah Court were
c 2merged in those of the Majlis al~ Urfi.
During 192? the catch improved by 20% over the previous year. 
Accordingly, there was more cash in the hands of the diving community and 
this in turn generated a corresponding increase in Bahrain's import trade. 
The Tisqam advance, offered at the end of the main season, v/as raised to 
Rs. 100 for a diver and Rs. 80 for a puller. This improvement continued 
and in 1928 both the pearl trade and the general trade of Bahrain v/ere 
good. Sale of exceptional pearls increased during the year by 10-15/e 
over the previous year and that of inferior grades was down by 20%.
ij.
The Tisqam for the following season was maintained at its 1928 level.
The catch for the 1929 season was good, but the pearl trade v/as static,
because of dwindling sales. Bahrain dealers had unsold stocks and were
desperate for cash. The year v/as described as the worst for twenty 
5
years. The divers protested at the Salaf advances which were fixed at 
Rs. 100 for a diver and Rs. 80 for a puller. They expected larger 
advances after the successful season in 1928. Shaikh Hamad conceded 
their demand after a leading Nakhuda from Hedd, Jabur bin Musallam, owner 
of thirty boats, agreed to give his divers increased advances. As a 
result, they were all allowed a further advance of Rs. 30 and Rs. 23 for 
each diver and puller respectively.^
The global recession of 1930 aggravated the slump in the pearl-trade.
1 A.R.P.A. 1926, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 1927, op. cit.
3 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/296, No. 56il-~9A, 5 Sha°ban 13^6.
h A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
5 Belgrave, Annual Report for 1930. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/104A.
6 Captain Prior to Colonel Biscoe, I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. C/8 9, 2^.5.1930.
1
The season's sales dropped to less than 28 lakhs of rupees. Foreign 
buyers had unsold pearls from the previous season and they were reluctant 
to buy more. Only a few Bahrain merchants managed to sell, the majority 
of them v/ere left with stocks built up over tv/o years* Markets in Paris 
and Bombay were badly affected by the recession.
Before the start of the 1930 season Shaikh Salman bin Hamad 
A1 Khalifah and the Adviser held a meeting with the leading pearl-dealers 
in order to fix the advances for the season* The merchants complained 
of the scarcity of cash and desired that the advances should be reduced. 
Hence they were determined at Rs. 80 and Rs. 60 for a diver and a puller 
respectively. It was also decided that if a Nakhuda was unable to give 
his diver the authorised advance he should issue him with a Barwa, i.e. 
a document granting a diver the right to dive for any Nakhuda of his 
choice. When the reduced advances were proclaimed to the public on 
14th May 1930, the divers protested and refused to go out diving. Their
action created panic in the bazaar and the Agent had to allay the fears 
of certain merchants. On this occasion, Shaikh Hamad again defended 
the divers and agreed to allow them larger advances. The Agent, on the 
other hand, saw the increase as contrary to the aims of the pearling 
reforms which sought to control the debts by controlling the advances. 
Moreover, he v/as opposed to the withdrawal of the earlier proclamation.
He believed that such a step would be damaging to the prestige of the 
Government of Bahrain. A way out was found and the Nakhudas v/ere 
instructed to give an extra loan of up to Rs. 20 for a diver and Rs. 15 
for a puller against the Tisqam for the next season. Following this 
settlement about half the divers were paid their advances either in full 
or in part, and many thousands were given free Barwas by the Government
1 A.R.P.A. 1930. I.O.R. 15/2/296.
1or by their Nakhudas. On 21st May the divers ended their protest,
and the fleet sailed to the banks thereafter. The Agent wrote:
"One is of course anxious to keep the divers out of debt as far 
as possible, but when they are setting out on four months very 
hard work a substantial advance is only reasonable, and an 
advance lower than this yearfs, would make the divers look about 
for some other employment
Investigations conducted in 1929 showed that many old divers owed
their Nakhudas as much as Rs. 3?000. As the earnings were decreasing
year after year, there v/as no chance of their settling the outstanding
debts. 338 boats operated during 1929? and in the following year only
509 boats took part in the diving. The accounts of 249 boats examined
by the Diving Clerks in 1930 revealed that only the divers of three boats
received any shares in the profits. The rest of the boats paid no
profits, because the expenses were greater than the income. Here is
how the Advisor outlined the impact of two poor seasons upon the merchants
"Owing to last year's bad season (1929) the small and medium 
merchants were badly hit, this year (1930) the big merchants as 
well have been seriously affected and at present only two or 
three of the leading pearl merchants are in possession of any 
funds. They all hold large stocks of pearls which they cannot 
sell at present even at a great loss. Debts and instalments 
are not being paid and merchants v/ho two or three years ago could 
easily command several lacs of rupees are now hardly pressed to 
find a few thousands. If one of the big men failed he v/ould 
pull dov/n with him in his fall number's of others.1’
3
The worsening economic conditions twice forced the Government to 
increase the advances, contrary to the reform measure which called for 
their reduction. Early in 1930 the Adviser warned against those 
Nakhudas v/ho "were dodging the rules by keeping side accounts". In a 
letter to the Agent, he called for stricter supervision by the Government
4and the Courts to prevent a return to the old days. Earlier in December 
1928, he spelt out a similar warning:
1 Belgrave's Annual Report for 1930, op. cit.
2 Prior's No. C/8 9, op. cit.
3 Belgrave's Annual Report for 1930, op. cit.
4 Belgrave to Prior, No. 1337/48, op. cit.
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"Although Shaikh Hamad is mildly sympathetic towards the divers, 
he dislikes countenancing any action which may possibly annoy 
any of the merchants or the Nakhudas. To enforce the diving 
rules it is sometimes necessary to punish persons who disobey
them. Shaikh Hamad does not support the Courts in doing this."^
The economic situation worsened in '193'! and the pearl trade came to
a virtual halt, except for the cheaper grades for which there was some
demand in India. As a result, local dealers suffered financially and
the extent of their loss is best described by the excerpt below:
"It is estimated that two thirds of the pearling capital in Bahrain 
had disappeared into the sea in the last three years (1929-31)* 
and men who had a capital of ten or fifteen lakhs have nothing left 
except pearls for which there are no purchasers.
The Salaf advance for the 1932 season was fixed at Rs. 30 and Rs. 25
for divers and pullers. The divers agitated for increased Salaf and on
25th May of that year their leaders were arrested. On the following 
day, divers from Moharraq and Hedd, armed with sticks and stones, crossed 
to Manamah to rescue a colleague who had been detained. They attacked 
Manamah Police Station where he was being kept in confinement and managed 
to release him. There followed a clash with the Naturs, armed watchmen, 
who wet'e reinforced by members of the Indian Police Force. The watchmen 
reacted by firing their rifles, killing two divers and wounding many 
others. The merchants and the Nakhudas blamed the troubles on the 
Government’s earlier leniency in dealing with the divers. These 
criticisms compelled Shaikh Hamad to take a firm line with the divers on 
any future occasion.
According to the Agent, the authorised Salaf advances were the lowest 
ever approved by the State, much below what was essential for sustaining 
a diver’s family throughout the diving season. Again, the Government 
instructed Nakhudas who did not have cash to issue their divers with 
Barwas. However, divers who received Barwas failed to find employment
1 Belgrave, The Pearl Industry of Bahrain, 19-12.1928. I.O.K. 15/2/152.
2 A.P.P.A. 1931, op. cit. Also see Captain Prior to Colonel Biscoe.
I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. C/91, 2.8.1951.
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outside the pearling industry. Reporting the matter to the Government,
the Resident wrote:
" the demonstration was intended as a protest against the 
smallness of the diving advances ,.. The economic position on
the Arab coast is exceedingly serious. It is essential that
divers should receive advances to support their families during 
their absence, and merchants, boat owners and others have not got 
the capital now to pay the customary advances owing to the fact 
that they have been unable to dispose of last year's pearls.
The divers are a heterogeneous community « Baluchis, Arabs,
Negroes, Nejdis, Persians, etc., and are difficult to control;
I hope however that they have now realised that a resort to force 
is not the best method of representing grievances. On the 
other hand so far as economic conditions permit steps will have 
to be taken to remedy these grievances, though the problem is an 
exceedingly difficult one."^
During the 1932 main season, the catch was described as "disappoint-
ing”, but this was compensated for during the Raddah diving, i.e. the
closing season, when both the catch and the prices recorded some 
3
improvement. In the following year, by order of Shaikh Hamad, a
Diving Council presided over by the Adviser was introduced to advise on
the affairs of diving. Greater numbers of Nakhudas operated on the
Khammas system than before. This was due to the fact that Nakhudas
could not secure cash from the creditors and under Khammas no advances
were offered to the divers. A few merchants managed to sell pearls
from previous years, but only at about a quarter of the price for which
k
they had originally bought them. The advances for 1933 were maintained 
at their 1932 level and no objection was raised by the divers, many of 
whom accepted advances belov; even what had been specified by the 
Government. They knew well that if they objected to them they would be
asked to seek alternative employment. Although Government instructions 
obliged the Nakhuda not to exceed the authorised amount, he was never™ 
the less left free to give smaller amounts provided the arrangements he
1 Prior to Biscoe. I.O.R. 15/2/8A8, no number, 30.5*1932.
2 Col. Biscoe to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/8^8, No. 35^“S, ^.6.1932.
3 A.R.P.A. 1932. I.O.R. 15/2/297.
k Belgrave, Annual Report for 1933* I.O.R. 15/2/297, No. 923-9A,
6.1.193^.
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had made were acceptable to his divers.
As the industry1s future was becoming more uncertain, merchants
demanded mortgages of land and property from their Nakhudas against the
cash they loaned to them. This is borne out by the cases litigated in
the Courts during the years 1952-55- The Nakhudas were unhappy with the
merchants1 demands because they violated the established usages of the
diving system. In the past, only a Nakhudafs boat and divers were
-1
subject to seizure in settlement of his liabilities.
In 1934 the merchants still suffered from lack of cash, and the
advances were fixed at Rs. 20 and Rs. 15 for divers and pullers. The
number of boats which took part in the diving fell by 96 over the previous
season. The table below shows the downward slide of the industry during
the years 1930-54. Compare the tiny value of the catch for the years
specified below with the annual average value of "one to three million
•5
pounds", estimated by the Adviser in 1928.
Year Number of Boats Estimated Total Value of Pearls
in Lakhs of Rupees
1930 509 2 1 ,251000
1931 504 1 8,3 2 ,0 0 0
1932 458 12,14,000
1933 436 13,40,000
1934 340 10,0 0 ,0 0 0
Factors Which Militated Against the Industry
By the end of 1954 people sav; little hope in the industry*s future 
and they began to doubt if it could ever regain its former prosperity. 
Various reasons were given for the decline of the pearl-trade.
1 Belgrave, The Pearl Trade and the Diving Industry, 1552 C1935)• 
I.O.R. 15/2/195.
2 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 8?5/9A, 25 Shawwal 
1355 (30.1.1935).
3 Belgrave, The Pearl Industry of Bahrain, 19-12.1928, op. cit.
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Bahrainis attributed its ills to diminishing numbers of oysters on the 
pearl banks, to the deteriorating quality of the pearls, and to the belief 
that the banks had been over-fished. Some even took into their 
consideration the harm caused by the local wind, Barih, a cool north
■ ■■■■ ■■■■!■■ IM ^I
wind which used to blow for forty days before the start of the main 
diving season, and which since 1930 had coincided with the season itself, 
making the sea unbearably rough for the diver. At the end of 1933
several pearl-dealers urged the Adviser to close the banks for a whole 
year so that the oysters might be given a chance to grow and multiply.
The closure would also help dealers to dispose of large stocks of unsold 
pearls from previous years. But the suggestion was rejected because, 
although it would have helped the dealers, it would have at the same time 
put divers out of work for a whole year. Moreover, without the full 
co-operation of all the Gulf States, the closure restricted to Bahrain 
boats only, would have damaged the islands* economy.
Since 1930 the number of divers engaged in the industry as a whole
had steadily decreased. On the other hand, the number of divers
operating on the Khammas system was increasing. In 1934, out of 292
boats whose accounts were kept by the diving clerks, 116 were Salafieh 
and 176 v/ere Khammas. It was even believed that in the absence of any 
improvement in the industry the Khammas system would replace the Salafieh 
as the customary system. It was also believed that the divers' debts 
would cease to be a problem once the Salafieh system collapsed. The 
debts of 500 divers, calculated in 1934, showed that the average diver 
owed his Nakhuda about Rs. 507, that the debts of eight elderly divers
1 In April 1930 information was received to the effect that the firm
of Qusaibis had ordered three diving suits from Europe for use during
the main season. The Residency advised the Administration in Bahrain 
to legislate against their use. A foreign dealer believed that the 
only reason why Bahrain banks had not been exhausted, as the 
Australian and Philippine banks had been, was due to the absence of 
the diving apparatus and to intensive pearling. See Captain Prior 
to Col. Biscoe. I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. C-3 8 , 5.4.1930. Also,
Col. Biscoe to Prior, I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. 174-S, 12.4.1930.
1
reached over Rs. 2,000 and those of nine others exceeded Rs. 1,000.
Concern among European dealers about the circulation of cultured
pearls was reported by the Agency Report as early as 192%. Over the
years greater numbers of people were attracted to cultured pearls because
they were cheaper and practically identical in appearance to genuine 
2
pearls. In May 1929? the Administration was informed that the Qusaibi
firm was conducting negotiations in Bombay with the aim of introducing
methods of cultivating pearls into Bahrain. This the Administration
could not allo\\r to happen, and, anyway, trade in cultured pearls had
3
already been prohibited. Also in 1929 a local man was convicted by
the Court of infringing Government regulations governing the handling or
ktrade in cultured pearls. Commenting upon the impact of Japanese
pearls, the Adviser noted:
"It has taken the Bahrain pearl dealers several years to realise 
what harm is done to their trade by the cultured pearl 
industry ... As the production of cultured pearls increases 
and improves yearly I see no prospect of improvement in the 
Bahrain pearl trade."
So far we have accounted for those factors which influenced the 
pearl trade directly. As regards the attitude of the divers, Nakhudas, 
merchants, the Administration's view was thus outlined by the Adviser in 
193*f:
1 Belgrave, The Pearl Trade and the Diving Industry 1353 (193*0. I.O.R. 
15/2/195.
2 Cultured pearls were sold for one thirtieth of the price of genuine 
pearls of similar weight and appearance. See Belgrave*s No. 875-9A, 
op. cit.
3 Belgrave to Prior, I.O.R. 15/2/122, No. 1492«9A, 9th Dhil Haj 13*1-7 
(18.5.1929). Also, Prior to Captain Russell, D.P.R. I.O.R. 15/2/ 
122, No. C/77, 2.6.1929. And also, Russell to Prior, I.O.R. 15/2/ 
122, No. 1*l48, 20.6.1929.
A The person involved in the above case was Abdullah al»Zayed. In
another case of 1933, Khalil Bakir, a pearl dealer from Qatar trading 
in Bahrain was found guilty of a similar offence. Belgrave, The 
Pearl Trade and the Diving Industry, 1352, op. cit.
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"The protection of the interests of the divers is a thankless 
task, the divers themselves do not realise that their interests 
are being safeguarded, they are utterly improvident and never 
think of the future, the Nakhudas and pearl merchants, with a 
very few exceptions, are callous and selfish and although the 
Ruler is sympathetic towards the divers in principle he is liable 
to he influenced by the arguments of the Nakhudas in individual 
cases.
The Industry*s Fortunes from 1935"19^5
During the first half of the 1930s, the pearling industry was hit by 
the recession, and even some time after the world had recovered from the 
recession, the industry remained in a bad shape. Greater production and 
circulation of cultured pearls, absence of European and American demand 
for Bahrain pearls, meagre sales and prices at home and abroad, oil 
replacing pearling from mid-193^ as the chief source of income for the 
country, and finally divers being attracted to the stability and security 
of wage-oriented jobs, all served to weaken the industry*s foundation.
Some slight improvement was recorded during the years 1935? 1937?
19^ +1? 19^ -3? and 19^5? but these were only temporary improvements. The 
main trend of the industry was one of gradual decline as is borne out by 
the falling number of boats operating during the season and the correspond­
ing drop in the number of crews manning them. (See Table supplemented 
to the present Chapter.)
From 1935, European buyers, who used to visit Bahrain every season, 
more or less ceased to come and the catch was taken to Bombay for sale 
there. The Indian demand for Bahrain pearls was mainly restricted to 
the lower grades. With the expansion in the Oil Company*s
installations, many divers found manual work with the Company during 1936. 
As wage-earners they were now able to settle their debts to their
1 Belgrave, The Pearl Trade and the Diving Industry, 1353 (193^), 
op. cit.
2 Belgrave, Annual Report, I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 1221-9A, 6.2.1936.
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ex-Nakhudas by monthly instalments of Rs* 5* In this way both the diver 
and the Nakhuda benefitted from the oil industry. Alternative employ­
ment on an even larger scale became available first in 1940, and again in 
1944. In 1940, the Government was involved in the extension of the
Moharraq sea-»road, and in 1944 both the Oil Company and the R.A.F.
2
executed large construction plans.
The price of pearls improved slightly in 1937* The catch for the
year, which consisted principally of small and seed pearls, was
3
nevertheless bigger than that of the previous year* The improvement
was short*»lived and 1938 turned out to be a very bad season owing to a
4
poor catch and to decline in the price of pearls* In the following
season the catch v/as small but of a better quality. Both absence of 
foreign buyers and the unstable world condition helped reduce the price 
of pearls considerably. The firm of Qusaibx availed itself of the
5
opportunity and bought pearls worth seven and a half lakhs of rupees.
The Qusaibis managed to sell half the pearls on the Indian market during
£
1940, which was another bad year for the Bahrain pearl market. The 
catch improved during the 1941 season, but the pearls fished were mostly 
of medium and low grades. Nevertheless, the Indian market was still 
active and there was a greater demand for Bahrain pearls than in 1940, 
as a result of which the market in Bahrain itself was stimulated* An 
Increase of 30% was recorded in the price of pearls over the 1940 season,
1 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 1303-9A, 7.2.1937.
2 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/299, No. 56-9A, 3*2.1941.
Also, Belgrave*s Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/300, No# 427-9A, 
8.2.19^5*
3 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 184-6/3.F., 8.2.1938.
4 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 2298»9A, 14.2.1939*
5 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 2369-9A, 3*2.1940.
6 No. 59™9A, op. cit.
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despite the virtual closure of the American and European markets through”
-]
out the War period. The improvement of 19^1 raised new hopes and more 
boats participated in the diving during the next season. Regrettably, 
the catch for 19^-2 was poor, few boats made any profits and the majority 
of the divers simply increased their debts to their Nakhudas, High 
winds were reported to have forced smaller dhows to seek shelter much of 
the time. From 19^2 onwards the cost of provisioning the boats 
increased, largely owing to the great rise in the price of foodstuffs 
(see Chapter Eight) , The increase had adversely affected the
Nakhudas and the divers, and to match the rising cost of living the 
advances were slightly increased during the years 19^2-45 (see Table 
provided)®
The 19^3 season was described as reasonably good owing to the Indian
demand for medium and lower grades of pearls and to slightly higher prices
paid on the Bombay market compared with the previous year. Almost all
Nakhudas and divers were said to have made profits and the average earnings
3
of a diver during the season was over Rs, 150. However, for the first
time during the War the divers had to eat Jareesh,crushed wheat, and dates
kinstead of the more popular rice. In the following year, Ramadan,
the Islamic month of fasting, occurred during the season and diving had 
to be halted for a whole month, A diver*s average earnings for the 
season, i.e. 19Mf, was given as Rs. 165.
In 19^5 fewer boats operated in the season than in the preceding
1 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/299, Wo. 81-9A, 31.1.19^2.
2 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/3^3, Wo. 273-18, 11.2.19^3.
3 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/299, Wo. 2^0”9A, 3*2.19^.
4 Director of Customs* Annual Report for 19^3 - Food Control. I.O.R. 
15/2/299, Wo. PA/HL/10/88.
5 No. A27-9A, op. cit.
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year, but the catch was comparatively better and the prices obtained
were slightly higher* The improvement was attributed to the ending of
the War. The season was described as "the best flicker of
2
prosperity from pearls".
Despite the smallness of the advances throughout 1935^5 T divers 
did not raise any objection as they did earlier in 1929» 1930, 1932.
This was perhaps partly due to the lessons learnt from the troubles of 
1932, but more certainly to the fact that they had reconciled themselves 
to the economic realities of the pearl trade, harsh though these were.
Recent Views and Counter-Views
A recent article, critical of the pearling reforms, states that
"the reforms were not well received ... even by the divers and pullers they
3were presumed to benefit". This statement fails to mention the
Nakhudas whose resistance to the reforms was, in some respects, greater 
than that put up by the divers. Examination of the archival material 
reveals that the Nakhudas, not the divers, asked for the abolition of the 
account system introduced under the reforms. Again it was the Nakhudas 
who demanded the restoration of the Salifah Court to its former position, 
so that they selected its judge from among their ranks. It was also the 
Nakhudas who desired a return to the earlier practice of selling the 
pearls without consulting the divers or as the Agent put it "on the sly". 
Furthermore, it was the Nakhudas who asked to be allowed to castigate 
disobedient divers, as the case was before the initiation of the reforms, 
instead of reporting the matter to the Authorities at the end of the
1 Belgrave, Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/301, number illegible, 23*1* 
19^ 6.
2 Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 13^ -.
3 S.K. Datta and J.B. Nugent, Bahrain*s Pearling Industry: How It Was, 
Why It Was That Way and Its Implications, in J.B. Nugent and
T.H. Thomas (ed. ), Bahrain and the Gulf (1985), p. 31•
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season*. (See Nakhudas* Petition of September 1925* cited earlier*)
On the other hand, the divers protested mainly against the reduction of 
the advances, i.e. Salaf, Tisqam, essential to sustain their families 
while they were absent diving. As to their earnings from the sale of 
pearls, they were less certain whether a season was going to be profitable 
to them or not. They were long used to living and providing for their 
families by means of borrowed money, and the hope that the next season 
would be a more auspicious one. Poor yields, bad markets, and falling
demand were the sort of risks that the industry had to face from time to 
time. These risks became even greater in the 1930s when expenses 
surpassed earnings and the business gradually lost its previous lucrative- 
ness through fall of prices and sales. The same article goes on to 
say:
"Most analysts ... have approached the issues involved in a 
normative perspective, emphasizing whether the system was *good* 
or *bad*. Most such analysts have tended to stress the unfairness 
of the exploitation and control of one party by another. What 
they leave unexplained is why the industry developed in the way 
it did ...
To come into existence and to remain in effect so long, the system 
must have been relatively efficient (though not necessarily *good*). 
It was a system designed to maximize the advantages and minimize 
the disadvantages of all three basic forms of organization 
mentioned above."^
The diving systems by which the Nakhudas operated, Salafieh, Khammas, 
CAzil, survived as long as the industry functioned profitably. Before 
the age of oil, the diving industry provided employment to tens of 
thousands. Manual work, at that time, was limited. Government- 
sponsored public works increased only after revenue from oil started 
accruing to the Government, i.e. in 193^ when Bahrain began to export oil. 
Similarly, alternative employment created by the construction work of the 
Oil Company postdated the discovery of oil in 1932. Date-plantation,
1 ibid., pp. 32-3*
boat-building, weaving, pottery, etc., were traditional industries 
pursued predominantly by the Baharnah Arabs, the native islanders. In 
its heyday, pearl diving was the greatest single employer during the 
season.
The Salafieh system of diving was the most widespread in Bahrain
and the reforms of 1924 were designed to rectify the malpractices which
had affected it over the years. The system was controlled by the
tribesmen who were loyal to the Rulers. Finance and captaincy of the
boats operating on the Salafieh system, together with the old Salfah
Court, were heavily influenced by these same people. Apart from
Bahrainis, most of the divers operating on the System were Persians,
Baluchis, Muscatis, Omanis and many other coastal Arabs from all over the
Gulf. It was easier for a foreign diver to seek employment on the
Salafieh than on other systems.
True the system survived, but it was taken over by Khammas from the
mid-1930s. The fact that it survived does not necessarily indicate that
it was efficient. What is certain is that it was managed unscrupulously
by those in charge of it. Moreover, Salafieh owed its survival not to
its agreeability to the divers, but to the sheer weight of the pearling
fraternity behind it.
As regards the risk factor in the industry, the article argues:
"One reason why a fixed rent system was not common in the pearling 
industry was probably the much greater income risk that 
characterized pearling than date production ...
The dominance of share contracts in which the risk is shared 
among all parties presumably reflects the fact that pilots and 
in turn merchant financiers were not willing to accept all of 
the very considerable income risk that such a system would impose 
on the pilot and the merchant-financier."^
Normally, the income risk was more real for the divers and pullers
1 Ibid., pp. 33-4.
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than for creditors and Nakhudas* A creditor was hound to take his
money back plus interest before the Nakhuda and the divers got their
shares* After him came the Nakhuda who deducted the amount of loans
he paid out to his divers plus the interest and all other expenses such
as equipping and provisioning the boat. What remained from the
profits, thereafter, determined the volume of the shares to be distributed
among the divers, pullers and assistants. It was this portion of the
profits which was more prone to fluctuations.
The article praises the advantages of share contracts wherein the
risk was shared among all parties, and the incentive thus provided for
good team work, etc., and draws the following conclusions:
"Given the aforementioned advantages of the flexible share-profit 
system ... ..., it is quite possible that many, if not all, of
the British-stimulated reforms of the 1920s may have been counter­
productive, contributing to the demise of the pearling industry 
rather than providing for its revival."^
It is claimed that the reform measure which terminated 'inter1** 
generational transfer of debt1 had possibly increased the cost of 
'recruitment of labour1 and the 'granting of loans'. It is also 
claimed that the introduction of the account system had added to the 
overall cost of the operation, and that the giving out of uniform loans 
to all divers without paying attention to their skills weakened the 
desire to be competent in diving, and therefore made the system less 
effective.
There is a measure of truth in these arguments. No doubt 
bureaucratic innovations such as the introduction of diving clerks to keep 
the account books, or the boat-licensing tax, raised the Nakhudas' 
expenses, but only marginally. Hov/ever, there is an element of 
exaggeration in the statement that the reforms were counter-productive
1 Ibid., p. 38.
2 Loc. cit.
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and contributed to the collapse of the pearling industry® From 1930 
onwards, the industry*s fortunes began to decline owing to a set of 
factors which had nothing to do with the reforms enacted by the 
Administration. The downward trend was irreversible and as years went 
by it became clear that the chances of the industry recovering from its 
ills were getting slimmer. It is only fair to say that when the 
pearling reforms began in 192*f, the industry had already been through a 
couple of bad years, for example 1920-21, as a result of poor markets 
and sales. The market picked up during 1923, but again in the following 
year receded to its earlier state of inactivity, mainly as a result of 
the caution of the European buyers who were concerned about the spread of 
cultured pearls. Apart from 1926 which was a bad season, the pearl 
trade remained active and profitable during 1927 and 1928. Thereafter, 
the industry went into a slow and steady decline as indicated by lack of 
demand from Europe, falling sales and prices, and the wider currency 
which Japanese pearls had attained worldwide.
The reforms recognised the customary laws and rights of all the 
parties involved in the business. They sought to protect the diver 
against victimization, against faulty accounts, against bequeathal of 
his debts to his son, ensured to him a fair trial, and endowed him with 
the right to witness the sale of the pearls as a shareholder. By 
reducing the seasonal advances, the reforms aimed to free the diver from 
perpetual indebtedness and from life-long attachment to his employer, 
the Nakhuda. The reforms also safeguarded the interests of the 
Nakhuda, by conceding to him high interest on his loans to the divers and 
by barring the impoundment of his personal property against failure to 
settle his debts to the merchant. The reforms recognised the great 
risks to the merchants, and therefore allowed them high interest rates on 
money lent to the Nakhudas.
It is difficult in view of the evidence to see how legislation
against malpractices could have been injurious to the pearl trade when 
all the facts show that the real culprit was global recession, Japanese 
pearls, poor sales and prices. In short, nothing could have averted the 
collapse of the pearl trade, not even the absence of the pearling reforms 
altogether. After the 1930s the industry was progressively becoming 
less and less remunerative.
There remains one unanswered question, viz. since the Khammas system 
was fairer to the divers than the Salafieh, and the Adviser*s views 
quoted above vouch for its fairness, and since Khammas was compatible 
with the teachings of Islam in that, unlike Salafieh (Madyan) , it did 
away with interest-bound loans, so why did not they encourage the 
Khammas system? The Administration could have persuaded new divers or 
those of them with little or no arrears owed to their Nakhudas to switch 
to the Khammas system. The irony is that the wretched divers were 
eventually relieved of the Salafieh by the slump in the pearl trade.
And even when Salafieh failed, its failure came at a time when the 
industry was ailing irretrievably, dashing even Major Daly*s earlier 
hopes that in due course other Gulf States would seek to adopt the 
pearling reforms of Bahrain.
1 Many Indian merchants in Bahrain were involved in the financing of 
boats whose Nakhudas operated on the Salafieh system. S.B. Miles 
thus recorded their influence:
'•The management and profits of the pearl trade are entirely in the 
hands of Hindoo and Khoja merchants, who reside in Bahrain, the towns 
on the Pirate Coast, and at Lingah and Muscat. These astute 
traders not only own most of the boats but advance provisions, 
clothes, and other necessaries to the pearl fishers at exorbitant 
prices and receive the whole produce of the industry, which they 
thus continue to turn almost entirely to their own profit and 
advantage." The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (2nd 
Edition 1966), p. A15.
Statistics of Boats and Advances for 1935-I9^5
Obtained from the Annual Reports of the Political Agency, the Director 
of Customs, the Adviser to the Shaikh (I.O.R. 15/2/298-301).
Year Number of Boats
Tisqam Salaf
Diver Puller Diver Puller
1935 316 Rs.20 Rs.15 Rs.20 Rs.15
1936 26A 20 15 20 15
1937 271 AO 20 AO 20
1938 252 20 15 20 15
1939 219 20 15 20 15
19 AO 191 25 20 25 20
A9A1 222 25 20 25 20
19^2 298 30 25 30 25
19 A3 278 30 25 30 25
19AA 188 AO 30 Ao 30
19^5 121 Ao 30 AO 30
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Chapter Siac
The Politics of Education: From Seclusion to Integration 1919-19^5
The Emergence of Modern Schools in Bahrain
1919 is usually taken to mark the start of modern schooling in 
Bahrain. In that year the first Arab school: Madrasat al-Hidayah
al-Khalifiyah was built by the Sunni Community of Bahrain. Rs. 300,000 
were collected in donations for the school, which was built in Moharraq, 
the Rulers1 place of residence then. It was supervised and run by a 
secular Committee, which was presided over by Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa 
A1 Khalifah. Members of the Committee were mostly merchants who, them­
selves deprived of modern schooling, were keen to see that their children 
did not miss it either.
During the Summer of 1919 Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa was invited to 
England where he visited schools and was greatly impressed by what he had 
seen there„ On his return to Bahrain, both he and his associates involved 
themselves in a plan for a modern school with a view to secular as opposed 
to purely religious education.
Certain Arab writers have tended to regard al-Hidayah as the first 
modern Arab school in the Gulf, which contradicts the facts as they now 
stand. The Mubarakiyah School in Kuwait, named after Shaikh Mubarak bin 
Subah,was opened in 1912 and therefore pre-dated al-Hidayah by about seven
1 Memorandum from C. Belgrave to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, Eo. 1366/
2E, 15th Ramadan 13^8. Also note that after Shaikh Abdullah's 
return from England in late October 1919, a public meeting was held at 
which funds were collected for the new school. Yusuf Kanoo, hoping 
to become President of the Education Committee, donated Rs. 40,000 
towards the school, but instead Shaikh Abdullah was elected President 
and Kanoo was offered mere membership of the Committee. This 
provoked him into uttering angry remarks as a result of which Shaikh 
Abdullah returned to him, in public, the contribution he had made 
towards the school. In resentment, he told the Agent later on that 
the school v/as " ... a deeply laid plot for the teaching of anti- 
English doctrine and pan-Island-sm". See Note on Yusuf Kanoo 
attached to Dickson's Memorandum No. ^30-C, op. cit.
years. And in all fairness, if by modern we mean Western-style
schools, then mention should be made of the Girls* School started in
Bahrain by Mrs. S.W. Zwemer of the Arabian Mission in 1892, which v/as
2
clearly the pioneer of modern schooling in Bahrain. For history's
sake, mention should also be made of the Persian school: Ittihad, founded
in Bahrain m  1910.
Mosque-based schools were the precursor of modern education in
Bahrain, as in most other Islamic countries. Some such schools were
dependent on trusts and endowments from members of the community and were
listed as Waqf-schools. A large number of ShiCah Waqf Schools existed
in Bahrain from earlier times. These were destroyed, over the years, by
opponents of the Shi ah faith, for example, the school once attached to the
mosque at the ancient village of Bilad al-Qadim. These were places for
religious teaching carried out by traditional Mullahs or °Alims. The
advent of modern schools, however, hastened the disappearance of those that
L
remained, and their number by early 192? had dwindled to twenty.
From December 1923* the Administration of Shaikh Hamad paid a regular
monthly subsidy to al-Hidayah School, to the exclusion of the Shi°ah who
wanted equal rights, as the statement below indicates:
"A scheme he (i.e. Shaikh Hamad) does not favour, but for which
there is a considerable demand, is for a school for Shiahs.
The Civil List includes a monthly contribution of Rs. 1000 to the 
Sunni Boys' school".
7
1 H. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. ^8 . Wahbah served as Headmaster of al-
HidSyah from October 1920 to the end of November 1921. See his letter
to the Resident dated 14th February 1922. I.O.R. 15/V327-
2 R.B. Winder,'Education in Al-Bahrain! in The World of Islam: Studies 
in honour of Philip K. Hitti. Edited by J. Kritzeck and R.B. Winder, 
p. 310.
3 A.Y. Al-Hamar, An Analytical Study of the System of Education in 
Bahrain 19^0-65* PP. 8 , 1Q*U
k C. Belgrave, Education. I.O.R. 15/2/2 9 6, 23-2.1927-
5 See Monthly Budget, Government of Bahrain in Major Daly's letter to
the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 208/C/9/2, 17-12.1923- 
Note that the total monthly allocation on Bahrain's first Civil List 
drawn up by Daly in December 1923 was Rs. 36,000.
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The Administration was highly dissatisfied with the way schools were 
run by the Education Committee whose members sought to appoint relatives 
and friends to teaching posts, regardless of training or qualifications.
In 1925 lack of adequate cash and absence of trained local teachers
' i
prevented the Administration from taking over the control of schools.
During the school year 1926-27, there were three schools in Bahrain
and the teaching staff was increased with the arrival of a number of
trained Syrians whose employment, nevertheless, touched on local
susceptibilities as the commentary below shows:
"There is considerable feeling against the importing of foreigners, 
but there was no remedy as local teachers do not exist.
Three hundred boys received free education in the schools. Their
ages ranged from six to sixteen. They were taught reading, writing,
arithmetic, elementary algebra and geometry, and English. Head teachers
received a salary of Rs. 250/- to 300/- monthly and v/ere provided with
quarters in the school. Several local teachers were former pupils.
What the Administration sought to do with school-leavers was outlined by
the Adviser as follows:
"It is hoped that after the schools have been in existence for a 
year or two more, that some of the pupils will be qualified to 
take up posts as clerks in the town*"^
In 1927 the wife of one of the Syrian teachers opened a class for 
girls. When it was first started it was attended by a few girls from 
the Ruling and the merchant classes. It took parents considerable time to 
adapt to the idea of sending their daughters to modern schools to learn
1 A.R.P.A. 1925» op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 1927, op. cit. Note that the word Syrians*, at this time,
subsumed both nationals of present-day Syria as well as Lebanon.
3 G. Belgrave, Education. I.O.R. 13/2/296, 23rd February 1927- It is
interesting to note that it was Sater Baig, ex-minister of Education 
in Iraq, who recommended the introduction of Syrian teachers to 
Bahrain. See Belgrave, Education. I.O.R. 15/2/296, No. 56V9A,
3th Shaban, 13^6 (February 1928).
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reading and writing. They feared that they might be tempted to
correspond with boys. In 1928 a girls1 school was inaugurated in
Moharraq at the request of Mrs. Belgrave.
Commenting on the school-boys' standard of education, Belgrave wrote 
in early 1928:
'•At present the best results are obtained from the American 
Mission Boys1 School. Two scholars from the Mission School have 
been taken on in Government Offices, but when an attempt was made 
to fill another vacancy of a clerk from the Khalifa Schools nobody 
was found with the requisite amount of education.
The Government has every wish to encourage the State schools by 
giving appointments to the scholars in the various Government 
Offices but so far the standard of education falls considerably 
below that required in a junior clerk."^
The First Educational Mission to Beirut
Seven boys were selected in 1928 for further study at the American
2
University in Beirut (A.U.B.) at the expense of the State. The aim was 
to train a number of Bahrainis for vacant jobs on the Administration of 
Bahrain. The son of Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa and that of his brother 
Shaikh Mohammad were among those destined for Beirut. Shaikh Abdullah 
bin Shaikh Ibrahim A1 Khalifah had already joined the University in the
3
previous year, also at State expense. The mission was exclusively 
formed of Sunni boys in line with official policy which favoured the 
prevalence of the Sunni element in the Administration of Bahrain.
1 No. 56V9A, op. cit. Rev B.D. Hakken was head of the above School
founded around 1905-
2 Those included in the Mission were: Khalifah bin Shaikh Mohammad 
AlKhalifah, Hamad bin Shaikh Abdullah AlKhalifah, Ahmad bin Ali bin 
Musa, Abdul Aziz bin Sacad Shamlan, Rashid bin Abdur Rahman Zayani, 
Abdur Rahman bin Qasim Macawda, Mohammad Kamal bin Shaikh Jasim.
See letter from Major Barrett, P.A. to the Registrar, A.U.B., Beyrout, 
Syria. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, 28.6.1928. Although the decision to send 
the boys to Beirut was approved by the Administration in Bahrain and 
by Shaikh Abdullah, it was nonetheless done at the instigation of 
Uthman al-Hawrani, Headmaster of al-Hidayah School. See Petition, 
in Arabic, addressed to Shaikh Hamad by members of the Education 
Committee, attached to the Adviser*s Memorandum to P.A., No. 1366/2E, 
op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
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Eor the first time the Ruling House of Bahrain allowed its members to
join a Christian institution, in this case the A.U.B. - formerly the
Syrian Protestant College - in order to benefit from Western education.
Earlier in 1923, Shaikh Hamad turned down a suggestion from the Agent to
send his sons to a missionary school, viz.
"I (i.e. Daly) mentioned Van Ess's School at Basrah. Shaikh 
Hamad did not appear to like the idea, he emphasized that he would 
like them to go to a Muhammadan Institution ...
He would regard with the greatest suspicion any attempt on our part 
to wish to advise him to send them to a Mission School and even if 
he consented I think ill-wishers would make capital out of it.”^
The Formation of a ShicaSi Education Committee
c cIn 1927 leading Shi ahs headed by the Shi ah Qadi Sayed Adnan made
their first attempt at establishing a modern school for boys. The village
of Suq al-Khamis was chosen as a suitable site for the proposed school.
The choice was made because of the existence in the surrounding areas of a
number of densely populated villages. Donations for the school came
cmainly from the Shi ah community. Pledges of support were also made by
Shaikh Hamad and this included contributions towards the cost of
2
construction and the running of the school.
On its completion, the school was inaugurated by Shaikh Hamad in May
1928. It had two teachers, one Iraqi and the other Bahraini, and a total
3
of 25 boys on its register. On March 15th of the following year a second
Q
school, al-Madrasah al-Ja fariyah, bigger than the previous one, was 
opened in Manamah town also by Shaikh Hamad. It was financed jointly
1 No. 208/C/9/2, op. cit.
2 No. 56V9A, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
4 A.R.P.A. 1929, op. cit. It is interesting to note that a modern
Shicah School also called al-Madrasah al-Jacfariyah had existed in 
Baghdad prior to the outbreak of World War One. See Amal Vinogradov, 
The 1920 Revolt in Iraq - The Role of Tribes in National Politics, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, No. 3 (1972), pp. 123-39®
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by the ShiCahs and by the Shaikh’s Administration, Its management was
Q
entrusted to a Committee of Prominent Shi ahs presided over by Sayed Ahmad
c c — cbin Sayed ,Alawi. Mohammad Sa id Al-Jum ah, educated in Baghdad, was
appointed headmaster of the School, The staff of the school comprised
the former’s brother plus three Iraqi teachers. At the time of opening
198 boys attended the school, the maximum number that it could take.
Support for the school came from the Shi°ah Qadis and from the Baharnah
Community in Manamah, and the State budgetted Rs. 1100/- during 13*4-7
c *1(1928-29) for the annual upkeep of both Shi ah schools.
The Dismissal of the Syrian Headmasters: The Beginnings of Centralization
In 1928, actual State expenditure on Education totalled Rs. 70,000.
There existed then four Sunni boys*Schools located in Manamah, Moharraq,
Q
Rafaa and Hedd. The last one was opened during the year. The total
number of boys in them amounted to A4-2, in addition to 75 girls in Moharraq
Girls* School. The number of teachers had grown to 26, among them were
3
13 Bahrainis, 8 Syrians and 5 Iraqis.
In response to a demand by the Sunni Community in Manamah, a Girls* 
School was opened there in 1929- The increase in the number of schools 
made the task of supervising their affairs that much harder. The 
Education Committee was now responsible for the affairs of six Sunni Schools,
c
not to mention the two Shi ah Boys* Schools, managed separately by a 
Committee of Shi ahs. In June of that year Shaikh Abdullah approached 
the Adviser suggesting the formation of a Government body to assume control
1 C. Belgrave, Notes on Expenditure 13*4-7 (1928-29)- 1*0.R. L/P+S/10/10*44.
2 For Annual Budget Estimates - not actuals - in respect of Education,
See Table provided under the Budgetary Affairs of Bahrain.
3 A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
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1
of education in Bahrain, At this time, the official view regarding
Education was thus outlined:
"Education is still backward, but thanks to the push of Shaikh 
Abdulla .•, it has made immense strides during the past two
years. The drive in this case has come wholly from Bahrain
subjects themselves,
Certain changes were envisaged for the school year 1929-301 as first
steps towards control of Education by the State, These were described
by the Adviser as follows:
"There is shortly going to be a complete change in the administration 
of Education Department .,•
An inspector of Education is shortly to be appointed and the 
Department will have its headquarters in an office in the 
Government buildings
This v/as the first time that the Adviser mentioned the Department of
Education, by name, twice. It shows that the Department existed in
August 1929i when the above letter was written.
In September 1929 Faiq Adham, the new Lebanese Inspector,was engaged
to supervise the affairs of Primary Education in Bahrain. He was 
appointed on the recommendation of the A.U.B,, where he obtained a degree, 
and his wife, who was a qualified teacher, was made headmistress of the 
Girls* School opened in Manamah in the same year. During January 1930 
he attempted to introduce a number of changes, including a new pay scale
for teachers in replacement of the one then in force. The new scale
determined a teacher*s pay according to his 'qualifications* rather than 
'personality or influence'. He clashed with the two most experienced
C mm Q
Syrian headmasters, Sayed Uthman al-Hawrani of al-Hidayah, and Omar
1 Captain Prior's No. C/8^, op. cit. In 1929i the Sunni Education
Committee consisted of the following merchant members: Abdul Aziz
al-Qusaibi, Haji Abdur Rahman az-Zayani, Yusuf Abdur Rahman Fakhroo, 
the treasurer of the Committee.
2 Col. Barrett, P.R., to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 385-S,
28.8.1929.
3 Belgrave to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. J+09/2E, 26th Rabi I, 
13^8 (31.8.1929).
Yahya al-Hawrani of Manamah Boys' School, both of whom resisted the
proposed changes including Adham's plan for introducing English in the
clower forms of Primary Schools. Uthman, who felt secure in his position, 
initiated a strike in al-Hidayah which spread to the Boys' School in 
Manamah, bringing the two to a complete halt. Teachers and students of 
both schools demonstrated in support of the Syrian headmasters, and the 
strike lasted for around ten days.
Shaikh Abdullah summoned the two headmasters who refused to appear 
in person and instead submitted to him a number of demands, viz. that the 
Inspector be stripped of authority to inspect schools, that the staff's 
pay should remain unaffected by the proposed changes, and that appointments 
for posts should be on a permanent basis. The two Syrians were dismissed
from their posts on account of 'unsatisfactory behaviour' and on 6th
2February 1930, they were deported. Some members of the Education
Committee spoke against Government interference in the affairs of Education,
and together with the public expressed sympathy for the two Syrians.
The Adviser described the departure of the men as an "occasion for
3
hysterical demonstration". The Agency Report thus commented upon the
Inspector's plan for education in Bahrain:
"The new Inspector of Education has been a great success, but 
undoubtedly showed too great a tendency to model the schools on 
the Beirut System, and introduced English into all except the very 
lowest forms. The Political Agent drew attention to this and 
suggested that the schools should model themselves on Baghdad and 
Basra, and not on Beirut, and since the indigenous boy is not very 
intelligent, urged that time should not be taken up with English 
until he had obtained a good grasp of his own language."^
1 Belgrave to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. 1339/2E, 11th Ramadan 
13^8 (Feb ruary 1930).
2 Telegram from P.A. Bahrain, to P.A. Muscat. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. 210, 
6.2.1930.
3 No. 1339/2E, op. cit.
k A.R.P.A. 1930. I.O.R. 15/2/296. It is not quite clear if the Beirut 
system of which the Agent disapproved was American oriented. However, 
the same Report quoted above, warned the American Missionaries in Bahrain 
to restrain their missionary fervour:
"The American Mission deserve every credit for the pioneer work they have 
done for female education in Bahrain. The Reverend Mr. Hakken's ardent 
evangelism caused some excitement and the Political Agent advised him 
to abate his zeal if he wished to remain in Bahrain." Ibid.
During the crisis rumours circulated suggesting that the Government 
intended to introduce English lessons at the expense of religion and Arabic. 
To appease the public Shaikh Abdullah called for a meeting to which members 
of the Sunni Education Committee, the Sunni Qadi, a number of merchants, 
and even teachers of religion, were all invited. Members of the Sunni 
Committee defended the ousted headmasters and regarded their dismissal as 
unfair and rash. They blamed the State for meddling in education and 
submitted a petition to Shaikh Hamad which contained a number of requests, 
chief of which was the one for the reinstatement of the headmasters. They 
referred to the debt the country owed to CUthman al-Hawrani, especially for 
his efforts towards the initiation of female education in Bahrain, the 
sending of the boys to Beirut, etc. They blamed the new Inspector for 
failing to patch up his differences with the two men, deliberately allowing
'I
the dispute to heighten beyond control.
Following the above developments the Agent wrote to Shaikh Hamad
suggesting that it was time for the State to assume control of Education:
"The Education Department has very properly dismissed the two head­
masters, who merited severer punishment, and they should on no 
account be allowed to return ...
It has been freely asserted that the Education Department were trying 
to interfere with religious education and abolish Arabic, but 
Shaikh Abdulla held a meeting and clearly proved that the rumours 
were baseless ...
2
Since the Government pays the whole cost of the Schools, they have 
every right to do what they please with them. Bahrain must be the 
only country in the world where the schools are controlled by a 
Committee who can barely read and write and it would be far better 
if Shaikh Abdulla and the Inspector were left to manage them without 
interference ...
1 Petition addressed to Shaikh Hamad, attached to Adviser's No. 13&6/2E, 
op. cit.
2 State Expenditure on Education during 13^8 (1929-30) was budgetted at 
Rs. 90,000. See Prior to Col. H.V. Biscoe, P.R., I.O.R. 15/2/127,
No. ?89, 12.5.1930.
3 C.G. Prior to Shaikh Hamad, Deputy Ruler of Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, 
No. 112/V.O., 15.2.1930.
17^
In the wake of this suggestion, the schools were subjected to direct
State control. Shaikh Abdullah presided over the affairs of Education
and the Inspector supervised the technical side of the same. As far as
the Education Committee was concerned the developments were too abrupt for
its members and, in the circumstances, it was left to die a natural death
having served from 1919 to early 1930.
Shortly after the arrival of the headmasters in Syria, an article
dated 11th March 1930 appeared in the a.l-Ayyam newspaper of Basrah, which
blamed the dismissal of the Syrians on the Political Agent and accused him
of involvement in the affairs of education in Bahrain. The article
attributed the removal of the men to their refusal to allow the teaching
2
of English to the lower forms.
The Education Authorities in Bahrain responded quickly to the same by
publishing their own account of the educational developments in Bahrain.
c <•
Their account appeared in the Beirut paper, al-> Ahd al-Jadid - The New 
Epoch - of March 29th, 1930. It was signed by ”a Syrian in Bahrain”,
but was published with the approval of Shaikh Abdullah and the Adviser,
3it was reported.
The Recalling of the Mission from Beirut
From 1930 onwards, the Administration was pre-occupied with the
question of further training of Bahraini boys who had completed their primary
schooling. Primary education, the highest available in Bahrain then, fell
1 No. 1366/2E, op. cit.
2 al-Ayyam Newspaper, No. 26, 11.3*1930. I.O.R. 13/2/1231. Also vide 
Memorandum from P.A. to the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. 55^, 
26.3.1930.
3 Col. H.V. Biscoe, P.R., to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 167-S, 
9.^.1930. Also, Translation of an article from al-cAhd al-Jadid,
28th Shawwal 13^ -8 (29.3*1930), attached to the Adviserfs Memorandum 
to the P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. 1903/2E, 9th Dhul Haj, 13^8.
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short of qualifying a local boy for a clerical post with the Government
or with an independent employer. To take on further studies, the boys,
encouraged by their parents, looked forward to Arab countries.
Commenting on the same, the Resident wrote:
"The question is where to send them, there are objections to 
Syria, Iraq and India. In the circumstances, would it not be 
possible to make a beginning with secondary education in Bahrain 
as students finish their primary education and the demand for it 
is felt? The finances of the State are thoroughly sound and can,
I imagine, well afford some increased expenditure on education, 
and there are obvious advantages in educating boys in Bahrain 
instead of sending them abroad and the cost of course would be 
very much less."^
By the end of the academic year 1929-30, the seven boys had been
withdrawn from Beirut. The decision to call them back was taken in the
middle of the year, but they were allowed to stay until the end of June
1930. The official reason for this action was that the courses they were
doing were above their academic standard and that they were not chosen for
2their academic excellence in the first place. Much to the dissatisfaction
of the Administration, when they were back in Bahrain most of them refused
to work with the Government. The official displeasure with the boys
was thus outlined by the Agency Report:
"They have learnt very little and show no sign of gratitude for 
the large sums spent on them and all the State has to show for an 
expenditure of over half a lakh is a few young men with wind in 
the head.1'
3
Earlier, the boys had sent a cable from Beirut, protesting at the 
sacking of the Syrian masters, which accounted, partly, for the 
Administration's anger with them. Moreover, British officials suspected 
the training of Bahrainis in an American institution. In December 1929, 
the Resident described Beirut as a 'highly Westernized' place, which
1 Col. Biscoe to Col. Prior. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 72-S, 20.2.1930.
2 A.R.P.A. 1929, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 1930, op. cit.
1
provided the 1wrong atmosphere' for Bahrainis. Over the years
suspicion did not abate and in 1939 the Adviser wrote:
"I have often heard Beirut University described as a hotbed of 
nationalism and anti-English propaganda.
The subjection of Bahraini boys to political indoctrination abroad 
and the search for an alternative continued to be one of the main concerns 
of the Administration. This quest sometimes produced bizarre ideas, 
such as:
"The great mistake in Bahrain as in India, has been to educate 
the few at the expense of the many ... since we have a number 
of these little schools attached to mosques and Wakfs, it is 
obviously our policy to find them out and encourage them to 
organize themselves into more efficient bodies.1'
The Thirties: Education in the Age of Oil
By the end of the school session, 1930-31, most of the old teaching
staff were released from duty and a new batch of teachers, five men and
three women, were recruited from Syria. Their services were hired by
4arrangement with the Islamieh College of Beirut, where Adham had his first
training. Some of the old teachers were re-engaged including three
Bahrainis, one of whom had a B.A. degree from the A.U.B. Also engaged,
£
with difficulty, for the Shi ah schools were three Iraqis. The new staff 
had to sign regular contracts which stated the terms of employment based on 
a new pay scale.
At the start of the School year 1931-32, two educational Councils were 
formed, whose members were Sunnis as well as Shi ahs. They were partly 
elected by the public and partly appointed by the Government. Shaikh
1 Resident to I.G. Acheson, Deputy F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. P.S.-8,
14.12.1929.
2 Belgrave to H. Weightman, P.A. I.O.R. 15/1/373, 20.7.1939.
3 No. 7 8 9, op. cit.
4 During 1931, the Inspector, i.e. F. Adham, entered into partnership with
Khalil ICanoo, a leading merchant, to produce tiles. The tiles they 
produced v/ere said to have been as good as those imported from Basrah. 
The partnership, however, collapsed owing to falling sales and to mutual 
distrust. A.R.P.A. 1931, op. cit.
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Abdullah bin Isa, was recently appointed Minister of Education. The
State now controlled the finances, pay and appointment of teachers.
Members of the Councils resented tight State-control since it deprived them
of opportunities for mal-practice such as had existed earlier. The
Administration, however, had a low opinion of the Councils:
"The existence of those Councils of Education, composed almost 
entirely of persons with no knowledge or experience, is of no real 
assistance to the government and is the cause of constant disputes."^
There were six boys* Schools during 193^-32, four Sunni, two Shi ah,
in addition to two girls* schools. The number of boys in those schools
totalled around 500, and the girls 100. Students were supposed to pay
for their books, though few of them did. Members of the education
Councils were themselves opposed to any requests for payment. Arabic was
the medium of instruction, and English was taught from the fourth grade
(Primary) upwards, at the request of the Councils. The school year
spread over nine months and attendance was divided into a morning and an
afternoon session from 8 a.m. to 12 noon, and again from 2 p.m. to f^.30.
Books and curricula were largely standardized, and the subjects taught
included: the Qur'an, Arabic, reading and writing, grammar, recitation
of poems, composition, arithmetic, geometry, book-keeping, history,
geography and hygiene. Commenting on the educational changes and local
reaction, the Adviser wrote:
"On the whole the public appreciate the efforts of the Government 
to encourage education, but the slightest innovation appears to 
provoke a general outcry so all improvements have to be effected 
very slowly and carefully."^
The advent of oil in June 1932, heralded brighter prospects for 
education in Bahrain. During that year both Sunni and Shi ah Boys*
1 Adviser*s Annual Report on Education, 1350 (193^ —32)• I.O.R. L/P+S/ 
10/10*4, No. 105/SF, 5 Safar 1350. The President of the ShiCah 
Council was a local cAlim, Shaikh Mohammad Ali al-Jish-shi, with whose 
performance the Adviser was unhappy. Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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schools in Manamah were amalgamated and subjected to a central authority.
A new era had begun in the field of education, implemented more 
appropriately for reasons of economy than anything else. Boys of both 
religious sects were for the first time subjected to a unified system of 
schooling. Fears of Shi ah opposition to the amalgamation proved
unfounded. On the contrary, mixed Sunni-Shi°ah education was conducive
to the unity of the two sects, first at school level and, later on, at the 
national level. The events of the late 1930s and, more especially, the
early 1950s, bore this out.
With the rise in the political awareness of the people, education 
became the focus of attention. During 193^ the Baharnah demanded the
Q
restoration of Shi ah representation on the Educational Council, the
opening of new schools in the villages, and the appointment of a competent
Baharnah: Ibrahim al- Urayyedh to the headmastership of Manamah Boys*
School. In the past, lack of cash was the Statefs only justification to
not building schools. After the export of oil in 193^, royalties began
to accrue to the State, and public pressure for more schools and better
education increased greatly. Absence of cash was no longer a valid
pretext. During 1935 the Department appeased the Baharnah by opening a
Boys* School in Sitrah, followed at a later stage by two more schools at 
c **
Budayya and Karzakkan. In 1937 the Administration decided to send
C CMohammad Saleh Sayed Adnan, the son of the late Shi ah Qadi, to Madrasat 
cib> c
al-Wa izin, a Shi ah school in Lucknow in order to train as Qadi for the 
c 2Shi ah Waqfs. Earlier, the British Authorities in Baghdad had advised
c 3against sending him to a Shi ah institute in Iraq,
By 1938 the Company's high-salaried workers were almost entirely
1 A.R.P.A. 1932. I.O.R. 15/2/297.
2 Adviser to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 18^6/SF, 8.2.1938.
3 P.A. to the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/1231, No. 895-6/18, 16.^.1937-
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foreigners, and the low-salaried were predominantly natives. The 
former occupied skilled jobs, whereas the latter were employed in manual 
capacities. Among the natives there was quite a significant number of 
school-leavers. As the Company had not yet provided training programmes 
for the benefit of its local employees, it was criticized for being partial 
to the foreigners. The country*s educational system was also severely 
attacked for failing to provide the appropriate training essential for 
skilled jobs.
The number of schools, Girls*as well as Boys1, had risen during the
year to ten, the teachers to *4-2, and the students to 1,113- The number
of school-leavers had also grown, and the disappointment felt by parents
at the failure of their children to secure suitable employment became
correspondingly greater. By the end of 1938 public pressure for the
removal of the Lebanese Inspector, held responsible by the public for the
blemishes of the school system, had become so persistent that in March
1939 both he and his wife were removed, having worked in Bahrain for nearly 
2a decade.
Reorganisation of Education under British Directorship 1939-4-5
After the Inspector*s departure from Bahrain, the Administration 
invited Mr. C.R.L. Adrian-Vallance, then of the Iraqi Department of 
Education, to advise on the future development of education in Bahrain.
His visit, which lasted from 12th to 22nd June 1939» introduced him to the 
schools there and provided an opportunity to confer with the Adviser over 
various questions. Shortly after the visit was over Vallance wrote to him
1 A.R.P.A. 1938. I.O.R. 15/2/298.
2 A.R.P.A. 1939- I.O.R. 15/2/298.
" ... the immense danger to the Gulf of its present educational 
state of affairs and the splendid opportunity which now exists 
of doing, at quite modest cost, a job of work which would turn 
the anti-British flank in the Middle East, and go a long way 
towards isolating the Gulf from the extremely dangerous 
influences of the Arab States ... especially from those of 
Iraq.11 ^
He then explained how, to the Arab mind, the words politics1,
'progress* and 'education', purported the same thing. Absence of higher
education in Bahrain, forced the local boys to search for it elsewhere.
He believed that Egypt was sufficiently far away from Bahrain and travel
expenses were high enough to discourage parents from sending their boys to
that place. Syria and Lebanon were objectionable on political grounds,
he wrote. To illustrate his point, he cited Lord Lloyd:
" ... he (i.e. Lloyd) was satisfied that the American University 
of Beirut was one of the chief sources of anti-British propaganda 
in the Middle East."^
He then quoted Iraq which he blamed for exposing the minds of Arab 
youths studying there to "pan-Arab and anti-British propaganda", and 
added:
"Iraq was for centuries ... a centre of trouble. She is still 
today a country of assassination, violence, treachery, vengeance, 
unrest and corruption of all kinds ...
... What is so well known about Iraq is that educationally, and 
therefore politically, she now has her eyes upon the whole of 
Arabia south of Basra, especially upon Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
Hadhramout, the Yemen, and Saudi Arabia".^
Iraqi schools were places for agitation and to them Vallance 
attributed the organisation of the political demonstrations, Palestine 
protests, and the destruction of British and Jewish property in Iraq.
The sending of the boys to the above countries was, he believed, 'suicidal* 
His advice to Belgrave was:
1 Despatch from Adrian-Vallance to C. Belgrave. I.O.R. 15/1/373,
para. 26.6.1939*
2 Ibid., para. 6.
3 Ibid., paras. 7 & 8.
"Put up at Bahrain, a Higher College, a sort of Lower University, 
under British direction, ..., a partly British staff ... call it 
the Gulf College ..., and take into it all the more intelligent 
Gulf boys who have got as far as their local schools can take
them, and are asking for more ... 11
Finance for the new College was, according to Vallance, supposed to
come from the Oil revenues of Bahrain and also donations from the Oil
Company there. The British Council was expected to assist by defraying
the cost of teachers of English. The Rulers of the Gulf States were to
have been induced to send their sons to Bahrain instead of Iraq or Syria,
and ibn Saud, who ’held strong views about the contaminating influences of
Baghdad*, was to have been persuaded to follow suit.
Vallance cited two examples from his Gulf visit which illustrated
the British failure to take the initiative there. He mentioned how, when
on a visit to the principal Government School in Manamah, the boys chanted
the school song which turned out to be the national anthem of Syria. His
other main criticism was the absence of a local history for use in schools,
about which he stated:
"At neither place (i.e. Kuwait and Bahrain) had anyone made it his 
business to provide the schools with a local history, or a History 
of the Gulf, with the result that while Gulf boys know nothing 
whatever about their own long history, or about our 150 years' 
protection of their shores and their liberties, they know (from 
Damascus history-books) all about the struggles for freedom of the 
various oppressed and ill-used Arab States.
Belgrave, who appreciated Vallance*s views and proposals for education
in Bahrain, described their political implications to the Agent as follows:
"The scheme appears to me to have great possibilities. It would 
be useful for Bahrain and I believe valuable politically. The 
Bahrain Government would satisfy the public demand for higher 
education and would ensure a supply of educated men uncontaminated 
by foreign influence and there would no longer be the need to send 
young men to Beyrout, which is expensive, or to Iraq or India, ... ",
1 Ibid., para. 11.
2 Ibid., para. 13.
3 Belgrave to H. Weightman, P.A. I.O.R. 15/1/5731 20.7.1939
More importantly, Vallance's plan was also welcomed by T.C. Fowle,
the then Resident, who took an interest in the local boys' ignorance of
the 'history of their own State', i.e. Anglo-Bahraini relations, and spoke
of his support for writing such a history. Belov; is how he described
the plan to the India Office:
" ... distinctly attractive, and would have an excellent political 
effect from our point of view. In general, therefore, it has 
my support
In November 1939, the Government of Bahrain engaged the services of
Adrian-Vallance, first British Director for Education in Bahrain, with a
view to reorganising or, perhaps better, reorienting education there.
His contract obliged him to teach advanced English and to assume
3
responsibility for the State Education System. The British Council was
supposed to pay £500 annually towards his salary of £800 per annum, with
b
the Government of Bahrain providing the remaining £300.
Once in office, Vallance submitted to Shaikh Hamad a formal report on
the State of Education in Bahrain, based on his observations during visits
to schools. It contained some of the points he had raised earlier in the
despatch to the Adviser, in addition to a number of deficiencies noted
while inspecting schools, such as: irregular attendance, premature
5
leaving, overcrowded classes, lack of sufficient text-books, antiquated
methods of teaching, students' lack of a sound grounding, neglect of
6village-schools and students' poor health, etc. ...
1 Col. T.C. Fowle, P.R., to H. V/eightman. I.O.R. 15/1/373, No. C/356,
15.8.1939.
2 Fowle to R.T. Peel, India Office. I.O.R. 15/1/373, No. C/35^, 15.8. 
1939.
3 A.R.P.A. 1939, op. cit.
b R.T. Peel to the Secretary-General, The British Council. I.O.R. 
15.1.373, No. P.Z. 6658/39, 1.11.1939.
5 During 1935-36 over 150 boys from Manamah and Moharraq abandoned their 
schools preferring to take up manual jobs with the Oil Company which was 
expanding its operations and was in need of extra workers to do con­
struction work. As their employment was temporary, the Administration 
expressed concern over the boys' fate once the work had been completed 
and they were no longer needed. See Belgrave to the Agent. I.O.R. 
15/2/298, No. 1303/9A, 7-2.1937.
6 Report on Government Education in Bahrain with Proposals for Reform.
I.O.R. 15/1/373, 1.9.1939.
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Vallance also noted and commented upon the complete absence in schools
of any *patriotic influence* by which he meant that the boys* loyalty was
towards the Arab World instead of their own islands. Commenting upon the
writing of a local history, he wrote:
"It should be written in such a way as to impress its youthful 
readers with a strong consciousness of the fact that the Bahrainis 
are a separate, independent and sovereign people, able to hold 
their own."^
He also wanted to see the development of a ’strong consciousness of
national independence*, and expressed his dislike of *a slavish imitation
of the methods and institutions of other countries*, imported into Bahrain,
he said, by the Syrian teachers. Aiming to supplant the ’dependent
attitude* of the boys by an independent outlook*, he recommended:
" ... that firm instructions should be given by Your Highness that 
the new Inspector shall do his utmost to stamp out in the schools 
this wholly undesirable tendency to look to and to lean upon 
neighbouring States, in matters which are the concern of Bahrain 
alone."^
In a letter to the Agent in Bahrain, Colonel Prior, who had succeeded 
3
T.C. Fowle as Resident in September 1939* attempted to assess some of
Vallance*s ideas for reorganising education in that place. He concurred
with him in encouraging the boys to join Technical Education since most of
them were destined to work with the Oil Company. But Prior expressed
reservations about the relevance of some of Vallance*s remarks, especially:
"I am very sceptical of the possibilities of inculcating patriotism 
and 'Reverence for the flag' by lessons in school but having never 
received such instruction myself perhaps I do not appreciate their 
finer points. Vallance’s acquaintance with Iraq is too short to 
remember how in the nineteen twenties all the Britishers on the Iraq 
pay roll were far more Iraqi than the Iraqis themselves and full of
1 Ibid., p. 19.
2 Ibid., p. 27.
3 From the start Col. Fowle was enthusiastic about Vallance’s plan for 
the writing of a modern history of Bahrain and after leaving the 
Residency he joined the British Council where he was in a position to 
enlist the Council*s support should extra funds be needed. See 
letter from Peel to Prior. I.O.R. 15/1/373? No. P.Z. 3^8/39?
8.12.1939.
l8*f
zeal in teaching them that they were Ton an absolute equality* 
with other nations. The only harvest of this seed was a fine
crop of Xenophobia, and the sack for most of the sowers as soon 
as the Iraqis came into power."^
Prior correctly saw no use in teaching English to the young boys at
a stage when their grasp of Arabic was not yet adequate. More
importantly, he saw Vallance's appointment as Director of Education as
disadvantageous since it increased the European team on the Administration
in Bahrain. He drew attention to his recommendations cautioning of
the great expenditure their implementation would entail, far beyond what
2
had been hitherto anticipated by officials in Bahrain.
Subsequently, the Agent wrote to the Adviser warning of the high
cost of Vallance's recommendations to the Administration, especially the
one for an Inspector of Education and a European doctor, to be devoted
exclusively to the School-health service. Moreover, while questioning
Vallance's suggestion to introduce a 'Hebrew teacher*, the Agent enquired:
"Is it incumbent on Bahrain to provide a special teacher to enable 
Jews to learn their national tongue? ...
No one would for a moment object to any attempt to instil feelings 
of personal loyalty in the children towards their Kuler; but to 
suggest that Bahrain should be taught that it is 'on an absolute 
equality with other nations' and that the Bahrainis are 'sovereign 
people able to hold their own as regards antiquity and race 
integrity with any nation in the world' can only lead to 
misunderstanding and unhappiness for everyone in the future.
I do not believe that patriotism can be taught; nationalism can 
be, and you have only to look around the Near and Middle East to 
see its dismal results ... "
The Agent also counselled caution over setting up an English class
for the Police, knowing only too well that a great number of the men
tended to leave the Force and seek employment with the Oil Company or
become motor drivers. Teaching them English, he wrote, "will only serve
Zf
to focus their gaze on the rosy goalw.
1 Prior to H. Weightman, P.A. I.O.R. 15/1/373, No. C/831, 2.12.1939*
2 Ibid.




During 1938, many policemen, on completion of their first four years*
contract with the Force, refused to re-enlist because they had secured
1
employment elsewhere.
Vallance*s activities as Director of Education included the writing of 
a weekly column in The Bahrain Newspaper, devoted exclusively to educational 
affairs. The idea was initiated entirely by him and the aim was to 
acquaint the public v/ith the problems of education, to invite their views 
on how to cope with them, and also to prevent the spread of erroneous 
information about education.
In the February 5th issue (19^0) of the aforesaid paper, the 
Department of Education published an article which examined the complaint 
made in late 1938 that the Oil Company*s well-paid posts went mostly to 
foreigners. Vallance supported the Company*s point of view that 
foreigners possessed the necessary training and skills for high posts, and 
that very few Bahrainis attained high standards of training to qualify 
for those posts. Nevertheless, as Director of Education, he assured the 
people of Government intention to see that Bahrainis were treated fairly 
in matters of employment. He went on to say that the Government had 
already asked the Company to give priority to a Bahraini over a foreigner 
if both were equally qualified for the same job and that the Company had 
agreed to this.
The article also underlined the importance of technical training to 
foreign firms operating in Bahrain, and urged the boys to take it up since 
there was nothing demeaning about it. Recently the Department of Education
issued instructions to all teachers to inform their students "that manual
2
work is just as noble and just as dignified as any other kind of work".
1 Adviser*s No. l8*f6/S.F., op. cit.
2 The Bahrain Newspaper, 15.12.19^0. I.O.R. 15/2/208. Note that the
paper was edited by Abdullah al-Zayed to whom further reference is 
made in the Chapter on the 19^0s.
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Six months after he had taken over as Director of Education, Vallance 
submitted his first progress report in May 1940. It contained an account 
of the changes introduced so far, viz. teachers1 working hours, salaries, 
grades, annual increments, and compulsory participation by all teachers in
1
the Government Provident Fund Scheme. Also mentioned was the opening 
in 1940 of Manamah College, al-Kulliyah, which provided secondary level
instruction in Science, Algebra, Geometry, etc., the highest form of
2education then attainable in Bahrain. Two years later it was renamed: 
Manamah Boys' Secondary School. It's introduction transformed the school
system into three stages each involving three years of schooling at
3
elementary, Intermediate and Secondary levels. A significant change was
the use of an Arabic text-book as a first reading book for elementary
— 4students, instead of the Qur'an as was the case earlier.
Vallance also drew attention to the inadequacy of school health
services, with emphasis on village schools which were deprived of
dispensaries and doctors who barely visited the villages once a week. To
make up for the shortage of health-staff, the Department worked out a plan
with the American Mission Hospital whereby six students were to receive
training in nursing, compounding and X-ray work for a period of two years.
During 1940, a new State Medical Officer (S.M.O.), Dr. Snow, was appointed
to office and one of his earliest pre-occupations was with school health.
He paid regular visits to schools and extended medical supervision to them 
5all over Bahrain.
1 C.R.L. Adrian-Vallance, Director of Education, Report on Progress in 
Education, December 1939 - May 19^ +0- I.O.R. 15/1/373- Referred to 
hereafter as Progress Report.
2 Belgrave's Annual Report on Education for 1942. I.O.R. 15/2/299-
3 H. Weightman to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/1/373* No. C/418-4/16, 
15-5.1940.
4 Progress Report.
5 Dr. R.H.B. Snow succeeded Dr. Ian Davenport Jones as S.M.O. on 24th 
April 1940. The latter resigned the post on 6.11.1939 to join the 
Royal Army Medical Corps in Egypt. For some time, Dr. M.M. McDowall, 
Lady Medical Officer, officiated as S.M.O. Vide A.R.P.A. 1939 and
1940. I.O.R. 15/2/298, 299 respectively.
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Lack of trained Shi ah headmasters for village schools was another 
problem that the Department had to cope with. The schools at Sitrah and 
Suq al-Khamis had no headmasters, and the Department sought to train a 
number of competent Shi ah teachers to take over the running of the 
schools*
The Department also started evening classes for members of the Ruling 
Family in April 19^0. Eighteen Shaikhs were given instruction in 
Arabic, Arithmetic and English by Vallance, the Education Office Secretary, 
and the headmaster of the Manamah School. An experiment was conducted
Q
at Budayya School in which local boys and their parents were asked to take 
part. The aim was to persuade them to spend more time on learning 
reading, writing and arithmetic instead of spending the whole day receiving 
religious instruction by two local Mullas, traditional teachers, who 
formed the entire staff of the School. Tv/o efficient teachers were sent 
from Manamah to Budayya School, one was made headmaster there, and the 
other who arrived shortly after the first, was asked to teach text-books 
prescribed by the Department. The Mullas were restricted to the teaching 
of religion and prayers only. The experiment was described as highly 
successful and in appreciation of the new system the students volunteered 
to build tv/o new classrooms to be added to the existing structure. The 
number of boys in the School subsequently rose from 18 to 7^»
A grave and chronic problem which had affected the Department *s work 
since its creation was the dearth of trained local teachers. The problem 
was particularly acute at the secondary level. Four Lebanese teachers who 
had worked with Vallance in Iraq were approached with the aim of inducing 
them to join the Department in Bahrain, but they all refused. In the 
circumstances, the Administration applied to the Palestine Government
1 Progress Report.
2 Ibid.
through whose good office eight qualified Palestinian teachers were
-|
recruited for work in Bahrain as from October 19^0.
Vallance *s plan for reorganization of education also involved
Bahr ainization of both administrative and academic posts at schools. This
was in line with his express aim of reorienting the outlook of the boys
from one of dependence upon the Arab countries to that of independence
from them. He believed the Syrians were to a large extent responsible
for the indoctrination of the boys in pan-Arabism. By making it known
that the ultimate object of the Department of Education was to appoint only
Bahrainis as headmasters and assistants in all the schools, Vallance hoped
to curtail what he called "the undesirable ascendancy of Syrian masters
2
over Bahraini masters".
The changes effected by Vallance in the field of education in Bahrain
3
were lauded as 'an excellent beginning' , nevertheless, he resigned in 
July 19^1 having served as Director of Education for two academic years.
His enthusiasm for a local history for use in schools, a suggestion high­
lighted in his earlier report, had never materialized. He was succeeded 
in October of the same year by F.J. Wakelin, formerly of the British 
Council. Wakelin's appointment coupled with that of Mrs. C. Belgrave, 
who became Director of Female Education also in 19*4-1 , put two more posts 
in British hands.
The Development of Technical Education
In 13^ 8 ('1929-30) Expenditure on Education was budgetted at Rs.
90,000, of which Rs. 12,000 was allocated for the development of Technical
1 Adviser to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/299, No. 56-9A, 3.2.19*1-1.
2 Progress Report.
3 Mr. H. Weightman to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/1/373, No. C/*f35-**-/17,
26.5.19^ 0.
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c 1Education, and the expansion of the Shi ah schools. Carpentry Schools
were the forerunners of Technical Education in Bahrain. Thereafter it 
developed gradually to include basic engineering and v/elding in 1938, 
and a year later the Technical School in Manamah was extended to accommo-
3
date a greater number of applicants.
Late in 1939* the Government of Bahrain invited Mr. G.E. Hutchings, 
Principal of the Baghdad Technical School, to advise on the expansion of 
Technical Education there. After studying Bahrain*s needs, he submitted 
a report in March 19^0. His first plan, which took into consideration 
Bahrain*s aspiration to become the educational centre of the Gulf, turned 
out to be too dear for Bahrain to afford. Commenting on the same the 
Agent wrote:
,fI do not think that Bahrain can possibly absorb as many as 50 
trained technical students a year. If this report were followed 
literally, the State would be involved in non-recurring 
expenditure of close on Rs. 1-^  Lakhs and recurring expenditure not 
very far short of Rs. 50,000 annually."^
The number of students who registered for the Technical School in
51939 was a mere 17 with three teachers to instruct them. During the 
year, the Oil Company employed eight graduates of the school, and the 
Department of Education engaged another five ex-graduates as travelling 
carpenters to do repair work at schools. This served as an incentive 
for more students to apply for Technical training, not to mention the press 
campaign of 19*K) which was equally successful in attracting more students.
1 Belgrave to C.G. Prior, P.A. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10H, No. 160, 29th 
Muharram, 13^8.
2 A.R.P.A. 1938, op. cit.
3 Belgrave to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 2369/9A, 3-2.19^.
4 Weightman to Prior. I.O.R. 15/1/373, No. 0/3^8-4/16, 33^.19^0.
5 No. 2369/9A, op. cit.
Work on a new Technical School began in 19^0, and while it was being
built, the Agent proposed the engagement of an efficient American Principal
1
to run it. This proposal was not acceptable to the Resident for the
following reasons:
"The atmosphere of Bahrain has already become far too Americanised, 
and if we start introducing them into the Bahrain Administration 
there will be nothing left but to invite them to assume a 
Mandate over Bahrain.1^
Mr. Hutchings was eventually engaged as Principal of the new school, 
opened in September 19^1. He was now in a position to implement his 
plan, lately revised and reduced to more manageable proportions. The 
acquisition of equipment and staff for the school, during the War, was the 
most difficult part of his job. Nevertheless, the new syllabus was 
expanded to include drawing, English and mathematics. In early 19^2 he
Zf
travelled to India where he purchased equipment worth Rs. 25,000.
Training in the new school was not restricted to Bahrainis only.
There were students from Kuwait and in 19^2 five, who were financed by the
Kuwait Oil Company, successfully completed their technical training in 
5
Bahrain. Despite the improvements, the number of students at the
school fell from 50 in January 19V+ to 36 in December of the same year.
The drop was occasioned by:
" ... the favourable condition of employment offered by the British 
Military Services and by public and commercial undertakings ...
Only 25 boys offered themselves as candidates for admission to the 
school when the new classes were opened in October with vacancies 
for over 5 0."g
1 Weightman to Prior. I.O.R. 15/2/208, No. C/536-4/16* 28.6.1940.
2 Prior to Weightman. I.O.R. 15/2/208, No. 480-S, 9-7.'i94o.
3 Belgrave to Mr. E.B. Wakefield, P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/299* No. 81-9A, 
31.1.19^2.
4 Annual Report by Belgrave for 1942. I.O.R. 15/2/299*
5 A.R.P.A. 1942. I.O.R. 15/2/299.
6 Adviser to Major T. Hickinbotham. I.O.R. 15/2/300, No. 427-9A,
8.2.19^ 5.
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In 1945 Technical education was further expanded to embrace training
in elementary electricity and weaving. On 19th May of the same year,
Mr. Hutchings* agreement with the Department of Education expired. He
relinquished his post having served for four years in War-time Bahrain.
He was succeeded by Mr. Said Tabbara who took over as Principal of the
-1
Technical School from 20th May 1945*
Educational Affairs Before the End of the War
Government efforts to improve education continued throughout the War**
period and the public, aware of the benefits to the country, appreciated
them. Commenting upon the same the Agent wrote:
T,The demand for a good education for their children by Bahrain
parents is due to the fact that they have now come to realize
that Boys when properly educated obtain more remunerative posts 
and that girls who have received a good education find the 
contracting of a suitable marriage less difficult than their 
ignorant sisters . .."^
During 1943, the Administration experienced much difficulty in
3
recruiting teachers for work in Bahrain. A year later, the problem was 
solved when the Residency allowed the engagement of Egyptian teachers for 
Bahrain. Egypt was the only Arab country which had a surplus of 
qualified secondary school teachers. For the first time, thirteen 
Egyptian masters joined the Department of Education in Bahrain in 1944. 
They were employed on terms identical to those agreed with Kuwait whereby 
the Egyptian Government subsidized half their salaries.^ The lending of
1 A.R.P.A. 19^5. I.O.R. 15/2/301.
2 A.R.P.A. 19^3. I.O.R. 15/2/299.
3 Belgrave to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/299, No. 240/9A, 3.2.1944.
4 Telegram from the Resident to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/208, No. 1270,
30.5.19^ -
5 No. 427-9A, op. cit.
6 Telegram from the Agent to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/208, No. 466, 
18.5.1944.
Egyptian teachers to Bahrain inaugurated a period of co-operation which
has continued to the present times. Besides, 1944 also saw the sending
1
of nine Bahraini students to Cairo for further education. A year later
another three graduates of the Technical School were despatched for the 
2same purpose.
In 1944, the Oil Company in Bahrain decided to set up four Scholar­
ships for Bahrainis. Two of these were assigned for the Technical School 
at the rate of Es. 1,000/- per term each, and another two for the Secondary 
School at the rate of Es. 960/- per term each. The candidates were
selected on the basis of their scholastic attainment, financial need,
3
character and general potentiality.
In 1945 Mr. Wakelin, the Director of Education since Octobei' 1941,
failed to return to Bahrain from a leave which had started in late June of
that year. Mr. K.M. Willey was deputed by the British Council to replace
him. He served from 30th June until 8th August, when he fell ill and
gave up his post. Thereafter, the Directorate of Education reverted to
c *» A
a Bahraini, Ahmad al- Umran. He officiated for the Director and 
assumed responsibility for a Department whose budget estimate for 1364 
(1945-46) exceeded four Lakhs of rupees. The Department now controlled 
15 schools, 127 teachers and 2 ,6 1 9 students, who in their entirety formed 
the core of both Boys* and Girls' Education in Bahrain in 1945* The 
policy of Bahrainisation of posts, started during Vallance9s time, was kept
C -*►
up under al- Umran, and despite increased dependence upon Arab capabilities, 
self-sufficiency, especially at Primary level of Education, continued to be 
the chief aim of the Directorate throughout the rest of the 1940s.
1 No. 427~9A, op. cit.
2 A.E.P.A. 1945, op. cit.
3 Letter from W.P. Anderson, BAPCO's Local Eepresentative, to the Agent.
I.O.E. 15/2/1231 * No. C/PA-147, 28.6.1944.
4 Note that just before his appointment as Officiating Director in
August 1945, Mr. al-cUmran was Secretary of the Moharraq Municipality.
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To recapitulate, Sunni education relied for its early development on
donations from the Sunni Community of Bahrain, and on State subsidies from
1923 onwards. Until 1928, Shi°ah Arabs v/ere denied equal rights in
matters of education, and when the first School was built for Shi ah boys
in May of that year, there already existed four Sunni Boys* Schools, plus
1
one for girls, which were in receipt of subsidies from the State. This 
was the case, despite the institution of the policy ©jT reforms since 1923? 
whose raison d*etre was to ensure equal treatment of both sects of the 
population.
Centralization was achieved appropriately in 1932 when both Sunni and
cShi ah boys* schools were integrated into a unified system of Primary
Education. In its formative years, education in Bahrain relied mainly on
the efforts of Shaikh Abdullah, the public, the Education Committees, and
in the field, on the toil of a number of expatriate Arab teachers and
c cheadmasters, prominent amongst whom were: Hafiz Wahbah, Uthman and Omar
al-Hawrani, Faiq Adham, etc., not least Uthman^ wife who started classes 
for female education. Direct British involvement began with the 
appointment of Adrian-Vallance in November 1939? sis the first British 
Director of Education in Bahrain. That appointment came as a result of 
(a) public disapproval of the School system in the late 1930s, (b) British 
concern about the spread of nationalism, which having hit Egypt, Syria and 
Iraq, was beginning to influence youths in Bahrain.
Vallance*s plan for re-organization aimed at general improvement of 
the educational services, and also at tempering the rising tide of Arabism 
which had penetrated the class-rooms in Bahrain, and which he imputed to 
Arab teachers and text-books. His assessment of the impact of the 
Syrians on the pan-Arab leanings of the boys, contained an element of 
exaggeration. The spread of communications, the media, the clubs as well
1 A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
as schools, and an enhanced interest in education, were all conducive to 
the shaping of the thinking of the boys. The political awareness of the 
people was on the increase especially in the late 1930s when popular 
demands were made for reforms. It was only natural for the Arabs of 
Bahrain to get involved in the issues of the Arab World with which they 
shared language, history, geographical proximity, and religion.
Less than three years after Vallance had departed from Bahrain, the 
Administration was left with no other choice but to employ Egyptians for 
teaching there. Without their co-operation, secondary education could 
have faced serious difficulties.
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Chapter Seven
Agriculture, Oil, Trade and Finances of Bahrain, 1920-45
Agriculture
Agriculture has been one of the traditional pursuits of the
Baharnah Arabs since earliest times. The main island had in the early
twentieth century, over twenty square miles of date-groves covering its
northern parts. These provided dates, date-juice, material for use in
the construction of local huts and houses, and a host of cottage
industries which relied on them: mat-plaiting, basket weaving, folk-
medicine and so on. Vegetables, fruit and lucerne - used as fodder
for donkeys - were also grown in patches of land assigned for them within
the date-gardens.
Until recently the existence of numerous natural springs on the
islands and offshore, supplied water both for drinking and for irrigating
the date-plantations either by natural flow or by locally made lifts.
2
Water from the springs, had, m  fact, originated in mainland Arabia. 
Increased local consumption, and perhaps greater pumping of water in
1 P.A. to the Manager of the British Cotton Growing Association.
1.0.R. 15/2/1241, No. 946, 2.8.1931.
2 On "The Water Supply of Bahrain", the Geographical Journal wrote in 
1928: "The Water must ... have its origins on either the Persian or
the Arabian mainland. For geological reasons the former is most 
unlikely, and an assumption of an Arabian source has the support of 
the copious springs at Qatif and Hasa oasis, where the rainfall is 
considerably less than at Bahrain. The ultimate origin of this 
water must be sought in the highlands of Nejd, which is the nearest 
locality with a sufficient rainfall." J.R.G.S., Vol. LXXI (1928), 
Appendix I, p. 463. In 1942, Max Steineke, a geologist working for 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company wrote: "The sources of the
water from zones A, B, and C (designated on a map attached to his 
report) are evidently from the Hadhramaut interior of Arabia, and 
the Syrian desert. However, it is possible that some of the water 
from the deeper zones might be coming from Iran, Iraq, etc.
However, for the present discussion it is reasonable to assume that 
the sources of the water are from the interior of Saudi Arabia." 
"Water Resources of Bahrain Island", dated Bahrain July 15» 1942.
1.0.R. 15.2.207.
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al-Hasa led to a sharp drop in the levels of water in Bahrain in recent 
years.
In 1924 arrangements were made, under Major Daly, for the boring 
of artesian wells in the chief towns, and a year later two experimental 
wells were sunk in Manamah and in Moharraq. By 1926, fourteen wells 
had been bored, seven in each of the two chief towns. Owing to 
excessive use of water, oil company experts urged the authorities to take 
conservation measures and in 19^1 the Bahrain Government prohibited the
sinking of wells without official permission, and ordered the use of
2control valves on existing ones.
In examining agriculture and the degree of attention it received 
from the Government of Bahrain, it is convenient to make a distinction 
between (a) agricultural activities themselves, and (b) problems 
associated with the leasing of the date-gardens. These will be treated 
separately.
Attempts to Improve Agriculture
The recession of the early 1930s did great damage to the Bahraini 
economy especially the pearl trade. In its search for alternative 
sources of income the Administration in Bahrain turned its attention to 
agriculture, whose condition was described by the Agent in 1930 in the 
following terms:
"At present the Island is entirely dependent on the pearl trade 
for a living, and if agriculture was properly developed it would 
prove a valuable second string, but until some opportunity is 
given to the shamefully rack-rented peasantry to enjoy the fruits 
of improvements made in their holdings, progress will be difficult."^
During 1930, the Agent stated in a letter to the Adviser:
" ... had a bold agrarian policy been undertaken, some 10 ,000  
persons might have been settled on the land. The appointment 
of an agricultural expert cannot be any longer delayed ...
1 A.R.P.A., 1926, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A., 19^1, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A., 1930, op. cit.
k C.G. Prior, P.A., to the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/127* No. 2?-C,
2^.3.1930.
To this the Adviser replied:
"I entirely agree that agriculture on a fairly large scale would 
be a most valuable improvement, especially as a substitute to 
diving which is an uncertain quantity* The only difficulty 
would be to obtain people to take it up. No Arabs (i.e. Sunnis) 
go in for agriculture in Bahrain. The agriculturalists are the 
Bahama and a number of imported Hasawis. The Arabs here, as 
a whole, are extremely lazy, except for diving they do no manual 
labour, all the coolies ... masons, painters and carpenters are 
foreigners. If a sort of allotment system on a large scale was 
started I think it would be very popular with the Bahama who 
would certainly co-operate, but the Khalifahs would not 
encourage such schemes and the Arabs would not be interested, 
they might even be actively against it if their possible tenants 
left them to work independently, as they certainly would.
During 1930 the Government of Bahrain did engage the services of
an Iraqi agriculturist, Said Abdul Nour, to advise on methods of
cultivation and on cotton growing. He was an employee of the
experimental farm at Rustum, near Baghdad, a branch of the Iraqi
Ministry of Agriculture. During the year the Government of Bahrain,
responding to Major Holmes1 advice, ordered boring on the plain at
C*”
Ali in search of water. After a few abortive attempts, water was 
finally discovered at 300 feet below the ground, but it was found to
contain a high quantity of sulphur. As the soil there was good for
cultivation, the agriculturist used it for his experiments. Meantime, 
he was consulted by owners of date-gardens and cultivators on various 
matters and in addition to giving lectures at schools he took the boys 
to Ali for practical lessons in the preparation of the ground for 
cultivation and the sowing of seeds, etc. He also supervised Senaian 
Garden, described by the Adviser as one of Shaikh Hamad*s finest 
gardens with over 2 ,0 0 0 date trees. Besides, he introduced the 
manuring of date-trees as practised in Iraq, though the locals viewed 
the outcome of the process with misgiving. The sinking of artesian 
wells for irrigation purposes encouraged certain members of the
1 Belgrave to Prior. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. C-50, 18.^.1930
Al Khalifah family and a few merchants to increase their date-groves
and to experiment with new crops* The interest in expansion was also
occasioned partly by a drop in local produce and a corresponding rise
1
in import of dates into Bahrain*
In 1931 the agriculturist conducted an experiment on cotton growing
for which cotton seeds were obtained from the British Cotton Growing
2Association in Baghdad* Ibn Battuta, the famous 1^ -th century• o #
traveller, had recorded the growing of cotton in Bahrain:
"We then travelled from Siraf to the city of al-*Bahrain, a 
fine large city with gardens, trees, and streams* Water is 
easy to get at there =■ one digs with one’s hands (in the sand) 
and there it is* The city has groves of date palms, pomegranates, 
and citrons, and cotton is grown there.
The experiment was successful and specimens of cotton grown in
Bahrain were despatched to the Association in Baghdad whose experts
vouched for its excellence. About one ton of cotton was reported by
the Adviser to have been produced from three acres of land belonging to
ij.
Abdul Aziz al-Qusaibi. Cotton as a crop was not, however, lucrative
because:
"Until cotton can be grown on a larger scale it will not be 
very profitable, and local landowners have been unwilling to
1 Belgrave: Agriculture - 13^9 (1930-31)• I.O.R* L/P+S/10/I0¥f.
2 The quantity and value of raw cotton imported into Bahrain during 
the years 1927 to 1931 were as follows:
1927 400 bales valued at Rs. 35,670
1928 9^9 bales valued at Rs. 82 ,000
1929 1 ,2 2 7 bales valued at Rs. 75,390
1930 434 bales valued at Rs. 25,890
1931 284 bales valued at Rs. 11 ,700
Source: Director of Customs to P,A. I.O.R. 15/2/12^-1, No. PA/
SF/18/293, 16.11.1931.
3 The Travels of Ibn Battuta (A.D. 1325-135^-). Translated by
H.A.R. Gibb (1.962/, Vol.'II, p. 409.
4 Belgrave to Mr. A. Eastwood of the British Cotton Growing 
Association, Baghdad. I.O.R. 15/^/1241, no number, 12.11.1931.
embark on a crop which shows such a poor return at present 
world prices. The Government cannot now spare the funds for 
encouraging them or providing the ginning machinery that is 
required."^
In August 1932 the Iraqi agriculturist left Bahrain after his post
2
had been abolished by the Government owing to lack of funds. In 1933
orange trees, planted earlier, produced good fruit. Also tried during
the year was the 'mesquite* seeds, a quick growing tree suitable for
firewood, but Bahrain's oil industry provided a new source of energy
obviating the need for wood or coal. The firm of A. and M. Yateem
in partnership with an Indian agriculturist, experimented with the
growing of new European vegetables, not previously tried in Bahrain.
This experiment failed as the land on which they were planted was laid
3open to strong winds which abound in Bahrain , but every year some 
merchants experimented with European vegetables and fruit. Prior to 
the 1930s, apart from dates, vegetables and lucerne, nothing else was 
grown. In 1934 the Adviser estimated the area of Bahrain at 138,000 
acres,^2 th of which, i.e. roughly 1 1 ,000 acres, was suitable for 
cultivation, though the area actually cultivated amounted to only />q th 
of the entire area, i.e. 6,000 acres roughly. Cultivation was 
dependent on irrigation, but lack of water limited agricultural
4expansion.
In 1935 the firm of Yateem tried to grow tobacco but with little or 
5
no success. As far as the Government of Bahrain was concerned nothing
1 A.R.P.A., 1931, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A., 1932, op. cit. For a record of annual State allocations
for agriculture see table on Annual Budget Estimates provided in
Chapter Seven.
3 A.R.P.A., 1933, op. cit.
4 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/1241, No. 916-23, 3.1.1934.
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much had been done since the closure of the Department of Agriculture
in the second half of 1932, owing to financial stringency* In 1936
the re-opening of the Department was discussed , and a year later the
Government decided to obtain the services of an Indian agricultural
Advisor* He arrived in March 1938, and stayed in Bahrain until mid-
May of that year "surveying the possibilities of agriculture". After
some delay he eventually submitted his report in August 1939, more than
a year after he had left Bahrain, and which the Agent described as
3
"almost entirely valueless".
In 1939 Captain A.C. Byard was appointed Assistant to the Adviser
and was put in charge of the Government’s newly created experimental
garden at Budayya where green vegetables, potatoes, wheat, barley,
sugar cane and lucerne were grown with positive results. During that
year some gardens situated on the south-east coast were said to have
if
been affected by date disease. The following year Captain Byard
left Bahrain, and responsibility for the running of the Government garden
5
reverted to the Public Works Department. An Egyptian expert, Husain 
Effendi, was engaged in 19*1-1 to supervise the experimental garden and to 
advise landowners on cultivation. Also, a Committee was formed under
Shaikh Ibrahim bin Shaikh Mohammad A1 Khalifah to deal with agricultural
. 6affairs.
During cold weather vegetables like beet, celery, spinach, cabbage, 
lettuce, turnip, cauliflower, onion, carrot, parsley were grown
1 A.R.P.A., 1936, op. cit,
2 A.P.P.A., 1937* op. cit,
3 A.P.P.A., 1938, op. cit. The author was unable to locate the above 
report in the relevant files.
A.R.P.A., 1939, op. cit.
5 A.R.P.A., 19*1-0* op. cit.
6 A.R.P.A., 19*1-1,
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successfully in Bahrain. In the summer cucumber, okra, sweet potatoes,
marro\tfs, Indian corn, pumpkins, egg-plant, melons, were found to be more
successful. Despite government encouragement for expansion in the
growing of vegetables, local demand for European varieties remained very
limited and their cultivation was not very profitable.
Shortages of cereals during the Second World War led Shaikh Salman
2
to encourage the growing of wheat. Previous experiments carried out
by individuals had proved successful but only during the rainy season or
-x
in those areas where they could be regularly irrigated. In 19^2
an area of land was sown with Indian and Canadian wheat in the
c cexperimental garden at Budayya , and also at Umm Na san and on the coast
near Jasrah. Wheat planted in the latter two places was envisaged to
grow entirely relying on rainfall whose annual average there was
estimated at 2^ inches. Rainfall during the year was less than expected,
and strong winds carried sand over the beds covering the growing wheat,
and the experiment there ended in failure. Only the Canadian wheat
ogrown at Budayya was successful and the two bags sown there produced a 
crop of fourteen bags. Its successful growth was attributed to 
regular irrigation and supervision by the Egyptian agriculturist and his 
men. Nevertheless, wheat was not a lucrative crop for Bahrain because 
irrigation entailed the presence of a large work force and it had to be 
grown on land normally assigned for lucerne and vegetables, both of which
ij.
were more profitable to produce than wheat. In 19^ -5 the Egyptian
adviser left Bahrain and no successor was appointed.
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12^1, No. 1661A2, 10.9-19^2.
2 A.R.P.A., 19^2, op. cit.
3 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12VI, No. 1125A2, 18.6.19^2.
Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/12^1, No. 1305A2, 15.6.19^-3*
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The Leasing of Date-Gardens
Most of the date-gardens in Bahrain were owned by the Ruling Family
and the system by which these were leased out to the Baharnah tenants was
the cause of much complaint as the Agent’s Report of "1923 reveals:
"Much oppression continued to take the form of compulsory 
leasing of date-gardens » belonging to the (junior Shaikhs) - 
to the Shiah farmers at rates which could not possibly be 
remunerative to the latter and the terms of which they 
inevitably failed to fulfill whereupon they were subjected to 
various forms of punishment, The more powerful Shaikhs were 
in the habit of letting whole estates containing many gardens 
to a Shiah who would be appointed ’Wazir’ over the locality.
The individual would in turn sublet the gardens to his own 
advantage. In as much as he had the ear of the Shaikh and the 
official position of Wazir such official was responsible for a 
great amount of oppression, A number of cases of the 
confiscation of the property of Shiahs occurred on the 
flimsiest pretexts. Practically all the gardens now owned by 
Easa Alkhalifah family have been so acquired during Shaikh Easa’s 
rule from the original owners
In 1925 Major Daly made two suggestions towards easing the problem.
He proposed that either the A1 Khalifah owners of gardens hired their
cultivators directly and collected the proceeds, or that the State
provided a group of experts to assess and determine the annual rental
of a garden on the spot. Both systems were said to have been currently
2m  operation m  Iraq.
The system of leasing remained ’unsatisfactory* and it was a cause 
for discontent in the early 1930s. In 1930 more date-trees were 
damaged by locusts and the annual yield fell significantly. In an 
attempt to redress complaints made by the tenants of gardens, the 
Government formed a committee of Sunnis and Shi ahs which inspected the 
gardens and made certain recommendations. Accordingly a proportion of 
the annual rent was deducted in cases where the tenant’s complaint was
1 A.R.P.A., 1923» op, cit.
2 A.R.PoA., 1925t op. cit.
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considered legitimate by the Committee. The landlords resented 
government action arguing that:
"tenants should take the good years with the bad years; if the
crop had been extra heavy they would not have paid higher rent."^
There were, it appears, more cultivators wanting to lease gardens
than there were gardens available for lease and the livelihood of a
cultivator depended upon securing the tenancy of a garden. On the day
of the bidding the tenants competed against each other and the highest
bidder acquired the lease. This in itself was sufficient to ensure
inflated rentals for owners, some of whom sent their own men to stimulate
higher bidding. Moreover, the conditions of the leases did not provide
for the fluctuations in either the price of dates or the annual yield.
This was an added risk for the tenant on top of problems associated with
locusts and date disease. Frequently tenants would lease a garden for
more than it was really worth hoping that if they were unable to meet
the full rents, the landlords would relinquish part of the amount due to
them. The annual payments were made partly in cash and partly in kind.
After the Baharnah protest of February 1922, the Government extended the
lease of gardens to two years. If a tenant defaulted on the payment
of rent, and v;as allowed to lease the same garden for another two years,
2hxs outstanding debts were added to the new lease.
In 1931-32 the date crop was slightly better than the previous year, 
owing to absence of storms, disease and locusts, but the yield fell 
short of meeting local demand and more dates were imported from Hasa and 
Iraq, to the value of approximately 300,000 rupees. Many complaints 
about tenants defaulting on payments were made by landlords who were 
unwilling to grant any remissions and they took their tenants to the
1 Belgrave to P.A.: Agriculture 13^9 (1930-1), op. cit.
2 Ibid.
Court. Some tenants had their houses confiscated by order of the Court 
and others had their belongings auctioned in settlement of thexr debts.
In 1932-33 over 7,000 young date trees were imported from Saudi 
Arabia and in this year there were less cases of default referred to 
the Courts, partly because the leases had been reduced and also because 
of landlords realising that the tenants had no possible means of paying 
debts, and there was little to be gained from prosecution. Some 
landlords started hiring paid labour - mostly Hasav/is - to work their
gardens instead of leasing them. V/ith a few exceptions, landlords
2
were unwilling to spend money on their gardens.
Cases of failure to settle rents in full abounded in the summer of 
193^ creating serious unrest among the Baharnah community. As co-judge 
with Shaikh Salman on the Bahrain Court, the Adviser was on leave and 
Shaikh Salman alone adjudicated cases of default on rents issuing harsh 
verdicts against those concerned. The matter caused great dis­
satisfaction among the Baharnah whose leaders approached the Government 
of Bahrain over the sentences passed*, This and other related issues 
are discussed in Chapter Eight.
To recapitulate, the attempts to improve agriculture during the 
years 1930-^3 , us the above survey has shown, were limited both in 
purpose and in scope. They suffered from inadequate funds, lack of a 
considered plan and the expertise to implement it. With the discovery 
of oil the earlier enthusiasm for expansion in agriculture gradually 
waned. The recession of the 1930s reduced the price of dates and dealt 
a serious blow to cultivators and to the owners of the date-gardens alike. 
The oil industry rescued both the diver and the cultivator who found 
alternative employment with better wages. Over the years, the
1 Belgrave: Agriculture 1350 (1931-2). I.O.R. 15/2/193-
2 Belgrave: Agriculture 1351 (1932-3). I.O.R. 15/2/195*
development of the oil industry induced a rise in the value of the land 
occasioned by greater construction plans by firms and also by individuals. 
With the date-plantation no longer an economic activity, many owners of 
gardens availed themselves of the rise in the value of the land and 
divided their gardens into small plots and sold them at considerable 
profit.
Agrarian reform, in effect, turned out to be a series of disconnected 
experiments on cotton growing, which was not new to the islands, 
vegetables and wheat. These were carried out under the guidance of an 
agriculturist assisted by a committee about whose activities little is 
mentioned in the records. The traditional cultivator, who was better 
acquainted with date-cultivation, was happier to get on with his 
customary work which he had been doing for centuries, than to explore 
the growing of new crops and varieties. His chief complaints had to 
do more with a greedy system of land tenure and renting than with an 
unproductive soil. That system, in effect, reduced him to what the 
Agent collectively called "shamefully rack-rented peasantry", and 
reforms did not alter the conditions under which he continued to suffer 
despite the fact that these deficiencies were repeatedly reported to 
the Government of India by British officials in the area.
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The Oil Industry of Bahrain
British interest in Middle Eastern Oil began well before the start of
the First World War, and with the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company (A.P.O.C.) in 1909* and the Turkish Petroleum Company (T.P.C.) in
1912, that interest was firmly established. Oil was found in Persia in
1908, the Abadan refinery was built in 1912 and two years later the British
Admiralty made arrangements with the A.P.O.C. whereby supplies of Persian
fuel were provided to the British fleet.
After the First World War, Britain and France had to try to reconcile
their oil-interests with those of the United States and in 1925 a new
agreement was signed whereby certain U.S. Oil Companies acquired 25-75%
stake in T.P.C. This agreement gradually brought U.S. Oil Companies into
a new era of oil-explorations in the Middle East. T.P.C. struck oil in
Kirkuk in 1927 and in 1929 it was renamed Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.)*
The earliest known contact between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the
British Government over oil took place in 191*1* and in May of that year
Shaikh Isa bin Ali - Ruler of Bahrain - undertook not to grant oil
concession to any person or group without prior consultation with the
2
British Government.
On 6th May 1925 Major Frank Holmes - a New Zealander representing
the British-owned Eastern and General Syndicate Limited - obtained the
first oil concession from Ibn Saud for the province of al-Hasa. This was
followed in May 1924 by a similar arrangement with the Shaikh of Kuwait,
3
this time for the Neutral Zone. Holmes took Bahrain as his headquarters
1 For a detailed account see, S.H. Longrigg: Oil in the Middle East.
Its Discovery and Development (1968). Also see, R.W. Ferrier: The
History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1982.
2 Translation of a letter dated 18th Jamadi II, 1552 from Shaikh Isa bin 
Ali A1 Khalifah, Chief of Bahrain, to Major A.P. Trevor, P.A. Bahrain, 
in Aitchison^: A Collection of Treaties ..., Vol. XI, No. XVI,
p. 2595 op. cit.
5 Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 98-100.
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and was soon introduced to Shaikh Hamad, the Deputy Ruler, through two 
Bahraini merchants, Ali and Mohammad Yateem. Although Holmes's chief 
interest lay in oil, he was first to draw the attention of Shaikh Hamad 
to artesian wells as a way of searching for sweet water. During late 
192^, he signed a contract with the Shaikh whereby the Syndicate undertook 
to drill 12 to 16 artesian wells on the main island. In November 1925 
water was found and such was the Shaikh's satisfaction with the discovery 
that:
"As a reward to the Syndicate ... ... the Shaikh granted an
oil concession agreement which he signed on December 2, 1 9 2 5 -M2
That concession, however, was covered by Shaikh Isa's contractual
commitments to the British Government. As the Syndicate was not an oil
company, Holmes tried to resell the Bahrain concession to British Oil
companies. When approached by him these companies showed little interest
in the deal because their geologists doubted the existence of oil in 
3
Bahrain. In November 1927* the Syndicate sold the option to the U.S.- 
owned Eastern Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation 
and a shareholder in T.P.C. Shortly after the sale was completed,
Eastern embarked upon plans for survey and development. At that stage 
Company officials became aware of the restrictions imposed by the Red Line 
Agreement of 51st July 1928, to which the Company was committed. The 
Agreement required from its signatories an undertaking not to seek oil
rights independent of the T.P.C. in an area which included all of Arabia
A
except Kuwaxt. Accordingly the Company decided to honour its 
obligations by selling the option to the Standard Oil Company of 
California, which was not a signatory of the above Agreement. Standard
1 Daly to Under-Secretary to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/1/527* No. 2*f2/2/5* 
2 .^11.192 .^
2 T.E. Ward: Negotiations for Oil Concessions in Bahrain, El-Hasa 
(Saudi Arabia), The Neutral Zone, Qatar, and Kuwait (1965)* P- 25.
5 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
k C. Tugendhat: Oil: The Biggest Business (1968), pp. 8^-8 5.
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then applied to the Colonial Office seeking approval for the transfer of
the Bahrain concession to them. As the British Government controlled
Bahrain’s foreign relations, the Colonial Office set forth certain
conditions which were not acceptable to the American Company and the
matter was eventually referred to the U.S. State Department.
Prolonged negotiations followed between the two sides and the
situation was resolved by an agreement which gave Britain a great measure
of control over the Company's Bahrain operations, including a condition
2to incorporate the new company under British laws. That Company, a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil, was formed under the name: The Bahrain
Petroleum Company Limited (B.A.P.C.O.), and in response to a suggestion
from T.E. Ward, Attorney-in-Fact of the Eastern and General Syndicate, it
3
was registered in Canada on January 11th, 1929*
Drilling operations started in Bahrain in October 1931 ? and by 31st
May of the following year oil was struck in commercial quantities at Jabal
*" A
ad-Dukhan (Well No. 1), at a depth of 2,000 feet. The significance of
the Bahrain discovery was thus decribed by V/ard:
’’The finding of oil in Bahrain marked a vital change in the 
outlook for oil over the entire Persian Gulf areas. It stimulated 
other activities particularly in the mainland areas. The oil 
producing zones of Bahrain found in the discovery well proved to 
be dissimilar to those of Iran and Iraq ...
The Bahrain Oil discovery led directly to the oil developments of 
Saudi Arabia, the Neutral Zone, Qatar and Kuwait, and the 
discovery sustained the conclusions of the Gulf Company geologists 
that the possibility of finding oil in commercial quantities in 
Kuwait was very much brighter.”^
1 H.F. Liebesny, International Relations of Arabia: The Dependent Areas,
in The Middle East Journal, Vol. I (19^ +7) » PP- 157-60.
2 R.F. Mikesell and H.B. Chenery, Arabian Oil - America's Stake in the
Middle East (19^9)» PP* ^9-50.
3 Ward, op. cit., p. 138.
k R.M. Burrell and K. McLachlan, The Political Geography of the Persian 
Gulf in: The Persian Gulf States ..., op. cit., p. 121.
5 Ward, op. cit., p. 182.
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The Company*s drilling operations were initially carried out chiefly
by American personnel assisted by a number of Iraqis who operated the rig
and a number of Sikh Indians who were in charge of the Company*s Power
House* The American influence in Bahrain manifested itself first in
the form of technical know-how and later on via American manufactured
goods which began to appear in the shops of the Manamah bazaar* To this
effect the Agency Report for 1932 contains this interesting commentary
which shows the continuing residuum of a desire by local British
officials in the Gulf to exclude external influences, this time American:
H •** there is little doubt that the Company are beginning to exert 
a considerable local influence. This will undoubtedly increase 
with their operations and their experience of Bahrain, and combined 
with the Arabian Mission they represent a most unfortunate 
intrusion of foreign influence into Bahrain."^
During 193^ oil tanks were constructed on Sitrah Island and a three
mile submarine pipeline which extended from the tanks to the deep sea
moorings was laid. On the 7th of June of the same year, approximately
3,300 tons of Bahraini crude were shipped aboard the tankship El Segundo,
3
thereby inaugurating Bahrain*s entry into the age of oil-exports. On 
29th December 193^, Shaikh Hamad signed the Mining Lease of the Bahrain 
Oil Concession, which replaced the earlier one obtained by Holmes in 
December 1923- The Lease was for 55 years commencing from January 1935* 
Royalty was determined at the rate of 3 rupees, 8 annas per ton of crude
oil (i*e. 14 cents per barrel, See, Arabian Oil - America*s Stake in the
Middle East, op. cit., p. 69) with a minimum annual payment to the 
Government of Bahrain of not less than 75,000 rupees, raised later on to
150,000. The Lease entitled the Company to both Customs and tax-relief.
1 A.R.P.A. 1931, op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 1932, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 193^, op. cit.
Longrigg, op. cit., p. 103*
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At first lack of overseas marketing facilities posed a problem for 
Standard, encouraging it to consider in late 1935 the construction of a 
refinery in Bahrain, Subsequently in July 1936 the Company entered into 
an agreement with Texas Oil Company which gave it access to the marketing 
facilities of Texas in return for a 50% stake in B.A.P.C.O. The new 
partnership resulted in the creation of a subsidiary company, Caltex, 
whose refined products were sold to India, the Far East and the Middle 
East."1
According to Ward, Caltex owed its success, worldwide, to its Bahrain 
operations:
"Beginning with Bahrain what is now known as the CaltexGroup of 
Companies, has grown into a worldwide overseas organization and 
has become one of the most efficiently managed major operations 
with production not only from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia but also 
from Indonesia. Caltex executives have carried Bahrain 
experience around the world."^
Work on the Bahrain refinery began in early 1936, and by December 
1937 it was complete. For the first time production of crude oil exceeded
3
the one million tons during 1937* A new supplementary concession was 
concluded between Bahrain and the Company on 19th June 19^ -0, whereby the 
exclusive area was extended from the original 100 ,000 acres to cover all 
the lands of Bahrain, including the outlying islands and territorial 
waters. In 19^2 facilities for receiving up to 35*000 barrels of Saudi
crude daily were installed at the Zallaq terminal in Bahrain, and a 
pipeline was laid to carry crude from there to the refinery* During the 
year ^,^29,000 barrels of Saudi crude were imported into Bahrain.
1 F.I. Qubain, The Impact of Petroleum Industry on Iraq and Bahrain, 
pp. 308-9.
2 V/ard, op. cit., p. 188.
3 A.R.P.A. 1937* op. cit. For oil production levels see table appended
to this section.
k Ward, op. cit., p. *f.
5 A.R.P.A. 19^2, op. cit.
There was a sharp increase in the Company’s work force in 1944, owing
to:
" ... a very large construction programme ... undertaken to provide 
facilities for the production of aviation spirit and to increase 
the quantities of other products vital to the successful 
prosecution of the War."^
In 1945 a new 34 mile pipeline, about 24 miles of which were
submerged, was laid to carry crude direct from the Saudi fields to the
refinery in Bahrain. During the year 15,649*272 barrels of Saudi crude
2were transported to Bahrain. In 1950 the royalty rate was raised to 
Rs. 10/- per ton, and in December 1952 a profit sharing agreement on the 
basis of 50-50, similar to that signed with Saudi Arabia in December 1950, 
was concluded with Bahrain and the concession was extended so as to last 
until 29th December, 2024.^
B.A.P.C.O. and Its Bahraini Employees
During the second half of 1938 the people of Bahrain agitated for 
educational, judicial and administrative reforms and local employees of
B.A.P.C.O. took the opportunity to publicize their grievances against the 
Company. The Authorities blamed the protests upon a Youth Movement, 
some of whose members were employees of B.A.P.C.O., and on 5th November 
1938 arrested some of the Movement's adherents accusing them of
4
instigating the trouble. The following day, the Movement called for a 
strike and the local employees of B.A.P.C.O. responded, bringing the 
Company's operations to a partial halt for two days, i.e. 6-7th November.
1 A.R.P.A. 1944, op. cit. For the Company's work force, local and 
foreign, see table provided at the end of this section.
2 A.R.P.A. 1945* op. cit.
3 Ward, op. cit., p. 138.
4 Belgrave, Causes and Objects of Recent Agitation, 22.11.1938.
I.O.R. 15/2/176.
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The number of jobless persons during the year increased considerably, 
and the Oil Company, by now the largest employer in the country, had 
recently completed major construction work, thereby shedding a large 
number of workers employed to carry out manual labour. Accordingly the 
local work force of the Company was reduced from 3*350 i*i 1937 to 1,569
'I
in 1938. The reduction in the number of Bahrainis employed by the
Company, together with complaints about wages and working conditions
sparked off the protests. Lack of communication between the two sides of
the dispute made things that much worse. In a cable to the Agent in
Bahrain, the Resident wrote of his regret to discover that neither the
Government of Bahrain nor the Company had envisaged the need to appoint a
person authorised to represent the workers in industrial disputes. In
the absence of recognised workers* representatives, their complaints were
communicated to the Government by four senior Bahrainis who mediated on
the workers * behalf and the Government approved their action. The workers1
3
grievances were as follows:
(1) That the number of foreign employees of the Company exceeded that 
of local inhabitants.
(2) That Asians (i.e. Indians) received higher wages than Bahrainis 
employed for similar jobs. The Bahraini worker received 10 annas 
daily, whereas his Asian work-mate was paid Rs. 2/-. At the 
distillation plant in the refinery the Company had replaced Indians 
with Bahrainis and instead of paying them Rs. 5/- daily, the previous 
daily wage of the Indians, the Bahrainis were offered only two rupees.
1 For total numbers of Bahraini and non-Bahraini employees of B.A.P.C.O., 
see table appended to this section.
2 Telegram from the Resident to the Agent, Bahrain. I.O.R. 15/'l/3,+3*
No. 358, 16.11.1938.
3 Translation of a letter addressed to the Adviser by Yusuf Fakhroo,
C C“Mansour al- Uraiyedh, Saiyed Sa id, Mohsin bin Ahmad al-Tajir. I.O.R. 
15/2/176, 29th Ramadan 1357 (22.11.1938).
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(3) Foreign employees were housed in stone-built quarters whereas
Bahrainis were provided with local huts which did not promise such 
good shelter against dust and cold.
(k) Foreign employees were entitled to free transport from where they 
lived to the oil camp and vice versa, national employees had to pay 
for the same.
(3) Foreign employees were entitled to sick-pay, and Bahrainis did not 
have similar rights.
The workers demanded the formation of a representative body to defend 
their interests especially, they wrote, when two equally qualified persons 
apply for a job, one Bahraini and the other non-Bahraini, the former ought 
to be given preference over the latter. Besides, they wanted their 
representatives to negotiate with the Company for better wages and housing 
for Bahrainis, free transport, compensation for those of them disabled 
while serving the Company, annual paid leave of 20 days, the introduction 
of training courses and evening classes, a scheme for Provident Fund, and 
the erection of two mosques for the local workers.
In early December 1938 a meeting was held in which the above griev­
ances were examined. It was attended by the Agent and the Adviser as 
representatives of the Bahrain Administration, and by Company officials, 
viz. Mr. J.S. Black, Chief Local Representative of B.A.P.C.O. in Bahrain,
and Messrs. M.H. Lipp and F.A. Davies, joint managers. The discussions
2centred upon the following matters:
Housing: As regards the demand from Bahrainis to be housed in the Company's
married quarters, Company officials argued that Bahrainis were unwilling 
to take up residence with their families in the Oil camp from the start,
1 Ibid.
2 H. Weightman to T.C. Fowle. I.O.R. 15/V3^3, No. C/753 - 1.6/5, 
10.12.1938.
preferring to stay in their home towns. Had the Company built greater
numbers of houses, it was felt, they would have lain vacant. Company
officials now agreed to erect stone-built houses for bachelors working in
the refinery or in the field, instead of the local huts in which they were 
1
then housed.
Wages: Company officials believed that Indians were more efficient than
Bahrainis, and they were unwilling to increase the wages of the Semi­
skilled* Bahrainis. They argued that the Company was a commercial 
concern and that the local managers had to satisfy the Directors and to 
safeguard the interests of the shareholders. They opposed the raising 
of the ten annas limit, the daily wage of Bahrainis and others engaged by 
the Company to do manual work. This wage was the common rate for a 
coolie*s working day in Manamah. They argued that should the Company 
increase the rate, the labour market in Manamah would be disturbed. They 
also rejected the Bahrainis* demand for free transport on account of the 
high cost to the Company, whose policy it was not to encourage labour to 
live far from the scene of operations.
Compensation for Accidents and Sick-Pay: Company officials dismissed the
claim that Bahrainis received no compensation for sustaining injury on 
duty as baseless allegations. On the contrary, Bahrainis, they argued, 
v/ere entitled to rights similar to those enjoyed by foreigners. Moreover, 
they had new arrangements which they said would entitle classes II and III 
of the Company's local employees to medical treatment at the new Bahrain 
Government Hospital and at the Mission Hospital. The extent of injury 
sustained and compensation for accidents would then be determined by
1 Note that by 1938 °Awali, the centre of the oil industry in Bahrain, 
had its own hospital, school, commissary, club, swimming pool, sports 
ground, and living quarters for some 110 married and 200 unmarried 
foreign staff (Longrigg, op. cit., p. 103)* In 19^0 the Company 
undertook to build twenty-six stone houses at cAwaii and at Rafa Camp 
to house its Bahraini workers. In 19^ the existing facilities were 
extended to accommodate the large work force imported to carry out 
construction work at the refinery. See A.R.P.A., 19^0* 19^» op. cit.
215
doctors other than those of the Company Hospital. This measure, while 
aiming to benefit the workers, was also calculated to save the Company 
doctors from the accusation that they tended to minimize injuries 
sustained in accident.
Excessive Employment of Foreigners: Company officials denied the charge
that the Company employed more foreigners than Bahrainis. Children born 
in Bahrain of Persian parents were, they argued, Bahrain subjects and the 
Company was not prepared to regard them otherwise. They admitted that 
the Company had in its employ many Persians born in Bahrain and that it 
was not the policy of the Company to reduce their numbers on account of 
their being foreigners. The local Bahraini workers regarded the native 
born Persians as foreigners and did not wish to include them in the native 
statistics* Company officials also spoke of evidence pointing to a drop 
in the number of Persians and Indians employed by the Company. They 
mentioned that a great number of Najdis and Hasawis posed as Bahrainis, 
and that to stop such a deception the Company had of late required its 
job applicants to produce official certificates to prove that they were 
Bahraini subjects.
Paid Leave and Provident Fund; According to the officials Bahrainis were 
entitled to six paid-holidays every year, though not all of them were 
eligible for Friday off with pay. New plans for coolie labour to get 
short annual leave with full pay, and a scheme for a Provident Fund, were 
awaiting the approval of the Company's New York Office, they said.
Finally, they welcomed any reasonable complaint which the local workers 
wished to put to the Company and added that the majority of the Company's 
employees were satisfied with the Company whose popularity among the 
working classes of Bahrain had not been affected by the recent agitations.
The Bahrain Administration's view was voiced by the Agent who desired 
to see the largest possible section of the people of Bahrain benefitting 
from the new prosperity generated by the oil industry. It was also decided
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that the Government of Bahrain should shortly appoint a representative to 
mediate in industrial disputes between the Company and its local workers. 
And to dissipate misinformation about the Company's treatment of 
Bahrainis, Company officials undertook to invite a number of leading 
Bahrainis to visit the Company's offices.
In January 1939i the Government of Bahrain named Shaikh Ali bin
Q
Ahmad A1 Khalifah - the Amir of Rafaa who also derived an allowance from
2
the Civil List - for the above job. His duties were defined as a
go-between, between the Company and its labourers, and to communicate any 
general grievance that they might have and wish to raise with the Company. 
He was also required to report such matters to the Adviser first. Shaikh 
Ali was chosen on the basis of his membership of the Ruling Family, his
previous experience in public matters, and the fact that he lived in
c c 3Rafaa which was close to Awali.
Shortly after his appointment Shaikh Ali was provided with a
memorandum which contained adequate information about conditions of
employment with the Bahrain Petroleum Company. According to this
memorandum the wage of unskilled workmen had been raised recently to 12
annas a day for the initial month of employment. Thereafter if the
Company decided to retain a worker's services his wage would be increased
4to 14 annas a day.
How the Oil Industry affected Bahrain
Bahrain's finances were in a very bad shape in the couple of years 
or so which preceded the export of Oil in 1934. The pearl trade of
1 Weightman's No. C/753-1-6/5, op. cit.
2 Letter of appointment from Belgrave to Shaikh Ali bin Ahmad AlKhalifah.
I.O.R. 15/2/846, 22.1.1939-
3 Weightman to Belgrave. I.O.R. 15/2/846, No. C/87-1.6/5, 11.2.1939-
4 Memorandum on Conditions of Employment with B.A.P.C.O. I.O.R. 
15/2/846.
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Bahrain was in steady decline, unemployment was on the increase among the 
working population and the country's trade was affected by the recession 
of the early 1930s. Oil came at just the right time as Longrigg 
aptly noted:
"No community or government, indeed, has been more suddenly and 
timely rescued from economic disaster than those of Bahrain in 
1932."^
Both the Ruler and the Government of Bahrain began to receive oil- 
royalties from 1935 onwards. Theoretically, one third of the royalties 
was assigned for the Ruler and members of his family, the other two thirds 
went to the Government of Bahrain out of which salaries of the civil 
servants were paid, public works and services were financed, and an annual 
amount was deposited in the State's reserve fund.^ These and other 
issues of relevance to the State's income are analyzed in detail in the 
next section of the present Chapter, suffice us to mention here that the 
Ruler and his family actually received a much higher proportion of the 
State's income.
Royalties, wages, plus the Company's local purchases and contracts 
stimulated the flow of cash in the country on a hitherto unprecedented 
scale. The Company's disbursements in Bahrain in 1938 amounted to 
1»3 1 3 ,900 lakhs of rupees, and kept growing thereafter until they reached
3,212,000 in 19^5* Merchants and shopkeepers profited from the 
circulation of oil money, and imports of goods for Bahrain and its transit 
trade with the mainland recorded enormous increases. After 1935 the 
oil industry established itself as the mainstay of the economy. Both 
the Ruler and members of his family now controlled greater cash than the 
pearlers or the merchants.
1 Oil in the Middle East ..., op.cit., p, 103.
2 Col. Loch to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. C/60*f-Vl, 12.12.1935.
The royalties paid annually to the Government of Bahrain are shown in
a separate table appended to this section of the study.
3 Qubain ..., Table 32, op. cit., p. 330.
The Company's contribution to the welfare of Bahrain included 
material support for education, medical services, Public Health and anti­
malaria campaigns. The construction of a network of modern roads, 
causeways and bridges allowed greater movement of persons and goods 
within Bahrain. Over the years sea and air travel to Bahrain increased 
and this raised the level of communication with the rest of the world.
The people of Bahrain also realized they were part of the wider world 
when on October 19th, 19^ -0, the Italians dropped bombs on the refinery, 
many of which failed to explode, and those that did caused little damage. 
This generated a certain amount of anti-Italian feeling in Bahrain and on 
the 13th November of that year the Reverend Father Irzio Luigi Magliacani, 
who had recently opened the Roman Catholic Sacred Heart School at Bahrain, 
was deported because of fear for his personal safety®
At home the Oil industry brought about major economic and political
changes. For the first time, the unemployed divers and cultivators
found alternative employment with the Company. As years went by a
cprofessional class of workers - both Sunni and Shi ah Arabs - with common 
interests emerged. Both their sharing of employment with the Oil 
Company, and the amalgamation earlier in 1932 of Sunni-Shi ah schools 
under a unified system of education, helped to promote greater co-operation, 
trust and toleration between the two groups.
The expansion in the Oil industry was accompanied by a parallel 
growth in external influences. The number of Asians and Europeans, 
whether working for B.A.P.C.O. or for other businesses which emerged as a 
result of the oil wealth, grew so that the country's housing facilities 
could no longer satisfy the demand for accommodation. Rents soared 
above the established norms and only those with ready cash, i.e. the
Rulers and a few merchants, benefitted from the situation by developing 
the lands which they owned into new houses and villas.
Some Western influence in Bahrain was reflected in changes in modes 
of dress, food, drink and particularly in the consumption of alcohol by 
local Arabs. True, these changes became more conspicuous after the 
arrival of the oil industry. Nevertheless, Bahrain was open to fareign 
influence long before oil was discovered. It was an important centre 
for the Gulf's trade, it had an organized Administration and, above all, 
a Customs House, reformed as early as 1923* These facilities had 
attracted Arab, Indian, Persian and European merchants much earlier, 
though oil proved to be the greatest attraction of all.
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Royalties Received Annually 
by the Government of 
Bahrain in Lakhs of Rupees
1934 1 ,000 285,072 -
1935 3 ,0 0 0 1,264,807 6 ,18 ,1 9 2
1936 12 ,000 4,644,636 1 7,8 3 ,6 0 0
1937 21 ,000 7 ,7 6 2,26*1 17,06,347 (34,00,000)^
1938 22 ,000 8,297,998 35,02,184
1939 20 ,000 7,588,544 31,74,832
1940 19 ,000 7,073,919 30,91,989
1941 18,614 6,794,157 28,47,200
1942 17 ,000 6,240,627 26,78,462
19^3 18,004 6,571,609 1 3,2 9 ,9 7 8 (2 6,6 0,0 0 0)(a)
19H 18,344 6,713,795 28,64,453
1945 20,024 7,308,938 15,6 5 ,9 2 5 (31,00,000)(a)
Source: Administration Reports of the Political Agency, Bahrain
(a) Royalty figures in respect of the years 1937, 19^3, 1945 are for 
the first half of the year only, i.e. January-June. Figures 
for the second half of the' year were not available at the time of 
the compilation of the Administration Reports for those years. 
Normally, figures for the second half of the year tended to be: 
slightly higher than for the first half. To obtain a reasonable 
estimate for the full year the figure shown for half of the year 
can be doubled and this is shown in brackets.
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Company Employees from 1933-1945








1933 32 19 - 113 164 151
1934 58 24 - 149 231 348
1935 26 61 k9 - 2bb 380 1283
1936 157 323 153 - 658 1291 374?
1937 508 472 126 - 688 1594 3350
1938 224 422 90 - 286 1022 1596
1939 192 374 67 - 399 1032 1878
1940 143 352 55 19 346 915 1837
1941 134 270 3b 2b 254 716 1291
1942 119 237 29 291 bib 1624
1943 114 220 32 23 359 748 2096
1944 150 707 770 50 1350 3027 6389
1945 292 681 261 82 792 2108 3580
1 Canadians plus others.
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The Trade and Finances of Bahrain
Bahrain Government Income and Budgetary Affairs
This section is concerned with the country's revenues from foreign 
trade, the annual income from the Customs Service, the nature of the 
annual budgets and what effect oil-revenues had on the progress of 
Bahrain. Tables giving total Customs revenue, import/export trade of 
Bahrain, the value of cargo transhipped at Bahrain for the Arabian main­
land, plus the chief items of Expenditure in annual budget estimates are 
all provided at the end of this section.
Bahrain's income from the Customs Service was its chief source of 
revenue before it started receiving royalties from oil in 1935• The 
reorganisation of the Customs under a British Director was discussed with 
Shaikh Isa in 1903* when Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, visited Bahrain; but 
the Shaikh viewed the offer as threatening his independence and therefore 
refused to proceed with it. Meantime, Shaikh Isa continued to lease
the Customs to a Hindu firm (See Chapter Three).
In 1920 Bahrain's pearl-trade was slack resulting in a drop in the 
country's cash returns and in people's buying power. The opening in 
June of that year of the Eastern Bank Limited however stimulated Bahrain's 
trade with India and Europe. Only Indians and Europeans, who were 
acquainted with banking operations in their countries of origin, 
initially benefitted from the banking services. Many local inhabitants 
opposed it on the basis of religion, and some merchants saw it as a 
threat to their own money-lending operations. Gradually, local Arabs, 
having realized the ease with which the import of goods from Europe and 
elsewhere was possible, began to take advantage of the Bank's foreign and
1 Col. Haworth to F.S.G.I., No. 295-S, op. cit.
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domestic services.
During 1920 Shaikh Isa charged the full rate of customary duty, i.e.
5%, on goods consigned to Najd, Hasa and Qatif instead of the former 2%.
At the request of his subjects, Bin Saud protested against this rise and
the matter was referred to the Government of India whose orders were
communicated by the Resident to the Shaikh:
’’The Government of India have directed me to write to Your 
Excellency and convey their orders which are that this 
practice is not in accordance with the existing international 
law, and to inform you, on behalf of Government, that in 
future you are to take only 2% on goods consigned to the 
neighbouring places on the mainland landed and reshipped at 
Bahrain, and that you are not to take any duty on goods 
which are transferred from ships to dhows straight off and 
which proceed direct to mainland ports.
In any case it is understood that the goods on which the 2% 
duty will be charged are those which are consigned to 
specified merchants residing on the mainland via Bahrain 
through their agents residing in Bahrain, such goods being 
reshipped from Bahrain to any of the ports on the mainland 
within 20 days of the date of landing at Bahrain. Full 
duty will be charged on such goods if they remain in your 
island longer than the above mentioned period (2 0 days)
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five, the pearl-trade of Bahrain was
bad in 1921, and this affected the country’s imports and created cases
of bankruptcy among traders. During the latter part of 1922 and
throughout 1923 the market improved. In 1923 the administration of the
Customs was entrusted to Mr. Bower (see Chapter Three) shortly after the
1 During Captain Loch’s term of office as P.A. Bahrain 1916-18, a 
scheme for a British Bank was repeatedly opposed by the Shaikh and 
by the Sunni Qadi. They were partly influenced in their attitude 
by Yusuf Kanoo who viewed the opening of a bank as a threat to his 
own financial operations. Loch cautioned Kanoo against 
"obstructing the Government’s considered schemes". Commenting upon 
Kanoo*s operations Dickson wrote in 1920: "Big merchants were
accustomed to lend him their money in Bombay at the beginning of
winter, on the promise that he would repay the amount at the 
commencement of the pearl season in Bahrain. The sums sometimes 
amounted to 18 Lakhs (of rupees). A bank in Bahrain meant that 
these merchants would be able to transfer their money at a low rate 
of exchange and so would no longer give their money to Yusuf. It 
was naturally to Yusuf Kanoo*s interest to keep out the bank.
See Dickson’s Note ... para. 7, op. cit.
2 Colonel Trevor to Shaikh Isa. I.O.R. 15/2/123, No. 303, 1^.6.1920.
retirement of Shaikh Isa. The new Director terminated what was then
described as: "the horrible state of accounts under the late Director
'I
and evidence of considerable embezzlement”. Due to Bower's efforts,
Bahrain's revenues improved markedly, and imports for 1923 were reported 
to be worth £2,454,571 and exports £8 60,589* Two thirds of the
Bahrain*s Customs Tariffs
were as follows:'
imports were transhipped to the mainland.'
.3
(1) Customs Duty: All imports into Bahrain were charged 3% ad 
valorem import tax, with the exception of 
certain imports shown as *Exemptions*•
(2) R.E. Export Duty: Goods which were marked R.E. before arrival and
which were re-exported after arrival at the 
port within 20 days to mainland ports were 
charged at 2% ad valorem only. If the period 
of 20 days was exceeded the full 3% import 
duty was levied.
(3) Transhipment at Sea: Cargo transhipped at sea was free of charge.
(4) Tobacco Tax: There was a municipal tax of 2% on tobacco and
cigarettes.
(5) Contraband: The following imports were forbidden:
(a) Arms and ammunition
(b) Liquor; except for personal consumption 
by Europeans and Americans
(c) Obscene literature and pictures
(d) Artificial and cultured pearls.
In December 1923, Major Daly and Mr. Bower together produced the first 
monthly budget for Bahrain. It demonstrated to the Government of India 
the underlying soundness of Bahrain's finances and its ability to fund 
the projected reforms. The budget estimated monthly receipts at
1 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 15/2/123, No. 42/8/4, 18.10.1923. From
1919 to mid-1923 the Customs was farmed by the Hindu firm of
Mr. Gangaram Tikamdas. Before that Seth Rao Sahib Tirathdas Maharaj, 
headman of the Hindu Community in Bahrain, was Director of Customs
until 1919, the year he died in Karachi. See A.R.P.A. 1919, 1920,
op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 1923, op. cit.
3 Colonel Barrett, P.A., to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/13"l3i No. 291,
27.3.1929.
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Rs. 87,000 and expenditure at Rs. 67,150-^
On the 14th January 1924, Mr* de Grenier (see Chapter Three) took
over as Director of Customs shortly after his predecessor's period of
2loan to the Government of Bahrain had expired. During the year the
Agent drew up Bahrain's first annual budget for the Arabic year starting
3
1st Moharram 1343 O^ d  August 1924-25)- It anticipated receipts of
Zj.
Rs. 15,23,000 chiefly from the Customs, but also from the Courts, 
contributions by the municipalities towards upkeep of the Police Force, 
rents of Government lands, and quarantine receipts, together with a small 
surplus deriving from the previous year. The chief headings of 
expenditure were:
Manamah and Moharraq Water Supply Scheme Rs. 3,00,000
Civil List (i.e. Payments to the Ruling Family) 3,73,800
Upkeep of State Levy Corps 1,20,000
Upkeep of State Police and Pay of Amirs 74,000
State Contribution to Municipalities 5 60,000
Education (Grants in aid to Schools) 48,000
Public Works 38,000
Estimated Surplus to be devoted to the
completion of Water Supply Scheme, and
to Manamah Electric Power Scheme 2,46,000
1 Monthly Budget, Government of Bahrain, attached to a letter from the 
Agent to the Resident. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1039, No. 208/C/9/2, 17-12. 
1923-
2 Mr. de Grenier served as Director of Customs until 20th March 1943- 
See A.R.P.A. 1943, op. cit.
3 For 1343 Budget see Colonel F.B. Prideaux's letter to F.S.G.I.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1044, No. 426-S, 27-7-1924.
4 Customs revenue came from various sources, the 5% Customs duty being 
the most important source. Other income for the Customs derived 
from supervision fees, sales of forms, weight certificates, 
amendment fees, certificate fees, Khanchia (i.e. warehouse dues or 
demurrage), gammali (i.e. porterage), pier fees, royalty charges, 
taxes on motor cars and divers* licenses, pearling licenses and boat 
registration fees. See State Budget for 1343* Ibid.
5 The reference is to Manamah Municipality created in 1920 and to 
Moharraq Municipality whose creation was forecast for 1924, but was 
delayed until 1927, the year in which it was established under the 
Presidency of Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa. However, since 1921 an 
unofficial municipal committee existed in that place. See A.R.P.A. 
1921-7, op. cit.
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192*1-25 were bad years for the pearl-trade of Bahrain for the
reasons mentioned in Chapter Five. The disaster that struck local
boats during the 1929 season left a large number of seamen jobless for
the rest of the year, causing the Agent to voice his concern:
"The Deputy Ruler may well be advised to consider the 
possibility of the introduction of some industry. Some years 
ago the weaving of canvas for boat sails was a fairly 
prosperous industry amongst the Baharnah, but it practically 
died out owing to the severe oppression to which the Baharnah 
were subjected during the late years of Shaikh Isa's rule, 
when members of the ruling family indiscriminately taxed every 
form of indigenous industry."^
No new budget was produced for the year 13*^ (1923-26) owing to
Daly's absence from Bahrain during May-November 1923* In budgetting for
the year, the Assistant Political Agent followed the guidance of the
previous year's budget. During 1925 the Administration decided to
engage the services of a financial adviser, an appointment for which
Charles Belgrave applied and was interviewed and chosen for the post by
2
Colonel F.B. Pndeaux, the then Resident. Prideaux specified the
following reasons for the engagement of a financial adviser for Bahrain:
"The revenues of the State are greater than the Chief and his 
Arab advisers can judiciously spend. It is recognised that 
the income is likely to expand and that the growing community 
of Europeans, Americans, and educated Arabs, Persians and 
Indians are entitled to expect their condition of life to be 
improved."^
Total revenue from the Customs rose from less than nine lakhs of 
rupees in 13Vf (1925-26) to over nine and a half lakhs in 13*+5 » as-d
1 A.R.P.A., 1925* op.cit.
2 Prideaux to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office. I.O.R.
L/P+S/10/I0*t*l-, N o . P. 3190, 15-9-1925- Prideaux described Belgrave 
as follows: "An officer has. been found who seems in every way 
suitable. He is Mr. Charles Belgrave, Administrative Officer
(Cadet) on leave from Tanganyika Territory, East Africa ......
I have interviewed Mr. Belgrave* He is aged 31. He can speak
Arabic, Swahili and French. During the War he served in Egypt in
both military and civil capacities." Ibid.
3 Prideaux to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/I04*f, No. 378-S, October 1925*
22?
exceeded ten and a half lakhs in 13^6 (See Table provided). Bahrain's
trade for 1926 revealed the popularity of aluminium and enamel ware, and
also earthenware imported from Europe. The import of motor cars was
said to have continued during the year when there were 1^0 cars in
Bahrain, some private, some taxis and four lorries. The majority of
these were Fords, and the tendency was to import the more expensive high
power type. Earlier in 1923, a system of licensing for new drivers
2had been introduced.
During 13^ +6 (1927-28) Bahrain's import figures grew by four and a
half lakhs of rupees. The improvement was attributed to a good pearling
season. Also during the year the price of sugar fell by 20% and coffee
by 30%. The drop was caused by competition between beet sugar and Java
sugar, and by an abnormally good global coffee crop. Local consumption
of oil during the year increased as a result of the 50% increase in the
import of Anglo-Persian Oil Company's oil, with the Company's Agent
3
allowing credit facilities to his customers for the first time.
Manamah's prosperous trade was beginning to cause resentment among
Moharraq shopkeepers who alleged that the disembarkation of passenger •
k
steamers and dhow-cargo in Manamah port was an added advantage.
In his commentary on the State budget for the year, i.e. 13^6, the 
Adviser drew attention to the allowances of the Ruling Family, i.e. the 
Civil List, which amounted to Rs. 9,90,000 while the actual total revenue 
of the State for the year was Rs. 12,^0,055* He wrote:
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/296, 23.2.1927*
2 A.R.P.A. 1925, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 1927, op. cit. From 193^-39, Khan Sahib Yusuf bin Ahmad
Kanoo was the local Agent of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. See
Administration Reports of the Political Agency for those years.
k Belgrave to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/296, No. 59V9A, 5th Sha°ban 13^6.
Steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company and the German 
Hansa Line called bi-weekly at Manamah Port.
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"About one half of the total estimated revenue is paid over 
yearly to the Ruling Family through the Civil List and various 
annual allowances ... etc* ... This amount does not include 
salaries which are paid to various Shaikhs, in addition to 
their allowances, who occupy positions in the Government such as 
Magistrates, Presidents of Courts, Amirs, etc. These payments 
are included under other headings, Protection, Judicial, etc."^
The second largest item of recurrent expenditure was State Protection
(defined below) which consumed 17% of the total revenue in 1346. For
the first time during the year the State allocated two lakhs of rupees
as the start of a Reserve Fund deposited at 4% interest in Bombay.
The actual total expenditure for 1347 (1928-29) amounted to
Rs. 11,82,214, which included one lakh deposited in the Reserve Fund
invested in Bombay. In certain cases actual expenditure outstripped
the budget estimates. Allowances to the Ruling Family were budgetted
at Rs. 4,59,064 but the actual .expenditure was Rs* 5,04,489; there was
an increase of Rs. 45,425 over the budget estimate. In addition, some
members of A1 Khalifah derived salaries from the posts which they held
in the State. An additional sum of about Rs. 16,000 was paid to
H.E. Shaikh Hamad for additional building to his houses in Moharraq and
Sakhir, and also for purchase of new equipment for the fish market. The
existing market was the private property of the Shaikh, and as it was in
a bad sanitary condition, the State offered assistance in the interest
of public health. The total amount paid to the Ruling Family during
1347 was Rs. 5,14,369.
The Judicial and Waqf Departments expenditure was budgetted at
Rs. 25,50° and the actual expenditure was Rs. 29,190. The State was
still paying the expenses of this department, and this was expected to
continue until such time as the proceeds were sufficient to cover
expenses. Waqfs cost the State Rs. 4,500 during the year. The Sunni
Waqfs were under the control of the three Sunni Qadis, assisted by two
1 Belgrave; Notes on Expenditure under budget headings for 1346.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1044.
2 Ibid.
clerks and one A1 Khalifah Shaikh. The Shi°ah Waqfs were, until
Q
November 1928, entrusted to Sayed Adnan the Shi ah Qadi, thereafter 
following his death they were handed over, first, to his executor 
temporarily, and then to a Committee consisting of six members (See 
Chapter Four).
Judicial expenditure during the year amounted to Rs. 24,690,
spent on the pay of Magistrates, Qadis, clerks, and other members of the
following Courts;
The Bahrain Court 
The Bahrain Small Court 
The Sunni Sharac Court 
The ShiCah Shara0 Court 
Majlis al-Tijarah 
The Diving Court 
The Small Joint Court
During the year 1347, 1064 new cases were investigated by the Bahrain 
Court and 282 cases by the Bahrain Small Court, in addition to a large 
number of old cases. The Majlis al-Tijarah consisted of twenty members 
local and foreign merchants, under the Presidency of Shaikh Humud bin 
Subah A1 Khalifah. The Diving Court consisted of three merchants, 
renowned in the pearl-trade; Abdur Rahman Zaiyani, Hajji Abd cAli bin 
Rajab, and Hajji Ali bin Sagur, with one paid member Khalifah bu Ghais.
The Diving Court functioned only during the off-season and held its weekly 
session in the Bahrain Government Court House in Manamah.
State Protection included the Indian Police, Arab Police, two Amirs 
and Naturs, i.e. Watchmen, upkeep of the prison, and cost of deportations. 
The Indian Police was commanded by two officers, one British, the other 
Indian, in addition to 95 other ranks. The Arab Police consisted of one 
superintendent and 41 other ranks. The Naturs totalled 128. The Indian 
and Arab Police were provided with lodgings, uniforms and rations by the 
State. The Naturs were salaried employees, engaged on a temporary basis,
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since many among their ranks were divers who were given leave during the 
diving season and were replaced by others while they were absent.
During 13^6 (1927-28) expenditure on Education amounted to 
Rs. 32,119, and the Resident wanted this raised on account of the growing 
income of the State and also because education was becoming a "dominant 
factor" in Bahrain. In 13^7 expenditure on education increased to 
Rs. 37,883, owing to the rise in the number of boys and girls attending 
the schools and to the sending of eight students, three from the Ruling 
Family and five sons of leading merchants, to Beirut at the expense of
'I
the State (See Chapter Six).
One lakh of rupees was earmarked for the Electricity Scheme in the
Budget estimates for 13^ -7, and another two lakhs were alloted for the
construction of Manamah-Moharraq Sea-Road; both items appeared under
Special Projects. But the actual expenditure for 13^7, makes no mention
of either of the two projects.
Trade prospects during 13^8 (1929-30) looked gloomy due to the
disturbed conditions on the mainland, the exclusion of Persians from
Bahrain except for those with proper passports, and the dull state of
the Paris pearl market. During the year both the State's revenue and
expenditure were budgetted at Rs. 16,32,576. The State's cash assets
were shown to be healthy at the beginning of the year:
Fixed deposits - Bombay - excluding Reserve Rs. 2,00,000
Cash in Consolidated Fund - Bahrain 1,10,238
Cash in Lloyd's Bank - Bombay 35,259
Cash in current account with Eastern Bank - Bombay 2,0^,981
Reserve - also on fixed deposit in Bombay 3,00,000
Rs. 3,00,000 were allotted for the electrification of Manamah, and
Rs. 75,000 for Manamah-Moharraq Sea-Road. Owing to the expansion in
education its share of expenditure was increased to Rs* 90,000.
1 Notes on Expenditure 13^7 • I.O.R. L/P+S/10/104^.
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Allowances on the Civil List also increased as a result of additional
grant to Shaikh Isa, and the restoration of the allowances to certain
members of A1 Khalifah hitherto in exile.
The revenue for the year showed Recoverable Loans totalling
Rs. 27,098 from previous years. These loans were extended by Shaikh
Hamad to the tribal elements, to relatives and to a few merchants.
Rs. 15,000 was loaned to Mohammad bin Subah, headman of the Ben Ali tribe,
at the start of the pearling season, Rs. 6,000 to Abdul Latif ad-Dosari,
and Rs. ^-,000 to Ahmad bin Khalifah al-Ghatam, a relative of the Shaikh.
13^9 (1930-31) was according to the Adviser "a very disastrous one
financially, the revenue of the State has decreased to an alarming extent”.
During the year work was carried out on the Manamah-Moharraq Sea-Road,
and on the building of the quarantine station. Also, the balance of
2
the cost of the Electric Scheme was paid. The deficit in revenue forced 
the State to draw Rs. 1,70,000 from its investments in Bombay. The 
total balance of the State's funds at the end of 13^8 was Rs. 3,^0,365 
with an additional Rs. 3,00,000 in reserve. At the end of 13^9 the 
deficit in revenue exceeded the estimated sum by over three laks of 
rupees, which the Adviser attributed to "the present worldwide trade
1 State Budget for 13^8. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/lOVf. In March 1933, 
Yusuf Kanoo mortgaged his cAmSrah (building) in Manamah to the 
Eastern Bank Ltd. on account of a loan of Rs. 75,000. (See the 
Bank's letter of 19th July 193^. I.O.R. 15/2/2^1). Thereafter, 
his financial position deteriorated further, and Shaikh Hamad 
assisted him by extending to him a loan of Rs. 20,000 in 193^ -, and 
again by buying a house from him in 19^ at Rs. 80,000, more than 
its worth, and by offering him further two loans of Rs. 20,000 in 
19^, and Rs. 10,000 in 19V1. (See Belgrave to Prior. I.O.R. 
15/2/241, No. C/1131, 23*6.19^1*)' Other loans by the Ruler were 
offered to Abdullah al-Zayed: Rs. ^,000, and two Lakhs to Qusaibi, 
both during 1358 (1939-^) (See His Highness1 Expenditure during 
1358. I.O.R. 15/2/197).
2 The Electric Power Station in Manamah was opened by Shaikh Hamad 
on the 12th May 1930, and electricity was extended to Moharraq in 
1931. A.R.P.A. 1930-31, op. cit.
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depression”.
That depression continued to affect Bahrain's trade and finances in
the following year 1350 (1931-32). The Customs revenue fell to
Rs. 5>09)000 owing to the fall in commodity prices, and to the bad pearl
2
trade, and also the decline in the prices of dates. While budgetting
for the year, the Adviser needed an extra one lakh in revenue to cover
the normal recurrent expenditure, and to obtain this he proposed the
3
raising of the Khanchia, to one anna per maund on all bag cargo, his
justification for the increase being:
"It is unfortunate that it should be necessary to increase 
taxation but at the same time it is a well known fact that 
Bahrain is more lightly taxed than any other State in the Gulf.
With the exception of the Customs duty and a local house tax 
in Manamah and Muharraq which is collected by the 
Municipalities, there are no local taxes whatever."^
Total expenditure for 1350 was reduced to Rs. 8,32,516, sufficient
to cover normal recurrent expenditure. All existing State-financed
construction work was halted. As a result, unemployment among the
country's working population increased. The allocations on the Civil
List were reduced by 10% with the Shaikh's approval, and no extra
allowances were allowed that year to the Ruling Family. Nevertheless,
the Civil List still amounted to nearly half the State's total
expenditure. Total allocations for Government Departments were also
1 Annual Report for 13^9- I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1044, No. 105/S.F., 5 Safar 
1350. Two very large bankruptcies took place in 1930 one of which 
was that of Khan Bahadur Mohammad Sharif Awazi who, as a result, fled 
to Persia leaving debts of over three lakhs, two lakhs being due to 
the Hansa Line whose agent he was. (A.R.P.A. 1930, op. cit.) He 
was charged with fraudulent bankruptcy including cheating the Customs 
Department for over four years. Owing to his abscondment, the 
charges against him were abandoned, but his possessions in Bahrain 
and his British titles were subjected to forfeiture. See Prior
to Biscoe. I.O.R. 15/2/102, No. C-23> 14.3.1931.
2 A.R.P.A. 1931} op. cit.
3 Fee collected on imported goods whose owners desired to store them in 
the Customs Warehouse for a period of ten days, excluding holidays. 
For a further ten days, the importer had to pay another Khanchia fee, 
and so on.
4 Belgrave: Budget for 1350, attached to No» 105/S.F., op. cit.
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reduced by about Rs. 12,000 compared with the previous year. This was
done by reducing the number of Government employees. Expenditure was cut
by Rs. 10,000 in the wake of the Government decision not to send back the
students to the A.U.B., and by another Rs. 9*000 when it was decided not
to send the Hospital Boat to the pearl banks throughout the main diving
season. Cuts in public expenditure also affected the Municipalities,
the Electric Supply Scheme, Agriculture, etc. The total cuts in
recurrent expenditure, compared to the Budget of 13^9* amounted to almost
two lakhs of rupees, Rs. 7^,000 of which represented the cut in the Civil
List. Commenting upon the Recoverable Loans owed to the State, the
Adviser remarked: "It is in my opinion very doubtful whether this sum
(Rs* 17,016) will be repaid".^
There was however some consolation to be gained from the Agency
Report for 1931 which offered the following optimistic note:
"Bad though the state of trade is in Bahrain there ia some comfort 
to be found in the reflection that our neighbours are worse off, 
for Qatif and Qatar are to all intents and purposes ruined. A 
cause of the comparative prosperity of Bahrain is to be found in 
the fact that Gulf capitalists have steadily been moving their 
capital over and establishing their headquarters here for some 
years past. This is true both of the Arab and Persian Coasts, 
and is a great tribute to the Administration of Bahrain. There 
is little doubt that its good order, security, bank, wireless and 
shipping facilities act as lodestones, and both Nejdi and Persian 
merchants and Shaikhs have been moving their valuables to its 
gilt-edged shores.
On 6th May 1932, the Government of Bahrain raised the duty on
luxuries from 5 to 72% and to 10% from 3'ist December of the year. The
3
duty on liquor and tobacco was also increased to 15%*
Commenting upon the State's finances at the close of 1351 (1932-33) 
the Adviser wrote: " ... the financial position of the State causes me 
very grave concern; both the new Budget (1352) and the figures for the
1 Ibid.
2 A.R.P.A. 193% op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 1932, op. cit.
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last year reveal a very disastrous condition of affairs”•
He went on to compare the finances of Bahrain during the years 1350 
and 135"! • The actual revenue during 1351 dropped from what it was in 
1350 by Rs, 1,20,07^. The drop was largely in the Customs receipts due 
mainly to dwindling imports, and to the diminishing buying power of the 
people of Bahrain. Expenditure in 1351 exceeded revenue by Rs. 93,672. 
Although actual expenditure in 1351 was less than the amount forecast in 
the Budget, yet the revenue fell short of the budgetted amount by 
Rs. 1,05,302. By the end of 1351 there was a deficit of Rs. 69,132.
The Reserve Fund which stood at three lakhs of rupees at the start 
of 1351, shrank to two and a half lakhs towards the end of the year. For 
the first time in his budget estimates for 1352, the Adviser showed a 
deficit in revenue over expenditure which he covered from the Reserve 
Fund. In 1351 budget revenue was estimated at Rs. 7,89,600 though the 
actual revenue amounted to Rs. 6,8A,298 only. Customs receipts for the
year were less than the estimate by one lakh of rupees. The drop was 
attributed to ”the deplorable condition of the pearl industry”, falling 
imports and the likelihood of Bahrain losing its re-export (R.E.) trade. 
Hence the revenue from the Customs was estimated in 1352 (1933-3^) at 
Rs. 5,50,000, i.e. one and a half lakhs reduction over that of 1351• 
Estimated total expenditure for 1352 was also reduced by 72,100 rupees 
over the estimate for the previous year. As regards the Civil List, 
the Shaikhs were made to realize that a cut in its allocations was 
inevitable. That cut, originally suggested at 5-6%, eventually amounted 
to 2^ /o only, i.e. Rs. 6,000 out of a total allocation to the Civil List 
of Rs. 3,86,000. Even then it cost the State more than half the total 
expenditure for the year. The Adviser warned:
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/196, No. 17/SF, 29^.1933.
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" ... it is my considered opinion that thfe finances of Bahrain 
will never be on a satisfactory footing unless the Civil List 
is made to correspond, to a certain extent, to the actual revenue, 
increasing and decreasing according to the income of the State. 
The proportion was laid down when the State was comparatively 
wealthy, unfortunately since then the revenue has diminished by 
half, but a reference to the comparison of revenue and Civil 
List, which I enclose shows that the fluctuations of the revenue 
have not proportionally affected the Civil List ...
If this State finds itself in serious financial difficulties it 
will depend upon the Government of India for monetary assistance
.......  If the Government of India comes to the conclusion
that the Civil List requires readjusting it will be necessary 
for it to express this opinion very definitely to the Ruler 
himself."^
He provided the following comparison:
Total Revenue Civil List Percentage
13^5 Ks. "11, 91,810 4 ,50,094 ^5-3
13^6 12,40,056 4 ,62,599 37.3
13V72 12,15,694 5,04,489 *t1.5
13^8 11,54,131 5,08,434 ¥ f.8
13^9 8,17,716 4,91,995 60.1
1350 7,96,601 4,34,700 5^.5
1351 6,84,298 4,13,844 60.5
The Adviser's assessment above shocked the Government of India who
replied to the Resident:
"The Government of India cannot view such a state of affairs with
equanimity. They realise that Mr. Belgrave's position as a paid
servant of the State precludes him from exercising any real
pressure on the Shaikh in the matter of his Civil List. They
consider it essential that unless figures for the first part of
the present financial year, when available show a probability that
the budget will balance the extremely serious nature of the
financial position of his State should be explained to the Shaikh
in unequivocal terms and a substantial reduction effected in his
Civil List * . . " 7  
5
1 Ibid.
2 In 13^7 Shaikh Isa's monthly stipend was increased from Rs. ^-,000 to 
Rs. 5?000. The above figures represent actual expenditures, not 
the estimates shown in the Annual Budgets supplemented to this 
section.
3 F.S.G.I. to the Resident. I.O.R. '15/2/196, No. F. 261-N/33,
2^.10.1933.
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The actual revenue of the State in 1352 (1933-3*0 was slightly 
higher than the previous year. There was an increase of Rs. 8,000 in 
Customs receipts due to the introduction of higher Customs tariff in 
May 1932, plus rents from government land, oil concession from B.A.P.C.O., 
and the payment of the rent of Moharraq aerodrome. The total 
expenditure during the year was less than the expenditure in 1351 hy about 
Rs. V7,000. There was a saving of Rs. 2^,600 in the Civil List owing 
to the death of His Excellency Shaikh Sir Isa bin Ali which occurred on 
9th December 1932, and also to the death of certain persons included on 
the list. The cost of State protection increased owing to the fact that 
during the year the police force was reinforced and new uniforms and 
equipment were purchased. Actual expenditure outstripped revenue by 
Rs. 4-,000. 1
Customs revenue improved by about half a lakh of rupees in 1353 
(193^-35) over the previous year due, mainly, to large imports of Japanese 
rice and the general expansion in trade following the establishment of 
B.A.P.C.O. Also during the year eight instalments of Rs. 5*769* i.e. 
totalling Rs. ^6,152 were received from B.A.P.C.O. in accordance with 
the Supplementary Agreement signed earlier. Five instalments which 
totalled Rs. 28,8^5 were paid in 1352. The total payment by the Company 
in 1353 amounted to Rs. 75*000, of which Rs. 50,000 was recoverable from 
future royalties. Also received from the Company was Rs. 20,000 from 
the minimum royalty clause of the Supplementary Agreement. Revenue also 
included two instalments paid during the year by the Imperial Airways 
for the lease of the Manamah aerodrome for a period of 18 months. The 
decline in interest rate reduced income on Reserve Funds from Rs. 8,000 
to Rs. 5*000.
1 Belgrave: Notes on Revenue and Expenditure 1352. I.O.R. 15/2/195.
2 A.R.P.A. 193*1-, op. cit.
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Daring the year three pieces of land were sold to the British
Government, two in Manamah (Jufair) and one in Moharraq. The deal
fetched Rs. 1,96,031. Out of this sum Rs. 33*352 was paid into the
Privy Purse, and the payment was not included in the report on
expenditure. The purchase of land from private owners cost the State
Rs. ^5,012 and in addition to this Rs. 7,000 was paid to Shaikh Mohammad
bin Isa who had a claim to all the open land in the neighbourhood of
Jufair. The net government receipt from the whole transaction was
Rs* 1,10,367. In addition to the financial arrangements a large amount
2
of government land was given to the previous occupants.
Early in 1935 the people agitated over the high rate of unemployment. 
Shaikh Hamad*s solution to the problem envisaged the resumption of the 
construction of the Manamah-Moharraq Sea Road which had been stopped due 
to the recession. Since then the State*s financial position had 
improved mainly as a result of the oil money and this was likely to 
increase in the future. During the year, the State had Rs. 3*00,000 
in reserves. The completion of the work on the Road was expected to 
cost the State a further 80,000 rupees. The receipt of over one lakh 
from the sale of land to the British Government enabled the Administration
to spend Rs. 30,000 on the resumption of work on the Manamah-Moharraq
h-
Road, thus providing work for the unemployed.
1 In April 1935 the British Naval Stations at Henjam . and Basidu were
transferred to Bahrain. The construction of the buildings of the
naval base at Jufair was carried out by the Government of Bahrain 
at cost price. The work consisted of a pier 1800 feet long and
10 feet wide. Other buildings included an Officers* club,
canteen, quarters for the clerk in charge, etc. See Belgrave*s 
Report for 1935, No. 1221-9A, op. cit. Also, A.R.P.A. 1935,
op. cit.
2 Belgrave, Report on the Revenue for 1353. I.O.R. 15/2/195*
3 Belgrave to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/196, No. 706/13 L.D., 7.2.1935.
^ Belgrave to P.A.: State Budget for 135^. I.O.R. 15/2/195, No. 326/
S.F., 30.6.1935.
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During March-April 1935* talks were held between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain which brought on a reduction of the transit duty on cargo for 
the mainland from 2 to 1,75% ad valorem. In his annual report for 
1353 Belgrave described the financial position of Bahrain as 'distinctly 
better* than what it was at the start of the year. State revenue 
improved by about half a lakh over 1352. The 1351$ 1352, 1353 budgets 
showed a deficit, but 135A (1935-36) commenced with the State owning a 
reserve fund of two lakhs and a balance from the previous year of 
Rs. 1,38,000. Towards the end of 1935* the austerity measures which 
had been adopted earlier were abolished and full payments were restored
to Civil servants and to the Civil List, at the Agent's request. The
3
total to be restored was roughly estimated at Rs. 35*000 a year. The 
actual revenue for 135*+ exceeded the previous year's by Rs. A,55*000*
The net amount of royalties received by the State after deducting 
Rs. 50,000, the final instalment of a loan extended by the Company in 
193*+, was Rs. 5*68,192. Of the Rs. 13,*+2,000 collected during 135*+*
Rs. 5*68,192 was from royalty on oil, the remaining Rs. 7»2A,000 from 
other sources, chiefly Customs receipts. Expenditure for the year 
recorded an increase of Rs. 2,10,000 over 1353. Increase in expend­
iture included Rs. 1,89,000, one-third of the oil-royalty paid to the 
Ruler, and Rs. 1A,000, the cost of restoring the cuts in Civil servants' 
pay and in the Civil List three months before the end of the year.
Other increases in expenditure occurred in State protection, and in the
A
medical and educational services.
1 A.R.P.A. 1935, op. cit.
2 No. 326/S.F., op. cit.
3 Colonel Loc.h to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. C/60A-A/1, 
12.12.1935.
A Belgrave: Notes on Revenue and Expenditure 135A. I.O.R. 15/2/197*
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On 30th January 1936, the Adviser communicated with the Agent about 
two of Shaikh Hamad1s younger sons who were married and were paid
allowances of Rs. 350 each per month from his share in the oil revenue,
1
and he wished to add their names to the Civil List instead. To this
the Agent replied:
"The intention underlying my letter No. C/607-Vr'1 of 17th June 
193^* which was written with the approval of the Honourable the 
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was that no further 
increase should be made to the Civil List, which already formed 
too high a proportion of the expenditure of the State. In the 
circumstances any new allowance of this . sort should, I think, 
be met from the one-third of the oil royalties.
Customs revenue increased in 1355 (1936-37)* over the previous year, 
by more than Rs. 1,80,000. The oil industry stimulated the country*s 
trade which recorded a notable improvement. B.A.P.C.0.*s local 
employees reached 37^7, the highest figure since the Company started its 
operations in Bahrain. The earnings which the employees received were 
spent in the local bazaars. The influx of Europeans and relatively highly paid 
Aslans created a market for highly priced luxury articles. The State*s 
income from liquor alone amounted to Rs. 1^,841 during the year. The 
actual revenue during 1355 surpassed the budget estimate by seven lakhs 
owing to unanticipatedly higher receipts from the oil-royalties and from 
Customs, The recurrent expenditure for the year which included, mainly, 
Administration, Protection and the Civil List, amounted to Rs. 9*22,000 
slightly less than the amount forecast in the budget. Expenditure also 
included 36,000 rupees spent on the new Customs House, 88,000 rupees on 
completing the Manamah-Moharraq Road, 13,000 rupees on road construction 
including the new Manamah-Budayya0 Road, and ^9,000 rupees on building 
shops on government land in the main bazaar. Government subsidies to the
1 Belgrave to'Loch. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. 1163-2A, 30.1.1936.
2 Loch to Belgrave. I.O.R. 15/2/197* No. C/77-^1* 16.2.1936.
2^0
Municipalities were restored to the original rate of 2,000 rupees monthly.
This amount, had been reduced at the time of the cuts in public expend-
iture in 1350 to 1 ,000 rupees per month.«
In his budget estimates for 1356 (1937-38) the Adviser made a very
important point when he noted that: "the income from the oil royalty has
now superseded customs receipts as the chief source of revenue". In fact,
oil royalties exceeded Customs receipts since 1936. He anticipated a
steady growth in oil revenue and in Customs* receipts. Accordingly, he
budgetted total revenue for the year at 22,10 ,000 rupees, and noted:
"this is about eight lakhs more than the most prosperous year in the
history of Bahrain*s finances when the pearl industry was flourishing
2
before the years of depression".
The largest item of expenditure was the Civil List and the Ruler*s 
one third of the total oil revenue estimated at 9 ,2 0 ,0 0 0 rupees.
Expenditure on Government Departments, Protection, Medical Services,
Public Works was increased slightly over the previous year because of 
projected increases in the Government staff. Rs. 3,23,000 were allocated
3
for Special Projects which included 1,00,000 for the new hospital;
1,00,000 for the proposed new palace for the Shaikh; 50,000 for the 
Manamah-Moharraq bridge; 35,000 Court House; 32,000 fire engine;
6.000 Water Cart. At the end of 1355 the Reserve Fund was increased 
from two to four lakhs. At the beginning of 1356 the State had a 
balance of ^,79,000 rupees, in addition to the four lakhs in the Reserve 
Fund. Out of that balance ^,11,752 rupees were invested in British War 
Loan at 3^% interest, thereby increasing the Reserve Fund to about
ix
8 .12 .000 rupees.
1 Belgrave to P.A., Budget for 1356 and Notes on Revenue and
Expenditure 1355. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. *f35/S.F., 31.5.1937.
2 Ibid.
3 Note that the medical services were provided chiefly by the American 
Mission Hospital and by the Victoria Memorial Hospital before the 
opening of the new Government Hospital in 19^ +0.
k Ibid.
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The 1356 budget estimates drew critical remarks from the Agent who 
pointed out three main defects: (a) a considerable increase of expend­
iture over the estimated figures, (b) a tendency to depart freely from
budgetted figures in the matter of expenditure, (c) lack of distinction
-1
between recurring and non-recurring expenditure.
Although the Resident agreed to most of the Agent*s above views, he
nevertheless dre\i/ his attention to:
" ... the main facts from our point of view about the budget are:
(a) that the financial position is very satisfactory, and (b) 
that the Reserve is being increased. As you know, the income of 
the State is increasing rapidly and the Shaikh being what he is 
it is certain that the money which comes in will be spent freely.
I think all that is necessary on our part is to see that the money 
is spent on useful objects and not wasted, and that the Reserve is 
steadily increased. Beyond this I do not think we need interfere 
in details.
In November 1937* the Agent sent a note to the Adviser entitled:
"Formation of a Reserve Fund for Bahrain". In it he made specific
suggestions for increasing Bahraini Reserves over a number of years, and
the saving of funds for the future. He wrote:
"It is clear enough that heavy non-recurring expenditure must be 
contemplated in the next few years. There is much to do in 
improving Public Health (Sanitation, Hospitals, etc.) Agriculture, 
Communications and Education. Not only is it right to spend 
freely on such services, but circumstances will drive the Bahrain 
Government to do so. There will be pressure both from outside and 
from within, and the safe course, which no doubt coincides with 
inclination, is to forestall criticism or agitation."^
Belgrave concurred in the Agent*s views and assured him that the
Reserve was being increased steadily. In 1937 the Reserve Fund stood
at 18 lakhs of rupees, deposited at 32% interest, of which five lakhs
were in fixed deposits and the remainder in British War Loan and other
Government stocks at 3i^* In addition to this there was a sum of 10
Lakhs in the Consolidated Fund.
1 Captain Hickinbotham to the Resident. I.O.R. 13/2/197* No. C/485-4/1,
26.6.1937.
2 T.C. Fowle to Hickinbotham. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. 567-S, 2.8.1937*
3 H. Weightman: Formation of a Reserve Fund for Bahrain* I.O.R. 15/ 
2/197.
4 Belgrave to Weightman. I.O.R. 15/2/197, no number, 22.11.1937.
1357 budget (1938-39) estimated Revenue and Expenditure at 
Rs. ^2,02,000. For the first time Bahrain*s annual revenue was fore­
cast at over forty-two lakhs, as a result of the rise in oil-royalties. 
Rs. 12,00,000 were allocated to the Reserve Fund. The chief headings 
under Public Works included 1,30,000 for the construction of the new 
palace, and 80,000 for the new hospital. The total estimate for Public 
Works and repairs to roads and buildings was computed at 5»6 8,000 lakhs. 
In drawing up the new budget the Adviser took into his consideration 
the Agent*s earlier suggestions, especially the one for building up the 
reserves. Having examined the budget, the Agent wrote to the Resident:
"In examining the Budget now presented in the light of my Note 
of 22nd November 1937 in regard to the formation of a Reserve 
Fund, I find that the programme postulated for that Fund has 
been fully provided for.’'^
1357 was described by the Agent as most satisfactory financially, 
because the actual receipts exceeded the anticipated revenue, enabling 
the State to increase its Reserve by a further 19 lakhs, considerably 
more than was expected. Allowances to the Ruling Family increased 
greatly because the total revenue from oil was greater than expected, 
and as has been noted earlier one third of the oil revenue was paid 
directly to the Privy Purse. Expenditure on Public Protection was
increased as a result of an addition to the strength of the Police made 
at the time of the agitation, and also the purchase of new equipment. 
Savings were also made in Public Health, chiefly because the hospital 
was not finished before the end of the year, and in Public Works because 
of temporary postponement of the plan for a new Palace for the Shaikh.
By the end of the year Revenue exceeded estimates by roughly six lakhs 
and expenditure (excluding the Reserve) exceeded estimates by one lakh,
1 Government of Bahrain Budget for 1357* I.O.R. 15/2/197*
2 Weightman to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/197? No. C/323-Vr1» 
19-5.1938.
243
and the State's invested Revenue amounted to Rs. 40 lakhs.
The Customs revenue dropped from 11,58,547 lakhs in 1938 to
10,56,532 in 1939* This was largely because of a decline in receipts
from transit duty on shipments to the mainland from 2,19*942 rupees in
1938 to 1,03,650 in 1939- This was because of the opening of a port
at Ras Tannura and the direct shipment there of equipment to the
2California Arabia Standard Oil Company.
Total expenditure in 1358 (1939-40) exceeded estimates. The actual
expenditure was 3 6,75*000 rupees whereas the estimate was 31*41,000.
The excess was attributed mainly to the donation of four lakhs of rupees
by Shaikh Hamad to the British Government as a contribution to the cost
of the War. Besides, there was a huge consignment of rice, purchased
by the State as a special war time measure, half of which was sold to the
public during the year, and the rest valued at Rs. 1,36,000, was in State 
3custody. Expenditure on Public Protection exceeded estimates by 
Rs. 41,000, The oil royalty surpassed the estimated sum and, as a 
result, the Ruler's share was more than what was originally provided in 
the budget for the year. In spite of increased expenditure, it was 
possible to augment the Reserve Fund by a further ten lakhs of rupees. 
Allowances to the Ruling Family totalled 15*16,662 out of which 10,78,427 
was the Ruler's one-third share, and 4,38,235 was the payment to the 
Civil List. The cost of public works was estimated at Rs. 7*70*600 but 
the actual expenditure amounted to 6,35*300 rupees. Rs. 59*000 were 
paid in 1358 towards the cost of the Manamah-Moharraq Swing Bridge, whose 
contract price was 3*82,000 rupees. In the budget estimates, only three 
lakhs were allocated for the Bridge. Expenditure on the Hospital
1 Weightman to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/197* No. C/456-4/1, 26.7.1939*
2 A.R.P.A. 1939* op. cit.
3 For control and supply of foodstuffs during the Second World War see 
Chapter Eight.
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buildings amounted to Rs. 2,35i000. The extension of the Manamah 
pier cost the State 1,01,588 rupees. Besides, there were various other
'I
smaller items carried out under Public Works.
In the 1359 budget (19^-^'D revenue was forecast at ^5»07»0Q0 
rupees, but the actual revenue amounted to -^9 *0 1 ,^ 9 9i an excess of 
Rs* four lakhs approximately over the estimated amount. The actual 
revenue in 1358 was ^+5*78,765 rupees, Rs. 3t22,73^ less than 1359- 
The State revenue was increased during 1359 by receipts of Rs. 5i61,972, 
being the payment made by the Bahrain Petroleum Company on signing the 
oil concession over the additional area and the price derived by the 
Government from the sale of rice bought in 1358. Customs revenue dropped 
by more than one and a half lakhs in 1359 in comparison with 1358, and 
oil royalties were 8 2,8^3 less than 1358, due to shortage of tankers 
during the War. During the year over 16^ - lakhs of rupees were added to 
the Reserve Fund and invested in War Loan. The actual total expenditure 
for 13591 excluding the amount paid in the Reserve Fund, amounted to 
29i'1^>372 lakhs. The Civil List and the Rulerfs one third of the oil 
revenue amounted to about 50% of the total expenditure. Rs. 6,21,000 
were allotted during the year for Special Public Works, whereas the actual 
expenditure was Rs. 3*18,000. The reduction was occasioned by the fact 
that the Manamah-Moharraq bridge, due for completion during the year, was 
not yet finished. The women's hospital was completed and opened on 25th 
May 19^0, and the men's hospital was opened a few months later. The 
total cost of the men's hospital including electric, water and sanitary 
installations amounted to 1,32,000 rupees. The nurses' lodgings and the 
Lady Medical Officer's flat and Matron's flat cost approximately 86,000 
rupees. The two hospitals provided beds for 100 patients and possibly 
more in case of emergency. The building of the Technical School
1 Belgrave: Note on Expenditure 1358. I.O.R. 15/2/197-
2*1
Workshop* which was still in progress, cost the State 13,000 rupees.
In March 19^, the Adviser communicated with the Agent over the
Q
allowances of the Shaikh's two sons, Du aij and Ahmad. The Shaikh 
wanted to have their names added to the Civil List instead of drawing 
their salaries from his one-third of oil royalties. This arrangement, 
which excluded the two sons from the Civil List, was made in 1358
(1939-4-0) when Shaikh Hamad's revenue exceeded 13 lakhs, sufficient to
2
meet any extras in the allowances of the Ruling Family.
In April of the same year, the Agent informed the Resident of Shaikh
Hamad's objection to the payment of his sons' allowances from his share of
the oil royalties, and added:
?,At the time when the agreement was negotiated that he should 
retain one-third of the oil money and pass two-thirds to the 
State I am pretty certain that no one anticipated that royalties 
would reach their present total. I think I am right in saying 
that Bahrain was expected to produce somewhere round 10,000 
barrels of crude oil daily whereas it has averaged about double 
in the last three years and will probably continue at a rate 
between 18,000 and 20,000 for many years to come. My own 
feeling is that sooner or later we ought to get the Shaikh, 
whoever he may be, to reduce his own share to one-fifth ...
... we do not want this one-third and two-thirds proportion to 
continue for ever, partly because it is wrong in principle for us 
to connive at waste and partly because there will sooner or later
be trouble about it in Bahrain.’’
Early in 19^1 Shaikh Hamad asked for an increase in his allowance
justifying his demand by his growing expenditure. Belov/ is how the
Adviser reported the matter to the Agent:
" ... when oil revenue began to come in there was a discussion
with the Political Agent, Colonel Loch, at which Shaikh Hamad and 
the Senior Shaikhs and myself were present where it was agreed 
that one third of the future oil royalty should be paid to the 
Ruler's Privy Purse, in addition to the Civil List. It was 
also agreed that the Civil List should not be increased. This 
arrangement has been in force till now and in the beginning 
Shaikh Hamad was satisfied with the amount which he received.
1 Belgrave: Revenue and Expenditure 1359- I.O.R. 15/2/198.
2 Belgrave to Weightman. I.O.R. 15/2/197* 25*3.19^0.
3 Weightman to Colonel Prior. I.O.R. 15/2/197, No. C/285-Vl. 6.^. 
19^0.
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Shaikh Hamad now appears to believe that the arrangement which 
was made was that he should have one third, the family should 
have the other third and the rest would be spent on the State.
The senior Shaikhs suggest that if he had two more lakhs he
would not ask for the whole of the second third.
The matter was referred to the Resident and in early April 1941 he
wrote to the Shaikh reminding him that his income in 1351 (1952-33),
before the advent of oil royalties, was 1,6 5 ,0 0 0 rupees and that they
kept growing since then until they reached 12,9 3 ,0 0 0 in 1359, i.e. an
increase of more than seven times. He added:
"As you are aware in India Rulers restrict themselves and their 
families to 10% of the country's income whereas in this State 
Your Highness and the AlKhalifah together receive 33 per cent 
of the total revenue.
Last year Your Highness and the Family received the huge sum of
Rs. 18,54,634 from the State ......  While you have grown rich
your subjects have grown poor, and owing to the decay of the 
pearl trade most of the Bahrain merchants have been ruined.
I am aware that Your Highness is not responsible for the ruin, 
but when they see a family already very wealthy crying out for 
more and more money their discontent will increase until it 
becomes dangerous ... ... I trust that the reserve of one
third will not be touched in any way, but left intact so that 
it may hold the ship of the State firm in the hour of need."^
Earlier, during March of the same year, the Resident cabled the
Government of India to tell them that he had only lately discovered that
the whole of the Bahrain State reserve shown in rupees in the annual
budgets was actually held in sterling and that it amounted to over
66 lakhs. Also the Shaikh's private fortune of 12 lakhs was in sterling
deposits, and that reserve in a currency which was subject to exchange
rate depreciation was undesirable. He went on to say that the Shaikh
would expect the Government of India, at whose insistence the Reserves
3
had been built up, to make up for any losses that might occur as a result.
1 See Translation of the Shaikh's letter dated 13th Safar 1360, attached
to Belgrave's communication to Major Alban, P.A. *I.O.R. 15/2/19S,
7.2.1941.
2 Colonel Prior to His Highness Shaikh Sir Hamad bin Isa AlKhalifah.
I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. 183-S, 10.4.1941.
3 Telegram from Prior to the Government of India. I.O.R. 15/2/198,
No. T/113, 23.3.1941.
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Shortly afterwards the Adviser wrote to the Reserve Bank of India 
requesting the transfer of the Reserve Fund from England, and its 
investment in Government of India securities, preferably, those that 
were exempt from taxation.
The revenue for 13&0 (19^1-4-2) was estimated at about 10 lakhs less
than 1339- Royalty from oil was estimated at 25^ - lakhs, and receipts
from Customs at about two lakhs less than the previous year. The
reason for this cautious budgetting was, according to the Adviser, (a)
the reduction in the activities of the California Arabian Standard Oil
Company, (b) increased import trade of Kuwait, and (c) the rise of
unemployment in Bahrain, factors which would adversely affect the import
trade of Bahrain# The Civil List plus the Ruler*s one third of the
oil royalty was forecast at 12,90,000 rupees. Expenditure on Public
Health was increased over 1359 on account of special anti-malaria
measures, quarantine services, and the likelihood of hospitals now having
2to operate at full capacity. The estimate for Public Protection was 
also increased on account of the newly created Special Police for the 
protection of the refinery and oil fields. In fact, this Force was 
established, as mentioned earlier, after the Italian air-raid on the 
refinery on 19th October 19^ *0. Over six lakhs of rupees were allocated
1 Belgrave to the Reserve Bank of India. I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. 78VW.L., 
IO.5 .I9VI.
2 The A.R.P.A. for 19^2 mentions facilities for the R.A.F. at the new 
State Hospital, via. ”With the approval of His Highness the Shaikh 
of Bahrain accommodation for R.A.F. and other Service personnel was 
prepared in the State Hospital, and the new facilities were completed 
by October 1st (19^2). The R.A.F., who paid for the construction of 
a new ward, also supplied an R.A.F. Medical Officer and four nursing 
sisters.” See A.R.P.A. 19^2, op. cit.
3 The Special Police Force were recruited and trained by the Bahrain
Government, and they were under the command of the Defence Officer, 
responsible for the Protection of the refinery and other oil 
installations. They were paid for by the Bahrain Government. See
Belgrave’s Annual Report to the Agent, No. 5&-9A, op. cit. In 19^1
the Adviser’s account of this force read: ”This force consists of
150 N.G.O.s and men. The services of the Iraqi N.C.O.s were
dispensed with soon after the Iraq rebellion. A number of British 
N.C.O.s from the Indian Police were obtained from India.” See 
Belgrave’s Annual Report to the Agent, No. 81-9-A, op. cit.
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for the Reserve Fund. The non-recurrent expenditure on Public Works
for the year included completion of the surgery building in the Hospital,
the Manamah-Moharraq Swing Bridge which was opened by Shaikh Hamad on
18th December 19^ -1 and the new Technical School. In brief, priority
1
was given to what the Adviser called the building up of the reserve.
When Shaikh Hamad's death occurred on 20th February 19^2, his
2
eldest son Shaikh Salman became Ruler. He continued to receive one
3third of the oil royalty in the same manner as his father before him.
During 19^3 the Government of India demanded clarifications in
respect of variations in the figures affecting the budgets for 1360, 1361 
- ^
and 1362. In reply the Adviser submitted the following comparison and 
5notes:
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/19 8, No. 619-21, 17.*u 19^1.
2 Salman acceded to the Rulership of Bahrain by the will of his father 
who died at the age of about seventy. On April 6th, 19^2 a public 
Durbar was held at the Palace in Manamah during which Colonel W.R. 
Hay, the then Resident, presented to Shaikh Salman a Kharita from
H.E. the Viceroy which marked the Government of India's formal 
recognition of his succession. A.R.P.A. 19^2, op. cit.
3 Agent to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. C/187, 11.2.19^3.
Hickinbotham to the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/19 8, No. C/1363, 
15.10.19^3.




Oil Royalty 2 5,50 ,000 2 6,0 0 ,0 0 0 2 6,00 ,000
Customs 6 ,75 ,000 7 ,0 0 ,0 0 0 6 ,10,000
Interest of Reserve 2 ,35 ,000 2 ,6 2 ,0 0 0 2 ,5 0 ,0 0 0
Other Receipts and Taxes 1,04,000 1 ,38 ,0 0 0 1 ,97 ,000
Suspense Account
(Proceeds from Sales of 
Foodstuffs) 7,73,000
35,64,000 3 7 ,0 0 ,0 0 0 4 4 ,30 ,000
EXPENDITURE
Ruling Family 12,90,000 1 2,92 ,000 12,91 ,000
Administration 3 ,38 ,800 3,34,000 4,01,000
Public Health 2 ,52 ,200 2,64,000 3 ,18,000
Public Protection 4,15,000 4,00,000 5 ,28 ,000
Education 1,32,300 2,40,000 2 ,60 ,000
Public Works 3,86,300 69 ,0 0 0 90 ,000
Municipalities 60,400 61 ,0 0 0 51 ,000
Unforeseen, Agriculture, etc. 80 ,000 60 ,0 0 0 67 ,000
To Reserve Fund 6 ,09 ,000 9 ,80 ,000 6 ,16,000
Poor Relief - - 35 ,000
Suspense Account
(For Purchase of Food 
Supplies)
7,73,000
35,64,000 3 7 ,0 0 ,0 0 0 4 4,30 ,0 0 0
He explained the variations in Customs revenue on account of 
uncertain trade due to war conditions, and to the reduction almost by 
half of receipts from pearling licenses and their suspension in 1362*
As regards interest on Reserve the estimate for 1361 included the 
interest due on the Reserve plus interest for six months - in the second
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half of 1361 - on Rs. 9,80,000 which should have been added to the 
Eeserve in 1361, but was instead set aside for the purchase of foodstuffs.
Also on the revenue side 55,000 rupees were expected to accrue to the 
State from hospital fees in 1362, and 30,000 from Bridge tolls in 1361, 
in addition to smaller receipts from various other sources.
On the expenditure side, pensions were paid to non-members of the 
Ruling Family during 1360 and 1361 which were added to the Civil List.
The cost of Administration in 1360 was about 25,000 rupees less than the 
budgetted amount. This increase in cost was taken into consideration 
in the allotment for Administration in 1361. During 1362 the amount 
was increased as a result of War Allowances, higher cost of transport 
fares, stationery, etc., and the maintenance of the Food Department, 
lately started under the Customs Department.
Expenditure on Public Health was expected to cost more and therefore 
the estimate for 1362 was increased by 5^ ,000 to cover the rise in the 
cost of food, drugs, etc. In 1361 the actual amount spent on Public 
Protection was *f,31,000 rupees. The extra expenditure was due to the 
rise in the price of foodstuffs for the State forces and to the higher 
cost of uniforms and equipment. In 1362 the allocations contained
6 5 .0 0 0 rupees for new equipment.
The allocations for Education were 1,32,000 in 1360, and the actual 
expenditure was 1,57,000. In 1361, the allocation was increased v/ith a 
view to the purchase of tools and equipment for the Technical School at
35.000 rupees, furniture and equipment for Boys and Girls* Schools at
18,000. The allotment for 1362 was increased owing to transfer to a 
larger Secondary School, and a larger hostel, expansions made to certain 
village schools, war allowances for the staff, and the enhanced cost of 
text-books and materials used in the Schools.
1 Ibid.
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The revenue for 1363 (1944-45) was estimated at 40 lakhs, the actual 
revenue in 1362 amounted to 47 lakhs. The expenditure for 1363 was 
estimated at 3 5*3 0 ,0 0 0 lakhs, and the actual expenditure in 1362 was 
33»29*000* A surplus of 4,70,000 was expected in the revenue for 1363
which was destined to be added to the Reserve Fund, Oil royalty for 
the year was budgetted at 26,25 lakhs, and revenue from the Customs at
8.50 lakhs. Lately, the income from the Reserve Fund occupied the
third largest source of revenue for the State amounting to 2.75 lakhs. 
Although Customs receipts were estimated at 8.50 lakhs in 1362, the 
actual receipts amounted to about 14 lakhs.
In preparing the budget for 1362, the Adviser anticipated a serious
drop in Bahrain*s revenue from the Customs owing to the prevailing War
conditions, which brought about shipping difficulties and trade 
restrictions. Contrary to his expectations, Customs revenue increased 
during the year as a result of the rise in the prices of the imported 
commodities, and also the enhanced volume of food supplies imported via 
Bahrain for other Gulf States. Revenue also included interest from the 
Reserve Fund of 91*41,000 lakhs at 3%. Besides there were smaller 
receipts from the medical services, Land registration fees, judicial fees, 
etc. There was a Suspense Account of Rs. 7*73,000 in the budget for 
1362 which was the value of the food supplies held by the Government at 
the end of the year.
The expenditure in 1363 was forecast at over 35 lakhs, the actual 
expenditure in 1362 was 33 lakhs. The allowances to the Ruling Family 
absorbed 13 lakhs which again constituted more than one third of the total 
estimated expenditure. In previous years large sums were spent abroad 
on the purchase of building materials, motor vehicles, and of the entire 
super-structure and machinery for opening the Manamah-Moharraq Bridge, 
also called Shaikh Hamad1s Bridge. Expenditure in the 1363 budget was 
expected to be utilized almost entirely locally.
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Rs. i^-,50,000 were allocated for expenditure on Government
Departments, and this represented an increase of half a lakh over the
actual expenditure in 1362. There was an increase in the cost of
running the Food Control Department and in the war allowances introduced
for the benefit of Government employees in the second half of 1362, and
in wages and annual increments which contributed to the greater cost of
the Administration. The allotment for Education was increased by one
lakh over 1362. Defence and Protection cost the State about 6 -^ lakhs,
and was even likely to cost more. In 1362 the State sustained a loss
of 5 6 ,5 0 0 rupees over the sale of food supplies to the public at cost 
1
price.
The 1363 budget elicited a number of remarks from Major T. 
Hickinbotham, P.A., who was critical of the Adviser’s unduly cautious 
budget estimates. He told the Resident that the revenue figures were 
implausibly underestimated. He believed that expenditure was 
exaggerated by the inclusion of projects in the budget which would never 
be carried out owing to shortage of material during the War, and to the 
difficulty in finding trained personnel for Government appointments.
To quote but a few items to which the Agent alluded, the actuals, he 
wrote, for the previous year 1362 under Customs receipts amounted to 
Rs. 13,96,500, while the Adviser*s estimate was for Rs. 6,10,000. In 
the new budget, i.e. 1363, the Adviser estimated 8,60,000 rupees in 
Customs revenue, apparently expecting a decrease on last year’s actuals 
of 5,36,500 rupees. The import duty was levied on the value of the 
goods imported and not on the quantity, and the Agent expected a further 
rise in prices. The Adviser budgetted revenue at J>&% less than the 
actual for previous year and this, he wrote, v/as unnecessarily cautious.
He agreed with the Adviser in that there was a general rise in
1 Belgrave: Budget 1363. I.O.R. 15/2/198.
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expenditure owing to War allowances and other causes owing to the
unsettled state of the world in general.
During December 19^, the Secretary to the Government of India wrote
about the Governments satisfaction with the '’successful manner" in which
the affairs of Bahrain had been handled during the year and added:
"They would, however, invite attention to the fact that the
allowances of the Ruling family absorb a proportion of the 
total revenues of the State which is higher than is generally
considered appropriate .........  the Government of India trust
that you (i.e. the Resident) will lose no opportunity of 
impressing upon His Highness the desirability and importance 
of reducing his personal expenditure and the scale of 
allowances of his family as soon as this becomes possible.
The Resident believed that the time was not right for suggesting
any reductions in the Privy Purse, lest it gave rise to requests for
more funds. In a letter to the Government he wrote:
"It must be remembered that the Royal Family in Bahrain now 
receive almost exactly the same amounts they drew in 19^1 , 
although the cost of living has trebled, and, since their 
financial position has obviously greatly deteriorated they 
would consider it most inequitable to be asked at this stage 
to exist on smaller stipends.
I would also deprecate analogies being drawn from Indian States 
and applied to the Persian Gulf, where they have little 
relevance. Colonel Barrett ... stated in 1927 or 1928 when 
the late Shaikh Hamad was malting one of his periodical demands 
for money, that the AlKhalifah considered that the revenues of 
the State belonged to them, and that any portion they 
surrendered for the use of the administration must be regarded 
as an act of grace. This position still exists in Kuwait, 
with which the Bahrain Family could appropriately compare 
themselves, and also in Saudi Arabia to whom, and not to an 
Indian State, their eyes would naturally turn. It is 
impossible to move:* very far in advance of public opinion in 
these States, and so far as I know the handsome allowances 
paid to the AlKhalifah are regarded rather as a tribute to our 
administrative ability than an oppression which should be 
alleviated! In fact, if I were to attempt to reduce the 
allowances now, there is not the slightest doubt that I should 
be accused of starving the Ruling Family, and that widespread 
indignation would be aroused.
1 Hickinbotham to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. C/525, 
23.3.19^.
2 W.E. Richardson to the Resident. I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. D/I826I-ME/ 
¥k, 2 1.12.19^ .
... in an Indian State the main source of income is land 
revenue, which is levied at an exceptionally high rate, and it 
is only reasonable that the Royal Family should content them­
selves with 10 or 15 per cent of it. In Bahrain, however, the 
position is entirely different. There is no land revenue or 
zakat, and the main source of revenue contributed by the public 
is a very light customs duty. As is well known, their wealth 
arises from their mineral possessions, and in ensuring that only 
one third of this falls into the hands of the Royal Family, I 
feel that a very great deal has already been achieved. In 
actual fact there is no shortage of money whatever in Bahrain 
and the real problem is not as it formerly was, how to save 
money, but the happier one of spending it wisely."^
Receipts for the year 1364 (1945-46) were estimated at 48 lakhs and
expenditure at 38 lakhs. There was a surplus in revenue of ten lakhs
of rupees, allocated to the Reserve Fund. Royalty from oil was estimated
at 27 lakhs, and Customs receipts at 15,60,000 rupees. Interest on
State Reserve Fund was expected to reach 3,20,000 rupees. Estimates
of lesser receipts included: medical 45,000, Land revenue 31,000,
Education 19,000, Vehicle Taxes 25,000, Passport 10,000, Judicial fees
20.000, Bridge Tolls 20,000.
On the expenditure side allowances to the Ruling Family, which 
comprised one third of the oil-royalty plus the Civil List, amounted to
13.20.000, State Departments 3,03,000, Education 4,19,000, Public Health
4.72.000. The latter two items were increased by about one lakh each 
over 1363 estimates. Expenditure on Defence and Protection amounted to
8.00.000. Public Works allocation was 1,95,000 and the Municipalities
87 ,000  rupees.^
The budget attracted criticism from the Agent who wrote that the 
Adviser's chief objective was to save a certain sum on money regardless 
of the needs of the State and the requirements of "forward planning to 
meet post war conditions". He wrote:
1 Sir G. Prior to the Secretary to the Government of India. I.O.R. 
15/2/198, No. 172-S, 6.2.1945.
2 Belgrave: Note on the 1364 Budget. I.O.R. 15/2/198.
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"What stands out above everything else is the extra-ordinary 
fact that the State has succeeded in saving no less than 
Rs. 15j92,000 during the 5th year of the World War and this in 
spite of very considerable increases in expenditure. Almost 
as astounding is the Adviser's forecast for a saving of 
Rs. 10,00,000 on the working of the present year ...
I feel strongly that the policy of saving at the expense of 
well-being of the population and the material progress of the 
State which has been followed in the last three Bahrain 
Government budgets is neither reasonable nor correct. It is 
true that owing to war conditions materials for building and 
other purposes have not been available, but unfortunately it is 
equally true that there is a tendency to cloak inertia with the 
excuse that progress is impossible owing to war conditions.
Not only can progress be made at the present time but plans can 
be thought out for post-war expansion and estimates can be 
worked out for improvements which will be profitable to the 
people ... ... Unfortunately I see no sign of any desire on
the part of the Bahrain Government to improve living and working 
conditions in the country rather they incline more and more to 
the unhealthy accumulation of a large reserve."^
In his recommendations the Agent emphasized the need for employing
a qualified European Engineer for the Public Works Department, aided by
adequate staff to plan the chief towns Manamah and Moharraq, to improve
the narrow thoroughfares, to carry out repairs to the roads and to provide
a water borne sewage system. He even advocated the replacement of the
"antiquated and inadequate" power plant by a more powerful one to meet
the increasing demand for electric current. He concluded:
"Bahrain must be prepared to meet possible competition from 
neighbouring ports especially the new Saudi Arabian port of 
Ras Tannura. The best and only way to this is for the Customs 
Department to make this (Manamah) port more attractive than 
others by providing better and cheaper facilities and a more 
efficient and less officious administration than possible 
competitors ... "
Owing to the selection of Bahrain to become a centre for air travel 
and the anticipated increase in these services, he recommended the 
construction of a modern hotel to be built jointly by the State and the 
British Overseas Airways Corporation.
1 Hickinbotham to Prior. I.O.R. 15/2/198, No. C/595, 21.3.19^5*
2 Ibid.
2^6
Shortly afterwards, the Resident communicated with the Government
of India urging the adoption of a less conservative financial policy in
Bahrain. Contrary to earlier belief, oil was expected to last longer,
and Bahrain's financial reserves already exceeded the 100 lakhs, he wrote.
His final recommendation to the Government was for her to request the
Adviser to initiate a more forward policy. To this effect he noted;
" ... it has become clear to me that the attitude of the Financial 
Adviser, Mr. Belgrave, to any new proposal is unduly cautious.
He is still, to my mind, guided by his recollection of his early 
years in Bahrain when the most rigid economy was essential and 
he has failed to adapt himself to the era of abounding prosperity 
in which he now finds himself. I was surprised to find, for 
example, that when the last heavy rains occurred in Bahrain all 
the roads of the Capital became impassable, and still more 
surprised to see in his own annual report that persons had died 
of starvation in a State with near a half a million pounds in the 
bank."^
After the reorganization of the Customs in 1923t Bahrain's finances 
were planned in a co-ordinated manner for the first time in the country's 
modern history. Bahrain's import-export trade expanded as a result, 
and the annual receipts from the Customs, which were the chief source of 
revenue for the State before the arrival of oil, improved considerably.
From about nine lakhs of rupees collected in 13^ (1925-26), Customs 
receipts increased to more than ten and a half lakhs in 13^7 (1928-29).
The only time when revenue dropped was during the recession of the early 
1930s, and particularly in 1931 when receipts fell to five lakhs of rupees, 
the lowest income recorded throughout the period of this study.
The world economic recession adversely affected Bahrain's general 
trade and left the country's economy in a bad condition. Job opport­
unities were reduced sharply giving rise to high unemployment among the 
country's labour population. V/ith revenue falling short of expenditure 
for a number of years, the country had to offset its deficits by drawing
1 Prior to Secretary to the Government of India. I.O.R. 15/2/198, 
No. 395-S, 20.if. 19^ 5.
from the Reserve Fundi which by the end of 1351 (1932-33) had shrunk to 
two and a half lakhs. Even then the cost of the Civil List amounted 
to about half or more of the State's total annual expenditure. The 
pearl-trade of Bahrain never recovered from the impact of the slump, and 
the diving industry's fortunes deteriorated year after year as a result 
of the spread of the cultured Japanese pearls and falling sales and 
markets. As a result many bankruptcies occurred among pearlers and 
merchants. Agriculture presented an area of some hope which if 
developed adequately could have proved beneficial to Bahrain, but neither 
the public nor the private sectors were prepared to undertake sustained 
development projects, and investment in this area was much less than 
was required. As soon as oil was discovered in 1932, agriculture was 
quickly relegated to a subordinate position.
From 1935 the State began to receive royalties from the new industry 
and in 1936 these amounted to nearly 18 lakhs of rupees while receipts 
from the Customs were just over eight lakfes for that year. Within two 
years of oil exploration therefore revenue from petroleum was twice as 
much as receipts from the traditional source of State revenues. The 
equation whereby the Ruling Family was permitted to receive directly one- 
third of the royalties had unforeseen results for the State. As the 
royalties increased over the years, the allocations to the Civil List 
grew accordingly, not to mention the fact that some members of the Ruling 
Family also received salaries from their posts in the State. In reality 
their share of oil-wealth went much beyond what was originally intended.
In this way the industry provided them with financial power which had 
previously been the domain of the pearlers and merchants and this further 
strengthened the political dominance of the Ruling Family.
Oil-money undoubtedly injected nev; life into the Bahraini economy.
It also raised the hopes of the ordinary people and gave rise to 
frustrations when those hopes were not realized and the new wealth poured
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into the coffers of the Rulers. True the industry provided employment 
to Bahrainis, but the majority of the ordinary people, including the 
cultivators, remained outside the new wealth. The events of 1938 which 
culminated in the call for reforms were but one expression of that latent 
feeling of resentment.
Unduly pessimistic forecasts about the future of oil were made in 
1938, in consequence of which a yet more cautious budgetting policy was 
put into practice with the aim of building up Bahrain’s Reserves to ensure 
its future needs. The prediction was, however, erroneous and royalties 
multiplied from over six lakhs in 1935 to thirty-one lakhs in 19^5 - 
The State’s financial reserves grew from four lakhs at the end of 1355 
(1936-57) to over one hundred lakhs by 19^5* In. 1357 (1938-39) alone, 
twelve lakhs of rupees were allocated to the Reserve Fund out of an 
estimated annual revenue of forty-two lakhs. When the War ended and the 
target of one hundred lakhs in the Reserve Fund v/as achieved a less 
conservative and more dynamic policy with regard to expenditure was 
approved by the Government of India aiming to provide for the requirements 
of the post-war development.
It should be noted, however, that much of the later prosperity of 
Bahrain was founded upon the principles of annual budgets and accounts 
which were introduced in the early 1920s. No other local Arab State took 
such a step towards modernity at that time. Those reforms helped to 
create an orderly economic climate and they had begun to stimulate 
progress in banking, transport and shipping services before the arrival 
of the oil industry. In this respect too Bahrain was ahead of the 
other Shaikhdoms of the Gulf and it is not surprising that this helped 
to enhance its regional importance as a centre for transit.trade and, 
later, for air travel. While oil income quickly became the primary 
source of state and royal revenue the importance of traditional commerce 
should not be forgotten.
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1926-27 9 ,6 2 ,0*f1
13**6




1931 5 ,0 9 ,0 0 0
1932 6,1*f,59**
1933 5,53,393










I9*f*f 2 1,06 ,806
19*1-5 2 5,98 ,098
Source: Director of Customs Annual Reports
Total Value of Cargo Transhipped at Bahrain for the Mainland 
In Selected Years
Year Value Duty Collected
1345
July 1926 - June 1927 33,50,900 6 7 ,0 1 8
1346
July 1927 - June 1928 36,56,350 73,127
13*1-7
June 1928 - May 1929 37,04,800 74,096





1937 5 9 ,0 2 ,1 8 0 1,08,561
1938 1,2 3 ,8 1 ,164 2,19,942
1939 56,75,350 1,0 3 ,6 5 0
19*K) 51,46,214 92,919
19*f1 42,23,214 75,230
Source: Director of Customs Annual Reports
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1931 1,0^,61 ,880 66,58,340
1932 1,0 5,82 ,710 63,99,560
1933 91,94,300 6 6,78 ,100
1934 92,03,930 59,53,920
1935 1,20,93,400 9 1,67 ,0 7 0
1936 1 ,7 8,43 ,7 6 0 1,15,46,090
1937 6,31,200 (Sic.)^ 17,25,720 (Sic.)^
1938 1,56,53,076 88,23,156
1939 1,66,47,330 8 1,08 ,9 6 0
Source: Annual Customs Reports plus Agency Reports
Export figures above include estimated value of pearls.
(a) Import/Export figures for 1937 are quoted as provided by the 
Agency Report for that year, despite their apparent lack of 
accuracy.
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Chapter Eight 
The Background to the Years 1930-19^3
The Administration and Bahrain's Relations with Iran
The rise of Persian nationalist sentiment during the 1920s was 
accompanied by a revival of the Persian claim to Bahrain. In 1928 the 
Anglo-Iranian negotiations for a general treaty settlement began and 
reached a deadlock by 1932, the year during which the Imperial Airways 
route was transferred from the Persian to the Arabian littoral. (See 
Introduction.)
In 1929 Tehran alleged that the Persians in Bahrain were subjected
to maltreatment by the local authorities. This allegation was in fact
rooted in the earlier relations between the two countries, a brief account
of which will help clarify the matter. In April 1923j the Persian
Majlis passed a bill conferring upon Bahrainis the right to send a
1
representative to that assembly. Three months later, the Persian Vice-
Consul at Najaf issued a proclamation calling upon Bahrainis in that
2
place to register their names and obtain Persian passports. These 
attempts by Tehran were calculated to undermine the authority of the 
Shaikh of Bahrain, to give substance to their claim, and also to challenge 
the British position there. In rebutting the Persian pretensions in 
respect of Bahrain, British officials invariably stressed the independent 
status of the Shaikh, and argued their case on geographical and ethnic 
evidence, as the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did in 
May 1928 in his reply to the Persian protest over Article VI of the 
Treaty of Jeddah:
1 L. Oliphant to U.S.S.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^1, No. E 397V67/91 *
20.A.1923.
2 Telegram from Resident to the British Minister, Tehran. I.O.R. L/P
+s/io/io*n, No. 1A7/7 1 1, 18.7 .1923.
" ... the islands are not part of Persia, nor are the inhabitants 
of Persian race."^
In March 1928, a couple of months before the League of Nations
debated the Anglo-Persian controversy over Bahrain, Shaikh Isa deputed
the British Government "to defend Bahrain from outside interference and
to rebut the claim of the Persian Government to sovereignty over Bahrain 
2
Islands". Also, during the year boys from the Persian School paraded
through the streets of Manamah with a band and flags singing their
national anthem. The local authorities saw the parade as a provocative
act tending to create ill-feeling between Persians and Arabs, and they
ordered the headmaster of the Persian School to stop such parades, which
3
he did. However, the Persians reported the matter to Tehran and
representations were made to the Resident by the Governor of the Persian
kGulf ports in Bushire.
The Persian passport regulations of 1928 required all Bahrainis who
settled in Iran or those of them travelling to that place to carry Persian
travel documents. It was against this action by the Persian authorities
that the Administration in Bahrain retaliated by imposing the need for
British visas upon Persians travelling to Bahrain. Early in 1929j
several Persians were refused entry into Bahrain on account of their
5
failure to obtain visas. Shortly afterwards the Government of Bahrain 
issued a proclamation that all persons born in Bahrain of foreign parents 
would, unless registered at the Agency, be considered as Bahrain subjects. 1
Q
The Persian community in Bahrain comprised both Sunnis and Shi ahs.
1 The League of Nations Official Journal, No. 5? May 1928, pp. 605-07*
2 Shaikh Isa to the P.A. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^1, 22nd Ramadan 13^ +6
(15-3.1928).
3 A.R.P.A. 1928, op. cit.
h Barrett to Sir R. Clive. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^5, 8.11.1929*
5 Telegram from Clive to the P.O. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/10^1, No. 6 6 ,
11.2.1929.
6 Government of Bahrain, Proclamation. I.O.R. 15/2/150, No. 1101/17/
13^7, 17th Ramadan 13V? (27.2.1929).
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The former constituted a smaller group but they were the more influential
since their ranks included a number of leading merchants, who enjoyed the
trust of the Shaikh and the Administration, The latter were numerically
superior but wielded very little influence. There were a few well-known
merchants amongst them but the majority were small shopkeepers, owners of
tea-houses, manual workers and taxi-drivers. The relations of the
Persians with the local Arabs were to a large extent influenced by the
religious sect to which they belonged in that the Sunni among them
maintained closer links with the Ruler and with the Sunni Arabs of Bahrain,
the Shi ah similarly showed sympathy with their Arab co-religionists,
A review of the position of the Persians carried out by the Agent
in the wake of the allegations that they were maltreated in Bahrain
revealed their privileged' status. They had representatives on Majlis
al- Urf, the Municipalities, and the Police. They were allowed to
acquire property, to have their own schools, to conduct trade and to carry
out their religious processions during the month of Moharram, The only
real grievance which the Persians had was the passport restrictions which
1
caused disruption to their trade, according to the Agent.
In 1930, Tehran protested against the granting of the oil concession
by the Shaikh on the ground that Bahrain being Persian territory neither
the Shaikh nor His Majesty's Government had any right to grant such a 
2
concession. In 1932 the Persian Government again protested to the 
British Government against the issue of British Indian postage stamps
3surcharged 'Bahrain', and repeated their protest at the League of Nations. 
Also, during the same year the Baharnah of Mohammarah sent two petitions
1 Prior to Barrett. Note on the Persian Communities at Bahrain.
I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1045, 4.11.1929.
2 Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister at 
Tehran. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1045, No. 11650/710-1214, 23.7.1930.
3 Fowle to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. L/P+S/10/1045, No. 784-S, 17.10.1932.
to the Administration in Bahrain complaining that they were being forced
to renounce their nationality, threatened with forcible conscription into
1
the Persian army, and made to wear a foreign head-dress. Their ill- 
treatment earlier in 1929 bad produced a rift between the Persians of
Bahrain and the Shi°ah Arabs there to a point where "... the two
. . 2communities have little in common now". Following the above petitions
both Shaikh Hamad and the Adviser agreed to a number of retaliatory
measures which were submitted to the Agent for his consideration. These
included the exclusion of the Persians of Bahrain from representation on
public bodies, subjection of their schools to the control of the Bahrain
Department of Education, and a ban on the wearing of the Pahlavi hats in 
3
Bahrain. On being acquainted with these measures, the Resident cast 
doubt over their outcome adding that "All things that are lawful are not
Ij.
expedient".
On 30th March 1933* the Government of Bahrain reissued the
proclamation of February 1929* cited earlier, which defined the status of
Persians in Bahrain as:
" ... in every way similar to that of other foreigners such as 
Iraqis, Nejdis, Omanis, Syrians and other nationalities. The 
offspring of such foreigners who are born in Bahrain are treated 
as Bahrain subjects unless they wish to retain the nationality 
of their fathers in which case they must be registered at His 
Britannic Majesty's Political Agency."^
In March 1934, the Resident informed the Government of India that 
the Shaikh's subjects in Iran were being subjected to threats of
conscription into the Persian army, their passports were confiscated by
1 Translation of a letter from Shaikh Ali bin Hasan al-Mousa of Sanabis, 
to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/486, 3rd Jamadi II, 1351 (3-10.1932).
2 A.R.P.A. 1929, op. cit.
3 Belgrave to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/486, No. 579-9A, 8.10.1932.
4 Fowle to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/486, No. 842-S, 3-11-1932.
5 Belgrave to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/150, No. C/92, 17-5-1933-
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the Persian authorities and that they were forced to accept Persian 
nationality. He estimated their numbers at 8,000 resident in the 
Ahwaz consular district which included Mohammarah. About 2,300 of them 
owned agricultural property, of the rest 5 *7 0 0, who did not own property, 
1,700 lived in Mohammarah and about 4,000 in Gusbah and adjoining 
suburbs. The property owners among them were regarded as Persian 
subjects under the Persian law, and these were not entitled to British 
protection, but the rest were entitled to it. The Resident mentioned 
the futility of earlier protests to persuade the Persian Government to 
alter its policies towards the Bahrainis and that reprisals against that 
Government had resulted in even harsher measures applied against them.
He concluded:
" ... I must point out that the benevolent rule of His Excellency 
Shaikh Hamad under which Persians flourish in Bahrain, and the 
brutal treatment which is meted out to His Excellency^ subjects 
in Persia (for the protection of whom His Majesty*s Government 
are partly responsible), form a glaring contrast to which 
H.E. Shaikh Hamad has not infrequently referred, and which has 
an adverse effect on our prestige along the Arab littoral."^
The ill-treatment of Bahrainis in Persia formed the substance of a
subsequent letter of April 1934 from the Government of India to the
Under Secretary of State for India. In it, the Government underlined
the difficulties they were facing in persuading the Persians to accept
the fseparate existence of Bahrain nationality1. Only the signing of
a general treaty with Iran, they believed, could bring about such an
admission which in the political climate then prevailing was difficult to
achieve. Finally, they concurred with the British Minister at Tehran
2
that apart from protests nothing much could be done.
During November of the year, i.e. 1934, the Resident told the
1 Fowle to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2/486, No. 2-T, 20.3.1934.
2 F.S.G.I. to U.S.S.I. I.O.R. 15/2/486, No. F 101-N/34, 7-4.1934.
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Government that the sort of reprisals he favoured for adoption against 
the Persians of Bahrain were those ”that could be turned on and off at
will”. These he specified as prohibition of ownership of land in
Bahrain by Persians, ordering those of them who own land there to acquire
Bahrain nationality within a period of two years or else to dispose of
their property if they did not wish to become Bahrain subjects. These 
measures were identical to those adopted earlier by the Persian Government 
which prohibited foreign nationals from ownership of land in Persia.
Should the Persians decide to ease their ill-treatment of Bahrainis, the 
Administration in Bahrain would then reciprocate in a like manner by 
slackening the measures adopted against the Persians, he wrote. He 
admitted that what was happening to Bahrainis in Persia was embarrassing 
to the British Government and harming the Shaikh. His Majestyfs Govern­
ment could do very little about Bahrainis who owned landed property in 
Persia by reason of the Persian Nationality Law (P.N.L.). It could act 
only on behalf of those Bahrainis who were born in Bahrain and did not 
own property in Persia but were employed there in casual occupations like 
shopkeepers, coolies, etc.
In August 1935» the India Office wrote to the Foreign Office admitting 
that nothing effective could be done with regard to Bahrainis who had 
acquired Persian nationality by virtue of the P.N.L. Nonetheless, they 
wished to protest in cases of ill-treatment of Bahrainis born in Bahrain 
and who did not own land in Persia and who were therefore not affected by
the P.N.L. This they wanted to do in order ”to avoid the appearance
2
of acquiescing in the Persian claim to Bahrain”.
Finally, in May 1937i "the Government of Bahrain issued two separate 
notices signed by Shaikh Hamad promulgating the Law Regarding Ownership of
1 T.C. Fowle to F.S.G.I. I.O.R. 15/2A86, No. 308-0, 17.11.193**.
2 M.J. Glauson, I.O., to H*L. Baggallay, F.O. I.O.R. 15/2/*+86, No.
12.8.1935.
270
Immovable Property by Foreigners, and the Bahrain Nationality Law.
Article One of the Property Law prohibited foreigners "whose governments 
banned in their respective territories the ownership of immovable 
property by persons other than their own nationals", from owning such 
property in Bahrain. This was a clear reference to the Iranian 
government. In Article Two of the Law, the government of Bahrain 
pledged to notify foreign governments whose nationals would be affected 
by the above prohibition. On receipt of such a notification, a foreign 
national was required to provide the District Court, i.e. the Political 
Agent*s Court, with a list of the immovable property which he owned not 
later than three months from the date of his notification. The law 
also stipulated the appointment of assessors both by the government and 
by the owner so that they jointly assessed the value of the property and 
reported to the District Court, etc.
The Bahrain Nationality Law consisted of five articles. Article 
Two specified the persons who under the Law were considered Bahrain 
nationals, viz. (a) all persons born in Bahrain before or after the 
issue of the said Law, (b) persons born abroad before or after the issue 
of the said Law whose fathers or paternal grandfathers were born in 
Bahrain.
Article Three defined persons who were not to be considered Bahrain 
nationals, viz. a person born in Bahrain whose father registered him as 
a foreign subject within two years of his birth, and also a child who on 
attaining the age of 18 registered himself as a foreign subject.
Article Three dealt with loss of Bahrain nationality by persons who 
already possessed it, either through acquisition of the nationality of 
another state or through an order by the Ruler of Bahrain cancelling
1 Government of Bahrain Notice: Lav/ Regarding Ownership of Immovable
Property in Bahrain by Foreigners. I.O.R. 15/2/15Ii No. 19/1356,
8 . 5 . 1937.
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their Bahrain nationality. According to Article Four a woman married 
to a Bahrain national was eligible for Bahrain nationality, and a woman 
of Bahrain nationality married to a foreigner would have lost it on 
acquiring the nationality of her husband. Finally, Article Five gave 
the Ruler the right to grant or cancel Bahrain nationality on certain 
grounds.^
On 1st November 1937, the Iranian government was notified about her
nationals in Bahrain to whom the rulings of the Property Law applied.
On 16th January 1938, the Adviser issued a proclamation reminding
Iranians resident in Bahrain to submit lists of their immovable property
2to the District Court. Only one Persian national had submitted such 
a list, the majority did not, believing that the Property Law was a bluff 
by the Bahrain government to persuade Persians to acquire Bahrain 
nationality. A major gap in the Law was that it did not provide for 
penalties for failure to abide by its rulings.
During July 1938, an amendment was made to the Property Lav/ which
read:
"If a foreigner to whom the provisions of Article (3) apply 
fails to submit a list of his property as required by Article 
A ) , the Bahrain Government may apply to the District Court 
for the valuation of the property with a view to its 
compulsory acquisition. In this case the District Court shall 
give notice to the owner of the property, who shall be permitted 
to appear and shall then determine the valuation of the 
property . . . " 3
Although Shaikh Hamad set his seal on the Amending Law on 29th
A|_
September 1938, its publication was delayed for some time. In October
1 Government of Bahrain Notice: Bahrain Nationality Law. I.O.R.
15/2/131, No. 20/1336, 8.5.1937.
2 Bahrain Government,Land Department. I.O.R. 15/2/151, Notification 
No. 957/2, A t h  Dhul Qacda 1356 (16.1.1938).
3 H. Weightman to Acting Adviser to the Bahrain Government. I.O.R. 
15/2/151, No. CA83-1.a/2*f, 27.7.1938.
4 Government of Bahrain Notice. I.O.R. 15/2/151, No. 1357, ^th
Sha°ban 1357 (29-9.1938).
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of the year the Adviser informed the Agent that Persian parents were
applying to the Land Department for registration of gifts of immovable
property in the name of their children. In this way they were dodging
the Law and were retaining the property instead of selling it. Under
the Shara Lav/ only parents administered the property of minors and
therefore continued to benefit from them as before. According to the
Nationality Law a minor born in Bahrain of Persian parents had the
option of adopting Bahrain nationality on coming of age. The Adviser
suggested that the property of these minors who might in the future
become Bahrain or Iranian subjects should be placed under the
administration of the Government's Minors Department which was controlled
by a Majlis, headed by Shaikh Salman bin Hamad A1 Khalifah.
Shortly afterwards, the Agent communicated with the Adviser
reminding him that such practices by Persian parents could not be
prevented legally, and drew his attention to:
M ... a child born in Bahrain of Persian parents is from birth a 
Bahrain subject and there is no question of his adopting Bahrain 
nationality later on. Under the Nationality Law all that can 
happen, is that the parent can apply to have the child registered 
as a foreign subject within two years of the birth; or the child 
himself can, on reaching the age of 18, register as a foreign 
subject. Otherwise he is and remains a Bahrain subject.''^
He disagreed with the Adviser's suggestion for the Minors Department to
assume control of the property of the minors of Persian parentage unless,
he wrote, all minors* property was subjected to the control of the
3Minors Department.
The issue of the Nationality and Property Laws normalized the 
position of the Persians in Bahrain and consolidated the position of the
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 13/2/15% No. 782/29/1357, 1st Ramadan 1357
(25.10.1938).




Government of Bahrain. Many Persians found that it was in their own 
interest to apply for Bahrain nationality regardless of the fact that in 
becoming Bahrain subjects they were acknowledging the separate existence 
of Bahrain nationality, something their government sought to challenge 
without success.
Judicial Affairs
The Legal System of Bahrain, excluding the Agency Courts, consisted 
of the following Courts in 1930:
(1) The Bahrain Court: (See also Chapter Three) In 1927 Shaikh
Salman bin Hamad was appointed Magistrate of this Court. He had to 
adjudicate cases in the presence of the Adviser, his Co-Magistrate on 
the Bench. The Court heard civil and criminal cases between Bahrain 
subjects, ranging from land claims, fish-trap rights, water rights, to 
disputes involving tenants and owners of date-gardens. Thus was Shaikh 
Salman1s judicial experience formed.
Like Shaikh Hamad earlier, Shaikh Salman had no set of codified 
laws to guide him in his rulings. In 192*f the Resident furnished the 
Agent with a copy of "The Sudan Civil Justice Ordinance - 1900", which was 
based on the Indian Civil Code, and which the Resident recommended for 
use in Shaikh Hamad*s Court before it was re-named the Bahrain Court.
The Agent found it useful and having subjected it to certain modifications 
adapted it for use in the Agency and the Joint Courts, both of which relied 
on Indian Law. But he also stressed the need for simple civil and 
criminal codes to be written in Arabic and to be based on the Sudan and 
the Indian Codes for use by the Shaikh and by all the parties concerned. 
When this Code was ready it was expected to serve as the basis for the
1 Trevor to Daly. I.O.R. 15/2/133, No. 22^-S, 30.3.192!+.
*1
Administration of justice in Bahrain. The way the Shaikhs 
administered justice in the Courts was the subject of this commentary by 
the Resident:
,TThe AlKhalifah are uneducated ... ... and it would be
impossible for them to manage affairs without the support given 
them by the Political Agent or the Adviser. Both Shaikh Hamad 
and his son, Salman, ... are excellent in dealing with cases 
demanding local knowledge, but as they themselves confess they 
would not pass sentences of death or take action against 
prominent men without the support of their advisers.”
(2) The Lower Bahrain Court: was instituted in September 1927 as
a subsidiary Civil Court, whose creation was envisaged to alleviate the 
growing work of the Bahrain Court. When it was first started, Captain 
Parke and Shaikh Mohammad bin Jabur A1 Khalifah, Amir of Manamah, dealt 
with cases referred to the Court. In 1930, Shaikh Mubarak bin Hamad
A1 Khalifah replaced Shaikh Mohammad bin Jabur as joint-magistrate.
C “ c(3) The Shara Court: the Qadis, Sunni as well as Shi ah, were
Ilf" FT g, lL - ' *
appointed to their posts by the Shaikh. The three Sunni Qadis,
Q
mentioned earlier,were still in charge of the Shara Court. They
opposed Government interference in the affairs of the Sunni Waqfs in
1927 (See Chapter Four) and their relations with the Shaikh’s Administra-
c ction, thereafter, was far from being cordial. Ja fari (i.e. Shi ah)
o cShara was conducted by two Shi ah Qadis, Shaikh Abdullah bin Mohammad
Saleh and Shaikh Ali bin Hasan al-Musa. All personal matters such as
marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc., were disposed of by the Qadis.
Criminal justice was exclusively administered by secular Courts.
(*f) The Majlis al-ctlrf: (See also Chapter Three) In 1930 it was
presided over by Shaikh Rashid bin Mohammad A1 Khalifah, father-in-law of
Shaikh Hamad. He replaced Shaikh Humud bin Subah who had been
• * •
relieved from the presidency of the Majlis after his trial in 1929? as 
mentioned earlier. In addition to the Majlis al-cUrf, Shaikh Rashid
1 Daly to Trevor. I.O.R. 13/2/133, No. 97/9/6, 16.4-.1924.
2 Barrett’s No. 385-S, August 1929, op. cit.
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also presided over the Hiving Court.
It emerges from the above account that the Ruling Family had very 
close control of the legal system of Bahrain, and together with the 
Ruler*s prerogative to issue laws and decrees, their authority was very 
great even by local Gulf standards.
During the years 1929-30 the supporters of Shaikh Khalaf bin Ahmad
Q Q
al- Usfour, the influential Shi ah Alim, agitated for his return from 
2
Iraq. He had left the country in April 1927 at the request of the 
Resident. After Daly had left office in September 1926, Shaikh Hamad^ 
relations with the Alim, who was an admirer of Daly, deteriorated.
The Residents remarks below, made in February 1927? throw light on the
whole affair:
” ... Shaikh Hamad pretending that the only cause of trouble was 
the dislike of the Shias for their Qazi, who was dishonest.
In actual fact they were each suspicious of the other and ready
to take up any quarrel or intrigue against the other
As a result of an oversight by the Office of the High Commissioner
in Baghdad, Shaikh Khalaf was allowed to return to Bahrain during 193'l-
- cHis sudden appearance there caused great alarm to the other Shi ah Qadis
who dreaded his influence. The Government of Bahrain allowed him to
stay provided he kept himself away from the affairs of the country, failing
kwhich he was liable for deportation.
1 A.R.P.A. 1929, 1930, op. cit.
2 Ibid.
3 Colonel Haworth to F.S.G.l. I.O.R. 15/2/127, No. 86-S, 27.3.1927. 
In the same letter the Resident added: "Shaikh Khalaf was one of
the biggest supporters of Major Daly, and thus while Shaikh Hamad 
desired me to pull the chestnut out of the fire for him by getting 
rid of the Qadi, my doing so would give colour to a theory which has 
been suggested in places that whatever Major Daly did was wrong and 
that it is a safe game to play to go against his supporters.”
Ibid.
A.R.P.A. 1931, op. cit•
Government interference in the religious affairs of the country
which had begun in 192? continued, when in late January 1932 the
Administration issued a proclamation which made executors of wills
accountable to the Court, and required them to obtain its permission
before dealing with the property of a dead person. The aim was to
protect the interests of widows and orphans. The new ruling, however,
provoked popular opposition in Moharraq, Hedd, and in Manamah the bazaar
was shut from 9th-11th February 1932. The three Sunni Qadis sympathized
with the opponents of the proclamation. The Shi°ah Qadis did not oppose
its issue. Great embarrassment was caused to the Government by the
1
whole affair and the proclamation was eventually withdrawn.
Baharnah Leadership in the 1930s
The 1930s witnessed the emergence of new urban Baharnah leaders who 
lived in Manamah but some of whom had links with the villages where they 
commanded a large following. They included a few wealthy and influential 
landowners who were widely travelled and better informed in religious 
and secular matters. They had the unequivocal backing of their 
followers and were determined to pursue their community*s rights. They 
were partly encouraged by the improvement in the position of the Baharnah
Q
owing to the administrative reforms of the 1920s. IJnlike the Shi ah 
Qadis who were paid functionaries of the State, these leaders were not 
bound by such ties. Their broader outlook and greater political aware­
ness prepared them for closer co-operation with the leading Sunni men of 
Bahrain as we shall see later on. Below is a brief account of the 
Baharnah leaders in the mid 1930s by the Adviser:
"Mansour al-Uraiyedh: A pearl merchant and landowner now one of
the richest and most influential Shias in Manama. He has 
travelled much in India and is sensible and broad-minded with 
rather advanced ideas ...
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Abdul Rasuul bin Raja.b: ... illiterate old man who ... has
some influence among Manama Bahama, he is head of a Mat am.
Abd Ali Alewat: A Manama shopkeeper, notorious as an anti-
Government agitator ...
Hajji Mohsin al-Tajir: A Similar type to Alewat but better
educated and more intelligent. He is an extensive landowner 
and a man of wealth ...
Ahmad bin Nasr: The headman of the village of Barbar ...
Abdel Aziz bin Hajar of Buri: The headman of Buri, ...
a member of Shica V/aqf Committee, a respectable and influential 
man ...
Ali bin Abbas of Ali: The leader of one of the two factions
which exist in Ali, a strong supporter of Shaikh Khalaf 
(al*-cUsfour).
Husain al-Madhoubt of Bilad al-Qadim: The headman of the village
of Bilad, a landowner and a comparatively wealthy man . ..’’^
During the summer of 193^ the Adviser was on leave and Shaikh Salman
alone adjudicated cases in the Bahrain Court. These cases were filed by
A1 Khalifah landlords against Baharnah tenants of date-gardens who had
defaulted on the payment of rents due to the owners. (See: Agriculture,
Chapter Seven.) The annual cash from the yield of some gardens was said
to have dropped by 50% over the previous years. The income from the
sale of dates alone was insufficient to meet full rents. Besides, the
tenants complained of the damage caused by the Shaikhfs camels which were
2
allowed free pasturage, It was an old problem about which very little
had been done in the past. In September 1923 the Resident described the
large herds of stray camels as ’’an economic evil to Bahrain’’ and the reason
for keeping them was ” ... some shadowy sentimental notion of maintaining
3
the fiction that the AlKhalifah are Lords of the Desert”, He then made 
a number of suggestions towards controlling the harm caused by the camels
1 Belgrave to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/176, No. C-129, 28.1.1935-
2 Belgrave to Colonel Loch. I.O.R. 15/2/176, number illegible, 12.11. 
193^ .
3 S.G. Knox to the Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/83, No. 527-S, 2^.9-1923-
1
but these had been forgotten over the years.
On 14th October 1934, the Adviser returned to Bahrain from leave.
He investigated the complaints against the Court and ascertained the 
authenticity of the following claims:
(1) That the detainees were exposed to harsh treatment and to protracted 
and unlawful detention.
(2) No written record was kept of the evidence furnished by witnesses 
in the cases.
(3) In certain cases the Court refused to call upon witnesses asked for 
by the litigants.
(4) Sentences passed were not based on any recognised civil or criminal 
codes.^
Also in October, one of the Shaikh*s camels was found maimed near 
the Baharnah village of Saar. Two villagers were detained in connection 
with the incident and tried by Shaikh Salman but their guilt was not 
proven. Nevertheless, their detention continued and the village was 
ordered to pay a collective fine of 200 rupees. One of the detainees 
was in the service of Shaikh Mohammad bin Abdur Rahman A1 Khalifah, who
£
lived in Saar and showed his sympathy to the villagers by becoming a Shi ah.
c cHis conversion to Shi ism was announced by Shaikh Khalaf al- Usfour before
c« 3
a large gathering at the Friday mosque at Ali.
When the Adviser returned from leave, the Baharnah leaders discussed 
their political and administrative grievances with him. During the 
discussions Mohsin al-Tajir was reported to have said: "if our own
Government does not help us we know another one which will". This was 
interpreted by the Adviser to mean either "the Agency", i.e. the British
4Government, or "the Persian Government".
1 Ibid.
2 Belgravefs letter of 12.11.1934, op. cit.
3 Belgrave*s No. C-129* op. cit.
4 Ibid.
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On 30th December 193*N the Baharnah leaders addressed a petition to 
Shaikh Hamad which contained their complaints and suggested measures of 
redress:
"1- Court cases should be dealt with properly in accordance with 
lav;, namely, in every judgement passed in a case the section 
of proper law applied should be quoted so that the judge 
passing such judgement will not be accused of injustice and 
that the person against whom a judgement is passed will be 
satisfied that justice has been administered in his case 
and that the judge has been impartial. By means of these, 
the rights of the individuals will be protected.
2~ As we form the majority of the inhabitants, it is but just 
that we should be represented on both Majlises - Baladiyah 
and GUrfi - with a proportionate number.
3„ We request you to do us justice by restoring our rights 
on the Board of Education of which we have been deprived 
for many years and have been considered like foreigners 
although the foreigners have not been deprived, the fact 
which is contrary to justice and equity.”^
— 2
On 28th January 1935* the Baharnah leaders held a meeting at Matam
C cMadan in Manamah. Prior to the meeting Ali bin Mansour of Abu Saibi
village, who was a member of the Shi ah Waqf Department and brother-in- 
law of Mohsin al-Tajir, had called upon the villagers to attend the meet­
ing which was intended to discuss, inter alia, the employment of the 
Baharnah villagers by the Oil Company since many amongst them were 
jobless. On the day of the meeting a large crowd came from Manamah and
the villages including the leaders: Mansour al- ITraiyedh, Mohsin al-Tajir,
c c cAbd Ali al- Ulaiwat, *Abd-ur Rasoul bin Rajab, and Saiyed Mustafa bin
c cSaiyed Ahmad Alawi, head of the Shi ah Waqf Department. During this
meeting names of the unemployed parsons were taken down on lists with a
view to pressing their case with the Government of Bahrain. According
to the Adviser, the meeting also demonstrated the unity of the people and
1 Translation of a letter dated 23rd Ramadan 1353 (30.12.193*0 from 
eight Baharnah leaders to H.E. Shaikh Sir Hamad bin Isa AlKhalifah, 
K.C.I.E, C.S.I., Ruler of Bahrain. F.O. 371:18920.
2 A Matam is a religious Shicah institution maintained by endowments, and 
is used as a place of gathering both for religious mourning and jfor 
secular occasions. See also definition provided in Chapter One.
their leaders.
On the following day, one month after the presentation of the
petition, Shaikh Hamad replied to the eight leaders. Concerning their
demand for a standard code for use in the Court, the Shaikh wrote:
"For this purpose we will appoint a committee to examine our 
previous proclamations and suggest, after consideration and 
consultation suitable punishments which will be appropriate for 
all forbidden things. After completing this we will publish 
our proclamations in a book and this will be the local law.
At the same time we will examine some codes which exist in other 
Moslem countries and we will adopt a criminal and civil code for 
cases which are not sent to the Sharac Courts. But I would 
remind you that this matter is of great importance and requires 
hard work and much consideration nor can it be undertaken 
lightly or completed in a short time."^
With regard to their demand for greater representation on the
Municipal Councils, Shaikh Hamad asked them to wait until the next
elections. And as to their contention that there were more foreigners
on Majlis al-Tijarah than their kind, the Shaikh argued that foreigners
possessed knowledge of commerce which the Baharnah did not have, and
which was essential to the work of both the Agency and the Local Courts.
As regards the opening of schools in their villages, the Shaikh promised
3
to open more schools when the Statefs finances improved.
It was evident that apart from the formation of a Committee to 
supervise the codification process, nothing much was promised to the 
Leaders. The Shaikh*s real message, as the letter showed, was that he 
was determined not to bow to political pressures. On the evening of
29th January the leaders: Mansour al-CUraiyedh, °Abd °Ali al»°Ulaiwat,
c cAbd 'Ali al-Jishi, Abd al-Rasoul bin Raja.b and Mohsin Al-Tajir met in
Matam Bin Rajab to discuss Shaikh Hamad's reply. They asserted their
conviction as to the legitimacy of their demands and were unanimous about
1 Adviser to Agent. I.O.R. 15/2/17 6, 29.1.1935-
2 Letter from H.E. Shaikh Sir Hamad bin Isa AlKhalifah, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., 
Ruler of Bahrain to the Eight Baharnah Leaders. F.O. 371:18920, 
29.1.1935.
3 Ibid.
pursuing their case with the Government of Bahrain. During this
gathering both Mohsin al-Tajir and °Abd °Ali al-CUlaiwat advocated the
adoption of "all measures which will bring force to bear upon the 
1
Government".
At their own request, the four Manamah leaders met the Adviser on
30th January, 1935* They complained to him about the Administration's
inadequate response to their fair grievances, and threatened to publicize
them through their friends in The Times of India. They said it was
their support for Shaikh Hamad which ensured the Rulership to him and
prevented Shaikh Abdullah from supplanting him. They argued that their
community had made sufficient progress in recent times and was, therefore,
eligible for a greater share in the affairs of Bahrain. They wanted the
Government and the Oil Company to employ greater numbers of Baharnah than
2
they did at that time.
On 31st January, Shaikh Hamad met the four leaders, who put to him a
set of new demands. They asked that the Baharnah should be allowed to
form the majority of the members on the Committee to draw up the proposed
Code. That a census should be conducted; that members of Majlis al-
cTijarah should be elected instead of appointed; that a third Shi ah Qadi 
should be appointed; that Ibrahim al- Umiyedh, a nephew of Mansour al-
Q
Uraiyedh should be made headmaster of the Manamah Boys' School, and that 
3
Abdul Karim , son of the late Haji Salman, should be made head of the 
Police. The interview terminated with Shaikh Hamad reminding the leaders 
that as Ruler of Bahrain he was not to be told how to set about his duties, 
and warning them that he would hold them responsible for any disruptive
1 Adviser to Agent, 29-1*19351 op. cit.
2 Belgrave to Loch. I.O.R. 15/2/176, No. C-130, 4-. 2.1935-
3 Abdul Karim first received training with Karachi Police in 1936, and 
again at the Police Training School in Nasik from where he returned 
in 19^0 to become Sub-Inspector of Police in Bahrain. A.R.P.A.
1936, 19^0 , op. cit.
282
action that their community might contemplate such as the closure of the 
1
Manamah bazaar.
On February 1st, the Agent granted the leaders a brief interview 
during which he told them that the matter concerned the Ruler alone who 
was attending to their presentations. He also reminded them that their 
community's agitations were Unconstitutional1 and therefore merited no 
support from His Majesty's Government. Like Shaikh Hamad before him, 
he held them personally responsible for the actions of their followers.
The meeting drew to an end when the Agent uttered the Arabic word
* 2 "markhusm", i.e. you may leave.
In his exchanges with the Agent, the Adviser admitted that most of
the Baharnah demands were sensible except one for proportionate
representation1 on various councils, which he believed to be a 'dangerous1
precedent. He concurred in their view that foreigners had more
representatives on the Municipal Council than the Baharnah because there
were four Persians and only three Baharnah members on that Council. Out
of a total of twenty-two members on Majlis al-Tijarah, only three were
Baharnah. They had no representation whatsoever on the Education Council,
and that other than Suq al-Khamis and the Manamah JaCfariyah School, which
were funded by the Baharnah community, no other State schools were built 
3m  their villages.
Reporting the matter to the Resident, the Agent wrote:
"The ill-feeling between the Baharnah and the AlKhalifah has, 
however, again become acute owing to a series of incidents in the 
past year: the conversion of one of the AlKhalifah to the Shi°i
faith, date garden troubles due to the fall in prices which has 
seriously affected the tenancy system in vogue, a feeling that 
they are not sufficiently provided with educational facilities, 
the depredations caused by camels belonging to the Shaikh, 
alleged unfair judgments by Shaikh Salman bin Hamad in the
1 Adviser,*s No. C-130, op. cit.
2 Address by P.A. Bahrain to the Eight Leaders of the Baharnah. F.O. 
371: 18920, 1.2.1935.
3 Adviser's No. C-130, op. cit.
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1
Bahrain Court and other smaller matters.
The improvement in their position and the impact of modern ideas 
in Bahrain has rendered the Baharinah less ready to accept their 
lot and has given them aspirations, some of which are under­
standable and reasonable, but has also, unfortunately, caused 
them to make political demands of an extravagant nature and by 
intemperate methods.
+ • • • • *
Though some of their demands were reasonable, others were 
extravagant and foolish, and the leaders showed themselves 
ignorant, boorish and lacking in any sense of proportion ...
I would conclude by saying that I have sympathy with the country 
Baharinah, and with the ordinary townsman, and 1 believe that 
His Excellency Shaikh Sir Hamad is ready to improve their position 
... • ••, but it is quite impossible in a place like Bahrain to
tolerate threats of violence or agitation. At the same time 
the nature of some of the demands which have been submitted and 
the fact that certain Arabs have been talking of counter-demands 
show that the disruptive political tendencies of the present times 
are at work even in Bahrain. It will not be easy for AlKhalifah 
to maintain their tribal form of rule, but it is in many respects 
well suited to the Island and measures are gradually being taken to 
adapt it to the complicated and changing circumstances of the 
Bahrain of to-day.
In the meantime, the Agent explained to the Shaikhs, Hamad and
Abdullah, that the common people all over the world were demanding a share
in their own Government, and that the trouble in Bahrain was not confined
to the Baharnah. Criticisms had already been voiced by Sunni Arabs of
Moharraq with regard to school-standards and the Oil Companyfs employment
policy. (Adviser*s No. C-130, op. cit.) He urged the Shaikhs to
consider the claims put to them by their subjects. As a result of this
advice, Shaikh Hamad agreed to form a Committee to deal with the Code,
and to increase the number of the Baharnah representatives on the Manamah
3Municipality from three to six, i.e. on a par with the Sunni Arabs.
1 The A.R.P.A. for 1930 contained a commentary which vouches for Shaikh 
Salman*s judicial probity: "Shaikh Salman was Joint Judge in the
Bahrain Court. Allegations are occasionally heard against him but 
the Adviser has a high opinion of his integrity." op. cit.
2 Loch to Fowle. F.O. 371: 18920, No. C/112-1.b/3, 18.2.1933.
3 Loch to Fowle. F.O. 371: 18920, No. C-160, 6.3.1933.
On 9th March 1935 the Administration announced the formation of a
committee to supervise the collation of all previous laws issued by the
Government. Its members, appointed by the Shaikh, were: Shaikh Salman
bin Hamad, Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo, Hajji Mansour al- TJraiyedh, who was now
in India and whose inclusion in the Committee was calculated to appease
the Baharnah. Two more members were to have been added to the same,
should this become necessary in the future.
In a major despatch to the Government of India, dated 18th March and
entitled: the Baharinah in Bahrain, the Resident discussed the issues
raised by them earlier. He began by calling the Baharnah the
"original inhabitants ... are Shi ah, and are looked down on by 
the AlKhalifah ... who have in the past oppressed them. Since 
the abdication of the last Shaikh their position has much improved 
owing to our influence and the tolerance of the present Ruler.
There has never been any attempt at a census of the Baharain 
population, but it is believed to be some 120,000 or more. Of 
this the AlKhalifah family number perhaps two hundred. The other 
elements according to a very rough estimate, which is all that is 
possible, might be as follows. Arab Sunnis 20% of the total 
population and foreigners 20% of whom most are Nejdis and other 
Arabs, but some of whom are Persian Shicahs, Baharinah 60%.
Whatever amount of guess work there may be in this computation it 
is agreed that the Baharinah number well over half of the total 
inhabitants.'^
He then assured the Government of India that the Baharnah were better
treated now than they had ever been in the past and he attributed their
new aspirations to the idea of self-government which, he said, prevailed
over the countries of the Middle East and India with whom Bahrain had
close connections. Commenting upon their demand for reform of the
native courts, he observed:
"The Lower Court is presided over by one of the AlKhalifah family, 
as is the District Court. The Baharinah complain that this being 
so they do not get justice from these Courts, that in civil cases 
where Baharinah and (Sunni) Arabs are concerned awards are given 
against the former, and that in criminal cases much severer 
punishments are meted out to convicted Baharinah than to Arabs.
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/176, No. 1038-6A, 9-3.1935.
2 Resident to F.S.G.I. F.O. 371:18920, No. C-^3, 18.3.1935*
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Colonel Loch informs me that in his opinion these complaints are 
not without foundation.
The Adviser’s attendance in the Bahrain Court as Co-Judge with the
Shaikh was, in the Resident’s view, beneficial to ensuring the
administration of justice. Nevertheless, he believed the practice was
’definitely undesirable* from administrative and political points of view.
Belgrave was already responsible for the financial affairs of Bahrain in
addition to commanding the Police Force. Furthermore, he wrote:
"From the political point of view it is undesirable that we should 
be associated in public opinion with a measure of interference in, 
and responsibility for, Bahrain internal affairs, as is implied by 
there being a British official (even though not in our service) 
as Judge. It is not our business in Bahrain to administer 
justice for the Bahrain Government, but to induce and teach the 
latter to administer justice themselves, and it is a reflection 
on the judicial system of that Government that justice can only 
be achieved by the placing of a foreigner on the Bench.
The Resident went on to discuss the Baharnah demand for drawing up
a Code for use in the Court, and greater representation for them on various
Councils. He concluded his letter by proposing to the Government to
"have a serious talk with the Shaikh" on the following lines:
"That however well adapted purely autocratic methods may have been 
to conditions in the past, times have now changed and governments 
must now depend, to a large extent, on the public opinion of the 
majority of their subjects. That the majority of His Excellency’s 
subjects are Baharinah ... His Majesty’s Government ...
wish, however, to bring the following general considerations to the 
notice of His Excellency. Should the legitimate aspirations of 
the Baharinah not be fulfilled, (an eventuality which His Majesty’s 
Government naturally do not anticipate) and should trouble occur,
His Excellency can hardly look to His Majesty’s Government, who 
... are about to give self-government to India, for sympathy ...
I think a frank homily on the above lines ... will have a good 
effect. Shaikh Sir Hamad bin cIsa al Khalifah himself is a kindly 
and tolerant man, ... ..., so I gather from what I have seen of 
him, to appreciate the fact that "it is better to march with the 
times than to be dragged along in the procession".
It will be observed that the general lines of my suggested message 
to Shaikh Sir Hamad follow, what I understand to be ... those
which the Government of India have adopted as their policy of
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
recent years in India: on the one hand to meet legitimate
demands for self-government and on the other to suppress 
factitious and dangerous agitation ...
I should be glad to be informed ... whether the Government 
of India approve in general of my views . .."^
Replying to the Resident's above letter, the Government of India 
cautioned:
II ... there is much in the administration of Bahrain that is 
susceptible of improvement, they consider it desirable to proceed 
with caution in the matter of giving advice to the Shaikh of 
Bahrain in the constitutional, as opposed to the purely 
administrative, sphere.
They voiced concern about miscarriage of justice in the Court and
expressed the view "that the ruling family still have much to learn in the
matter of judicial probity". For this very reason, they were unwilling,
they wrote, to do away with the Adviser's presence on the Bahrain Court,
despite his diverse duties. They believed that the introduction of a
Civil Code might create needless complications for a "simple community"
whose commercial relations with foreigners were conducted by the Agency
Courts. They were in favour of the introduction of a simple criminal
Code based on the Indian Penal Code, such as the Sudan Code, which they
cited as an example. They were also in favour of increased Baharnah
representation on various Councils along lines suggested to the Baharnah
by the Shaikh. With regard to new schools for Baharnah villages, they
recommended the expansion of existing private or mosque schools. They
concluded by reiterating their initial cautionary remark:
"Government of India feel that no representations should be 
addressed to the Shaikh suggesting the introduction of popular 
institutions of a democratic nature, or carrying the implication 
that the support of Government to the ruling family will depend 
on the degree in which the Ruler meets the aspirations of the 
Baharinah ... ... for the introduction of popular or self-
governing institutions.
1 Ibid.
2 O.K. Caroe, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, to the 
Resident. F.O. 371: 18920, No. F230-N/35, 6.11.1935-
5 Ibid.
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As the above account showed, British involvement in the Administration
of Bahrain had not abated, despite the Agent*s assertions to the Baharnah
leaders in 193^ that their grievances concerned the Ruler alone,
British Officials in Bushire and Bahrain were directly involved in the
Administration^ decision to form a Committee to deal with the Code and
in selecting its members. Even Belgravefs exclusion from the membership
of the Committee was a calculated step, which would not prevent him from
1
"assisting the Committee with his experience from behind the scenes".
The pretension that the matter concerned the Shaikh alone was far from 
being the case.
During the 1920s, Major Daly interested himself in almost every 
decision of the Shaikh*s Administration, and he believed that what he was 
doing was right. During the 1930s, British involvement in the affairs 
of Bahrain did not diminish, but was less direct. The Government of 
India*s attitude to the problems of Bahrain showed little real sense of 
direction or purpose. The solutions they prescribed to those problems, 
as suggested in their despatch of 6th November 1935» showed that they were 
far removed from the problems of the people of Bahrain. Whereas the 
people were asking for modern schools for their villages, the Government 
was prescribing the developing of Waqf and mosque schools. Besides, they 
had little to offer in the way of judicial reforms. They failed to 
understand the transformations that had taken place since the administra­
tive reforms of the 1920s. There was a big gap between the attitude of 
the Government representatives and that of the Government itself. Both 
the Resident and the Agent were in favour of a gradual move towards some 
form of representative government, to which suggestion the Government 
was diametrically opposed.
1 No. C-43, op. cit.
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On the other hand the Shaikhs, who almost always acted on British 
advice, were dissociated from the spirit of the age. Their outlook and 
approach remained as it was in earlier decades, despite the centralization 
process, the creation of a bureaucracy and the social and political 
realities which had emerged as a result. Although reforms were 
implemented under Shaikh Hamad, he was too slow to grasp their 
implications.
The Government of India had no fixed long-term policies for Bahrain. 
They acted and reacted on the spur of the moment. They treated each 
incident or crisis more or less as it happened. Sometimes they bided 
their time and at others evaded the serious issues of the country. As a 
result, domestic pressures built up and they emerged in the shape of 
joint-demands from both Sunnis and Shi°ahs.
Agitations for Reforms - 1938
The second half of the 1930s witnessed the emergence of clubs which 
acted as the focus of various social and cultural activities. These 
were not new to Bahrain for in 1920 there existed a club in Manamah called 
Nadi Iqbal Awal, some of whose members contributed articles to Rashid
Rida's Almanar. Shortly afterwards al-Nadi al-Adabi was founded in• - - 1 ■l- -J- '
Moharraq. In 1936 the Nadi al-Shabiba club was established also in 
Moharraq and was renamed later on the Bahrain Club. The two most 
influential clubs of Manamah were the al-Ahli and CUruba, created in 1938
c
and 1939 respectively. Their founding members, Sunnis as well as Shi ahs, 
included intellectuals like Abdur Rahman al-Bakir, Abdul Aziz al-Shamlan,
C m  m
Ibrahim al- Uraiyedh, Ibrahim Hasan Kamal, Ali al-Tajir, Hasan Jawad
't
al-Jish-shi, Taqi Mohammad al-Baharnah, etc.
1 °Alam al-Kutub, Vol. Ill, No. k, p. 506, February 1983.
The spread of schools, cultural clubs, newspapers and radio broad­
casts, generated greater social and political awareness. Towards mid- 
1938 a feeling of resentment against the Administration was brewing 
beneath the surface. The reason for it was the falling school-standards, 
inefficient Courts, the rising cost of living , high unemployment, cases
of bankruptcy brought about by the decline of the pearl-trade and the
2shift m  the financial base in favour of the Ruling Family. In the
absence of legal avenues of communication, grievances were voiced through
anonymous articles, and other clandestine ways of communication such as
posters and circulars. At this time, i.e. 1938, few people had access
to Shaikh Hamad whose health was failing him.
The affairs of Bahrain were now receiving greater publicity from the
Arab press than ever before. On 27th July 1938, an Egyptian weekly noted
that the British base at Jufair contained both naval and aerodrome
facilities built and financed by the Bahrain Government. On
September lAth of that year, the same magazine published another article
entitled: bloomy Despair in Bahrain1, which was signed: "an Arab".
A
Belgrave suspected certain Bahrainis of the authorship of that article 
which, inter alia, was critical of foreign intervention in the affairs of
1 The A.R.P.A. for 1938 offers this explanation: "The European crisis 
caused great anxiety in the town. Profiteering began at once and 
there was a 20-23% increase in the prices of some food-stuffs, notably 
tea, sugar and coffee". op.cit.
2 To that effect, the Agent wrote: "The centre of wealth has passed 
from the one time powerful merchants to the AlKhalifah family, 
bankrupt merchants are aggrieved because they cannot obtain large 
loans from Government and lavish and wasteful expenditure by some of 
the Ruling family arouses resentment". P.A. to P.R. I.O.R. 15/3/3^3» 
No. C/70A-1.b/5, 19.11.1938.
3 Al-Rabitah al-CArabiyah, The Arab Bond, Cairo. I.O.R. 15/1/3AA,
27.7.1938.
A These were: "Abdullah al-Zayed, proprietor of Bahrain Printing Press;
Ibrahim al-cUraiyedh, Petroleum Concessions Limited*s (P.C.L.) 
Interpreter; Hajji Mohammad al-cUraiyedh, Bahraini merchant; Ali 
al-Tajir, Mr. Lermitte*s clerk, P.C.L.; Mohammad Duwaigher, 
Superintendent Minor Estatefs Department; Saiyed Mahmoud Alawi, 
Adviser*s Head Clerk; Mohammad Saleh Chirawi, an employee of BAFCO". 
Note by the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/176.
290
Bahrain, and cited the Customs, trade, the Eastern Bank, Education and 
Justice as areas under foreign control. The article blamed the sad 
affairs of Bahrain on the Adviser, and urged the people to follow the 
example of the Arab World in pursuit of their national interests. It
concluded by calling upon the people of Bahrain to press for the 
formation of a legislative Assembly consisting of 20 members, to be 
presided over by Shaikh Salman and accountable only to Shaikh Hamad, the 
Ruler. 1
The call for reforms in the administration of Bahrain was partly 
motivated by the Reform Movement in Kuwait, and to a lesser extent by that 
in Dubai, both in 1938. Also at this time, Shaikh Hamad's health was 
causing serious concern and the question of succession about which no 
definite decision had yet been made occupied the mind of Shaikh Salman, 
the Heir Apparent. Shaikh Hamad sought medical treatment in Kashmir, 
in the company of Dr. R. Holmes, the Agency surgeon. During his absence 
from Bahrain, 31st July - 13th September 1938, a Regency Council which 
consisted of Shaikh Abdullah, Shaikh Salman and the Adviser, was entrusted 
with the affairs of the State.
At this juncture, several meetings were reported to have taken place
in support of Shaikh Salman's probable accession to the rulership of
Bahrain. Yusuf Fakhroo, a well-known merchant, was gathering support
c 3for Shaikh Salman both among leading Sunnis and Shi ahs. Apparently, 
Shaikh Salman was keen on securing Baharnah support as his father did 
during Daly's time in 1921-22, when Shaikh Abdullah, Shaikh Hamad's half­
1 For a translation of the article of 1^.9-1938, see I.O.R. 15/1/3^3-
2 See R.J. Said, ’The 1938 Reform Movement in Dubai' , in al-Abhath, Vol. 
23 (1970), PP« 26A~318. Also, M.G. Rumaihi's Arabic article, 'The 
1938 Reform Movements in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai*, in Journal of the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Vol. I, No. f^, October 1975?
pp. 29-6 8.
3 Note by the Adviser. I.O.R. 15/2/176, op. cit.
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brother, stood in opposition to Shaikh Hamad's succession to the rulership. 
Current reports revealed the likelihood of the uncle challenging his 
nephew.
During August 1938, Baharnah leaders from Manamah, viz. Saiyed Sa°eed 
Saiyed Khalaf, Saiyed Ahmad Alawi, Mohammad Ali al-Tajir and Mohsin al- 
Tajir, attended a meeting convened in the house of Hajji Ahmad bin Khamis 
in Sanabis, and they agreed to raise the following matters with the 
Governments The formation of a Legislative Committee, Reforms in the 
Police Force, Reforms in the Bahrain Court, Dismissal of the then 
Inspector of Education, Dismissal of the two Shi°ah Qadis, Shaikh Ali 
bin Hasan, and Shaikh Ali bin JaCfar, Acceptance of Shaikh Salman's 
succession to the rulership. However, Hajji Ahmad bin Khamis, the 
leading man of Sanabis, himself a villager, was opposed to the removal of
'I
the two Qadis on account of their influence among the rural Baharnah.
The Adviser was now on leave and when he returned to Bahrain early 
in October 1938, he called upon the two Qadis and informed them that they 
were no longer \^anted by their people. They went round the villages 
where they commanded support of the people and organized a petition in 
support of their stay in office as Qadis.
q
There followed two more meetings in Mansour al- Uraiyedh's garden,
— c 2and again in Matam Saiyed Ahmad Alawi in Manamah. The leading persons
who attended them approved the previous decisions and added two more to
them, viz., (1) That the nationals of Bahrain should be given preference
1 Ibid.
G C
2 These were: Mansour al- Uraiyedh, Shaikh Baqir bin Ahmad al- Usfour,
Mohsin al-Tajir, Abd Ali al-cUlaiwat, Saiyed Saceed Saiyed Khalaf, 
Saiyed Ahmad cAlawi, Hajji cAli bin Marhoun, Hajji Ahmad bin Sallum, 
Abdur Rasoul bin Rajab., Shaikh 0Abdullah bin Mohammad Saleh - ex 
Shicah Qadi - who was reported to have influenced Manamah leaders
in their decision to get rid of the two village Qadis whom he held 
responsible for his dismissal from office in August’ 1933* Further 
details about the Qadi are provided under the Shicah Shara0 Court 
below.
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over foreigners in matters of employment with the Oil Company, (2) That
members of the Legislative Committee should consist of three Sunnis and
three Shi ahs with Shaikh Salman as its President. The dismissal of
the two Qadis was not raised in the latter meetings.
Although no official petition had yet been submitted to the
Government of Bahrain either by the Sunnis or Shi ahs, political rallying
continued. Sunni merchants like Yusuf Fakhroo, Yusuf Kanoo, Khalil
Moayyad, and Abdur Rahman Zaiyani approached the Sunni Qadis asking them
to take up the case of reforms with the Government in respect of the
Police, the Courts and the imposition of stricter restrictions on the
2sale of liquors, etc. During October 193o, political literature in the
form of hand-written posters which contained messages to the people were
found in Manamah and Moharraq. and some were pasted in Government Offices.
These were attributed to a nascent Youth Movement whose members were
identified as junior clerks and students.
While agitations for reforms were in progress, the Government of
Bahrain decided to concede to the Baharnah their demand for reform of the 
c cShi ah Shara .Court, closed since June 1938 after criticisms were levelled 
cby the Shi ah community against the Qadis and the Court clerk. The 
concession was made in order to appease the Baharnah, and more importantly 
to win them over to the side of the Government and to foil any attempt by
♦ GSunnis and Shi ahs to forge joint demands. The Government Notice of 




3 Persons like Ali bin Abdullah Abol, Ibrahim Jodar, Ali bin Khalifah 
al-Fadhil, Mohammad al-Fadhil, were reported to be the organizers of 
the Movement. See Adviser's Notes in: I.O.R. 15/2/176.
"The Public are informed that with effect from 8th Ramadan 1357
(1.11.1938) the Shica Shara0 Court will be opened. It has been 
decided that the following persons will be the Qadis: 
cShaikh Baqir al- Usfour, Shaikh Ali bin Hasan and Shaikh 
Mohammad al-Qari. They will be on probation for nine months 
during which the Government will see if they are capable and 
just, and if they are, they will be confirmed."^
c cBoth Shaikh Ali bin Ja far, the Shi ah Qadi and the Court Clerk,
whose removal from office was earlier requested by the Manamah leaders,
were dismissed. Shaikh Abdul Husain al-Hilli, a qualified Qadi recently
c cobtained from Iraq, was appointed as Appeal Judge on the Shi ah Shara 
2
Court. These measures were warmly received by the Manamah leaders who
conveyed to the Administration their community's satisfaction, but they
objected to the conditions imposed upon the Qadis and regarded them as
"5unprecedented interference in religious affairs. They now demanded
reform of the Bahrain Court by which they meant the introduction of
trained Magistrates and a Code for use in the Court, employment of a
greater number of Baharnah in Government and Oil Company posts. They
avoided any mention of the Legislative Council, and this was taken by the
A
Adviser to mean that the Baharnah were pacified.
On 5th November 1938 the Government arrested SaCad Shamlan and Ahmad 
Chirawi and accused them of fomenting trouble. The following day the 
Youth Movement ordered BAPCO's Bahraini workers to go on strike. Pickets 
were posted in Manamah to dissuade workers from reporting to work. The 
workers obeyed the call and the strike paralyzed the Company's operations. 
(See also Chapter Seven, under Oil.) Further arrests were made and in 
Manamah the Movement's supporters assembled in the Friday Mosque and
1 Government of Bahrain Notice No. 29/57. I.O.R. 15/2/176, 7 Ramadan 
1357 (31.10.1938).
2 P.A. to P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/3^3, No. C/680-1.b/5, 5/11.1938.




demanded an audience with the P.A. They organized themselves in a large
demonstration which proceeded to the bazaar in Manamah and closed the
shops there. The Police broke up the demonstration, some casualties
were reported, and Ibrahim Kamal and Khalifah al-Padhil, the latter was
1
one of the leaders of the Movement, v/ere arrested. Following the
arrests, the Government of Bahrain issued a Notice calling upon the people
to open their shops and to carry on business as usual, promising them
Police protection against: "interference by crowds of irresponsible
2
persons". Meantime, attempts by the demonstrators to persuade either
the divers from Moharraq or the Baharnah of Manamah to join in the
demonstrations failed to materialize as the Baharnah leaders restrained
3their followers at the request of the Administration.
On November 8th, peace was finally restored to Manamah and to the 
Oil Company, but on the following day circulars were distributed by "The 
National Youth" v/hich contained certain demands: release of those
arrested, formation of Councils to oversee reform of Education and Courts 
and the creation of a Labour Union.
Throughout the troubles, the absence of a legal channel of 
communication between the people and the Government posed a serious 
problem. Had it existed, it would have provided some form of an outlet 
for the peoplefs genuine grievances. On 12th November of the year, 
five merchants, two Sunnis and three Shi ahs, acting as mediators between 
the people and the Government, submitted a memorandum on behalf of the
1 Ali was convicted of sedition and was jailed for one year in Bahrain. 
Later on, he was released at the intercession of Ibn Saud and was 
allowed to stay in Kuwait. See Residency Memorandum, I.O.R. 15/1/
344, No. 296-S, 13.5.1941.
2 Government of Bahrain Notice. I.O.R. 15/2/17 6, No. 31/1357» 6.11.1938.
3 P.A. to P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/343, No. C/691-1«b/5, 12.11.1938.
4 Translation of a circular signed: The National Youth. I.O.R.
15/2/176, 16th Ramadan 1357 (9-11.1938).
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people which contained a number of demands:
1 Education: Appointment of a Committee of eight persons, four
Sunnis and four Shi ahs, to supervise educational reform.
2 Courts: Replacement of present magistrates by a bench of
Q
three judges, two from the public, one Sunni, one Shi ah, and
a third to be appointed by the Government. Creation of a
criminal oourt whose judge was envisaged to be a qualified
national of Iraq.
5 Labour Committee: Creation of a recognized body to look after
the interests of the Labourers.
k Municipalities: Replacement of foreign employees of the
2
Municipality by nationals of Bahrain.
0
5 Selection of six persons, half Sunnis half Shi ahs, to
3
represent the people.
Shortly after the submission of the above memorandum the tribal
groups from Hedd sent a letter to Shaikh Hamad which read:
"We, the undersigned, inform your Highness that we heard that 
certain demands have been put forward to you but we do not know 
anything about this nor has it been sent with our approval.
We inform you that we do not acknowledge those who put forward 
these demands as our leaders. We are satisfied with our Ruler 
and our Government ...
On December 13th, the Youth Movement issued a circular calling upon
the 'free youth of Bahrain' to renounce sectarianism and to work for 
5
national unity. In January 1939T deputations of rural Baharnah submitted
1 Agent's No. C/70h-1.b/5, op. cit. The five merchants were; Yusuf 
Fakhroo, Mansour al-cUraiyedh, Mohsin al-Tajir, Saiyed Saceed Saiyed 
Khalaf, Isa bin Saleh Hindi: The latter left the group later on.
2 About the Municipalities Belgrave wrote: "Complaints against the
Municipalities originate entirely from the Bahama who consider that 
more of them should be employed on the staff of the Manama 
Municipality". Belgrave: Report on Causes and Objects of Recent
Agitation. I.O.R. 15/2/176, 22.11.1938.
3 Translation of a Memorandum containing demands submitted to H.H. Shaikh 
Sir Hamad AlKhalifah, by five merchants of Bahrain, dated 19th Ramadan 
1357 (12.11.1938). I.O.R. 15/2/176.
4 Translation of a petition from the people of Hedd to H.H. Shaikh Sir
Hamad AlKhalifah received on 2*fth Ramadan 1357 (17-11.1938). I.O.R.
15/1/3^ 3.
5 Arabic circular dated 20th Shawwal 1357 (13-12.1938). I.O.R. 15/2/176.
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1
a petition to Shaikh Hamad pledging loyalty to him and to his Government.
In reporting the events of Bahrain, the Administration there adduced 
a number of causes, direct and indirect, which aroused the people*s 
resentment and triggered off the call for reforms. These factors were 
defined as follows!
1 National Awakening: By the late 1930s the number of school-
leavers had risen considerably. Some of them were bread-winners of their 
families and regarded themselves as more learned than their elders. They 
joined clubs, read,newspapers,and pursued all sorts of cultural activities 
and were open to nationalist, pan-Arab ideas. (See also Chapter Six on 
Education.) Work with the Oil Company opened their minds to some new yet 
hard facts, that foreigners were better trained than they were for Company 
posts. Such being the case, blame was bound to fall on the deficiencies 
of the local educational system, both from disappointed students and from 
disillusioned parents who expected higher income for their children.
2 High Unemployment: In 1938 the number of jobless persons
increased for the reasons discussed in Chapter Seven, under Oil.
3 The Reform Movements of Kuwait and Dubai: People in Bahrain
were under the illusion that the Executive Councils of Kuwait and Dubai 
were created with British support, and that British support was forthcoming 
for the Movement in Bahrain. Also, earlier in 1923 the British Government 
had retired Shaikh Isa to prepare the way for the reforms*
In addition to the above, both Sunnis and Shi ahs put forward a set
of specific grievances with regard to the following:
c c c1 The Shi ah Shara Court: During May 1935* the Shi ah community
approached the Government with a demand for the appointment of a third 
Shi .ah Qadi in addition to Shaikh Ali bin Hasan of Sanabis and Shaikh 
Abdullah bin Mohammad Saleh of Manamah, and that the three Qadis should
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/l/3Mf, No. 2095/26, 18.1.1939-
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Q
sit together as was done in the Sunni Shara Court- Shaikh Ali agreed
to the suggestion but Shaikh Mohammad Saleh and his followers opposed it
because an assembly of three Qadis was unacceptable to him on religious
grounds- The Government enquired into the matter by writing to Shaikh
Khalaf and to two other local CAlims. None of them supported the view
of Shaikh Abdullah who belonged to a Shi°ah faction which held different
views over the issue from the majority of the Shi°ahs of Bahrain.
Meantime, Shaikh Abdullah*s supporters agitated against the above
suggestion and also petitioned the government. The matter created a
degree of tension between the two factions and was eventually contained 
1
peacefully.
In August of the same year, Shaikh Abdullah bin Mohammad Saleh was
suspended from office after allegations of malpractices were made against
c c chim. He was about to become the third Shi ah Qadi on the Shi ah Shara
2Court, established during the year. A special tribunal was appointed 
by the Shaikh to try the Qadi. This resulted in much friction between
his followers from Manamah, and those of the other two Qadis: Shaikh Ali
c 3bin Ja far and Shaikh Ali bin Hasan from the villages. The seat of a
third Qadi remained vacant until April 1936, when Shaikh Baqir bin Ahmad
c c cal* Usfour was appointed to the Shi ah Shara Court.
Q
Thereafter, the Shi ah public opinion became critical of their Qadis 
and of the Court clerk who interfered with decisions taken by the Qadis 
and the Court was closed in June 1938, as mentioned earlier. Describing 
the condition of the Court, the Agent wrote:
1 Adviser to Officiating Agent. I.O.R. 15/3/176, No. 195/6A, 22-5.1935-
2 Assistant P.A. to H.E. Shaikh Hamad. I.O.R. 15/1/3^3i No. 268/V.O.,
15-8.1935-
3 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/1/3^3, No. 781/6A, 2.11.1935-




"It was the disgraceful condition of the Shi a Shara Court which 
provided opportunity for agitation to crystallize. It had long 
been recognized by the Bahrain Government that this Court must 
be overhauled, but there was unavoidable delay in reorganisation.
The leaders of the Manamah town Baharnah in ventilating the 
legitimate complaints of Shias in respect of the Court took 
opportunity to raise vague demands on various other matters
2 The Bahrain Courts: It was an established British policy to
entrust Al Khalifah with magisterial posts on State Courts. Work in the
Courts provided opportunity for direct contact with the people and the
British Authorities desired to involve the Rulers in public affairs. To
this effect the Agent v/rote:
"In the circumstances of Bahrain there are great advantages in 
selecting the magistrates from the AlKhalifah family, but they 
undoubtedly need instruction ... it is recognised that 
ignorance of elementary principles of procedure has led to 
conflicting decisions in similar cases and has been one of the 
main causes of complaint by the public."
It was clear that while the people made advances in many fields, 
procedures at the Courts stayed sadly elementary and the magistrates, 
even in the late 1930s, were relying on native reasoning in the absence 
of legal knowledge. The increasing intricacy of cases litigated in the 
Courts demanded a corresponding sophistication from the judges on the 
Bench. The credibility of the Court system became the focus of growing
public scrutiny. What was acceptable in the 1920s, was subject to
2
great public disapproval in the 1930s.
c c3 The Sunni Shara Court: Complaints against Sunni Shara Court
mainly affected the three Qadis who were too slow in their procedural
methods, in addition to seeking compromises instead of giving judgments.
The Adviser described them as " ... ignorant, narrow minded and 
3
unprogressrve".
1 Agentfs No. C/70^-1.b/5, op. cit.




In addition to the above three there were two other specific
grievances related to Education and the Oil Company, discussed earlier in
Chapters Six and Seven. However, the Administration in Bahrain designated
two areas of complaint which were to receive remedial attention: better
pay and working conditions for BAPCO's local employees (See Chapter Seven),
and improvements to the Judicial System. As regards the latter, the 
c c
Shi ah Shara Court was re-organized in October 1938 making it a much more 
efficient Court than it was before. Other measures included the 
opening of a school for the teaching of Islamic jurisprudence, and the 
sending of students for training abroad. No immediate plans were made 
for the reforming of the Sunni Shara0 Court against which the complaints 
were not as serious as those levelled by the Shi°ahs against the Shi°ah 
Court.
As regards the codification of laws the Committee in charge began 
its work in 1935* By the end of 1938 the Committee had accomplished 
the following: compilation and codification of relevant proclamations,
the drafting of a number of rules on various subjects like: diving laws,
pearl sale, fish-traps rules, bankruptcy, land regulations, division of 
immovable property and pre-emption, in addition to the collation of rules 
and regulations which were in force in the Bahrain Courts. Commerce,
Penal Code, etc. which required the services of a legal expert v/ere left 
unattended. Accordingly, Shaikh Hamad decided to hire the services of 
an expert who was envisaged to deal with the more specialized part of the 
Committee^ work. As a temporary measure, the Adviser was restored as 
Joint-Judge on the Bahrain Court.
In his final assessment of the events of 1938, the Resident blamed
the Bahrain Administration for lack of foresight. He wrote:
"It seems to me that to a large extent the Bahrain Government 
are responsible for the present situation. They were extremely
1 Ibid.
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remiss about initiating reforms, e.g. the Bahrain Code, ... , 
and allowed corruption and inefficiency in the Law Courts though 
they have now made last minute reforms ... ... the whole
essence of the agitation is that the people of Bahrain of all 
elements have no legal means of putting forward their grievances, 
whether real or imaginary, and are therefore reduced to illegal 
channels such as agitation ... "
As far as the Adviser was concerned, whose dominance over the
Administration was a matter for public resentment, he blamed the
agitations for reforms upon nationalist sentiments of the people:
"In my opinion the causes of the whole trouble are, incipient 
nationalism, the sectarian differences between the Sunnis and the 
Shias and resentment at the wealth from oil which pours into the 
coffers of the AlKhalifah.*^
According to the Agent, the Reform Movement in Kuwait and Dubai
provided inspiration to the movement in Bahrain, but there was no
resemblance between them:
"There has been revolution in Kuwait and Dubai owing to crass 
folly and abuse of their power by the Shaikhs. In Bahrain there 
has been ... evolution. Slowly but surely representatives of 
the people are being drawn into the Administration ... 
ultimately functions now performed by Belgrave and his colleagues 
will be taken over by natives of Bahrain.*'
z>
The Residents advice to the Shaikh was to form an Advisory Council,
himself appointing its members. He wrote:
"I gave exactly the same advice to two other Shaikhs - Kuwait and 
Dubai. They did not take it and the consequence is that both of 
them have now been forcibly saddled with Executive Councils. In 
other words, instead of the Shaikh sitting on the Council, the 
Council sits on the Shaikh."^
3It remains to be said that the four representatives, who submitted 
to the Government the Memoranda of 12th and 22nd November 1938 (the latter 
was cited in Chapter Seven under Oil) continued their good efforts on
1 P.R. to P.A. I.O.R. 15/1/3V5, No. 597-S, 17-11-1938.
2 Causes and Objects of the Recent Agitation, op. cit.
3 P-A. to P.R. I.O.R. 15/1/3^3, No. C/720-1.b/5, 26.11.1938.
k Residents No. 597-S, op. cit.
c c3 i.e. Mansour al- Uraiyedh, Mohsin al-Tajir, Saiyed Sa eed and Yusuf
Fakhroo•
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behalf of the people. On the other hand, the Youth Movement was 
weakened by the arrests of its members. With the tribal element 
professing loyalty to its traditional allies the Rulers, the villagers 
and the divers untouched by what was happening, the leaders had to accept 
whatever the Government of Bahrain decided to offer. From the start, 
Baharnah leaders from Manamah joined hands with members of the Sunni 
community in submitting joint-demands. This in itself, unthinkable in 
the 1920s, became the achievement of the late 1930s.
The Bahrain Administration During the War
The Second World War affected Bahrain in a number of ways not
experienced by the people before. During March 1939 Abdullah al-Zayed
-]
founded the weekly newspaper al-"Bahrain. Earlier in 1936 he introduced
2the first printing press in Bahrain. However, British authorities 
there used the paper as a vehicle for presenting the Allied point of view 
throughout the War period. Also, as a counterpoise to German war 
propaganda, diffused by the Arabic Service of Radio Berlin, the British 
set up the Bahrain Broadcasting Station which went on the air on f^th 
November 19^0. When V/ar first broke out, Shaikh Hamad made a
contribution to the War Fund and identified himself and his subjects with 
the Allied cause. Initially, certain measures to protect Bahrain's 
oil installations were put into operation. More elaborate defence 
schemes followed later, and with the introduction of a system of food 
rationing the impact of the War was brought much closer to the people.
1 CAlam al-Kutub, Vol. Ill, p. 506, op. cit.
2 Belgrave's Annual Report for 1936 mentions the supply of electricity 
to the printing press during the year. I.O.R. 15/2/298, No. 1303/ 
9-A, op. cit.
3 A.R.P.A. 19^0, op. cit.
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One of the earliest acts of war in the Gulf was the sinking by the Allies 
of an Italian submarine at the entrance to the Gulf in July 19^0. Its 
crew, now prisoners of war, were first transferred to Bahrain from where 
they were subsequently sent to India in great secrecy. On 19th October 
of the same year the Italians bombed the Bahrain refinery, perhaps in
'I
retaliation for the loss of the submarine. By the end of 19^2 the
2Manamah Municipality had erected ninety air raid shelters.
On 8th May 19^1, the Agent wrote to the Resident about the state of 
public opinion in Bahrain. He reported on the people's dissatisfaction 
with the Administration and with its officials, and defined their 
complaints as follows:
"a. The Bahrain Law Courts. Complete incompetence of judges,
absence of lav/s and procedure, extreme dilatoriness in 
disposal of cases, excessive authority of Court clerks, 
unfair decisions.
b. Adviserate. The Adviser is very much disliked. He 
allows his Indian Secretary (K.P. Narayan) too much power, 
corruption amongst subordinate officials unchecked, 
grievances of public are disregarded, Adviser is 
unbusinesslike and allows confusion and slackness to 
prevail throughout the administration in all departments.
c. Customs and Electricity Departments are the same as for 
Adviserate, Education Department is better but Director 
is unpopular owing to his unfortunate manner.
d. State officials British, Indian and Arab are impatient 
with the public and unwilling to examine grievances.
e. The Police are exceedingly corrupt ...
It is generally considered, however, that the State
Administration is under British control and the blame for its
acts or omissions therefore falls on us.”-.
On 25th May 19^1 the Resident corresponded with the Government of 
India over the affairs of Bahrain. He cited the Agent's letter, above, 
and attributed people's dissatisfaction to a ”deep-seated discontent v/ith 
the local administration”. He believed that the people had legitimate
1 Ibid.
2 Adviser's Annual Report for 19^2. I.O.R. 15/2/299.
3 Major Alban to Colonel Prior. I.O.R. 15/^/3^* no number, 8.5.19^1»
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complaints against the Bahrain Courts, and that as early as 1932 he had 
urged Belgrave to form a committee and to collate Government notices 
which had the force of law. He even provided him with an Arabic 
translation of the Sudan Penal Code for introduction in the Bahrain 
Courts. Belgrave had failed to act on these suggestions and since then 
he had rarely attended the Bahrain Court and had only functioned on the 
"nebulous" Court of Appeal. No coded law of any kind existed in 
Bahrain, he wrote, and earlier attempts to secure the services of Sardar 
Lehna Singh or Judge Lloyd came to nothing. The Resident described 
the Shaikhly judges as "incompetent, lazy and arbitrary, and compare
"I
unfavourably with those in Kuwait".
He then switched his attention to State officials beginning with
Belgrave who was at the head of the Administration:
"I am afraid this is true. Belgrave is becoming increasingly 
unpopular except with the Shaikhs. His mental capacity has 
not kept pace with the growth of Bahrain, and owing to 15 years 
in a most debilitating climate, he appears to me to be losing 
his mental grip. He has become very arbitrary and dislikes 
criticisms by any local inhabitants, in fact he has absorbed 
much of the Shaikhs* outlook himself. He and the other 
Bahrain officials have had things their own way for so long 
without any supervision, inspection, or control, that they have 
become a society of self-satisfied Czars, and Belgrave, in 
particular, who has marked likes and dislikes tends to be 
"inaccessible" to any one except the Shaikhs, with whom, 
however, he is very good, and who take up a great deal of his 
time. He is under the impression that he is overworked, but 
this is largely due to lack of method and a tendency to waste 
his time on trivialities. For example, though he does not 
know anything about animal husbandry he will spend hours looking 
at some milch cattle owned by the State, or in designing new 
furnishings for the Shaikh’s palace. He is, of course, quite 
ignorant of administration, as he was caught in the jungles of 
Tanganyika, and though I had suggested to him more than once 
that he should take the opportunity of his leaves to study a 
little law he has never found time to do so.
As regards his financial "Advisership" X need only quote his 
action in investing the entire State Reserve in a currency 
other than that of the State. His own finances he very 
wisely delegates to his wife."^




The Resident described the Customs Department as "efficient", and
its Director de Grenier as "most unpopular and arbitrary". The
Director was disliked by the Indians whom he treated with disrespect;
there were too many of them in his office and their presence was
attracting criticism from the local Arabs. Although he was hard
working and "efficient in his limited way", he nevertheless "has one
manner for people who matter and another for those who do not".
The Electricity Department was the subject of "unending criticism"
and lately the Resident had requested the Bahrain Petroleum Company to
provide a committee of experts to examine its activities in the last ten
years. The Committee, having conducted its investigation, reported
that nothing was wrong with the technical side of the Department's work,
but that accounting and administration were "inefficient in the extreme".
Commenting upon the same, the Resident wrote:
"The fact is that the present Electrical Engineer (R.W.B. Steele) 
...,has no head for business and it is unfortunate that he was 
not disposed of before v/ar broke out ... He is an instance of 
a person who was reasonably efficient 10 years ago but v/ho has 
gone to seed during 10 years in Bahrain v/ithout adequate 
expert supervision."^
The Resident gave a favourable impression about the Department of 
Education which as a result of re-organization made great progress.
The initial investigation carried out by the new Director into the 
affairs of primary education "reflected no credit upon Belgrave as the 
head of the administration", the Resident wrote. He felt sorry for 
the people of Bahrain v/ho were deprived of access to responsible 
officials, and were denied the right to air genuine grievances. He
added "the Shaikhly state of mind seems to prevail in which any
unfavourable comment is considered subversive".
He then discussed the affairs of the Police noting that in 193"!
1 Ibid.
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owing to financial stringency he had to terminate the services of 
Captain Parke, the then Commandant of Police. Since then the Police 
had been commanded by Belgrave in return for an allowance of Rs. '100 per 
month. "Belgrave”, he wrote, "knows nothing about Police work, and, 
finally, as a result of Weightman*s (the then Agent) insistence he 
(Belgrave) allowed Hallows to make investigations which disclosed a very 
large number of abuses ..."
The Resident told the Government of India that Major Alban, the 
Agent, spent more time with the local inhabitants than Belgrave, and that 
they confided in him and disclosed to him a great deal which should have 
reached Belgrave*s ears, but which did not. He concluded his despatch 
by saying:
"We are blamed in Persia for having landed them with Reza Shah, 
and it is quite certain that we are blamed in Bahrain for any 
defects in the State administration. How can it be said that 
we do not interfere in Bahrain? V/e deposed the late Ruler, 
introduced British officials and have regulated the finances 
for over sixteen years. While the Political Agent should not 
usually interfere in the administration beyond tendering advice 
in appropriate quarters, it is his business to redress genuine 
grievances ... Every case to which Alban has drav/n my 
attention so far has been one which required investigation or 
action on the part of the State and in each case his views have 
been borne out by the facts ... I do not wish it to be thought 
that Belgrave*s day of usefulness to the State has expired ... 
Belgrave is a gentleman, and is well liked by the Shaikhs who 
have implicit confidence in him. At the same time there is no 
doubt that Bahrain has grown too fast for him, and after the 
war some form of expert assistance will have to be found for 
him.
Rationing and Control of Food-stuffs
Bahrain*s chief concern during the War was to
3
food supplies for its 9 °*0 0 0 or so inhabitants.
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 The above figure was established on the night of January 22nd, 
when the Government of Bahrain conducted the first census in the 
history of Bahrain. The figures obtained showed a total population 
of 89,970 persons; 7^,0^0 were Bahrain nationals; ^1,9^ Sunnis;
^6,35^ Shicahs; 15,930 foreigners. Government of Bahrain Annual 
Report for 1369 A.H.
ensure sufficient 
India was the chief
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supplier of cereals, sugar and tea, while imports of goats, sheep,
potatoes, onions, fresh and dried fruits were obtained from Persia.
Shortly after the War broke out in 1939? the office of Food Controller
was created to supervise the retail sale of essential items to the public
at controlled prices. In 19^0 a Food Control System was introduced to
check profiteering, hoarding and to monitor prices and the distribution
of supplies to the public. At first Captain A.C. Byard was appointed
Food Controller, but from 19^0 onwards the Director of Customs was made
responsible for that task.
During 19^1 shortage of shipping caused delays in shipments of flour
from India resulting in acute shortages in Bahrain. Nevertheless, the
cost of living in Bahrain was reported to be much lower than in
1neighbouring states. During the year there was a great deal of
unemployment owing to reduction in the Oil Company*s labour force, a poor
diving season and because the government was not engaged in any project
which would have provided jobs to unskilled labour. On 1^th May of the
year, the Agent suggested to Shaikh Salman to start some food distribution
centres for those who had no means of livelihood. The suggestion was
2
made with a view to averting any possibility of disturbances. The
Shaikhs approved the idea, and in conveying their approval to the Agent,
the Adviser noted:
"In Muharraq especially many of the poor people are finding it 
difficult to earn money with which to feed themselves, but at 
the same time I do not think that any disturbances are 
imminent."
3
In 19^2 temporary shortages of rice, wheat and sugar were experienced* 
This was largely due to merchants transhipping to Saudi Arabia food~*stuffs 
originally ordered for Bahrain. They were lured by chances of greater
1 Adviser to P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/299, No. 81-9A, 31.1.19^2.
2 Major Alban to Belgrave. I.O.R. 15/V3^, No. 0/^9, 1^.5.19^1 *
3 Belgrave to Alban. I.O.R. 15/1/3^, No. C/833, 17-5*19^1 •
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profits there where price controls did not exist. The Government of Bahrain
responded, by banning the export of all food-stuffs to other countries 
except sugar and tea which v/ere allowed to go to Persia in return for 
meat, vegetables and fruit. In June a system of card rationing for rice, 
flour and v/heat v/as introduced under the supervision of Manamah and 
Moharraq municipalities. Retail centres v/ere opened in both places, and 
to assist the Food Controller in his task a Food Control Committee v/as
'I
appointed in August.
Also, during the summer of 19^2 , a philanthropic project: Relief
of the Poor Fund, was launched under the auspices of Shaikh Salman, the 
new Ruler. Two Committees, one Sunni one ShiCah, v/ere formed for the 
purpose. Donations amounting to Rs. 32,000 v/ere collected from members 
of the Ruling Family, and from Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis. In addition 
to the above sum, B.A.P.C.O. contributed Rs. 1,500 to the Fund. The 
money was used for the purchase of food-stuffs which were then 
distributed to the needy and poor of Bahrain. Towards the end of 19^2
shortages of rice, wheat and flour were experienced in India, and
3
consequently the Government there restricted their export. This led
to severe shortages of cereals in Bahrain v/here the Authorities applied
to the Middle East Supply Centre (M.E.S.C.), about which E.M. Lloyd wrote:
"In February 19^3, when supplies of rice from India ceased, the 
annual requirements of Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat, the Trucial Coast, 
and eastern Saudi Arabia were reported to MESC to be about
60.000 tons of rice. MESC could only offer wheat, flour and 
barley as substitutes and the records show that in 19*63 the 
Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms reluctantly accepted 21,000 tons of 
flour and 3j000 tons of barley, while eastern Saudi Arabia took
15 .000 tons of flour and 1 ,000 tons of barley.
This sudden and enforced change in diet from rice to wheat flour 
caused discontent and threatened to have political repercussions. 
Indeed it v/as feared that, if the pearl fishers did not get their
1 A.R.P.A. 19^2, op. cit.
2 Adviser to Assistant P.A. I.O.R. 15/2/8^6, No. 1568/23, 30.8.19^2.
3 A.R.P.A. 19^2, op. cit.
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normal diet of rice, dates and fish, the pearl-fishing fleet, 
which normally starts operations in May ... , might stay at 
home and create trouble."^
During 19^3 a Merchants Advisory Committee was formed to consider
the problems of supplies and shipping, and the number of authorized
shops for the sale of rations was increased. The rationing of rice,
wheat and flour continued for the second year running and a personfs
monthly quota for the year was fixed at 20 lbs of cereals divided into
8 lbs of rice, reduced in March to k lbs and in September to 2 lbs, plus
12 lbs of wheat. Whenever a person's quota of rice v/as reduced his quota
of wheat was raised instead. Tov/ards the end of 19*63? the Government
of India placed a total ban on exports of rice, and the individual quota
was accordingly adjusted to 12 lbs of wheat, 6- lbs of flour, and lbs of
barley. Hence rice, a staple diet of the majority of the people, ceased
2
to be the standard dish of the day.
Sugar was rationed at A lbs per person per month, but from April of 
the year this quota v/as reduced to 2 -^ lbs so that surplus sugar could be 
made available for export to Persia. Extra sugar was also procured 
from India for the purpose, as is borne out by the Controller's account 
below:
"It has been found that the more sugar these traders can obtain, 
the more plentiful are their imports. In view of this and as 
a result of representations to the Government of India through 
the Political Authorities, an extra quota of 25 tons per month 
has been sanctioned for this purpose. This is important,
Bahrain being entirely dependent on her neighbours for live 
Stock."
5
Apart from cereals and sugar, imported exclusively by the Government 
of Bahrain, local merchants were allowed to bring in tea, coffee, ghee, 
piecegoods and cigarettes. In mid-19*+3 shortages of tea and coffee
1 E.M.H. Lloyd, Pood and Inflation in the Middle East 19^0-5? (1956),
pp. 66-7 .




v/ere reported and the Government had to ration their sale for a while.
With the arrival in early August of Bahrain's monthly quota of 20 tons
of tea and 32 tons of coffee from India, in addition to the importation
of 500 cases of tea from Dubai and coffee from Aden, the rationing of tea 
1
and coffee ceased.
The Medical Authorities viewed a person's individual quota of
cereals and sugar as sufficient for his physical needs. However, the
poorer members of the community v/ere unable to purchase the full ration
with the result that many suffered from malnutrition and its accompanying
bodily disorders. To keep prices down, the Government of Bahrain
2
subsidized the sale of essential food-stuffs to the public.
Despite strict measures to control the export of all types of goods
from Bahrain, cases of smuggling occurred in 19^3 and many arrests and
convictions were made.^
In 19 ^  the Government of Bahrain spent 80 lakhs of rupees on the
purchase of wheat, flour, barley, rice, sugar and dates. This money
v/as subsequently recovered from the sale of such essential items to the
public. During the year, the M.E.S.C. allocated 1,500 tons of Iraqi
rice to the Gulf Shaikhdoms and Bahrain's quota amounted to 400 tons.
Extra rice was smuggled into Bahrain by owners of local dhows both from
5India and from Iraq.
Both in 19^3 and 1 9 ^  divers were served with jareesh, crushed 
v/heat, in addition to dates and date-juice. The cereal ration of 
20 lbs per person per month v/as maintained throughout, but the individual
1 Ibid.
2 A.R.P.A. 19^3i op. cit.
3 No. PA/HL/IO/8 8, op. cit.
k Director of Customs Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/300, No. PA/HL/1/139j
7.2.19^5.
5 Lloyd, p. 67.
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quotas were subject to alteration depending upon the availability of each
item. Early in 19^, a person's quota of sugar was set at 2-g- lbs for
town-dv/ellers, and only -3r pound for villagers, on account of the higher
consumption of sugar by the former among whom there was a. large community
of foreigners. Export of sugar and tea to the Persian Coast was allowed
in return for live stock, onions, potatoes and fruit. The smuggling of
tea to the neighbouring countries occasioned shortages during the first
half of the year. In the second half, tea v/as rationed to the public
and this ensured a fairer distribution. Complaints v/ere made by the
public against butchers who refused to sell meat at official prices, or
who withheld stocks from the market. As a result, the Municipality,
at the recommendation of the Food Control Committee, engaged salaried
butchers to retail meat to the people. Towards the end of the year
acute shortages of meat v/ere reported and the Municipality restricted
-1
slaughtering to only four days per week.
In 19M* the rents of shops and premises recorded unprecedented rises
and the Government v/as forced to intervene and to protect the tenants by
issuing a Rent Control Order which made it harder for landlords to
increase rents or to demand vacation of premises by the tenants for the
2sole purpose of reletting at a higher rent.
During 19^5i the monthly cereal quota of an adult v/as maintained at 
20 lbs, and for the first half of the year the individual rations included 
wheat, mixed flour, barley and milled wheat. For the rest of the year 
quotas were set at 13 lbs of wheat, 3 lbs of mixed barley and millet, flour, 
plus k lbs of rice per person. Throughout Ramadan an extra ration of 
rice was issued and the quota was adjusted to 6 lbs of rice, 3 lbs of 
millet and 11 lbs of wheat. After Ramadan the quota was modified to
1 No. PA/HL/1/139? op. cit.
2 A.R.P.A. 19^, op. cit.
lbs of rice, 12 lbs of wheat and lbs of millet. In total a sum of
118 lakhs of rupees v/ere spent in the purchase of wheat, millet, rice, tea,
1
sugar and dates, reported to the Controller.
During the war Persian exports of rice averaged 30?000 tons per year,
but owing to a bumper harvest Persia sent A0,000 tons in 19^5- The
M.E.S.C. negotiated a consignment of 1,800 tons on behalf of Bahrain v/hich
2arrived towards the end of the year. Both rice and wheat continued to 
be sold to the public at subsidized prices. Tea and coffee were in
abundant supply and these were no longer included in the ration system. 
Sugar was rationed at 3 lbs per adult in the towns, and 1 lb per adult 
in the villages. Throughout the year meat supplies were in abundance 
despite the fact that the Government of Bahrain incurred severe losses as 
a result of the destruction of their herds of goats by pneumonia.
During the second half of the year, the Government purchased a huge 
consignment of cloth and retailed it to the public at prices lov/er than 
those obtained in the local markets. Despite restrictions on the export 
of goods from Bahrain, attempts at smuggling did not cease and many arrests 
were made as a result. Prices of most commodities were reported to be 
lov/er in 19^5 than in the previous year.
The War involved the Government of Bahrain in a series of new 
measures such as the population count of early 19^1 ? import of essential 
food-stuffs for local consumption, introduction of controls on export 
of food-stuffs from Bahrain, checks on prices, rents, and also anti­
hoarding and anti-profiteering regulations. The Municipalities had to
cope with the opening of food centres, with the organizational and
1 Director of Customs Annual Report. I.O.R. 15/2/301, No. PA/C/22, 
20.1.19^6 .
2 Ibid. Also Lloyd, pp. 2^7-52, op. cit.
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supervisory duties of retailing rationed food to the public. As Food 
Controller, the Director of Customs had to plan imports of essential 
food-stuffs for months ahead and to consult with importers over the 
affairs of shipping and supplies. The Food Control System apparently 
functioned to the satisfaction of the people for whose benefit it was 
introduced. Shortages of supplies occurred from time to time, and cases 
of malnutrition and ordinary people finding it difficult to afford food 
even at subsidized prices were also reported. Nevertheless, conditions 
in Bahrain were reported to be better during the War than those obtaining 
in some of the neighbouring countries. In other words the War 
re~inforced that process of government involvement in a wider sphere 




This thesis has considered twenty-five years in the modern history 
of Bahrain. During that time this small state underwent some important 
transformations which influenced its social, political and economic 
structure. Until some time after the First V/orld War Bahrain*s 
Administration consisted of a couple of traditional councils and courts 
which were barely capable of coping with the challenges of the times.
In a decade or so, Bahrain managed to create and sustain a governmental 
apparatus which was creditable to the country and which then had no 
parallel elsewhere in the neighbouring Sheikhdoms. It should be noted 
that this achievement was the outcome of the policy of reforms applied 
during the 1920s, i.e. prior to the discovery of oil.
Before the introduction of the policy of reforms the ruling family 
of Bahrain wielded unrestricted powers, and they often used them rather 
wilfully and arbitrarily. Those adversely affected by this misuse of 
authority were, principally, the Baharnah Arabs. Oppressive members of 
the ruling family were rarely prosecuted, and if it v/as necessary, they 
were tried by the Shara Qadi whose impartiality and disinterestedness 
v/as open to doubt. Every prominent member of the ruling family 
exercised authority over a locality v/here his Wazir and Fidawis acted as 
his agents with the people. In the absence of institutionalized legal 
constraints, the will of the Shaikh v/as unfettered and his powers v/ere 
virtually absolute.
Throughout the First World V/ar, the British Government continued to 
give the Shaikh a virtually free hand with regard to domestic rule in 
Bahrain. There followed a period of misgovernment and subsequent 
events and public protests reminded Britain of her obligations concerning 
the introduction of a reasonably good government there. Shaikh Isa had 
ruled by custom and tradition long enough for this to have induced in him
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a disinclination for any change. Change as he perceived it implied the 
alteration of the status quo, which despite its conspicuous ills, v/as 
none the less beneficial to the ruling family over which he presided.
The Treaty of 1861, concluded with Britain by his predecessor Shaikh 
Mohammad bin Khalifah, defined the Shaikh*s status as Independent Ruler 
of Bahrain. After the enforcement of the Bahrain Order-in-Council in 
1919 the conduct of Bahrain*s affairs was subjected to dual control 
exercised both by the Shaikh and by the British Political Agent. With 
his customary prerogatives thus reduced, the Shaikh believed that his 
independence would be compromised in local Arab eyes. This is not to 
defend his Administration, ridden as it was with serious flaws and it had 
to be changed if it v/ere to become acceptable to the people. The 
sense of urgency for reforms increased after the Baharnah uprising of 
February 1922, in protest against unjust treatment, forcing a confession 
from the Ruler*s sons, for the first time, that "past misrule" was at the 
root of the problem.
Putting the reforms into practice was certainly not a smooth and 
straightfor v/ard task. First, the Administration had to deal with the 
rebellious Dowasir tribesmen who perpetrated numerous acts of violence 
in furtherance of their own political ends. Their threat in 1922 to 
muster the support of Ibn Saud against the Administration in Bahrain was 
taken seriously by the British Authorities. For the first time during 
1922-23 one of their contentious leaders was fined and they v/ere penalized 
for their lawless behaviour. The firmness which the Administration 
exhibited in dealing with the Dowasir left no doubt as to the British 
Government*s determination to prevent any external intrusion in the 
affairs of Bahrain.
The reforms initiated in Bahrain in the 1920s inevitably affected 
the structure of pov/er there, and culminated in the reduction of the 
excessive authority of the Shaikh and in curbing the autonomy of the
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tribal elements. During the implementation of the reforms the Agent
became heavily involved in the Shaikh's Administration so that in
addition to his duties as Political Agent he, in effect, supervised the
execution of the actual reforms. Instead of proffering advice to the
Shaikh he v/as now occupied in the day to day affairs of the Administration.
The Shaikh's lax attitude was partly responsible for this state of affairs
which heightened the Agent's prominence v/ay beyond the powers legally
invested in him by the Bahrain Order-in-Council.
Under the reforms judicial practices were standardized, secular
courts were established and proper procedures were introduced. The one
problem that plagued the judicial reforms was the absence of new civil and
criminal codes for use in the native courts, and this continued to be a
problem for the Administration throughout the period treated in this
c
thesis. The Shara Qadis were, however, made to work with committees 
and councils whose members were laymen and this engendered in them 
considerable resentment though the new arrangements did result in greater 
efficiency and a notable reduction in mal-practices. Seizure of land 
from the natives and its confiscation, a chronic problem of the pre-reform 
era, ceased to be a serious concern. A uniform municipal tax on houses, 
shops, etc., replaced, in 1922, the taxes which had previously been
q
collected exclusively from the Baharnah. Sunni-Shi ah relations 
gradually improved in the wake of the changes made, and the fact that the 
two communities came to share schools, jobs, social clubs, etc., 
especially in the 1930s, generated greater communication between them.
In his book Rumaihi ascribes the absence of unity between Sunnis and
0
Shi ahs in the 1920s to the latter's unwillingness to co-operate v/ith the 
former. He points out that the Baharnah sided with the pro-British 
Administration instead of uniting with their Sunni compatriots, in 
opposing v/hat was to him British meddling in the internal affairs of
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Bahrain. In fact the Baharnah saw in the administrative reforms
their one hope of securing a more even-handed form of government which 
would treat them on a basis of equality with the Sunnis. For long they 
had been subjected to unequal treatment meted out to them by the old 
regime. For this reason they supported Shaikh Hamad's Administration and 
acted as a counterweight to the wishes of the tribal camp which v/as 
opposed to that Administration. Their backing for the reforms was 
entirely comprehensible since the raison d'etre of the reforms was the 
formation of a more efficient and responsible Administration. Rumaihi
also believes that the Baharnah absence from the Congress of October 1923)
2 . • indicated their lack of faith in the Sunnis. The chief decision of
that Congress was a call for the restoration of Shaikh Isa to the rulership
of Bahrain, and this revealed that the interests of the tribal elements,
the major beneficiaries of the old regime, continued to take precedence
over the interests of others who attended the Congress. In view of their
needs, it would be inconsistent to expect the Baharnah to participate
actively in a Congress which was bent upon restoring the head of the old
regime under which they had suffered greatly. The unity of Sunnis and
Shi ahs was in fact held back by the psychological and religious cleavages
of the past, which were exacerbated by the harsh policies pursued against
the Baharnah by the tribal elements over a long period of time. In the
absence of mutual trust and regard the attainment of unity remained a
c *distant objective and Sunni-Shi ite relations remained a sensitive matter
throughout the period of this thesis.
The three main constituents of the Bahraini society: the Rulers and
their tribal allies, the town-dwelling Sunnis, and the urban and rural
1 Social and Political Change ..., pp. 195-6, op. cit.
2 Ibid., p. 181.
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Shi ahs, certainly retained their identities after the reforms. The 
Ruling family v/ho at first resisted the reforms, eventually reconciled 
themselves v/ith the new system of authority and accepted power in its 
attenuated form. Their influence v/as, however, noticeable in almost 
every new institution that the country had. They presided over the 
Municipalities, the Courts, government departments and various other 
councils and offices. They adhered to their earlier attitude of not 
allowing the people a real share in power, partly encouraged in this by 
the official policy of the British Government which restricted the native 
inhabitants to Government service merely in an administrative or advisory 
capacity. Legislative Councils, v/hich commanded executive powers, were 
avoided in Bahrain and elsewhere in the area as a matter of policy.
The British always viev/ed the Arab littoral of the Gulf as an area
of essentially Sunni influence. This perception also applied to Bahrain
0
where there was a majority Shi ah population. When Ibn Saud voiced his 
unease at the removal of Shaikh Isa from office in 1923 he received 
assurances from the Resident concerning the British Authorities* intention 
to sustain Sunni control over the Administration.
In its approach to the reforms the Government of India was sometimes 
wary and occasionally inconsistent. In the first place, the policy of 
reforms was in itself imposed upon the Government of India by the Foreign 
Office in the aftermath of criticisms from Tehran implicating the Govern™ 
ment of India in misrule in Bahrain. Having accepted the policy of 
reforms the Government of India was cautious not to be directly associated 
with them. They urged only basic reforms and left their planning, 
finance and execution to their representatives in the area. Also, they 
desired to see the Shaikh actually taking part in them and not merely 
responding to Government incitement. Later in 1926, the Government of 
India revealed a serious lack of vision when it asked the Agent to 
consider a halt to the process of reform and possibly to reverse the changes
that had been made. This sudden shift in Government attitude was 
occasioned by a feeling of unease over Britain*s ties with the other 
Trucial Shaikhs who were apprehensive over what v/as happening in Bahrain. 
These fears, manifested during the second half of the 1920s, were to 
receive the attention of the Government of India for they came at a time 
when the Arab Coast was increasingly designated as the focus of those 
British interests which might have to be transferred from Persia.
The global recession of the early 1930s brought economic hardships 
to Bahrain. The country's pearl-trade was seriously affected by that 
depression, and subsequently by a host of external factors over which 
Bahrain had no control. When the pearling reforms began in 192^ the 
prevailing system manifested serious defects, and there was no shortage of 
evidence to prove its injustice and inadequacies. The British 
Authorities in Bahrain saw the diver as the victim of mal-practices for 
which the Nakhudas, most of whom were of tribal affiliations, were largely 
responsible. In short, the system served the interests of the Nakhudas, 
not those of the divers who despite their hard work received very small 
returns in addition to incurring uncontrollable debts. Bahrain was the 
centre of the Gulf's pearl-trade and the British chose it for the 
pearling reforms. When reformed the system v/as calculated to attract 
more divers to Bahrain from the neighbouring Shaikhdoms, and to serve as 
an example for others to follow. Also, it v/as envisaged to emancipate 
the impoverished divers from conditions of virtual bondage to the Nakhudas.
The reforms enacted sought to regulate the legal and financial 
aspects of the system as they affected the three vital participants - the 
merchant, the Nakhuda and the diver. They also included legislation 
against trade in Japanese pearls, and against the use of modern equipment 
for diving purposes, measures which tried to ensure protection for the 
industry. Apart from committing the Nakhuda to the observance of the 
customary laws as defined by the Government of Bahrain, and the reduction
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of the advances to the divers to prevent the growth of debts} there was 
nothing in the reforms which could have injured the pearl-trade of Bahrain.
The worldwide depression of the 1930s, growing international demand 
for cultured pearls and dwindling purchases and prices of Bahrain pearls, 
accelerated the collapse of the industry.
The reforms v/ere certainly good in themselves and they did help to 
alleviate the conditions of service of the divers, but international 
factors v/ere soon to bring a devastating decline to the pearl trade, and 
that did great financial harm to those v/ho had previously financed it.
The reforms had been designed to remove abuses from a traditional system
of pearl fishing, they v/ere not designed to strengthen the industry as 
such and they certainly could not protect it against those pov/erful 
external forces which were, in the end, to destroy it.
As a result of the depression the Administration of Bahrain first 
switched its attention to agriculture as a possible area for development. 
Some serious efforts v/ere made but these were thwarted by the high salinity 
of the soil, absence of local expertise, falling water levels in some 
places and lack of v/ater in others, and above all inadequate investment in 
agriculture. Experimentation with the growing of cotton proved 
successful, but the price of cotton fell as a direct result of the 
recession deterring merchants from involvement in the new crop. Most of
the productive land was owned by the ruling and merchant families who
preferred to invest on a short term basis and to achieve quick returns. 
Landlords alv/ays preferred to turn their attention to seasonal crops which 
needed small investments with generally predictable and rapid profits.
Also, they relied principally on the rents which they received from the 
lease of their gardens, including a quota of the dates and vegetables 
which were stipulated in the conditions of the tenure. The conditions 
governing the lease of date-gardens were the cause of much trouble between 
the landlords and their tenants, usually Baharnah. The price of dates
320
fluctuated from one season to another, so did the produce of dates from a 
given garden. Pests frequently infested the trees, and locusts caused 
damage nearly every season. When a tenant failed to settle the agreed 
annual rents in full he often faced prosecution and the threat of losing 
his trivial possessions, including the tenancy of the garden, his only 
means of livelihood.
A great part of the official enthusiasm for agricultural reform was 
washed away by the discovery of oil in 1932 and its subsequent development. 
The oil industry saved Bahrain from the grip of acute economic difficulties 
induced by the general slump and by the failure of the pearl-trade. Oil 
also raised the expectations of the people. It provided the State with 
a new large source of revenue with which to develop the infra-structure of 
Bahrain. Growing revenue from oil helped re-organize Bahrain's finances 
and expand the municipal, educational and medical services which had been 
begun. The oil industry opened up employment opportunities for the 
divers, and the date-cultivators and provided them with the security and 
stability of a paid job with the Oil Company. The country's imports 
increased as a result of the people's enhanced buying power. Articles 
which were regarded as luxuries in the pre-oil era, attracted great 
numbers of buyers, many of whom were employees of the Oil Company. This 
in turn, gave new prosperity to the merchants. The Annual royalties 
which the Government of Bahrain received increased from over six lakhs of 
rupees in 1935? to over thirty lakhs in 19^5 ? an increase of five fold in 
a decade. Annual income from the Customs in the same period rose from 
over six lakhs of rupees in 1935 to nearly twenty-six lakhs in 19 -^5 - 
In this sense oil had a more far reaching impact upon the economy and 
society of the country than the improvements induced by the reforms of 
the 1920s. A major outcome of the growth in oil production was the 
shift in the financial power v/hich moved from the merchants and pearlers 
in the pre-oil period, to the Euler and his family. There was now greater
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cash in circulation in Bahrain, and its flow v/as, in effect, controlled by 
the Rulers* There is, therefore, an interesting contrast to be seen in 
the history of Bahrain during this period. The political reforms of 
the 1920s had, as has been seen, tended to curtail the arbitrary powers of 
the ruling family, and this had generated resentment among that group.
The introduction of the oil industry, on the other hand, gave them a new 
sense of economic power and on balance their dominance over Bahrain*s 
affairs probably grew rather than declined.
The striking of oil in Bahrain brought a sense of relief to the 
country which was facing the prospect of economic collapse. At this time,
Bahrain*s relations with Persia were subjected to greater strains than 
ever before. Bahrain in the 1930s was not only an oil producing country, 
but also became the focus of more British interests in the Gulf. Britain 
had already handed over to the Iranian Government postal and quarantine 
services during the 1920s, and transferred the Imperial Airways route to 
Bahrain and to some other Shaikhdoms on the Arab Coast in 1932. After 
withdrawal from Henjam and Basidu a new naval base was established in 
Jufair in 1935* The oil concession in Bahrain also attracted a protest 
from Iran, and Bahrainis resident in Iran v/ere subjected to new pressures 
v/hich, inter alia, required them to hold Persian passports and Persian 
nationality if they owned property there. On a number of occasions they 
complained to the Administration in Bahrain, v/hich could not do anything 
for them until 1937, the year the Bahrain Government promulgated its own 
Property and Nationality Laws. These regulated the position of Persians 
in Bahrain and consolidated the authority of the Shaikhfs Government. 
Nevertheless, Persian pretensions in respect of Bahrain remained in 
existence until 1970.
Also during the 1930s there was a conspicuous rise in the political 
av/areness of the people of Bahrain, brought about by the increased 
communication which the oil industry helped to create. Internally, the
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oil industry was responsible for the emergence of an embryonic workers 
movement whose members were both Sunnis and Shi ahs. Mixed Sunni-
Q
Shi ah schools provided the opportunity for greater communication, 
co-operation and even mutual toleration between the two religious groups. 
Towards the end of "1938 Bahrainis of both persuasions submitted joint 
demands to the Government of Bahrain and to the Oil Company for reform 
of the judicial system, better work and pay conditions at the Oil Company, 
and adequate technical training to enable Bahraini school boys to apply 
for jobs which required technical skills. The education system which had 
undergone certain changes failed to satisfy the parents of the school- 
graduates who expected higher financial rewards for their children. With 
the Oil Company becoming the chief employer in the country, the 
Administration of Bahrain felt responsible for introducing better 
technical training. Yet again we can see that reforms in one sphere 
generated demands for change elsewhere and the wish of the Government of 
India to limit the extent and scope of reforms became impossible to achieve. 
It might be said that oil from the new wells in Bahrain lubricated more 
than the engines of foreign cars.
The Government of Bahrain was not willing to shoulder direct 
responsibility for education prior to '1929-3 0, apart from giving out some 
subsidies towards the cost of running a few schools. The schools were 
run by committees, some of whose members, despite their good intentions, 
were lacking in knowledge or experience. These committees ran the 
schools until 1930 when the Government took over direct responsibility.
There was a gap of about nine years between the institution of the first 
Sunni Boys* School in 1919 and the first ShiCah School in 1928, during 
which time education was subjected to separate and uneven development, 
negatively affecting the Baharnah boys and girls. There was also a delay 
of about one decade between the creation of the first Boys * School in 
1919 and the introduction of the first class for girls in 1927, and a
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girls' school in 1928.
As early as 1929-30, the Administration voiced its unease about the 
impact on Bahraini boys of pan-Arab ideas, v/hich had already affected 
students in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad and Beirut, and which were beginning 
remotely to influence Bahrain too. The serious implications of these 
ideas v/ere stressed by the British Director of Education in his report 
of 1939? v/ith which the Adviser was in full agreement. What both men 
failed to take into consideration was that Bahrainis v/ere also Arabs and 
to share the aspirations of the Arab World was not alien to their minds.
From 1939 to 19^3 education was subjected to direct British control. 
As a result the annual allocations for education increased from sixty 
thousand rupees in 133^ (1937-38) to over one lakh of rupees in 1337 
(1938«39)i and to over four lakhs in 136^ (19^3“^6). The v/hole system 
v/as overhauled, a new Technical School v/as opened, primary education v/as 
reorganized, secondary level instruction v/as introduced for the first 
time, and extra emphasis was laid on school health services. Technical 
education v/as further developed during the years 19^ +1 ”^3? under a new 
British Principal with previous experience in Iraq. Among the problems 
encountered was difficulty of recruiting staff for the Technical School 
and the purchase of equipment during the War.
Between 1920 and 19^5 therefore Bahrain experienced a series of 
important changes. Political and administrative reforms began to alter 
the institutional structure of Shaikhly rule. Gradually some long­
standing abuses were rectified and modern administrative practices were 
introduced. In these areas Bahrain was certainly ahead of the other 
Arab Shaikhdoms of the Gulf. The path of change v/as not a smooth one 
and with the devastating decline of the pearl trade Bahrain faced economic 
ruin. Salvation came in the shape of a new industry - oil. The demands 
of that industry generated further economic and social change, and the 
new wealth helped Bahrain through the difficult years of the Second V/orld
War* By this time new political ideas were beginning to affect even 
the traditional societies of Arabia* The process of educational reform, 
and the new international ties generated by both the oil industry and the 
relocation of the air route from the Persian littoral, helped to bring 
on new ideas and new contacts. It is arguable that Bahrain was fortunate 
in having begun the process of change before oil revenues began to .flow*
For when they increased sharply after the Second World War, Bahrain already 
had some experience of change and had already begun to abandon traditional 
ways of rule. The power of the ruling family was certainly preserved 
~ indeed it may even have been enhanced because of oil revenues » but the 
benefits of modernity were being shared by many citizens, and because the 
population was so small no large group was excluded from these benefits.
The experience of reform and economic change in the 1920s and 1930s 
certainly gave hope for the future.
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